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Research Articles

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Die Umdrehung der Werte: The Ambivalent Intellectual Relationship between Georg Simmel and Max Scheler

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Abstract

This paper explores the intellectual and the biographical relationship between Georg Simmel (1858-1918) and Max Scheler (1874-1928). This topic has been examined through correspondences, direct and indirect references, as well as investigations in the Munich Archive (Bayersiche Staatsbibliothek – BSB). Simmel and Scheler lived in Berlin in the early twentieth century, so they shared the German Jahrhundertwende "Zeitgeist" and many fascinations, anxieties, hopes, and feelings. Scheler was Simmel's pupil (Berliner Humboldt Universität) in 1895, but they were destined to meet again and again. Simmel attended some of Scheler's lectures as he searched for his theoretical path. Their roots of reciprocal influence also spanned many indirect interests and they developed personal acquaintance. There are many similarities and affinities in Simmel's and Scheler's work, that behind the reciprocal effect of their respective intellectual work hide an undeniable and unavoidable ambivalence. They converge on many topics (the cultural and moral analysis of values, the rediscovery of "emotional" issues in the foundation of social and cultural theory, the historical and anthropological interests, etc.), even though their respective philosophical and sociological findings were quite different. Scheler's "essentialist" position, in opposition to some Simmelian "functionalism" (i.e. relationalism), does not detract from the mighty importance of Simmel's unique approach, which brought a breath of novelty to both philosophical and sociological fields through its eclectic and innovative inquiry into modernity and from Scheler's new phenomenological

* I am very grateful to Prof. Dr. Wolfhart Henckmann (i.R. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München), Prof. Dr. Horst Helle (em. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München), Prof. Sergio Belardinelli (Università di Bologna), Prof. Guido Cusinato (Università di Verona), Prof. Leonardo Allodi (Università di Bologna), Dr. Caterina Zanfi (Bergische Universität Wuppertal) for their invaluable suggestions and exchanges in the last months. I would like also to thank the Bayersiche Staatsbibliothek in Munich for facilitating and supporting my archive researches.

approach. The interaction between Simmel and Scheler was certainly significant for both of them, surely for defining and clarifying their own philosophy of culture as well as their anthropological and sociological achievements.

Keywords: Simmel, Scheler, sociology, anthropology, Lebensphilosophie

1. The Simmel-Scheler Milieu

The first aim of this paper is to sketch the biographical and intellectual relationship between Georg Simmel (1858-1918) and Max Scheler (1874-1928). It explores the mutual influence of two of the most meaningful *maître à penser* of the twentieth century: no one can deny how deep and wide has been the legacy of their thought within the philosophy of culture as well as any sociological field.

I must admit that from the very beginning this aim appeared as a challenge rather than a real research task. Reconstructing the "mutual action" [*Wechselwirkung*], to use a central Simmelian phrase, which two intellectuals trigger, is not a simple matter. It is no coincidence that the last work in this regard (one of the few) goes back more than twenty years (Hübner-Funk 1995)[1]. This partly depends on the bibliographic and biographical data available, and partly on the "neglected affinities"[2] that they shared. In Schelerian interpretation of Simmel's thought, some topics addresses an authentic comparison, equipped by systematic quotations, but elsewhere a strong criticism also emerges.

Both Simmel and Scheler did not have a "school"[3] *stricto sensu* (Lukàcs 1958 [1918]), although if the impact of their intellectual work on their contemporaries was very significant. They had, however, actually pupils, and this certainly reflects their influence: both of them died prematurely, Simmel (in 1918) after the recent achievement of a stable academic position in Straßbourg, Scheler (in 1928) after the call to the University of Frankfurt (and after a series of intricate events due to his former academic experience in München).

It is possible to gather some traces about the relationship between Simmel and Scheler from direct sources (the texts to which they refer or mention to each other), from

letters (that involve them more or less directly), and through the intellectual profiles of authors who personally met and dealt with both of them. This is, for example, the case of Karl Wolfskehl and Sigfried Kracauer, whose intellectual profile were strongly influenced by the Simmelian-Schelerian double ancestry. Theodor Adorno reported:

> [Kracauer] is linked to Georg Simmel and Max Scheler […] He knew both of them well privately. Simmel, of whom he wrote a study, advised him to go over completely to philosophy. Not only did he train his ability with him to interpret specific substantial phenomena in relation to that which – according to that conception – appears mainly here in the way of the general structures […] Simmel's influence on him was really more at the level of a gesture of thought then of an elective affinity to an irrationalist philosophy of life (Adorno 1974, 391-392)[4].

Max Scheler and Georg Simmel met for the first time in Berlin in the spring of 1895. At that time, Simmel was a *Privatdozent* at Alexander von Humboldt Universität: he mostly lectured philosophy (moral Philosophy) and sociology. Max Scheler, who was 21 and came from the University of Munich (as a student of medicine and biology), enrolled in Berlin for one year only as a student of philosophy, psychology, medicine, and sociology. The Berlin experience was short but crucial in the path of Scheler's definitive "conversion" to the philosophical studies. Scheler completed in fact his studies (in philosophy under Eucken's guidance) at the University of Jena in 1897[5].

During Scheler's first period in Berlin, Simmel lectured on various subjects, including *Sociologie [mit Berücksichtigung der Geschichte der Familie]* and *Neueste philosophische Theorien [Theorien der letzten dreißig Jahre]*, and for a wider audience (269 people) entitled *Ueber den Pessimismus [insbesondere den Schopenhauerschen]*. In the summer semester of 1895 Simmel began lecturing on Kantian philosophy (*Die Philosophie Kant's*) and social psychology (*Social Psychologie mit Berücksichtigung des Sozialismus*). During the winter semester of 1895/96, the period in which Scheler attended Simmel's classes (Henckmann 1998, 17)[6], the Berlin sociologist lectured on the *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie [von Descartes bis zur Gegenwart]*, *Sociologie*, and on the *Ethik [mit Berücksichtigung der Probleme des modernen*

Lebens] (Köhnke 1996, 198). During these years Simmel strongly aspired to the ethics chair at Humboldt University, a position that was previously held by Georg von Gizycki († 1895). The inner academic dynamics favored the candidate Max Dessoir, thanks to Dilthey's strong ancestry (Köhnke 1996, 361).

At the time, the great "light" of philosophy in Berlin was indeed Wilhelm Dilthey, and Scheler attended some of his lessons. It is noteworthy that in the *fin de siècle* metropolis of Berlin Simmel and Scheler were destined to encounter each other again, and in more meaningful ways and occasions, namely within those intellectual salons that came to life around the figure of the poet Stefan George[7]. Simmel's and Scheler's common friendship with Ernst (and Friedrich) Gundolf and Karl Wolfskehl, whom Scheler met on such occasions, decisively revealed Scheler's aesthetic tendencies. George's "heroic" poetics fits very well with the great influence that Nietzsche's philosophy had on both Simmel and Scheler during the last decade of the nineteenth century. From Nietzsche's radically skeptical and tragic conception on the fate of the Western culture (more particularly, the effects of the rationalistic modernization and the progressive conflict with the "mediocrity" of Western mass society, as well as the speculations on the *ressentiment* theme), both Simmel and Scheler forcefully responded, embracing *Lebensphilosophie* as a possible antidote to the increasing *Kulturpessimismus* of the early twentieth century (Belardinelli 1992; Lichtblau 1996)[8]. Gundolf and Simmel are cited not coincidently together by Scheler in an explanatory passage of the essay *Vorbilder und Führer* (1911), particularly in the chapter *Der Genius in der Sphäre der (Welt)-Erkenntnis*,

> The task of phenomenology with regard to poetry is the uncovering of the phenomenological structure of the poetic world (such as Gundolf, Simmel.) Poetry and philosophy are united by the structure of worldview (Scheler 2000, 329)[9].

Within the frame of the Schelerian aesthetic theory, the poet-figure was considered as the artist of the "inner world" [*der Kunstler der Innenwelt*] and Scheler referred to Simmel's *Goethe* to explain this concept:

> True poetry teaches us - far beyond the content of poetry - to experience it in all its forms, to grasp the most immediate of our emotional activity - to grasp the most immediate of our spiritual activities - the soul as it grows, the soul as it experiences (Scheler 2000, 336)[10].

Georg Simmel's son Hans also reported in detail some anecdotes on the *George-Kreis*. He lists many followers of Jewish origins, including: "[...] Karl Wolfskehl, Freidrich and his brother Ernst, Arthur Salz, Ernst Morwitz, my father [Georg Simmel], and others like Max Weber, Reinhold Lepsius, Paul Verlaine, Bohringer [...] who frequented the salons of the *George-Kreis* in Berlin in the years 1903-1904" (Simmel* 2008, 58). It is well-known that Georg Simmel focused on George's aesthetical portrait in the essay *Stefan George. Eine kunstphilosophische Studie* (1901)[11] and then he dedicated the second (1905) and the third (1907) edition of the volume *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie* to his friend-poet (Simmel 2008, 316-317).

2. Scheler's stays in Berlin (1909-1916)

A privileged point of view for the reconstruction of the biographical and intellectual relations between Simmel and Scheler can certainly be the correspondences. Much of this material has been lost (Simmel 2008: 1026 [*Editorischer Bericht*]), but what has been collected in the recent decades, thanks to the valuable philological and bibliographical work by Otthein Rammtedt within the *Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe*, has provided scholars an indispensable means for their research.

It is well-known that Scheler lectured in Jena until 1906, when he moved to the predominantly Roman Catholic University of Munich (more precisely, he lectured since December 21, 1906 as *Privatdozent*, after his *Umhabilitation*). In 1910, after he was publicly accused of adultery by a Munich newspaper, Scheler sued for libel but lost, and the University of Munich canceled his teaching contract. He moved to Göttingen, where he lectured in coffeehouses and other private venues. From 1910 to 1919, he would have to earn a living as a private scholar, lecturer and freelance writer. Because Scheler was forbidden to teach in German Universities, his lectures would

often have to be held in hotel rooms rented by his close friend Dietrich von Hildebrand. In this period Scheler frequently moved from Göttingen to Berlin, and vice versa.

In a letter written on February 6,1909 Simmel wrote to Karl Wolfskehl[12] referring to Scheler's scarce bibliographic achievements and the "material difficulties" he was experiencing at the time (Simmel 2008, 684). Indeed, in those years Scheler - beyond some reviews and the *Habilitationsschrift* "Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode", written under the aegis of Rudolf Eucken in 1899 and published in 1900 - was far removed from the scientific-academic point of view (Scheler 1971, 420ff.). In this letter, Simmel implicitly referred to the scandal that impeded Scheler the *venia legendi* at the University of Munich ("*der Fall Furtwängler*"), and also talked about a sum of money that he would have collected for his benefit. We have a real and more detailed consistency of this sum in a successive letter (March 8,1909) that Simmel addressed again to Wolfskehl, which stated that Simmel's "personal contribution" to Scheler amounted to 1500 marks (Simmel 2008, 691-692)[13]. In a letter to Margarete von Bendemann (March 22, 1909), Scheler was mentioned as was Ernst Bloch (Simmel 2008, 693), who, beyond commonly attending Simmel's lessons in Berlin, had previously shared some academic years with Scheler in Munich (between 1905 and 1906[14]).

A new letter to Wolfskehl on April 13, 1909 referenced an unequivocal request from Simmel, who sought him as an intermediary for Scheler, in regard to the support [*Hilfsaktion*] in his favor, since "[...*Scheler's*] difficulties – not exclusively economic – had exacerbated" (Simmel 2008, 695). Henckmann wrote about this Scheler's difficult period:

> Scheler reichte 1907 eine Scheidungsklage ein, zog sie aber kurz darauf wieder zurück. 1908 gab er die häusliche Gemeinschaft mit Amélie endgültig auf. Als diese erfuhr, daß er sich wenige Wochen nach der Trennung auf ein Verhältnis mit einer jüngeren Frau eingelassen hatte, für die er außerdem großzügig Geld ausgegeben haben soll, während er ihr gegenüber vorgab, die Alimente für seinen 1905 geborenen Sohn Wolfgang nicht oder nicht pünktlich zahlen zu können, verwandelte sich ihr verletzter Stolz in einen ungehemmten Vernichtungswillen (Henckmann 1998, 21-22).

In these years Simmel attempted, thanks to key figures of Margarete Susman and Gerturd Kantorowitz, to introduce Henri Bergson's philosophy within the *George-Kreis* in Berlin (Zanfi 2013, 86ff.; Fitzi 2002). Bergson's philosophy would have played a strong influence on Scheler, who really appreciated the translation into the German language as a valuable contribution for the scientific community[15].

A new letter addressed to Wolfskehl (December 6, 1909) reported another one episode related to the Simmel-Scheler biographical relationship (Simmel 2008: 737): the Berliner sociologist talked about a "very unpleasant experience" [*eigentümliches negatives Erlebnis*] referring to Scheler. This letter referred of a together planned voyage in Italy for the autumn 1909. Scheler did not reply to some insistent letters. Simmel then asked Wolfskehl for further news about Scheler, and admonished him for his rudeness and lack of respect [*Unhöflichkeit und Rücksichtslosigkeit*].

In February, 19 of 1911, Simmel addressed a letter to Edmund Husserl: after mentioning his two recent volumes *Hauptprobleme der Philosophie* (a copy of which was sent with the letter) and *Philosophische Kultur* (in forthcoming press), Simmel asked Husserl for news about Scheler. He precisely asked for "his *modus vivendi* and his plans" (Simmel 2008, 941). As known, the "fatal" encounter between Scheler and Husserl (during an editorial meeting of the "Kant-Studien" review) dates back to January 1902: this was surely fatal for Scheler, since he had finally found a philosophical solution within the debate on the *Methodenstreit* between neo-Kantians and psychologists (Amori 2010, 32ff.). The Husserlian phenomenology must have seemed to Scheler's eyes a kind of "*lapis philosophorum*", offering a new perspective of studies (he always refers to phenomenology as a new fundamental "approach") and research in the epistemological field. The influence of Phenomenology in Scheler's work is very complex, as Mancuso recently underlined (Mancuso 2007)[16]. Scheler found in Husserl a new intellectual guide, as well as Husserl considered him as one of the most promising of his epigones. After the episodes related to the loss of the *venia legendi* at the University of Munich in 1910, Scheler privately lectured in the

winter semester 1910-11 in the "phenomenological" city of Göttingen (Husserl 1994: 407).

In regard to Simmel's voyage to Göttingen, planned in April of 1913, a new letter to Husserl (March 2, 1913) mentioned Scheler. Simmel particularly mentioned an interesting series of seminars that he would attend (Simmel 2008a, 169; Mader 1980, 42ff.).

Scheler had moved back to Berlin in 1912[17] and, as referenced by the testimony of Michael Landmann, Arthur Stein and Simmel, who attended his courses, Simmel had a powerful reaction, especially in relation to Scheler's talk titled *Aufsatz über die Lebensphilosophie* (Landmann 1976, 272). We find confirmation of Simmel's attendance at Scheler's lectures[18] in some Hermann Schmalenbach's remembrances of Simmel (Gassen and Landmann 1958, 213).

Scheler addressed a letter to Husserl from Berlin on March 12, 1913. Simmel (beside the name of Renach) was mentioned in this letter that contained some topics of a conference in Berlin held at the *Kantgesellschaft*. Husserl was invited to speak (Husserl 1994a, 216-217). He could not participate due to the concomitance of the publication of the volume *Ideen I*. In this letter Scheler referred of the circulation and proliferation of phenomenological thought, and he mentioned Nicolai Hartmann (and the *Marburger Schule*), Frischeisen-Köhler (the "Dilthey-Schule"), and some scientific reviews ("Logos"). He then wrote: "Von Simmel hoffe ich sehr, daß er in einer allgemeinen Zeitschrift sich zu der Sache äussert. Er erhielt ja auch meine hiesigen Vorträge einen besseren Begriff von der Sache" (Husserl 1994a, 217).

In Strasbourg Simmel's new city of residence, he finally became a Professor Ordinarius. He then wrote a postcard to Scheler (September 3, 1915), asking him to meet in nearby in Heidelberg (Simmel 2008a, 556). Simmel informed Freidrich Gundolf in a successive letter (September 5, 1915) of the same intentions. A new request for their meeting was sent to Scheler on September 18, 1915, in which Simmel implicitly referred to his forthcoming intellectual commitments (Simmel 2008a, 558). These commitments included his participation in the Wiener Urania program "Kriegsvorträge in Wien", a conference on the

second year of the First World War: Paul Deussen, Hugo von Hoffmansthal, Ernst Troeltsch, and Simmel were some of the most noted invited speakers.

In a new letter dated October 6, 1915, Simmel congratulated Scheler for the publication of the book *Abhandlungen und Aufsätze*[19] and for good review on it that appeared on the "Frankfurter Zeitung" by Max Böhm (Simmel 2008a, 562)[20]. In Scheler's *Zur Idee des Menschen* (1913) Simmel was mentioned in relation to the concept of "person" that emerges from the pages of the Simmelian essay *Die Persönlichkeit Gottes* (1911), and later collected in the volume *Philosophische Kultur* (Simmel 1996: 349-366), and then in relation to the concept of God – Scheler directly mentioned Simmel's words (Simmel 1996: 354). In *Abhandlungen und Aufsätze* (1915), Simmel's name appeared several times: it was mentioned in *Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen* (Scheler 1915, Bd I, 64 et seq.), and then again in references to Simmel's *Phiolsophie des Geldes* in the Schelerian essay *Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis* (Scheler 1915, Bd. 2, 129); and finally a reference to Simmel in the essay *Zum Sinn der Frauenbewegung* (Scheler 1915, Bd. 2, 278).

In the letter to Husserl, written on March 8, 1916, Scheler referred to Simmel, this time about his possible call to Heidelberg on the chair previously occupied by Emil Lask, who died on May 26, 1915:

> Seit ich (wie ich Ihnen unter Diskretion sage) aber hörte, daß bei Gelegenheit von Fakultätsbsprechungen über dei Besetzung des Lask'schen Lehrstuhles mein Name gennant wurde, schreckt mich das peinliche Gefühl zurück, wie ein Wartender auszusehen, wenn ich mich dort niederlasse. Simmel der, z.Z<t>. hier ist, meint, er könne hilfen, diesen Eindruck zu beseitigen. Nun – wir werde sehen (Husserl 1994a, 229).

3. Simmel's influence on Scheler's work

Simmel's books were quite apparent in Scheler's personal library. From an investigation in the Munich Archive (*Bayersiche Staatsbibliothek* – BSB), which preserves Scheler's *Nachlaß*, significant elements emerge in this regard. Simmel's volumes that were held by Scheler included: *Die Religion*

(1906), *Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie* (1905), *Hauptprobleme der Philosophie* (1910), *Henri Bergson* (1914), *Kant. Sechszehn Vorlesungen gehalten an der Berliner Universität* (1918), *Lebensanschauung. Vier metaphysischer Kapitel* (1918), *Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur* (1918), *Grundfragen der Soziologie. Individuum und Gesellschaft* (1920). In many of these works, Scheler had underlined propositions and added marginal annotations (sometimes highly colorful), which enlighten us how intensively he read Simmel. In the volume *Lebensanschauung. Vier metaphysische Kapitel* [BSB München: ANA 315 G 2 1851] there are pencil marks in different parts of the chapter titled "Tod und Unsterblichkeit". Scheler had dedicated an essay to the "Unsterblichkeit", which he never published indeed [ANA 315 CA IX 29, A 1-6]. Many underlines can also be found in *Hauptprobleme der Philosophie* [ANA 315 G 2 1378], *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie* [ANA 315 G 2 200], *Philosophische Kultur* [ANA 315 G 2 200] and in *Die Religion* [ANA 315 G 2 45]. In *Die Religion* Scheler often approved of Simmel's words (with a "gut!" or a "sehr gut!"), as well as in *Philosophische Kultur* (especially in the chapters *Das Relative und das Absolute im Geschlechter-Problem* and *Die Persönlichkeit Gottes*), but notes were also found that showed disapproval with a clear "nein!".

In the volume *Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel* Nikolas Spykman maintained that Georg Simmel had a great impact on many intellectual in the early twentieth century, and he wrote about Scheler and Simmel:

> Simmel had a great influence on the numerous students who passed beneath his touch during his thirty years of teaching. But he made no school in the narrow sense of term [...] Wiese and Scheler in Cologne and the "Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie" have definitely accepted Simmel's views regarding the study of sociology (Gassen and Landmann 1958: 186-187).

Ludwig Marcuse considered Simmel's contribution as indispensable to authors such as "Ziegler, Ortega y Gasset, Spranger, Jung, Spengler and Scheler", with particular reference to Simmel's reflections on the "*Lebensmetaphysik*" (Gassen and Landmann 1958, 191). Erich Przywara argued

that three important Jewish thinkers, Simmel, Husserl, and Scheler, were the "initiators" of innovative researches in the twentieth century. He indicated that Simmel had given new philosophical meaning and impulses with his text, influencing the philosophers Romano Guardini and Martin Heidegger. He credited that Husserl as being as a methodological renewer in all fields of knowledge. Furthermore, he indicated that Scheler was an innovator in the field of anthropology, psychology, and ethics (Gassen and Landmann 1958, 224-225; 227). Karl Berger, who lead "kunstwissenschaftliche Studien" in Berlin in 1908-1909 and then moved to Munich, recalled a meaningful anecdote. If someone asked him what is the newest philosophical foundation in ethics, he would replied with a smile: "Ich würde sie Max Scheler als dem an-ethischen Menschen *kat'exochen* anvertrauen" (Gassen and Landmann 1958, 247).

The depth of Simmel's influence on Scheler's studies emerges in his bibliographical productions. The first occurrence of Simmel in Scheler's works appears in the *Habilitationsschrift*: "Die transzendentale und psychologische Methode" (1900). In a phase still strongly influenced by Eucken, and due to the philosophical *mileu* inquiring into epistemological issues, the *Habilitationsschrift* was inscribed in the so-called "Methodenstreit". This involved the intellectual forces in the determination of a "place" of philosophy, namely as epistemology, and, more specifically, in order to clarify the inquiry subject and method within the *Geiteswissenschaften*. The Darwinian theory (and the echo that generated in various fields of culture) certainly was considered by Scheler to be very worthy and interesting. Among the various authors who were influenced by Darwin's theory, Scheler mentioned Simmel:

> Simmel applied his theory to the epistemology and he considered the truth as the characteristic of the ideas that best adapted to the environment, while others announced, with trumpet blasts, a new ethic based on that theory (Scheler 1971, 209)[21].

Scheler's competence and cognition on Simmelian studies were not at all superficial. Scheler knew not only Simmel's main volumes, which were published prior 1900, i.e. *Über sociale Differenzierung* (1890), *Die Probleme der*

Geschichtsphilosophie (1892), and *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft* (1892-93), but also the so-called "secondary literature" that Simmel produced in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Scheler specifically cited Simmel's scientific article *Über eine Beziehung der Selektionslehre zur Erkenntnistheorie*, which was published in the journal 'Archiv für systematische Philosophie' (edited by Ludwig Stein and Paul Natorp), Neue Folge, Bd. I, Heft 1 (1895). This article argued for an "evolutionization" of the Kantian *a priori* (Karlsruhen 2001): in this phase Simmelian thought was still strongly influenced by Spencerian suggestions, which socially and culturally reverberated in the concept of "differentiation". Notable developments and argumentations on these assertions could be found in the double volume *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft* that Simmel had published a short time previously.

Scheler quoted Simmel in a note, referring to an article of 1897, in relation to the analysis of the "principle of causality". He reported what Simmel considered a solution to the question – whether to consider the "subsumption" of this principle from an aprioristic normativity or whether to bring it back to the dimension of the Kantian judgment of experience:

> In the first volume of *Kantstudien* (1897), pp. 416ff., Simmel has attempted in his essay "On the Difference of Perceptions and Experiences" the sharpness of this either/or by the assumption of a gradual transition between the a priori synthetic Judgment and the judgment of experience. Since apriority and necessity necessarily belong together in Kant, it would also be necessary to establish consistent degrees of apriority, which (at least on the Kantian premises) is not pursuable (Scheler 1971, 249)[22].

The question of causality was then tackled by Scheler when the causality principle was analyzed and applied in the *Kulturwissenschaften*, and particularly in the "historic studies". This provided significant evidence that Scheler listed Simmel among the neo-Kantians of Baden:

> In agreement with Schopenhauer, who alleges that the methodological principles of a science could only be derived from their real work, but in contradiction to it, that the mental fixation of laws is an essential characteristic of scientific knowledge, Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, conclude that history already in its present state of art is a science, and that accordingly there must be

> two kinds of science, "sciences of law" and "sciences of events" (Scheler 1971, 304)[23].

In the second edition of *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (1923), Scheler referred again to Simmel, particularly looking at the essays *Fragment über die Liebe* (posthumous 1922) and *Lebensanschauung* (1918)[24]. Scheler's wide critique on sympathy in his book was primarily aimed at the theories of sympathy that he considered inadequate: 1. *Descriptive and genetic Psychology* (Hume, Darwin, Spencer, Lipps, Wundt, etc.), since sympathy cannot be reduced or referred to as psycho-physiological causes of the phenomenon; 2. *Metaphysical Systems*: while recognizing the originality of affective phenomena and the central question of sympathy, many philosophical systems were not exhaustive on the theme of identity and essential difference of "persons". Among the authors in this field we find both "metaphysicians of life" (Schopenhauer, Bergson and Simmel) and the so-called *Geiststheoretiker* (Hegel, von Hartmann, Driesch, and Becher).

In this volume, Scheler had with Simmel a real and concrete dispute, since Simmel's fragment on love was a valuable methodological example of an "emotional" analysis with an underlying sociological and philosophical meaning. Scheler refused to reduce the "love" to the pure function of an interaction, as Simmel supports, and he particularly argues:

> Love as such, as a pure function, never errs and is never deceived, so long as man does not deceive himself as to its presence, its genuineness, or concerning its object. Nor does it err or deceive itself even in those cases referred to in Georg Simmel's profound but very one-sided *Fragmente uber die Liebe*, where it seeks existence only for its own sake, as "pure feeling", and seems merely to make artful use of biological sex-differences and the automatic tensions which result therefrom, in order to engender itself and to irradiate the soul. For here it enters only into an earth-bound relationship, a union, for instance, in which the racial energies are in decline, and for this very reason it is constrained to sterility. For love as such seeks to produce a "nobler race", and this being impossible here, its very providence will at least hinder and restrain such men from mere reproduction of their kind and from handing on their hereditary taint still further to a distant posterity. But we must not follow Simmel in treating this "negative instance" as a norm; it is only a border-line case of love, to be taken instead as the marginal *exception*, which does but prove our rule. Simmel supposes that love resembles justice and the arts, which

> first sprang entirely from vital needs and motives, and continued to serve these purposes (in an objective sense) for centuries, only for a "reversal" [*Umdrehung*] to take place in which life and its energies came, in their turn, to subserve these spiritual values for their own sake. So lovemaking also, even to the kiss and the sexual act, is supposed to have originated in the course of evolution for the objective purpose of procreation, but thereafter to have emancipated itself into an independent value which now commands life to its service. But such a notion is too simple and too ingenious to be true as well. The converse theory has also been put forward by believers in a 'rationalization' of the will to propagate, for instance, by H. Grotjahn. But such analogies-Simmel's deeper one, no less than the more superficial ideas of Grotjahn, have no real justification. Against Simmel it must be said that in the last phase of his 'philosophy of life' (approached by way of Bergson), he completely misconceived the primordial nature of *spirit*, and the objects, meanings and values appropriate to it. Nor, indeed, is it correct to maintain, as Simmel does, that pure art, pure knowledge (i.e. philosophical, rather than positive scientific knowledge), justice, ethical norms of a more general kind and even the disposition of the individual, were ever developed out of "life", or were originally fostered and cultivated in the service of organic drives and needs. The original confines of the development of the spirit, its limited apprehension of meaning and value, may well have been progressively enlarged, in the course of human evolution, by the effect of organic drives and wants in giving direction to its aspirations; but the activity of the spirit has. Everywhere and at all times followed its *own original laws*, and its objects of meaning and value have always been sublimely *elevated* above all that relates to life as such (Scheler 2007, 113-114).

Scheler criticized Simmel and his "romantic" idea of (sexual) love[25], that substantially hides the false twofold mechanism of "the materialization of the spirit and the spiritualization of the material" [*die false Versinnlichung des Geistes und die falsche Vergeistigung des Sinnlichen*], and the subjectivism of his *Lebensphilosophie*. Simmel considered life as the new metaphysical center of any reflection and the very ontological issue in any field of culture. Life generates "forms" and then they rebel against it in some kind of "reversal" [*Umdrehung*] *sui generis*: Scheler found this statement by Simmel very incoherent. Scheler's foundation of the emotional theory was based indeed on the "objectivity" of values and emotions: they orient life and have their own ontological status.

We entirely reject metaphysical biologism, i.e. the conception of ultimate reality, in the manner of Bergson,

Simmel, Lodge and others, as itself an *élan vital* or life-principle, or as the life or soul of the universe. For neither in its knowing, intuiting and thinking capacity, nor in its emotional and volitional one, is Spirit, or "noûs", an outcome or "sublimation" of life. The modes in which cognition operates can nowhere be traced back to the bio-psychical pattern found in processes of the automatic and objectively goal-seeking type; each obeys laws of it own. Nor, again, are cognitive, ethical or aesthetic values subordinate varieties of biological value (Scheler 2007, 74-75).

Scheler also criticized Simmel due to the indistinction between "life" [*Leben*] and "spirit" [*Geist*]. This issue would be further deepened in Scheler's late work, particularly his masterpiece *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (1928). Simmel's "original romanticism" explained this indistinction: "Simmel is the complete romantic at this point and is also thinking as such, endowing the spirit with a spurious vitalism, and the truly vital with an equally fictitious spirituality" (Scheler 2007, 118).

Simmel's erroneous interpretation of love recurred in the unpublished essay *Die Grundformen des Schamgefühls. Lehren von der Herkunft des Schamgefühls* (1913). Scheler tackled there the *coquetterie* issue, as it emerges in Simmel's famous homonymous essay within *Philsophische Kultur* (1911):

> Simmel brings the coquetry - quite erroneously, as it seems to us - to sexual *love*, even to the well-known Platonic definition, and he finds in it a variety of surrenders and failures. But coquetry has nothing to do with sex love. It completely lies in the sphere of the *instincts*, and is far less mysterious than Simmel thinks. Above all, Simmel seems to me disregarding that it is not really a *genuine* home expression of "*something*" (for instance, of surrenders and failures, i.e. a *mental* processes), but only a rhythm of the movement that expresses nothing at all. Particularly, it is not a genuine surrender impulse and only apparent failure - this would at least be closer to the shame. See G. Simmel, 'Die Koketterie' in 'Philosophische Kultur', Leipzig 1911" (Scheler 2000, 104)[26].

The release of *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die material Werethik* (1913, 1916) represented an important turning point in Scheler's intellectual activity. The critique of

the Kantian moral paradigm flourished beside the "foundation" [*Grundlegung*] of ethics on the basis of new presuppositions: "emotional intuitionism" and "material apriorism" (Scheler 2009,14). As Scheler himself clarified in the preface to the second edition of *Der Formalismus*, the rigorous personalism is strictly related to the doctrine of an "individual and objectively valid good" and of the individual "moral destination" [*sittlichen Bestimmung*] of each person (Scheler 2009, 15). In the eyes of an Orthodox Kantian, this might seem to be a contradiction in terms (the conceptual coupling of individual/objectivity, individual/legality): rather Scheler treats these concepts in a systematic manner.

In the distinction between "ideal ought" [*ideal Sollen*] and "value" [*Wert*], Scheler demonstrated the relationship of dependence and derivation of the former from the second (but never the opposite). The *ideal Sollen* always has a relationship with the sphere of values, and meaning the obligation as "ought" precisely indicates the ontological status of the moral obligation itself with respect to the value. In this Scheler referred to Simmel's work *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft* (1892-93), where he *in nuce* glimpsed a theoretical formulation (Scheler 2013, 409 [241]).

Simmel furnished important intuitions to Scheler in order to clarify the relationship between individual and moral ought. Simmel's volume *Das individuelle Gesetz. Ein Versuch über das Prinzip der Ethik* (1913), quoted by Scheler in his book and defined as a "very instructive essay", was the starting point for a deepening of the (individual) moral obligation based on experience and on the "material apriorism" (Scheler 2009, 481).

In the essay *Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart* (1922)[27] Scheler asserted:

> In a closer association with the two Kantian schools there was also *Georg Simmel*, who from an initially more positivistic mindset over the Kantian issues finally managed to a "philosophy of life", the result of which he published in his posthumous "Lebensanschauung. Four metaphysical chapter". The essay "About Death" is the deepest and most mature of what this peculiar thinker, inspiring far beyond the German borders, wrote. His essay on "The Individual Law", in which, like Schleiermacher (and in his "Ethics"), he attempted to demonstrate the evidence of "individualized values", i.e. the

> *individual* moral *destiny* of man, in addition to "universal moral ones", has greatly enhanced ethics. His last "philosophy of life", suggested by Bergson, which remains dark, indefinite, and confused, cannot be admitted with equal applause (Scheler 2005, 291)[28].

Scheler's strong reference to the individual sphere within the "essential" value recognition did not pass through a formalistic, i.e. rationalistic, foundation of the Kantian *Sollen* – the "doctrine of the necessary universality of duty". It found in Simmel an important intellectual precursor. However, Scheler deviated from the Simmelian theoretical scheme (exposed in the essay *Das individuelle Gesetz*). He underlined the limits of the individualistic subjectivism, and claimed the dual character of the material theory of Schelerian ethics, which asserted, on the one hand the *objective content of the value* (the good in itself), on the other hand it maintained the *essential value of the person* (Scheler 2013, 945 [482]).

Scheler thus clarified a fundamental aspect of the relationship between individuals' "lived experience" [*Erlebnis*] and values, which directly concerns some reflections developed by Simmel in relation to his theory of religion. The Schelerian theory is in sharp contrast with the Simmelian theory on this topic. According to Scheler, the value is always the *telos* and the goal of any "living experience" [*Erleben*]. The relationship between value and *Erleben* is always determined by the orientation of the second one toward the first one, and never of a filiation or generation of the value from the *Erlebnis* (as Simmel, on the contrary, argues). In Simmel's theory of "religiosity", the content of religion seems to derive from a particular emotional connotation of humankind. It is derived from "optimism", from a particular anthropological "feeling" (or from an authentic worldview), whereas religion represents a crystallized and institutionalized formation of it. This Simmelian scheme reverberated in all of his last writings (on the *Leben* topic), in which the cultural forms are nothing more than temporary "stations" of the subjective mind that created them and needs to follow them to recognize each other[29].

In the volume *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* (1921) Scheler was strongly critical toward Simmel, particularly in the chapter "Der religiöse Akt", in which he confuted the

sociologist for reducing religious life to a simple kind of "apprehension" of any content. Simmel would have shifted the emphasis on the subjective aspect of religious experience, reducing the idea of God to a simple "related" noun (Scheler 2009, 619 et seq., GW V, 240 et seq.).

The Simmelian distinction between religion and religiosity is well known as well as the extent to which the latter is affected by the *lebensphilosophische* considerations and reflection in Simmel last works. Religiosity was described as "the whole existence expressed in a particular tonality" or as a "modality of the soul of living and experience the world" (Simmel 1989, 53; 113; 133). Scheler accused Simmel of an identification and misunderstanding of God with the thematic nucleus of his "metaphysics of life" [*Erlebnis*], the profound force that self-creates and continuously flows. Not accidentally, Scheler mentioned this in these passages on Simmel's volume *Lebensanschauung. Vier metaphysische Kapitel* (1918), which was certainly the most important manifesto of his *Lebensphilosophie*. The Simmelian "religious subjectivism", more generally the immanent vision of religious life, did not stand according to Scheler's critics.

If on the religious issue Simmel and Scheler seemed to share a sidereal distance, the spiritual and "metaphysical" interpretation of the radical experience of the First World War by the German Empire represented an element of theoretical and aesthetic convergence. The entry into war by Germany was not considered an exclusively political choice, but both interpreted it as an occasion linked to the "German spiritual destiny". The experience of war was seen as a decisive turning point in relation to the irreversible crisis[30] that was taking place primarily from a cultural point of view in Europe. It was a fatal watershed for all European people. According to Scheler, Germany should have lead Europe against the pressure of the three "empires" (the "Eastern", the Russian and the American forces) (Scheler 1982: 153). Scheler's war writings *Der Krieg als Gesamterlebnis* (1916) and the luckier *Der Genius des Krieges und der deutsche Krieg* (1915, 1917) were very close to the Simmelian writings on war (Watier 1991, Joas and Knöbl 2013, 137). In these years Scheler and Simmel assumed a nationalist

and warlike position, which essentially united them to many German intellectuals who were blinded by some kind of an "interventionist fascination": for many of them it seemed to be a real *Kulturkampf* (Bruendel 2003; Hoeres 2004;).

Finally, in the 1926 *Leib und Seele* lectures, Scheler delivered a significant testimony to the importance of Simmel (whom he mentioned besides Eucken) in the identification of an "original category" [*Urkategorie*], explaining the spirit of the new era:

> The deceased deep German thinker Georg Simmel once said (similar to Rudolf Eucken in his basic concepts of the present) that every age has its original worldview category from which it is imbued, as the starry sky and its mechanics in the 18th century (H. von Stein). And this original category is undoubtedly today: "Life" (Scheler 1997, 135)[31].

Not so far from these thoughts, particularly in *Versuche einer Philosophie des Lebens* of 1913, Scheler had adopted Dilthey, Nietzsche and Bergson as theoretical models for the presentation of the *Lebensphilosophie* as the new interpretive paradigm of the world, or "[...] a philosophy that springs from the fullness of life, or better, from the fullness of the experience of life" (Scheler 1997a, 82).

In conclusion: due to the "ambivalent" relationship between Simmel and Scheler, the balance of an interaction [*Wechselwirkung*] between the two of them remains open and uncertain. From the direct and indirect biographical testimonies, we can infer that it is undeniable that they shared and exchanged many suggestions and reflections within different phases of their life. Equally undeniable is the mutual intellectual esteem that reverberated in their works and in the intellectual process they undertook, spreading to different speculative outcomes. This interaction was anyway fruitful for both of them: Scheler's "essentialist" position, sometimes in opposition to some Simmelian "functionalism", does not detract from the mighty importance of Simmel's unique approach, which brought a breath of novelty to both philosophical and sociological fields through its eclectic and innovative inquiry into modernity issues. Simmel's philosophy of culture, his relational approach, and also his *lebensphilosophisch* "intuitions" certainly set a precedent and represented "doctrine"

for his pupils (*lato sensu* and *stricto sensu*), and this last assertion we might state would also work with Max Scheler.

NOTES

[1] Gunderson recently tackled a particular issue in Simmel and Scheler (the problem of technology and the "value-fused analysis of technology-values relations"), even if he did not explore the genealogy of their respective mutual intellectual exchange (Gunderson 2017). He considers the modern valuation of technology in Simmel and Scheler, i.e., technology is (as an end) considered irrational because it is a reversal of the means-ends relationship and values the general development of technology instead of the potential benefits of particular technical developments.

[2] I use this locution, which is an essay title describing the "fluctuating" and ambivalent relationship between the sociologists Simmel and Weber (Faught 1985).

[3] On this topic Sibylle Hübner-Funk examines in the *incipit* of her contribution on Scheler and Simmel (Hübner-Funk 1995). Hübner-Funk's study certainly opens the path to a series of questions about the relationship between Simmel and Scheler: it reduces to a simply a report of some conceptual affinities, and it is too focused on the common Simmel-Scheler Jewish origins. This perspective risks being reductive with respect to a reciprocal influence that goes far beyond the purely religious subjects.

[4] Martin Jay refers what already Adorno mentioned above: "Encouraged by the eminent philosophers Georg Simmel and Max Scheler, with whom he was personally acquainted, Kracauer turned into philosophical and sociological analysis as a new career" (Jay 1985: 155). In this regard, see also Inka Mülder's studies on the young Kracauer (Mülder 1985: 8).

[5] Henckmann remarks on this meaningful evidence, referring to the academic experience of these years: "Die Frage nach Zusammenhang und Verhältnis der theoretischen und praktischen Kultur war ihm fast gleichzeitlich durch den Gang seiner Studien sowie eindringlicher persönlicher Lebenserfahrungen gestellt worden" (Henckmann 1998a: 18).

[6] Henckmann argues elsewhere that Scheler during the winter semester 1895/1896 would have only followed a lecture on the history of philosophy (Dilthey), and one on the social psychology (Simmel) (see Henckmann 1998a: 18).

[7] The intellectual "triangulation" George-Gundolf-Simmel is detailed by Michael Landmann (see Dahme and Rammstedt 1984: 147-173). On the *George-Kreis* impact on Middle-West culture see Wilhelmy-Dollinger 2000; Norton 2002; Karlauf 2007.

[8] Simmel clarifies in *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche* (1907) that the fundamental difference between the two philosophers lies in Nietzsche's faith in "eternity", the very remedy for pessimism, whereas Schopenhauer,

who viewed the very essence of the world (*the will to live*), defended with his "best forces" (Simmel 1995a: 188).

[9] Henceforward Scheler's English translations from the German are mine [Ruggieri], where they're not specified for English editions. The original text as follows: "Aufgabe der Phänomenologie hinsichtlich der Dichtung ist die Aufdeckung der *phänomenologischen Struktur der dichterischen Welt*. (So z.B. Gundolf, Simmel.) Dichtung und Philosophie sind durch die *Struktur des Weltanschauens* geeint"

[10] "Die wahre Dichtung lehrt uns - weit hinaus über den Gehalt der Dichtung -, überhaupt formvoll zu erleben, das Unmittelbarste unserer seelischen Betätigung zu ergreifen - die Seele als werdende, als erlebende"

[11] G. Simmel, *Stefan George. Eine kunstphilosophische Studie*, in "Neue deutsche Rundschau", 13, 1901, Heft 2 vom Februar, pp. 207-215 (now Simmel: 21-35). Simmel published a review to George's lyric collection *Der siebente Ring* (1907): G. Simmel, *Der siebente Ring*, in "Münchener neueste Nachrichten", n. 315, vom 11.07.1909. Both of Simmel's essays on Georg were published in the posthumous volume (edited by Gertrud Simmel) *Zur Philosophie der Kunst. Philosophische und Kunstphilosophische Aufsätze*, Gustav Kiepenheuer Verlag, Potsdam-Berlin 1922, (pp. 29-45 e pp. 74-78).

[12] Karl Wolfskehl (1869-1948) was a poet, dramatist, essayist, and translator. He studied German literature in Giessen, Leipzig, and Berlin. In 1893 he obtained a doctorate at the University of Giessen and began following the poet Stefan George. From 1898 he lived in Munich, where he probably came into permanent contact with Max Scheler. This became a "landmark" of the bohemians in Munich. In 1933, due to his Jewish origins, he was forced into exile in Switzerland, then in Italy and finally in New Zealand.

[13] In those days, more precisely on March 7, 1909, the DGS (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie) was formally established, including Tönnies, Vierkhandt, Beck, Herkner and Simmel himself, but he left after a few years.

[14] In a letter sent to Husserl (March 5, 1906), Scheler wrote: "Ich werde voräufig hier in Berlin ruhig weiterarbeiten und den Gang meiner Anlegenheit in München abwarten: Potsdamerstr. 27/b" (Husserl 1994a: 213).

[15] Zanfi reports in a note a passage from Simmel's son, Hans, who writes: "The difficult translation of *L'évolution créatrice* was conducted by Gertrud Kantorowicz, with the collaboration and supervision of my father - and mine for some purely scientific steps" Max Scheler gave a positive judgment on the translation of *L'évolution créatrice* in his course on Bergson in Cologne in the winter semester of 1919/1920: 'the main metaphysical work of Bergson, L'évolution créatrice of 1907, was translated - really well - by the young lady Kantorowicz with the collaboration and supervision of Georg Simmel, with the title Die Schöpferische Entwicklung Jena 1910 ', [Bayerische Staatsbibliothek] BSB Ana 315, B, I, 99, f. 1" (Zanfi 2013: 85).

[16] On this issue see also Frings 1978; Spielberg 1994 (particularly: 268ff.); Cusinato 1998; Wang 2015; Venier 2016.

[17] Madler notes: "Nach der Heirat im Dezember 1912 lebte er [*Scheler*] mit Märit Furtwängler in einer kleiner Wohnung in Berlin-Wilmersdorf in der *Düsseldorfer Straße* 1" (Madler 1980: 42).
[18] In regard to an editorial note of Simmel's letters, Michael Landmann indirectly testimonies Simmel's attendance to Scheler's private lectures in Berlin during these years. Karl-Theodor Bluth (1892-1964) would have confirmed it with interesting details: "Max Scheler hielt 1912 Vorlesungen in Berliner Privatwohnungen; er las seine *Ethik*. Georg Simmel und einige seiner Freunde und Frauen nahmen an diese Vorlesungen teil" (Simmel 2008a: 170).
[19] M.Scheler, *Aufsätze und Abhandlungen*, I e II Band, Verlag der weissen Bücher, Leipzig 1915.
[20] M.Böhm, *Zur Philosophie Max Schelers*, in "Frankfurter Zeitung", 29 September 1915 (n. 270).
[21] "Simmel wandte die Theorie auf die Erkenntnistheorie an und sah in der Wahrheit das Merkmal der an die Umgebung bestangepaßten Vorstellungen, während wieder andere mit Trompetenstößen eine neue, auf jene Theorie aufgebaute Ethik verkündeten".
[22] "Simmel hat im ersten Bd. der *Kantstudien* (1897), S. 416ff., in seinem Aufsatze 'Über den Unterschied der Wahrnehmungs- und der Erfahrungsurteile' den Versuch gemacht, die Schärfe dieses Entweder- Oder durch die Annahme eines graduellen Übergangs zwischen dem synthetischen Urteil a priori und dem Erfahrungsurteil zu brechen. Da jedoch Apriorität und Notwendigkeit bei Kant notwendig zusammengehören, so müßten auch konsequent Grade der Apriorität statuiert werden, was (auf kantischer Grundlage wenigstens) nicht durchführbar ist".
[23] "Im Einverständnis mit Schopenhauer, daß die methodologischen Prinzipien einer Wissenschaft nur aus deren wirklicher Arbeit gewonnen werden könnten, darin dagegen im Widerspruche mit ihm, daß die gedankliche Fixierung von Gesetzen ein wesentliches Merkmal wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis sei, folgern Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, daß die Geschichte schon in ihrem derzeitigen Bestande eine Wissenschaft sei und daß es demgemäß zwei Arten von Wissenschaft, 'Gesetzes- und Ereigniswissenschaften', geben müsse".
[24] Scheler also refers to Simmel's *Lebensanschauung* in the unpublished essay "Unsterblichkeit" [BSB Archiv: ANA315 CA IX 29: A 1-6]. He particularly addresses Simmel's metaphysics (in addiction to Bergson and Driesch) in order to explain a theory on the existence of the so-called "soul" [*Seele*]. Along the same lines, Scheler mentions Peter Wust, probably referring to the volume *Die Auferstehung der Metaphysik* (1920) (Wust 1963). In Simmel's book *Lebensanschauung*, held in Scheler's library, there are indeed underlines only in the chapter "Tod und Unsterblichkeit" [BSB Archiv: ANA 315 2 1851].
[25] According to Scheler, Simmel should be put beside Schopenhauer and Freud due to their "functionalisation" of love, that is, they assign a secondary and derived function to love with respect to other primary instincts or forces (*will to live, "Es", life*): "Es ist der große Irrtum der

naturalistisch-sensualistischen Philosophie A. Schopenhauers und S. Freuds, dem G. Simmel an sich mit vollem Recht entgegentritt, daß sie in der Geschlechtsliebe nur einen sekundären, durch Triebverdrängung erst gewordenen luftigen und phantastischen *Überbau* zum massiven Geschlechtstrieb sehen – nicht eine *elementare* wertunterscheidende und wertwählende emotionale Funktion der Vitalseele, sondern ein bloßes Erzeugnis von Hemmungen des Triebes und geistiger Verarbeitung dieser Hemmungen (Scheler 2005: 124).

[26] "Simmel bringt die Koketterie – ganz irrig, wie uns scheint – mit der Geschlechts*liebe* in Zusammenhang, ja sogar mit der bekannten platonischen Definition, und findet in ihr eine Abwechslung von Hingabe und Versagen. Aber mit der Geschlechtsliebe hat die Koketterie gar nichts zu tun. Sie liegt ganz und gar in der Sphäre des *Triebes*, und ist überhaupt weit weniger geheimnisvoll, als sie Simmel hält. Vor allem scheint mir Simmel nicht zu beachten, daß sie eine *echte* Ausdrucksäußerung '*von etwas*' (z.B. von Hingabe und Versagen, also einem *seelischen* Vorgang) *von Hause aus* gar nicht ist, sondern nur ein Rhythmus des Bewegungsablaufs, der überhaupt nichts ausdrückt. Insbesondere ist sie nicht ein echter Hingabeimpuls und ein nur scheinbares Versagen – dies würde sie der Scham immerhin annähern. Vgl. G. Simmel, 'Die Koketterie' in 'Philosophische Kultur', Leipzig 1911".

[27] M.Scheler, *Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart*, in *Deutsches Leben der Gegenwart*, hrsg. v. Ph. Witkop, Berlin 1922, pp. 127-224 (now in GW 7: 259-326).

[28] "In einem loseren Verbande mit beiden Kantschulen stand auch *Georg Simmel*, der sich von einer anfänglich mehr positivistisch eingestellten Denkrichtung über die Problematik Kants hinweg schließlich zu einer 'Lebensphilosophie' durchrang, deren Ergebnis er in dem nach seinem Tode im Nachlaß erschienen Werke 'Lebensanschauung, vier metaphysische Kapitel' darstellte. Der Aufsatz 'Über den Tod' ist das Tiefste und Reifste, was dieser eigenartige und weit über die deutschen Grenzen hinaus anregende Denker geschrieben hat. Auch sein Aufsatz über 'Das individuelle Gesetz', in dem er ähnlich wie Schleiermacher und der Verfasser in seiner 'Ethik' neben 'allgemeingültigen moralischen Werten' auch 'individualgültige', d.h. eine je *individuell* sittliche *Bestimmung* des Menschen darzutun sucht, hat die Ethik bedeutend gefördert. Seiner durch Bergson angeregten letzten 'Lebensphilosophie', die dunkel, unbestimmt und verworren bleibt, kann ein gleicher Beifall nicht gezollt warden".

[29] In *Der Begriff und der Tragödie der Kultur* Simmel asserts: "Es ist der Begriff aller Kultur, dass der Geist ein selbständig Objektives schaffe, durch das hin die Entwicklung des Subjektes, von sich selbst zu sich selbst ihren Weg nehme; aber eben damit ist jenes integrierende, kulturbedingende Element zu einer Eigenentwicklung prädeterminiert, die noch immer Kräfte der Subjekte verbraucht, noch immer Subjekte in ihre Bahn reißt, ohne doch diese damit zu der Höhe ihrer selbst zu führen: die Entwicklung der Subjekte kann jetzt nicht mehr den Weg gehen, den die der Objekte nimmt; diesem letzteren dennoch folgend, verläuft sie sich in einer Sackgasse oder in einer Entleertheit von innerstem und eigenstem Leben" (Simmel 2001: 219).

[30] In regard of this aspect, Lichtblau considers the very tight relation between the Wilhelmine crisis among the intellectuals and the rising of the sociology autonomous science among the humanities (Lichtblau 1996).
[31]"Der Verstorbene tiefe deutsche Denker Georg Simmel hat einmal gesagt (ähnlich Rudolf Eucken in seinen Grundbegriffen der Gegenwart), jedes Zeitalter habe seine Urkategorie der Weltauffassung, von der es gleichsam trunken sei (so der Sternenhimmel und seine Mechanik im 18. Jahrhundert; H. v. Stein). Und diese Urkategorie ist ohne Zweifel heute: 'Das Leben'".

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Réduction et subjectivation chez Theodor Celms

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Abstract

Reduction and Subjectivation in Theodor Celms

The work of the Latvian phenomenologist Theodor Celms provides an interesting attempt to reinterpret Husserl's phenomenological reduction in terms of Natorp's subjectivation. This paper summarizes in broad outline some salient features of Celms' theory of subjectivation and discusses some of its similarities and differences with Husserl's and Natorp's views. I focus on two more central points. First, Celms proposes to interpret Husserlian reduction as radicalizing or generalizing an operation of thought that is pervasive throughout all forms of cognition. Secondly, he makes a distinction between epistemological and ontological subjectivation that leads him to adopt a critical stance toward both Husserl's transcendental idealism and Natorp's general psychology.

Keywords: Theodor Celms, Paul Natorp, Edmund Husserl, phenomenology, neo-Kantianism, reduction, epoche, subjectivation

Le lien entre la phénoménologie husserlienne et la philosophie de la psychologie de Natorp est philosophiquement substantiel. Les écrits de Husserl après les *Recherches logiques* attestent une influence directe et massive de Natorp, qui fut probablement l'un des facteurs déterminants à l'origine du « tournant transcendantal » de 1907 et du « tournant génétique » des années 1910 (Luft 2010). La théorie de la connaissance du philosophe letton Theodor Celms (1893-1989) représente un autre chapitre, largement méconnu, de l'influence de Natorp sur la phénoménologie de style husserlien. L'ambition des pages qui suivent est d'en explorer succinctement certains aspects qui dénotent une appropriation

fructueuse de la psychologie générale de Natorp et, plus spécialement, de son concept de subjectivation.

Historiquement parlant, Theodor Celms appartient à la filiation directe de Husserl. Ayant découvert les *Recherches logiques* en Russie, Celms est venu suivre les cours de celui-ci à Freiburg de 1922 à 1925 avant de développer une phénoménologie de style husserlien mais originale. Comme la phénoménologie de Celms est en partie dirigée contre l'idéalisme des *Idées I*, certains commentateurs, comme Rozenvalds, le rapproche du Cercle de Munich-Göttingen. Spiegelberg le rattache à ce qu'il appelle la « périphérie » du Groupe de Freiburg. Il le présente par ailleurs comme l'un des rares membres du groupe à avoir échappé à l'influence alors croissante de Heidegger, aux côtés d'Aron Gurwitsch, de Dorion Cairns et de Marvin Farber (Spiegelberg, 240).

L'influence de la philosophie du néokantisme marbourgeois et en particulier de Natorp fut également déterminante d'un bout à l'autre du parcours philosophique de Celms. Outre les rapprochements de nature philosophique que je suggérerai plus loin, on peut mentionner un certain nombre d'éléments factuels attestant que la formation de Celms a aussi été redevable, dans une moindre mesure, au néokantisme (Rozenvalds 2000). D'abord, avant de suivre les cours et séminaires de Husserl à Freiburg, la première initiation de Celms à la philosophie a été néokantienne. Entre 1912 et 1920, il a étudié la philosophie à Moscou auprès du néokantien Alexandre Vvedensky et de Georgy Tschelpanov, grand philosophe et psychologue qui a joué un rôle décisif dans la réception de Husserl en Russie et qui a aussi été le maître du phénoménologue Gustav Tschpet[1]. Par la suite, quand il part étudier en Allemagne en 1922, ce n'est pas seulement en vue de suivre les cours de Husserl à Freiburg, mais aussi pour écouter Heinrich Rickert — auquel Husserl avait succédé à Freiburg et qui enseignait alors, depuis 1915, à Heidelberg. Signalons que la thèse de doctorat soutenue par Celms à Freiburg en juillet 1923 était consacrée à la théorie du concept de Kant. Son titre entier était : *La conception kantienne de l'essence, de l'origine et de la tâche du concept du point de vue de la logique générale* [*Kants allgemeinlogische Auffassung vom Wesen, Ursprung und*

der Aufgabe des Begriffs]. Husserl avait refusé de diriger la thèse de Celms, qui l'a réalisée sous la direction de Josef Geyser, celui-là même qui venait d'obtenir, en 1916, la chaire de philosophie catholique de l'Université de Freiburg, âprement convoitée par Heidegger. Enfin, à partir de 1930, Celms obtient un poste dans la revue qui était alors la plus importante revue de recensions en Allemagne, la *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*. Il y écrit de nombreux comptes rendus, dont la plupart sont consacrés aux interprétations de Kant (Rozenvalds 1993, 24 ; Rozenvalds 2000, 72-73). C'est par exemple Celms qui a recensé *Kant et le problème de la métaphysique* de Heidegger dans la *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*.

Comme le remarquait Rozenvalds, ce *background* kantien est un point de divergence remarquable si on compare Celms avec les phénoménologues réalistes de Munich-Göttingen (Rozenvalds 2000, 72). Pour s'en convaincre, il suffit de lire la lettre de Celms à Husserl du 28 octobre 1925, où il qualifie la philosophie husserlienne de « transcendantalisme phénoménologique » au sens kantien (Husserl 1994, 65-66). Mais il ajoute aussitôt que le transcendantalisme, depuis Kant, est demeuré « abstrait et éloigné de la vie » et que le mérite de Husserl est précisément d'avoir ouvert la voie à ce qu'il appelle un « transcendantalisme de la vie ». Cette lettre est emblématique de l'attitude de Celms envers Husserl et le kantisme. D'une part il partage beaucoup de choses avec les héritiers de Kant, et ce qui l'intéresse chez Husserl est son transcendantalisme de style kantien. D'autre part il fustige les néokantiens pour leur « discursivisme » en affirmant haut et fort, dans la continuité des *Idées I* de Husserl, la possibilité et la nécessité d'une réflexion phénoménologique procédant par perception interne et non par des « constructions intellectuelles » *(gedankliche Konstruktionen)*[2].

Cette attitude nuancée apparaît clairement dans le texte de 1928 « L'Idéalisme phénoménologique de Husserl », qui est sûrement le texte le mieux connu de Celms. Dans ce texte, celui-ci voit dans Husserl un partisan de l'*Abbildtheorie* tant décriée par les néokantiens, qu'il oppose à la théorie de la vérité comme construction de Rickert et de Natorp (Celms 1993b, 140-141). Or, tout en exprimant ses sympathies à l'égard de la conception de Husserl, il défend aussi l'idée que « le corrélat

d'une vérité copie est l'être en soi » (Celms 1993b, 141). Ce qui l'amène à attribuer à Husserl une métaphysique au sens kantien, à savoir, comme je l'expliquerai plus en détail dans la suite, une « métaphysique spiritualiste ». Cette critique coïncide par ailleurs partiellement avec d'autres objections de Celms, dont je ne parlerai pas ici. Il considère en particulier que la monadologie transcendantale husserlienne est un subterfuge métaphysique en vue de sortir de l'impasse solipsiste dans laquelle Husserl se voyait confiné du fait de sa focalisation sur la conscience *individuelle*, par opposition à la « conscience en général » des néokantiens.

1. Objectivation et subjectivation

Celms a développé sa notion de subjectivation en particulier dans un texte d'un peu moins d'une centaine de pages intitulé « Sujet et subjectivation : Études sur l'être subjectif » et publié à Riga en 1943, simultanément en letton et en allemand. Incontestablement plus original que l'étude de 1928 sur l'idéalisme, ce texte dense et complexe a été écrit par Celms en vue d'un *opus magnum* en trois volumes intitulé *Phénomène et réalité de l'ego : Études sur l'être subjectif*, auquel il travailla longuement dans l'immédiat après-guerre et qui n'a pas encore été publié à ce jour. En outre, je montrerai occasionnellement que la problématique de la subjectivation est plus que préfigurée dans d'autres écrits de Celms et notamment dans le texte sur l'idéalisme de 1928.

La subjectivation au sens de Celms n'est pas tout à fait la subjectivation au sens de Natorp. Ou bien on pourrait dire qu'elle est identique de part et d'autre, mais que les deux auteurs en disent des choses assez différentes. Un premier point important est que Celms conçoit la subjectivation comme étroitement corrélative à l'objectivation. Bien qu'elle soit encore, en un certain sens, proche de Natorp, cette manière de voir apporte certains éléments nouveaux et fructueux. En particulier, la façon dont Celms conçoit le rôle critique de la subjectivation est assez éloignée de Natorp. Une autre différence importante entre les approches de la subjectivation chez les deux auteurs tient à leurs portées respectives. Alors que, chez Natorp, la fondation subjective est conditionnée par la fondation objective,

que la question de la subjectivation relève seulement de ce qu'il appelle la « psychologie générale », c'est-à-dire de la philosophie de la psychologie, Celms voit en elle une question philosophique de caractère général, emblématique de la philosophie moderne prise dans son ensemble (Natorp 1887, 285-286 ; Natorp 1912, iii *et seq*.).

Cette dernière conception doit être comprise à la lumière des prises de position de Celms en histoire de la philosophie. Dans une perspective qu'il partage avec de nombreux contemporains, par exemple avec Heidegger dans ses cours de Marburg, Celms oppose la philosophie grecque supposément asubjective à la philosophie moderne qu'il décrit comme étant « centrée sur le sujet » *(subjektzentriert)*. La première philosophie grecque est centrée exclusivement sur le monde à l'exclusion du sujet, ou plus exactement le sujet n'y entre en considération que comme sujet pratique et non comme sujet théorique. Celms attribue la découverte du sujet théorique à Protagoras, dont la « subjectivation de l'apparence » a le sens, pour lui, d'une préparation ou d'une géniale anticipation de la philosophie du sujet des temps modernes (voir *infra*). Dans son texte de 1943, Celms réfère expressément sur ce point à la *Psychologie générale* de 1912, où Natorp considérait qu'avec Protagoras « la subjectivité elle-même et en tant que telle (…) entre pour la première fois dans le domaine de la réflexion philosophique » (Celms 1993a, 242 ; Natorp 1912, 9). Il faut noter au passage que cette appropriation de Protagoras sur la question de la subjectivité joue un rôle important chez Natorp. On peut la faire remonter au moins aux *Recherches sur l'histoire du problème de la connaissance* de 1884, où Natorp ne se contentait pas d'adresser à Protagoras une critique relativement conventionnelle de type anti-sensualiste, mais où il interprétait aussi l'homme-mesure du *Théétète* (DK B1 = *Théétète*, 152a) au sens d'une éradication de tout en-soi, donc en des termes nettement plus sympathiques à un élève de Cohen comme l'était Natorp (Natorp 1884, 46-47).

À l'époque moderne, le sujet devient le centre de la philosophie. Celms dénombre sept concepts du sujet à l'époque moderne, qui vont du sujet psychophysique au sujet existentiel de Heidegger en passant par le sujet transcendantal de Kant et

par les différentes conceptions des idéalistes postkantiens et néokantiens. L'essentiel pour le moment est que, si la philosophie moderne est essentiellement une philosophie du sujet, alors les processus de subjectivation doivent y jouer un rôle prépondérant. Pour Celms, par exemple, le sens de la révolution copernicienne de Kant est d'avoir transféré la théorie des deux mondes de Platon dans la sphère du sujet, et le kantisme se définit en conséquence comme un « platonisme subjectivé » (Celms 1993a, 306, cf. 313). L'innovation propre de Kant n'est pas seulement d'avoir fait tourner le monde autour du sujet, mais plus exactement de l'avoir fait tourner autour des formes intemporelles du sujet qui sont le résultat d'une subjectivation des formes intemporelles extra-subjectives de Platon.

Celms donne une définition précise de la subjectivation dans son texte de 1943 :

> L'attribution cognitive au sujet de ce qui n'a pas un caractère immédiat et inaliénable d'appartenance à l'ego, mais qui est conscient originellement en tant que quelque chose d'opposé à l'ego, d'étranger à l'ego, d'indépendant de l'ego, et éventuellement aussi trouvé en tant que tel dans l'expérience, nous l'appellerons dans la suite *subjectivation (Subjektivierung)*. Subjectiver quelque chose, cela signifiera donc : refuser à ce quelque-chose un être indépendant de l'être du sujet, c'est-à-dire un être extra-subjectif, « transcendant », et voir ce quelque-chose comme étant dans son être unilatéralement dépendant de l'être du sujet. (Celms 1993a, 249)

Celms cite un exemple en dehors de la sphère théorique : je me réveille après un effroyable cauchemar (Celms 1993a, 263). J'éprouve alors, observe-t-il, un sentiment de soulagement, qui vient du fait que je reconnais soudain les créatures rêvées comme étant de purs produits de l'esprit, des chimères purement *subjectives*. Ce qui se passe ici, c'est que je fais d'objets vécus oniriquement comme réels des objets dépendants de moi sujet. Bref, je « subjective » ces objets, je ne les reconnais plus comme existant *en soi* hors de moi, mais je vois maintenant en eux des productions imaginaires, dépendantes de la subjectivité.

En un sens certainement plus large que celui retenu par Natorp, la subjectivation de Celms renferme un double moment de négation de l'en-soi d'une part, d'attribution à la subjectivité d'autre part. Pour ce motif, Celms insiste sur le fait que la réflexion et la négation de l'en-soi sont isolément des conditions

nécessaires mais non suffisantes de la subjectivation (Celms 1993a, 259, 291-292). Toute réflexion n'est pas subjectivation, toute négation de l'être en soi n'est pas subjectivation.

Comme je l'ai suggéré plus haut, Celms conçoit en outre la subjectivation comme corrélative à l'objectivation ou à la *« réalisation » (Realisierung)*. Par exemple, il observe que nous avons tendance à la fois à subjectiver ce qui nous cause du tourment et à « réaliser les formations simplement subjectives dont la réalité réjouit l'homme au plus haut point » (Celms 1993a, 263). Un exemple de cette double tendance est, selon lui, la croyance à l'immortalité de l'âme : nous subjectivons la mortalité humaine, nous objectivons ou réalisons son immortalité. En d'autres termes : « Par là on comprend que l'homme (…) puisse avoir tendance à rendre inoffensif par subjectivation ce qui est réel mais non souhaité, et à élever au rang de réalité ce qui est souhaité, mais irréel » (*ibid.*).

Mais il existe chez Celms un lien plus profond entre objectivation et subjectivation, qui réside dans le fait que l'objectivation semble supposer nécessairement la subjectivation. Reprenons la définition de la subjectivation : subjectiver, c'est révéler comme dépendant du sujet quelque chose qui m'apparaît originellement comme objectif et indépendant du sujet. Pour Celms, c'est là le lot de toute activité théorique. La prétention à l'objectivité du scientifique et du philosophe va de pair avec un effort visant à dénoncer le purement subjectif — c'est-à-dire à dénoncer comme purement subjectives les illusions induites par les « adjonctions subjectives » de l'expérience :

> Tout travail théorique opère au début avec des représentations incomplètes et même souvent fausses sur un domaine ontologique déterminé. Sa tâche est de dégager l'objet *(das Objekt)* dans son objectivité *(Objektivität)* pure, non contaminée par les adjonctions subjectives, c'est-à-dire, pour ainsi dire, de raboter le matériau représentationnel initial. (Celms 1993a, 249)

Ces formulations de Celms rappellent directement celles de Natorp dans son texte de 1887 « Sur la fondation objective et la fondation subjective de la connaissance ». Dans ce texte, Natorp caractérisait expressément l'objectivation scientifique comme un processus d'abstraction, à savoir comme une opération par laquelle l'objet est dégagé par abstraction de la subjectivité

(Natorp 1887, 270 et seq.). On pourrait envisager chez Natorp, en somme, quelque chose comme une symétrie de l'objectivation des sciences objectivantes et de la subjectivation psychologique — symétrie qui se traduit notamment par le fait que les deux opérations sont, pour ainsi dire, également abstractives : de même que la phénoménalité purement subjective du psychologue selon Natorp est reconstruite par abstraction à partir de l'objectivité et notamment de l'objectivité scientifique, de même l'objectivité ou l'être en soi scientifique résulte d'une abstraction de tout ce qui est subjectif dans l'expérience[3].

À certains égards, pourtant, ces quelques remarques montrent que la *fonction* méthodique de la subjectivation est essentiellement différente chez Celms et chez Natorp. Une originalité de Celms par comparaison avec Natorp est de penser l'objectivation et la subjectivation non pas tant comme des orientations cognitives opposées, mais comme des opérations *complémentaires* — toutes deux indispensables à l'activité théorique, qu'elle soit philosophique ou scientifique. La subjectivation est en quelque sorte le négatif photographique de l'objectivation. Dans le même passage cité ci-dessus, Celms utilise l'image du rabot :

> La tâche [du théoricien] est de dégager l'objet dans son objectivité pure, non contaminée par les adjonctions subjectives, c'est-à-dire, pour ainsi dire, de raboter le matériau représentationnel initial. « Là où on rabote, les copeaux tombent. » Par le rabotage théorique, ils retombent dans le sujet. (Celms 1993a, 249)

En clair, si la tâche du théoricien est de produire l'objectivité en la dégageant de sa gangue de subjectivité, c'est-à-dire d'*objectiver*, alors elle est tout aussi bien de faire ressortir ce qui, dans le « matériau représentationnel initial », est d'ordre subjectif, c'est-à-dire de *subjectiver*. Si nous voulons élever le donné d'expérience au rang de réalité objective, il faut commencer par montrer ce qui, dans ce donné, est dépendant de la subjectivité.

2. L'ego transcendantal

La même différence fonctionnelle entre les concepts de subjectivation des deux auteurs apparaît également dans ce que dit Celms de l'ego transcendantal kantien et néokantien.

S'inspirant explicitement des chapitres 1 et 5 de *L'Objet de la connaissance* de Rickert, Celms explique historiquement la découverte kantienne de l'ego transcendantal par un progrès dans l'objectivation (Celms 1993a, 244-245). Le sujet, explique-t-il, est d'abord conçu comme une « unité psychophysique », c'est-à-dire comme ce qui reste quand on objective tout corps étranger. Ensuite, l'objectivation en vient à s'étendre à mon corps propre lui-même. Le résidu est alors le sujet en tant que sujet « purement psychique » *(rein seelisch)*. C'est là, selon Celms, le concept de sujet prescrit par la réduction phénoménologique de Husserl. Enfin, l'objectivation est encore radicalisée et affecte maintenant le « moment psychique » lui-même :

> On peut encore aller plus loin dans le processus d'objectivation, en objectivant le moment psychique lui-même. Si ce processus est mené de façon conséquente, alors non seulement il ne reste plus aucun moment proprio-corporel, mais il ne reste plus aucun moment psychique du côté du sujet : tout ce qui est physique et psychique dans le sujet est maintenant transféré du côté de l'objet. Du côté du sujet il ne reste plus aucun contenu réel, mais seulement la forme vide de subjectité *(Subjektheit)* en général. (Celms 1993a, 244)

Le résultat, conclut Celms, est « un simple *abstractum*, quelque chose d'irréel, de supra-individuel », à savoir l'ego transcendantal compris comme « conscience en général ». Ce point est très caractéristique de l'approche de Celms. Dans une perspective qui rappelle sans doute plus directement le § 50 des *Idées I* de Husserl que la *Psychologie générale*, la subjectivation de Celms est complémentaire de l'objectivation également au sens où le sujet ultime est ce qui reste quand on a mené le processus d'objectivation à son terme — quand on a objectivé tout ce qui pouvait l'être. Le processus est inverse de celui évoqué plus haut. Autant l'objet scientifique était le résidu d'un processus de subjectivation, autant l'ego transcendantal est maintenant le résidu d'un processus d'objectivation.

Cette conception de l'ego transcendantal ne s'articule pas facilement avec ce qui a été dit plus haut des nécessaires subjectivations à l'œuvre dans toute activité théorique. Le problème peut être formulé de la manière suivante. D'abord, on l'a vu, la philosophie comme les sciences particulières sont des disciplines théoriques indissociables, comme telles, de subjectivations. On peut dès lors se demander ce qui différencie

les subjectivations philosophiques de celles des sciences particulières. Cette différence, selon Celms, est double. Fondamentalement, elle réside dans le fait que le sujet étudié dans les sciences particulières est toujours le sujet psychophysique. Les sciences particulières ne vont pas au-delà du sujet psychophysique, dans la mesure où la mise en question du sujet psychophysique est précisément une tâche spécifiquement philosophique (Celms 1993a, 254 *et seq.*). Autrement dit, le philosophe, à la différence du scientifique spécial, a pour tâche l'élaboration d'une « théorie du sujet » *(Subjektlehre)* (Celms 1993a, 252 etc.) qui consiste précisément à outrepasser les limites de l'objet physique et à dégager le sujet ultime par l'objectivation sans limites. Tel est le sens même de la subjectivation philosophique, que Celms qualifie d' « ultimement radicale » ou d'« ultimement principielle » (Celms 1993a, 256). Or, la possibilité et la nature d'une telle théorie du sujet deviennent très problématiques dans la perspective de Celms : d'une part, comme tout théoricien, le philosophe doit atteindre à l'objectivité par le rabot de la subjectivation, d'autre part il devrait procéder à des subjectivations philosophiques par l'objectivation radicalisée de tout ce que le scientifique spécial tient encore pour subjectif.

3. Subjectivation épistémologique et subjectivation ontologique

Une piste particulièrement intéressante pour surmonter cette difficulté est fournie par Celms lui-même à travers sa distinction entre subjectivation au sens ontologique et subjectivation au sens épistémologique (Celms 1993a, 251). Par exemple je peux qualifier de subjectif un jugement, comprenant par là qu'il n'est vrai que subjectivement, pour tel ou tel sujet, mais qu'absolument parlant il est tout simplement faux. Les mots « objectif » et « subjectif » sont alors compris au sens *épistémologique*. Cependant, je peux aussi qualifier un jugement de subjectif au sens *ontologique* où son objet est psychique, immanent, etc. Celms formule cette distinction en termes néokantiens : la subjectivité épistémologique est subjectivité de la validité (*Geltung*), la subjectivité ontologique est subjectivité de l'être.

Remarquons qu'on retrouve une distinction similaire chez John Searle, qui l'a introduite en réponse à une certaine objection contre l'idée d'une étude scientifique de la conscience. Cette objection dit en substance ceci : une science étant par principe objective, une science du subjectif est une contradiction dans les termes (Searle 1998, 43-45 ; Searle 2002, 22-23, 43-44). Contre cette objection, Searle rétorquait que l'argument repose en réalité sur une ambiguïté affectant la distinction entre subjectif et objectif. On confond ici le sens épistémologique et le sens ontologique des mots « subjectif » et « objectif ». Un état de conscience est par définition quelque chose de subjectif au sens ontologique, c'est-à-dire quelque chose dont l'existence est dépendante de l'existence d'une conscience. Mais cette subjectivité au sens ontologique est essentiellement indépendante de la subjectivité au sens épistémologique, c'est-à-dire qu'elle n'implique pas l'impossibilité d'une science (par définition épistémologiquement objective) de la conscience (par définition ontologiquement subjective). C'est exactement ce que voulait déjà dire Celms quand il affirmait en 1943 :

> La subjectivité épistémologique peut — en tant que caractère de validité d'une formation cognitive — apparaître tout à fait indépendamment de la question de savoir s'il s'agit de la connaissance d'un être subjectif ou objectif ; elle peut par exemple survenir en psychologie tout aussi bien qu'en mathématique. (Celms 1993a, 251)

Un argument très semblable est également à la base d'une des principales objections adressées par Celms à Husserl dans son texte de 1928 sur l'idéalisme. Dans ce texte, il reproche à Husserl d'avoir bâti son idéalisme sur une ambiguïté, à savoir sur l'ambiguïté du terme de *réduction* (Celms 1993b, 83 *et seq*.). Car la réduction phénoménologique, observe-t-il, signifie au moins deux choses. D'abord, elle peut vouloir dire la « reconduction de toute considération orientée objectivement (de manière transcendante) à la considération des modes de conscience correspondants ». Dans ce cas, la réduction phénoménologique signifie simplement autant que la réflexion phénoménologique. Elle n'implique aucune décision de nature métaphysique ; elle est par exemple neutre à l'égard de l'idéalisme et du réalisme. Cependant, Husserl attribue aussi,

selon Celms, une autre signification à la réduction. En un second sens, elle est aussi la « reconduction de tout *être* objectif (transcendant) à l'être des modes de conscience correspondants ». Dans le second sens, la réduction implique une décision métaphysique, que Celms appelle un « idéalisme de principe ». Si on confond cette seconde réduction avec la première, avec la simple méthode de réflexion phénoménologique, on passe fallacieusement du plan épistémologique au plan ontologique[4]. L'objection vient alors conforter l'argument de Celms — qu'on trouve chez Ingarden à la même époque (Ingarden 1929, 183-185) — suivant lequel Husserl aurait eu le tort de passer fallacieusement d'une conception juste et rigoureuse de la réflexion phénoménologique, en soi neutre à l'égard de la controverse métaphysique opposant le réalisme à l'idéalisme, à une « métaphysique spiritualiste » amenant quelque chose comme une régression en deçà de Kant.

Notons que ces remarques recoupent partiellement la thèse de Celms selon laquelle toute réflexion n'est pas subjectivation, ou selon laquelle la réflexion est une condition nécessaire mais non suffisante de la subjectivation (ontologique). Ce que Celms appelle la réflexion, c'est-à-dire la réduction phénoménologique comprise au sens épistémologique, ne signifie pas encore la subjectivation de l'être extra-subjectif, mais seulement une orientation du regard théorique vers la subjectivité. Pour avoir une subjectivation ontologique, il faut ajouter à cette réflexion une réduction au second sens, qui nie l'être en soi de l'objet extra-subjectif et le ramène à l'être subjectif.

La distinction introduite par Celms entre subjectivation ontologique et subjectivation épistémologique peut être interprétée comme un point de désaccord partiel entre la psychologie critique de Natorp et la « théorie du sujet » de Celms. Alors que celle-ci est le résultat de subjectivations au sens ontologique, la subjectivation dans la *Psychologie générale* de Natorp a primairement un sens épistémologique. Pour le comprendre, il faut se rappeler en quels termes Natorp conjuguait un dualisme de l'objectivation et de la subjectivation avec un inconditionnel « monisme de l'expérience ». Il affirmait ainsi, au § 11 de l'*Introduction à la psychologie* de 1888,

l'inconditionnelle identité phénoménale de l'objectif et du subjectif :

> Les phénomènes de la conscience sont totalement identiques aux phénomènes que la science rapporte à l'unité objective de la nature ; il n'y a absolument pas deux séries de phénomènes données indépendamment l'une de l'autre, qu'on ne pourrait mettre en relation l'une à l'autre qu'après coup, mais il n'y a qu'un donné qui est considéré de deux manières différentes, d'un côté comme simplement apparaissant, c'est-à-dire comme donné dans la conscience, et de l'autre en référence à l'objet apparaissant en lui. (Natorp 1888, 73 ; cf. Natorp 1912, 129)

Bref, la différence épistémologique ou méthodologique entre subjectivation et objectivation n'implique aucune différence ontologique entre phénoménalité objective et phénoménalité subjective : les phénomènes du physicien sont identiques à ceux du psychologue. (Je fais momentanément abstraction de la notion de « monisme méthodique » dans la *Psychologie générale*, qui complexifie le problème et à laquelle je reviendrai plus loin.)

Il semble donc qu'on ait ici un point de désaccord. Mais les mêmes formulations de Natorp sont-elles vraiment si éloignées de celles de Celms ? Elles trouvent en particulier un écho significatif dans la thèse de Celms suivant laquelle *la subjectivation n'altère en rien le matériau phénoménal*. La subjectivation ne nous révèle pas de nouveaux phénomènes, des phénomènes subjectifs réellement différents du monde objectif de l'attitude naturelle, mais ce sont *les mêmes* objets et les mêmes données d'expérience qui se donnent d'un côté et de l'autre. Par la subjectivation, affirme Celms, « on ne change rien au donné » (Celms 1993a, 250). Cependant, ces affirmations me semblent devoir être comprises dans une perspective husserlienne plutôt que natorpienne, ou plus précisément dans la perspective d'un dualisme phénoménologique du réel et de l'intentionnel plutôt que dans la perspective du monisme phénoménologique de Natorp. D'abord Celms ne se contente pas d'affirmer, comme le fait Natorp, l'homogénéité phénoménale de l'objectivité construite et de la subjectivité reconstruite. Quand il déclare que la subjectivation n'altère pas le matériau phénoménal, cela veut dire, tout aussi bien, que l'*Objekt* est préservé tel quel — c'est-à-

dire comme *Objekt* — par-delà la subjectivation. Conception qui rappelle plus volontiers l'idée husserlienne (ou supposée telle selon certaines lectures, qui n'ont pas à être discutées ici) que la réduction phénoménologique n'altère en rien le monde objectif mais se borne à le viser autrement, comme noème ou comme simple phénomène de monde : « Par le fait que quelque chose d'objectif *(etwas Gegenständliches)* est subjectivé, il ne cesse pas pour autant de se tenir du côté objet de la conscience *(auf der Objektseite des Bewußtseins zu stehen)* » (Celms 1993a, 250). Subjectivé, l'objet continue néanmoins à se trouver « du côté de l'objet ».

Un autre point important est que Celms développe ces idées en termes de positions d'être. Naturellement, c'est ici encore la théorie de la réduction de Husserl qui guide Celms, et non la théorie de la subjectivation de Natorp. L'idée est que la subjectivation n'altère pas l'objet lui-même, mais seulement, comme la réduction husserlienne, la modalité thétique sous laquelle il est visé :

> La subjectivation ne concerne que le caractère de position. La subjectivation d'un quelque-chose signifie donc autant que le transfert cognitif de ce quelque-chose du mode de l'« être-en-soi » vers celui du « simple être-pour-un-sujet ». (Celms 1993a, 250)

Cette idée, qui rapproche Celms des lectures externalistes de Husserl comme celle de Sokolowski (1984 ; 1987), est un thème ancien, qui remonte lui aussi à la première période de sa carrière philosophique. Dans un texte intitulé « De l'essence de la philosophie » et publié en 1930 dans un volume d'hommage à son directeur de thèse Josef Geyser, Celms définissait dans les termes suivants ce qu'il appelait alors le « voir philosophique » :

> Le voir philosophique est un voir réduisant philosophiquement, c'est-à-dire : on voit *la même chose* qu'avant — moins son absolutisation naïve. (…) Le philosophe doit donc voir totalement la même chose que l'homme naïf, mais sans la naïveté de celui-ci. (Celms 1993c, 215-216)

On est très proche, ici, de la théorie de la subjectivation. Le philosophe a pour tâche de nous affranchir de la tendance naïve à absolutiser le monde objectif, ce qui n'est possible, poursuit Celms, qu'en réduisant le mode objectif à ses « premiers principes », donc comme un conditionné à sa

condition. On rejoint par ce biais le texte de 1943, où la subjectivation philosophique est considérée comme une méthode en vue de s'affranchir de l'attitude consistant à voir dans le monde objectif un *en-soi*.

4. Motivation épistémologique et motivation ontologique de la subjectivation

Avant de conclure, j'en viens à quelques considérations plus spéciales. On trouve dans le texte de Celms sur la subjectivation une analyse consacrée à un autre aspect du monisme de Natorp, à savoir à la notion de « monisme méthodique » développée au § 2 du chapitre vi de la *Psychologie générale* de 1912 (Celms 1993a, 286-287). Cette analyse de Celms s'insère dans de longs développements consacrés à la motivation de la subjectivation. Après avoir distingué entre les motivations épistémologiques et les motivations ontologiques, Celms se demande sous quelle rubrique il convient de ranger la subjectivation des qualités sensibles chez Natorp.

Il pourra être utile de clarifier cette distinction au moyen de deux exemples. Un cas de motivation épistémologique est celle résultant de la thèse d'une impossibilité de la connaissance. Si j'estime que la connaissance de tel ou tel objet mène à des contradictions, alors il y a des chances que cet objet soit lui-même tenu pour contradictoire, qu'il se voie dès lors refuser l'« être vrai » et qu'il devienne une pure fiction, donc qu'il soit subjectivé (Celms 1993a, 279). La motivation est alors épistémologique, Celms citant par ailleurs les noms de Bergson, de Vaihinger et de Wundt (Celms 1993a, 281-282). Chez Wundt par exemple, la subjectivation des qualités sensibles est motivée par l'idée que la position des qualités sensibles mène à des contradictions et qu'il faut pour cela lui substituer une étude quantitative sur le modèle des sciences naturelles. Un autre exemple de subjectivation motivée épistémologiquement est la conception de la vérité de Windelband. Celms s'appuie sur un texte de 1881 repris dans les *Préludes*, « Immanuel Kant : Zur Sekularfeier seiner Philosophie », où Windelband entreprend une critique de l'*Abbildtheorie* qu'on qualifierait aujourd'hui de cohérentiste (Windelband 1903). Le point de départ est donc épistémologique. Il s'agit pour Windelband de

remettre en cause la conception suivant laquelle la vérité serait une relation de concordance entre une représentation et une chose extra-subjective. Mais ce point de départ amène Windelband à franchir un pas de plus et à poser que, si la vérité est effectivement une relation de concordance, alors cette relation n'unit pas une représentation à une chose, mais bien deux représentations. Ce qui se passe ici, commente Celms, c'est qu'une thèse épistémologique — la vérité n'est pas la concordance de la représentation avec la chose — a motivé une subjectivation, à savoir la subjectivation du corrélat objectif de la vérité : ce à quoi se rapporte la représentation vraie est désormais lui-même une représentation.

Comme exemple de motivation ontologique, Celms évoque la philosophie grecque (Celms 1993a, 288 et seq.). Le sous-chapitre commence d'ailleurs par une référence à la *Psychologie générale*, où Natorp déclare que la découverte de la subjectivité a été rendue possible par la distinction entre être et apparaître (Natorp 1912, 88). Sans entrer dans le détail, le raisonnement de Celms est le suivant. Dans la pensée védique comme au commencement de la philosophie grecque, l'apparence est tenue pour un néant pur et simple. C'est le cas chez Parménide qui pose l'équation : mobile = apparence = néant, mais aussi chez Héraclite posant l'équation inverse : immobile = apparence = néant. C'est ici précisément que Protagoras a joué selon Celms un rôle décisif, que j'ai déjà évoqué plus haut. La « géniale solution » de Protagoras a été d'affirmer que tout ce qui dans la sphère extra-subjective est simple apparence, donc par opposition à l'être vrai, doit maintenant être réinterprété comme pourvu d'un être vrai dans la sphère subjective. En d'autres termes, cette solution a consisté à *subjectiver l'apparence*. La subjectivation protagoréenne, selon Celms, est un exemple de motivation ontologique de la subjectivation : l'apparence est subjectivée parce qu'elle est d'abord tenue pour un néant extra-subjectif. Notons au passage que Celms attribue à Platon une position intermédiaire entre la « théorie de l'apparence-néant » de Parménide et Héraclite et la subjectivation de l'apparence de Protagoras. Chez Platon, l'apparence n'est plus un pur et simple néant, mais elle n'est pas encore devenue subjective.

La subjectivation chez Natorp est-elle épistémologiquement motivée, ou bien ontologiquement motivée ? Celms commence par constater que cette question est *prima facie* difficilement décidable. Il cite plusieurs passages de la *Psychologie générale* qui plaident en faveur de la motivation épistémologique aussi bien qu'en faveur de la motivation ontologique. Natorp écrit par exemple que les qualités sensibles sont subjectives du fait de ne pas être déterminables avec exactitude (au sens de l'exactitude mathématique) — ce qui représente visiblement une motivation épistémologique (Natorp 1912, 186). Mais, comme Celms le relève, Natorp affirme aussi, quelques lignes plus loin, que le privilège de la détermination exacte tient à son adéquation à une certaine identité et à une certaine unité caractéristiques de l'être véritable. D'où Celms conclut que la subjectivation est ici motivée par un certain concept de l'être véritable, donc ontologiquement.

Pour résoudre le problème, écrit-il, il faut partir de la philosophie de Natorp considérée dans son ensemble. Or cela doit nous conduire, selon lui, à faire deux remarques générales. Premièrement, les néokantiens subordonnent généralement l'ontologique à l'épistémologique, ce qui plaide plutôt en faveur de la motivation épistémologique. Deuxièmement, Celms se réfère au « monisme méthodique » de la *Psychologie générale*. Je ne me risquerai pas à approfondir cette notion de monisme méthodique, qui est difficile et complexe chez Natorp. Dans les grandes lignes, celui-ci assimile l'unité de l'expérience dont il a été question plus haut à ce qu'il dénomme l'unité de la méthode. Et il faut comprendre ici le terme de *méthode* au sens du *fieri* néokantien, au sens de « la marche *(Gang)*, de la progression *(Fortgang)* éternelle de la connaissance » (Natorp 1912, 132). Partant, Natorp compare cette unité de l'expérience en tant que méthode à une *direction* au sens géométrique présentant deux *sens* opposés — que sont l'objectivation et la subjectivation. L'important, ici, est que cette conception est pour Celms un argument fort en faveur de la thèse de la motivation épistémologique :

> Ce qu'on vient de dire fait clairement apparaître que chez Natorp c'est aussi l'unité de l'être vrai qui est en fin de compte réduite à

> l'unité simplement méthodique de la progression de la connaissance, c'est-à-dire que malgré toutes les tendances hegeliano-parménidiennes, encore si fortes dans l'école de Marburg, à mettre sur le même plan l'être vrai et le penser vrai, la connaissance a pourtant encore une préséance indéniable. (Celms 1993a, 287)

Et il conclut : « Il faut donc aussi compter la subjectivation des qualités sensibles accomplie par Natorp parmi les subjectivations motivées épistémologiquement » (*ibid.*)

5. Conclusions

Quelques remarques récapitulatives, pour conclure. Premièrement, les efforts de Celms visant à distinguer plus nettement que ne l'avait fait Husserl les points de vue ontologique et épistémologique l'ont conduit à remettre en cause l'idéalisme de Husserl comme la psychologie générale de Natorp. La critique celmsienne des connotations métaphysiques de l'idéalisme husserlien n'est certes pas entièrement originale, mais elle se distingue par son arrière-plan kantien et néokantien qui est étranger à ses détracteurs mieux connus comme Daubert et Ingarden.

Deuxièmement, je pense avoir donné quelques indications utiles en vue de clarifier en quel sens la théorie de la subjectivation de Celms pouvait être tenue pour une tentative originale visant à exploiter conjointement des éléments aussi bien husserliens que natorpiens. Remarquablement, la notion néokantienne de subjectivation conduit Celms à réinterpréter la réduction phénoménologique husserlienne en des termes plus larges mais aussi plus intuitifs, comme un processus déterminant notre attitude générale envers le monde. L'homme *subjective* quand, au réveil, il se convainc en se raisonnant que sa mésaventure n'était qu'un mauvais rêve. Il *objective* quand il inspecte sa chemise et constate que la tâche qu'il y a vue n'est pas simplement due à l'éclairage. Un autre aspect intéressant de la conception de Celms est qu'elle pose une certaine relation de complémentarité entre objectivation et subjectivation. L'homme qui, à la vue de l'illusion de Müller-Lyer, fait effort pour surmonter sa première impression et s'assurer que les deux lignes sont objectivement

de longueur égale, voit du même coup leur inégalité comme purement apparente ou subjective.

La thèse que la subjectivation « ne change rien au donné » joue un rôle central dans l'argumentation de Celms. Que la tache sur ma chemise soit réelle ou seulement apparente, elle *m'apparaît*. L'idée est la suivante : l'expérience nous livre un « matériau représentationnel initial » qui n'est pas intrinsèquement objectif, mais qui peut être visé thétiquement comme objectif et complémentairement non purement subjectif. L'objectivation signifie : *ma chemise m'apparaît tachée et elle l'est réellement*. La subjectivation signifie : *ma chemise m'apparaît tachée mais ce n'est qu'une apparence et en réalité elle ne l'est pas*. La proposition « ma chemise m'apparaît tachée » indique le matériau représentationnel initial commun à l'objectivation et à la subjectivation. Ces formulations induisent clairement une conception originale de la phénoménalité. D'après cette conception, l'apparaître n'est pas le résultat d'une opération de subjectivation comme tend à le suggérer sinon la théorie husserlienne de la réduction, du moins son interprétation celmsienne en termes de subjectivation. Dans une perspective qui rappelle plutôt Natorp que Husserl, Celms voit dans l'apparaître un matériau neutre en deçà de l'opposition objectif-subjectif.

NOTES

[1] Sur Vvedensky et Tschelpanov, cf. Dennes (1998, 69-78, 85).

[2] Cf. par exemple Celms (1993a, 315).

[3] L'idée est courante dans la tradition empiriste, notamment chez Brentano et ses disciples. Voir par exemple (Brentano 1924, 138), où Brentano déclare que l'objectivité des sciences naturelles se conquiert « par abstraction scientifique des conditions psychiques concomitantes ». De même Carl Stumpf (1906) soutient, contre le phénoménalisme d'Ernst Mach, que la connaissance physique n'a pas pour objets des phénomènes subjectifs, mais réclame au contraire une extirpation des phénomènes subjectifs.

[4] Dans sa recension de 1929, le phénoménologue Alexander Pfänder voyait dans la distinction entre réduction phénoménologique et réflexion phénoménologique l'apport le plus important de l'ouvrage *Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls* (Pfänder 1929, 2050). Sur ce point chez Husserl, Heidegger et Natorp, voir Zahavi (2003).

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Konstitution oder Deduktion des Eigenleibes? Paradoxien der Leiblichkeit in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Husserls

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Abstract

Constitution or Deduction of the Lived Body? The Paradox of Embodiment in Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology

The problem of embodiment and that of the constitution of the lived body are central to the Husserlian phenomenology. Husserl's endeavor to develop a theory of intersubjectivity and his attempt to avoid the solipsistic conundrum depend on his ability to solve the riddle of embodiment. Nevertheless, Husserl struggled until the late thirties to find an adequate account of the constitution of the (lived) body, without much success. In this paper I try to show with the help of Merleau-Ponty, Derrida and Figal that in order to solve the question of embodiment, one has to transcend the boundaries of traditional Husserlian phenomenology and to go beyond the cartesian mind-body dualism, which Husserl more or less adopts.

Keywords: transcendental subject, intersubjectivity, constitution of the body, lived body, embodiment of the ego

Die Frage nach der Konstitution des Eigenleibes oder die der Verleiblichung des transzendentalen ego stehen im Zentrum des husserlschen phänomenologischen Denkens. Schon in den ersten Paragraphen der im Wintersemester 1910/11 gehaltenen Vorlesung Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, wo die Untersuchung der Grundverfassung des Bewusstseins angekündigt wird, widmet sich Husserl der Frage nach der Leiblichkeit des Ich. Er geht von der Feststellung aus, dass jedes Ich sich „jederzeit als Zentrum (s)einer Umgebung [findet]" (Hua XIII, 112). Nicht nur seine Gedanken, Erinnerungen oder Gefühle sind keinem Anderen

außer ihm zugänglich, sondern auch seine ganze dingliche Umgebung ist immer um ihn und ihn alleine „gruppiert"(Hua XIII, 113). Dem Ich ist aber nie seine ganze Umwelt durch unmittelbare Wahrnehmungen zugänglich, sondern nur ein bestimmter Teil derselben, eben weil das Ich, ohne mit seinem Leibkörper zu koinzidieren, immer verleiblicht ist und alle möglichen oder wirklichen Wahrnehmungen, alle Dingerscheinungen nur in Bezug auf diesem einen Leib – also in bestimmten Abschattungen – denkbar sind (Hua XIV, 56). Das verleiblichte Ich wird daher als Zentrum seiner raumzeitlichen Umgebung gedacht, als Mittelpunkt oder „als Nullpunkt des Koordinatensystems [...] von dem aus es alle Dinge der Welt, die schon erkannten oder nicht erkannten, betrachtet und ordnet und erkennt" (Hua XIII, 116).

Diese eben skizzierte Auffassung des Leibes wird einige Jahre später eine zentrale Rolle für eine neue Umgrenzung des Begriffs der Einfühlung und für die Grundlegung einer plausiblen Theorie der Fremdwahrnehmung und Intersubjektivität spielen[1], denn die Leiblichkeit wird jetzt nicht mehr über die Möglichkeit, einem Körper Empfindungen oder Empfindungsfelder einzufühlen, definiert, sondern radikal anders, als Nullpunkt des Koordinatensystems gefasst. Als Zentrum meiner Umwelt, die mir nur leiblichzugänglich ist, ist mir mein Leib primär in einer „inneren Erscheinung" (Hua XIII, 261), in einer Nullerscheinung gegeben. Die Nullerscheinungsweise meines Leibkörpers, der mir immer unmittelbar durch Selbstwahrnehmung und Selbsterscheinung (Hua XIII, 263) gegeben ist, wird stark mit der Erscheinungsweise aller anderen Körper kontrastiert, die mir immer in äußerer Erscheinung gegeben sind. Was es mit dieser Unterscheidung auf sich hat, ist nicht gleich eindeutig, vielleicht auch deshalb, weil Husserl den unmittelbaren Charakter der Selbstwahrnehmung und Selbsterscheinung an dieser Stelle nicht ausführlich ausgearbeitet hat.Aber unabhängig davon, wie man die Unmittelbarkeit der Selbstwahrnehmung versteht, ist es dennoch klar, dass die äußere Erscheinungsweise meines Leibkörpers keineswegs zur Konstitution derselben als meines Leibes, d.h. als „Träger der Sensualität" beiträgt (Hua XIII, 255). Hiervon ausgehend sollte

es natürlich eine Selbstverständlichkeit sein, dass ich meinen Leib gar nicht sozusagen „von außen" sehen kann, ohne ihm die Leiblichkeit abzusprechen und ihn in einen bloßen Körper zu verwandeln. Ich kann mir aber nichtsdestoweniger vorstellen, nicht mehr hier, sondern woanders zu sein, nicht mehr diese Perspektive auf meine Umwelt, sondern eben eine andere zu haben – eine Vorstellung die von Husserl als „widersinnig" oder „unmöglich" charakterisiert wird. Diese imaginierte Möglichkeit hat nichtsdestoweniger, so Husserl, einen guten Sinn, „nämlich sie hat den guten Sinn, dass eine ‚Verdoppelung' des Ich möglich ist, so wie eine Verdoppelung eines sonstigen Realen. Nämlich: Es wird nämlich bei Vollzug dieser widersprüchlichen Vorstellung klar die Möglichkeit zweier Subjekte mit zwei Körpern" (HuaXIV, 143). Auch wenn es einem Ich grundsätzlich unmöglich ist, gleichzeitig an zwei verschiedenen Orten zu sein, ermöglicht ihm eine solche Fiktion, sich ein anderes, ihm ähnliches Ich vorzustellen, das sich dort befinden könnte, wo sich das in der Phantasie hinausgerückte Ich befindet.[2] Das fremde Ich wird also – wenigstens der Möglichkeit nach – als Analogon des in der Phantasievorstellung hinausversetzten Ich schon vor seinem wirklichen Erfahren gegeben.[3]

Diese Idee einer analogisierenden Vorstellung, die mir erlauben würde, den Körper eines alter ego als einen Leib zu verstehen, ist der Ausgangspunkt aller Versuche Husserls, eine plausible Fremdwahrnehmungstheorie zu entwickeln. Da die Konstitution des fremden Leibkörper die (notwendigerweise originalen) Konstitution des Eigenleibes voraussetzt, muss die Klärung der Verleiblichung und Verkörperung des transzendentalen ego allererst erfolgen. Die ursprüngliche Konstitution der Eigenleiblichkeit nimmt deshalb einen besonderen Platz im Rahmen der eigenheitlichen Reduktion ein. Wie Husserl vom Anfang an feststellt, ist mein Leib von dieser thematischen *Epoché* auf eine radikal andere Weise betroffen als alle anderen Fremdleiber. Er wird mir, so Husserl, unmittelbar gegeben, d.h. er wird als solcher ursprünglich konstituiert[4] (Hua I, 140) und ist demnach der einzige Körper dem ich Empfindungen und Empfindungsfelder unmittelbar zurechnen kann. Die Fremdleiber dagegen, die ich nur von

außen als bewegt erfahren kann, sind mir nie als „Träger von Empfindungsfelder“ unmittelbar gegeben und können in der „solipsistischen Einstellung“ nur als bloße Körper konstituiert werden. Der Entkörperlichung meines eigenheitlich reduzierten Eigenleibes entspricht somit die Entleiblichung des eigenheitlich reduzierten Fremdleibes.

Diese ursprüngliche Gegebenheitsweise des eigenen Leibes – der mir nicht nur unmittelbar gegeben ist, sondern auch radikal *gebend*, also die Bedingung der Möglichkeit aller und jeder Gegebenheit (Hua XV, 283)[5] – wurde schon in verschiedenen Forschungsmanuskripten aus den Jahren 1915 bis 1917 ausführlich diskutiert, ohne wirklich hinreichend erklärt zu werden. Die Grundaufgabe dieses Textes ist aber keine andere als eben diese unmittelbare Gegebenheitsweise des Eigenleibes in Frage zu stellen und den zutiefst problematischen Charakter der immer als schlichtweg unproblematisch dargestellten Frage der Eigenleibkonstitution aufzuzeigen[6]. In eins damit wird dann auch der Versuch gemacht, dass nie ausreichend erklärte Verhältnis zwischen dem transzendentalen Subjekt und seinem Leib zu erläutern. Dafür muss allerdings zuerst nochmals der Frage, wie mein Leib von der transzendentalen *Epoché* betroffen wird, nachgegangen werden.

Allem Anschein nach wird auch mein Leib (und zwar nicht nur als Körper) zusammen mit der ganzen Welt eingeklammert. Die universale Einklammerung der Welt muss, um vollständig zu sein, auch als Einklammerung meines weltlichen Ich und seiner „Seele“, also auch als Einklammerung des Leibes – und zwar nicht nur seiner Körperlichkeit – verstanden werden. Dass es so ist, wird von Husserl selbst in einer Passage aus der *Ersten Philosophie* in aller Deutlichkeit gesagt: „Ich wäre und bliebe der von aller Weltnichtigkeit in meinem Sein Unbetroffene, durch eine sozusagen erkenntniskritische Vernichtung meines Leibes wie des Weltalls überhaupt nie Zu-vernichtende.“ (Hua VIII, 73)

Die „phänomenologische Differenz“, d.h. der Unterschied zwischen psychologischem und transzendentalem Bewusstsein, zwischen meiner weltlichen Person und dem transzendentalen ego, macht offensichtlich nur dann Sinn, wenn mein ganzes

psychophysisches Leben und damit mein psychosomatischer Leib – also die Ganzheit meiner mundanen Selbsterfahrung – durch die *Epoché* eingeklammert wäre. Das entleiblichte transzendentale Subjekt scheint demnach für sich die höchste apodiktische Evidenz zu beanspruchen, sodass alles andere – also auch der Leib gemäß seiner Leiblichkeit und Körperlichkeit – ausschließlich nur im Ausgang von ihm konstituiert werden muss. Die Idee, dass auch der Leib selbst im Bewusstseinsstrom konstituiert wird, kann man schon in einigen um 1908 entstandenen Forschungsmanuskripten finden (Hua XIII, 5). Hier merkt Husserl zwar, dass die wechselseitige Abhängigkeit zwischen dem bewusstseinsmäßig konstituierten Leib und dem vom Leib abhängigen Bewusstsein erklärungsbedürftig ist, versucht aber zunächst dieses Problem zu lösen, indem er den Leib nicht als bloße Bewusstseinsvorstellung, sondern als „ein im Bewusstsein sich Konstituierendes" erklärt (Hua XIII, 6). Damit wird aber das Problem längst noch nicht gelöst und die unmittelbar daran anschließende Behauptung, der Leib sei „nur eine Anzeige für gewisse Einheit des Bewusstseins" (Hua XIII, 24) verschärft es nur noch weiter. Der in den früheren Manuskripten unternommene Versuch, die Leiblichkeit von der Dinglichkeit her, als ein Spezialfall dieser, zu denken, ist eigentlich von Anfang an zum Scheitern verurteilt, eben weil der Leib – seine Körperlichkeit ausgenommen – keineswegs bloße Abschattungseinheit ist, sondern wenigstens, wie Husserl selbst zugibt, „System wirklicher und möglicher Empfindungen (meiner oder Anderer oder möglicher Anderer)." (Hua XIII, 7) Was genau damit gemeint ist und wie man das Verhältnis zwischen Bewusstsein und Leib zu verstehen hat, ist leider dieser früheren Überlegung zur Leiblichkeit nicht wirklich zu entnehmen.

In einem etwas späteren Manuskript (vor 1909) nimmt Husserl diese Fragen wieder auf um bringt den Begriff der Selbstwahrnehmung im Spiel: „Der eigene Leib, als mein Körper mit meinen Empfindungs- und Bewegungsfeldern und meinen auf ihn bezogenen psychischen Zuständen etc., kurzum meine psychophysische Realität ist gegeben in der ‚Selbstwahrnehmung'" (Hua XIII, 24). Die Apostrophierung eines neu eingeführten Begriffs ist häufig bei Husserl ein klares

Zeichen dafür, dass der Begriff erklärungsbedürftig ist. In der Tat versucht er unmittelbar danach, diesen Begriff zu erläutern, indem er das „Selbst" der Selbstwahrnehmung als vom reinen Ich streng unterschiedene psychophysische Realität erklärt, die jedoch noch nicht als „Mensch" zu verstehen sei. Diese Behauptung ist im Einklang mit der Idee eines entleiblichten transzendentalen *ego*. Wäre das Selbst der Selbstwahrnehmung das reine *ego*, würde die phänomenologische Differenz zusammenbrechen, da das *ego* gewissermaßen aufhören würde, transzendental zu sein, wenn es durch bloße Selbstwahrnehmung auf seinen Leib sozusagen „stoßen" würde. Sogleich erwachsen aber weitere und schwierigere Fragen: Wenn der Leib vermittels der Selbstwahrnehmung sich selbst „konstituiert", wie kann er noch zum transzendentalen Bewusstsein zurückgeführt werden und was gibt mir als transzendentales *ego* Anlass dazu, ihn als *meinen Leib* zu verstehen? Obwohl Husserl diese Fragen nicht explizit stellt, scheint er sich jedoch dieses Problems bewusst zu sein und antwortet folgendermaßen darauf: „Wahrgenommen wird der Leib als ‚mein' Körper, und zwar gründet dieses ‚mein' zunächst in eigener, zu beschreibender Erscheinungsweise, die ihn auszeichnet vor anderen wahrgenommenen Körpern. Wahrgenommen wird dann auch, und zwar als zugehörig zu diesem so ausgezeichneten Körper, alles ‚Seelische', ihn als ‚mein' dadurch charakterisierend". (Hua XIII, 25)

Diese Antwort birgt offensichtlich mehrere Probleme als die Frage selbst. Zum einen wird hier klar, dass Husserl den Leib als einen ausgezeichneten Körper zu verstehen versucht, der sich von den bloßen Körpern durch seine besondere Erscheinungsweise, die er nicht wirklich thematisiert, unterscheidet. Diese verschwommene Erklärung des Leibes als eines Körpers, der eben dadurch „mein" ist, weil ihm eine besondere (unerklärte) Erscheinungsweise hinzukommt, ist eigentlich nur ein Versuch, die Leiblichkeit so zu denken, dass sie mit dem Modell der transzendentalen Reduktion einigermaßen verträglich ist. Denn wenn der Leib grundsätzlich als Körper gedacht werden kann, ist das Problem seiner bewusstseinsmäßigen Konstitution schon gelöst. Husserl merkt aber selbst in vielen Kontexten den problematischen, ja

widersprüchlichen Charakter einer solchen Deutung. In *Ideen II* wird das Problem der Konstitution des Eigenleibes auch ganz deutlich artikuliert, indem eine klare Unterscheidung zwischen den zwei Arten der Leibkonstitution gemacht wird. Auf der einen Seite konstituiert sich der Leib „als psychisches Ding, als Materie", andererseits aber als empfindendes und empfindliches. Irgendwie ist der Leib sowohl auf der Seite der Materie, als auch auf der Seite des *ego*, es ist – wie Merleau-Ponty ganz treffend sagt – ein merkwürdiges Subjekt-Objekt (Merleau-Ponty 1960, 165).In einem anderen Text (aus 1914/15) wird aber diesen eigentümlichen Status des Leibes am schärfsten zum Ausdruck gebracht: „Mein Leib ist das Hier, aber er ist nie im objektiven Raum als Objekt erfahren: ‚ursprünglich' erfahren, wahrgenommen im primären Sinn, nicht Einheit von Erscheinungen von derselben Struktur wie ein Außending. Und so bin ich mir auch nicht gegeben als ‚in' einem objektiven Ding ‚waltend' und als einem Objekt zugehörig." (Hua XIII, 240)

Das ist eine der ganz wenigen Passagen im ganzen Werk Husserls, wo er sich seines residualen Cartesianismus bewusst wird und ihn ausdrücklich zurückweist. Der Begriff eines Leibes, der als „Organ" oder „Vehikel" des in ihm waltenden Ich gesehen wird, ist offensichtlich auf die cartesianische Unterscheidung zwischen *res extensa* und *res cogitans* (beziehungsweise auf den Körper-Geist-Dualismus) zurückzuführen und hält sich eigentlich durch das ganze Werk Husserls hindurch. „Organ" und „Vehikel" des Ich kann allerdings der Leib nur in einem übertragenen oder metaphorischen Sinne sein. Erstaunlicherweise stellt Husserl nirgendswo die Frage nach dem Sinn dieser Metapher und problematisiert nie wirklich ihre cartesianische Herkunft. Es ist vielleicht dieser gewissermaßen unkritisch übernommenen Auffassung Descartes in erster Linie zu verdanken, dass Husserl nie bereit war, weder das Verhältnis zwischen Subjektivität und Leiblichkeit, noch dasjenige zwischen Leiblichkeit und Dinglichkeit zu problematisieren. Seine Grundauffassung des Leibes als „Körper, dem originär erlebte Empfindungsfelder zugeordnet sind" (Hua XIII, 270), lässt die früher angedeuteten Fragen so gut wie überhaupt nicht erscheinen[7]. Trotz der hiesigen expliziten Zurückweisung der

cartesianischen Perspektive wird Husserl in allen darauffolgenden Werken und Forschungsmanuskripten eben diese metaphysische Terminologie verwenden. An dieser Stelle wird aber ausdrücklich gesagt, dass der Leib mit seiner körperlichen Erscheinung nicht zu verwechseln ist. Leiblichkeit ist nicht eine Eigenschaft, die irgendwie einem Körper – der als „mein" gedeutet werden kann – hinzukommt, und es ist auch nicht ein Resultat, ein Epiphänomen der „Zusammensetzung" der *res extensa* mit der *res cogitans*.

Die „ursprüngliche Erfahrung" oder Wahrnehmung des Eigenleibes wird allerdings auch in diesem Fragment hauptsächlich nur *ex negativo* definiert, denn es ist überhaupt nicht klar, was „Wahrnehmung im primären Sinn" heißen sollte oder ob sie auch im Sinne der früheren Selbstwahrnehmung zu verstehen ist. In einem viel späteren Text (aus 1921), wo Husserl diese Frage wieder aufnimmt, wird diese Wahrnehmung als „somatologisch" erklärt, es fehlt jedoch eine nähere Erörterung dieses Begriffs: „[W]as meinen Leib anbelangt, so kann ich ihn zwar auch als physisches Ding apperzipieren, und auch er ist im entwickelten Ich als das konstituiert, aber für ihn habe ich die somatologische Wahrnehmung als Leib, und diese steht offenbar voran und ist für mich als fungierendes Ich das an sich Erste, und das Auffassen, das ‚Wahrnehmen' meines Leibes als physisches Ding ein Zweites". (Hua XIV, 61)

Um diesem Problem auf die Spur zu kommen, sollte man vielleicht zu der radikalen Idee der Unräumlichkeit des Leibes, die im ersten Satz der zitierten Passage behauptet wird, zurückkehren. Wenn der Leib nie „im objektiven Raum erscheint" drängt sich offensichtlich die Frage auf, wie seine Erscheinungsweise zu charakterisieren ist. Husserls Antwort darauf lautet: Die für den Leib charakteristische Erscheinungsweise ist die Nullerscheinungsweise, das absolute „Hier": „Es ist ein besonderes Hier, das auf diese Weise zum Ausdruck kommt. Es bezeichnet nicht den Ort, an dem man sich befindet, sondern einen selbst." (Figal 2015, 160) Wie früher gezeigt wurde, ist der Begriff des Nullpunktes der Orientierungen oder der der Nullerscheinungsweise des Eigenleibes einen Schlüsselbegriff der husserlschen

transzendentalen Phänomenologie und steht im Zentrum aller Versuche, die Frage der Fremdwahrnehmung zu lösen. Denn Umwelt, Dinge und andere Menschen sind nur perspektivisch von dem dynamischen „absoluten Hier" des Leibes her erfahrbar und können nur aus dieser leiblichen Perspektive konstituiert werden. Die ganze Welt ist um den Leib herum „gruppiert" und wird nur von ihm her erschlossen. In diesem Raum, der ausschließlich nur vom Leib her zugänglich wird, kann aber der Leib selbst überhaupt nicht erscheinen. Was allerdings erscheinen kann, ist nur seine Körperlichkeit, die eben deshalb gar nicht als Ausgangspunkt für das Verstehen des Leibes genommen werden kann.

Als Grundbedingung der Erscheinbarkeit bleibt der Leib – um einen Begriff Figals zu instrumentalisieren – „unscheinbar" (Figal 2015, 4). Als solcher kann er nie als „Einheit von Erscheinungen" gedacht werden, sondern ist in einer gewissen Hinsicht – genau wie das *alter ego* – „kein Phänomen im Sinne der Phänomenologie." (Hua XIII, 374) Als ermöglichender Grund der Phänomenalität bleibt er der Phänomenologie gewissermaßen unzugänglich. Diese phänomenologische Unzugänglichkeit, diese „Opazität" des Leibes ist eben das, was die Transparenz der phänomenalen Welt möglich macht. Figals Beschreibung der Möglichkeit der Erfahrbarkeit des Raumes könnte deshalb auch - wenigstens bis zu einem Punkt – auf den Leib angewendet werden. Der Leib kann nicht direkt erfahren werden, wird aber ständig miterfahren: jede Wahrnehmung, jedes Sich-beziehen auf etwas Räumliches impliziert auch eine Miterfahrung der Leiblichkeit, die selbst aber nie thematisch werden kann. Um mit Merleau-Ponty zu sprechen, „au moment où la perception vient, il [mon corps] s'efface devant elle et jamais elle ne le saisit en train de percevoir." (Merleau-Ponty 1960, 24)

Wenn aber der Leib grundsätzlich und notwendig phänomenologisch „unscheinbar" ist, wie kann man immer noch über die „transzendentale Konstitution"[8] des Leibes sprechen? In einigen Forschungsmanuskripten macht Husserl den Versuch, eine „Selbstkonstitution" des Leibes plausibel zu machen. „Der Leib", schreibt er, ist „an und für sich selbst konstituiert" (Hua XIV,75-76), er „konstituiert"[9] sich selbst. Die

Idee einer gewissen „Reflexivität" des Leibes, der sich selbst wahrnehmend „konstituiert", ist nicht nur in sich selbst fraglich[10], sondern auch mit der Theorie einer transzendentalen Reduktion und vor allem mit der Idee der transzendentalen Konstitution des Leibes unverträglich. Was würde aber genauer heißen, dass der Leib sich selbst „konstituiert"? Würde das nicht heißen, dass die Konstitution meines Leibes eine schon konstituierte und konstituierende Leiblichkeit und die Erfahrung meines Leibes eine erfahrende Leiblichkeit voraussetzte? All diese aporetischen Fragen zeigen nur, dass die transzendental-phänomenologische Begrifflichkeit Husserls am Problem des Leibes scheitert oder nur bedingt – wenn überhaupt – anwendbar ist. Das ist vielleicht auch der Grund, warum Husserl an einer Stelle nicht mehr über Konstitution, sondern über eine „transzendentale Deduktion" des Leibes spricht: „In meinem Erfahrungsbereich [ist] ein Gegenstand als dauernde Existenz konstituiert und […] mit diesem Gegenstand [ist] meine gesamte Subjektivität als erfahrungsmäßig verknüpft gegeben. […] Dieser Gegenstand als objektiv dauernd und die gesamte originär wahrgenommene Subjektivität an sich knüpfend kann nur ein transzendent konstituierter Gegenstand sein: Wir nennen ihn ‚mein Leib.'" (Hua XIII, 375)

Ob ein solches Modell überhaupt zu tragen vermag, darf allerdings aus mehreren Gründen bezweifelt werden. Seine Fragwürdigkeit ist nicht nur auf seinen Cartesianismus zurückzuführen – es wird nochmal der Versuch gemacht, den Leib von seiner mit der Subjektivität „verknüpften" Körperlichkeit her, zu denken –, sondern verdankt sich in erster Linie dem zirkulären Charakter des Arguments. Die „transzendentale Deduktion" des Leibes setzt einen Erfahrungsbereich voraus, der nur vom Leib her zu verstehen ist. Wie kann also sich der Leib in dem von ihm ermöglichten Erfahrungsbereich „transzendent konstituieren"? Durch den verschwommenen Begriff der „transzendenten Konstitution" scheint Husserl eine gewisse Selbstständigkeit des Leibes gegenüber dem Bewusstsein andeuten zu wollen. Die Idee einer transzendentalen Deduktion des Leibes, die den Leib allerdings notwendigerweise voraussetzt, ist aber der höchste Ausdruck

einer Unmöglichkeit am Leitfaden des Cartesianismus das Problem der Leiblichkeit zu lösen. In Wahrheit kann der Leib nie in Klammern gesetzt oder auf das Bewusstsein zurückgeführt werden[11]. Es kann nicht zuerst ein entleiblichtes transzendentales *ego* geben, das sich „danach" bemüht, die unüberbrückbare Kluft zwischen ihm und seinem Leib zu überbrücken, um sich zu seinem Leib mithilfe begrifflicher Virtuosität zurückzufinden. Arendts Vorwurf an Descartes, dem zufolge „aus dem ‚ich denke' niemals das wirklich lebende Ich, sondern ebenfalls nur ein gedachtes Ich [herausspringt]" (Arendt 1990, 15), scheint auch im Falle des transzendentalen Ich Husserls zutreffend zu sein. Der Leib kann sich nicht bewusstseinsmäßig innerhalb der Eigenheitssphäre konstituieren – alle Versuche Husserls, eine solche Konstitution oder Deduktion zu plausibilisieren sind, wie gezeigt, gescheitert – sondern fungiert als Bedingung der Möglichkeit dieser, wie Husserl selbst manchmal zuzugeben scheint[12]. Bewusstsein ist somit eigentlich immer schon und zwar notwendigerweise verleiblicht. Um einen berühmten Spruch Gorgias zu paraphrasieren: Ohne Leib würde das Bewusstsein nicht erscheinen können (bliebe somit *aphanés*) und ohne Bewusstsein bliebe der Leib ohnmächtig (*asthenés*) (Diels 1922, 266).

Die Frage nach der Beziehung zwischen Subjekt und Leib ist sinnlos, eben weil die Verleiblichung des Subjekts die Bedingung der Möglichkeit jedes Bezugs und jeder Gegebenheit ist. Um mit Figal zu sprechen, wenn man den eigenen Leib wie etwas, das anders ist als man selbst, betrachtet, kann es nur rätselhaft werden, dass ‚dieses da' die eigenen Empfindungen hat" (Figal 2015, 155). Das Subjekt hat nicht einen Leib, sondern ist Leib, die Evidenz des Leibes ist ebenso apodiktisch wie die des *ego cogito*. Die Tatsache, dass Husserl ständig über das Bewusstseins*leben* oder über die *lebendige* Gegenwart[13] spricht, ohne diesen Begriff des transzendentalen Lebens im mindesten erklären zu wollen oder gar zu können, ist eigentlich nicht nur ein Rückfall in den Cartesianismus, wie Steinbock argumentiert, sondern bezeugt die Unmöglichkeit, eine entleiblichte Subjektivität denken zu können. Die Entlebung und Entleiblichung des transzendentalen Subjekts kann nie

wirklich durchgeführt werden, eben weil der Leib sich der phänomenologischen *Epoché* entzieht. Merleau-Ponty bringt diese Idee ganz prägnant auf den Punkt, indem er sagt: „Si, réfléchissant sur l'essence de la subjectivité, je la trouve liée à celle du corps et à celle du monde, c'est que mon existence comme subjectivité ne fait qu'un avec mon existence comme corps et avec l'existence du monde et que finalement le sujet que je suis concrètement pris est inséparable de ce corps-ci et de ce monde-ci." (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 467)

Wenn aber der Leib nicht von Bewusstsein her, sondern das Bewusstsein selbst immer schon als verleiblicht gedacht werden muss, kann man eigentlich gar nicht mehr festhalten, wie schon aus der Behauptung Merleau-Pontys zu entnehmen ist, dass „[j]ede Ausweisung, Begründung für Wahrheit und Sein ganz und gar in mir [verläuft] und ihr Ende ein Charakter im *cogitatum* meines *cogito* [ist]" (Hua I, 31)[14]. Die phänomenologische *Epoché* – und in eins damit die egologische transzendentale Konstitution – kann nie wirklich restlos durchgeführt werden, sondern bleibt strukturell unvollständig (Merleau-Ponty 1960, 299)[15]. Das ist ein eindeutiger Fingerzeig, dass die Umgrenzung einer Eigenheitssphäre des transzendentalen *ego* – die für die Fremdwahrnehmungstheorie Husserls von entscheidender Bedeutung ist – grundsätzlich fraglich ist. Diese Frage kann leider an dieser Stelle nicht mehr diskutiert werden. Jetzt genügt es darauf aufmerksam zu machen, dass die Selbstbesinnung der transzendentalen Subjektivität sich weder als absolute Loslösung von der Welt noch als eine Trennung von den in dieser Welt implizierten, miteingeschlossenen Anderen verstehen kann, sondern ganz im Gegenteil „la réflexion radicale est conscience de sa propre dépendance à l'égard d'une vie irréfléchie qui est sa situation initiale constante et finale" (Merleau-Ponty 1960, IX). Damit wird also keineswegs die Möglichkeit der Phänomenologie durchgestrichen, auch wenn der Sinn der phänomenologischen *Epoché* und der transzendentalen Konstitution – und vor allem der Sinn der phänomenologischen *Differenz* – selbstverständlich neu gedacht werden muss. Erst im Horizont einer als „radikale Reflexion" verstandene Selbstbesinnung – oder, um mit Heidegger zu sprechen, einer *Hermeneutik*, die

notwendigerweise sich als *faktisch* verstehen muss – kann die Phänomenologie hoffen, die unhintergehbare Verflechtung zwischen Subjektivität, Intersubjektivität und Welt ergründen zu können. Die Phänomenologie würde dann zu einer Analyse der „Faktizität" (der Weltlichkeit und Geschichtlichkeit) einer immer schon verleiblichten und verweltlichten (Inter)Subjektivität, die eigentlich – wie diese in Anlehnung an Merleau-Ponty angestellte Überlegungen wenigstens zum Teil gezeigt haben sollten – im Schicksal der transzendental-idealistischen Phänomenologie Husserls liegt, auch wenn sie zum größten Teil ungedacht bleiben musste.

NOTES

[1] Vgl. auch Hua IV, 81: „Man merkt, dass die Leibesauffassung eine besondere Rolle für die Intersubjektivität spielt […]".
[2] Vgl. auch Hua XIV, 143f. In diesem Forschungsmanuskript aus 1921/22 erwägt Husserl erneut die Bedeutung der „Umfiktion des Ich" für die Frage der Fremdwahrnehmung, und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass eine solche Umfiktion nicht nur die Möglichkeit, sich ein anderes ich vor seiner wirklichen Erfahrung zu denken, „sondern sich eine Vielheit von Ich zu denken: also Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Kompossibilität" ist.
[3] Vgl. auch Hua XIII, 265.
[4] Dieser Begriff der ursprünglichen Konstitution des Eigenleibes muss noch im Laufe dieser Arbeituntersucht und geklärt werden.
[5] Vgl. auch Hua XV,285ff. Hier wird auch das Verhältnis zwischen dem Ich und seinem Leibkörper ein Stück weit problematisiert: „[I]ch bin nicht Ergänzungsstück dieses Körpers, als ob dieser wie andere Körper sein konnte, sondern bin kontinuierlich darin Waltender und dadurch auf alles äußere Dingliche bezogen, durch ihn ist alles Seiende für mich da, für mich zuganglich".
[6] Die Schwierigkeit, den Leibcharakter meines Leibes verständlich zu machen liegt vielleicht eben darin – wie G. Figal bemerkt hat –, dass mir „der eigene Leib zu nah" und damit „das Selbstverständlichste überhaupt" ist. (Figal 2015, 155)
[7] Diese cartesianische Auffassung des Leibes wird auch, zum Beispiel, von Figal scharf kritisiert: „Daraus, dass Lebewesen in ihrer Leiblichkeit Eigenschaften haben, die auch ,,physische Dinge" haben können, folgt nicht, dass Lebewesen auch physische Dinge sind" (Figal 2015, 157).
[8] Vgl. auch Hua XV, Text 31 (1932),549: „Ich bin transzendentales Ich eines transzendentalen Lebens, daraus entsprungener transzendentaler Habitualitäten, worin sich im transzendentalen Strömen Welt als Seinssinn konstituiert, und so, dass in ihr zugleich dieses transzendentale Leben selbst

sich als verweltlicht konstituiert hat und fortkonstituiert, in Form nämlich meines menschlichen Bewusstseins".

[9] Dieser Begriff der Konstitution kann hier eigentlich nicht mehr wirklich im transzendentalen Sinne verstanden werden.

[10] Wie Merleau-Ponty ganz überzeugend argumentiert, bleibt eine solche leibliche Reflexivität ständig unvollendet und kann nie wirklich vollzogen werden: „Si ma main gauche touche ma main droite, et que je veuille soudain, par ma main droite, saisir le travail de ma main gauche en train de toucher, cette réflexion du corps sur lui-même avorte toujours au dernier moment: au moment où je sens ma gauche avec ma droite, je cesse dans la même mesure de toucher ma main droite de ma main gauche" (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 24). Daraus konnte man vielleicht schließen, dass mein Leib (das Subjekt-Leib) sich selbst (als Körper) wahrnehmen kann, seine Wahrnehmbarkeit kann er aber nicht wahrnehmen. Und dennoch die Möglichkeit meiner mit der linken Hand berührten rechten Hand selbst von berührtem Körper zum berührenden Leib zu machen – ein Phänomen, das Merleau-Ponty als Umkehrbarkeit (*réversibilité*) des Leibes thematisiert – impliziert, dass „le toucher ici est répandu dans le corps, que le corps est « chose sentante », « sujet-objet »" (Vgl. Merleau-Ponty 1960, 210).

[11] Diese Irreduzibilität des Leibes wird vielleicht am Deutlichsten von H. Schmitz, der den Leib als die Grundlage des Personseins erklärt, zum Ausdruck gebracht. (Vgl. Schmitz 2014, 45).

[12] Vgl. zum Beispiel Hua XV, Text 31, Beilage XL (um 1932). Hier wird merkwürdigerweise über „meinen Leib" und „seine Originarität gesprochen". Damit ist aber nicht nur die Zugehörigkeit des Leibes zu dieser Originalsphäre gemeint, sondern vor allem die besondere und grundlegende Rolle der Leiblichkeit in ihrer vermittelnden Charakter, der Originalität überhaupt möglich macht: „Jedes andere Ding meiner originalen Sphäre ist für mich so da, dass ich von ihm einen originalen Bestand habe, aber *vermittels* meines Leibes und seiner Originalität, vermittels seiner originalen Kinästhesen". Wenn mir der Leib alle anderen Dinge in Ihrer Originalität vermittelt, wie kann er aber trotzdem dieser Originalsphäre angehören?

[13] Derrida findet auch Ausdrücke wie „lebendige Gegenwart" oder „Bewusstseinsleben" ganz problematisch – er spricht sogar in diesem Kontext über „l'énigme du concept de vie" – und weist auch emphatisch daraufhin, dass „l'unité du vivre, le foyer de la Lebendigkeit qui diffracte sa lumière dans tous les concepts fondamentaux de la phénoménologie (Leben, Erlebnis, lebendige Gegenwart, Geistigkeit, etc.) échappe à la réduction transcendantale" Vgl. Derrida 2005, 9). Meines Wissens gibt es eine einzige Stelle, wo Husserl den Sinn seines transzendentalen Lebensbegriffs flüchtig in Frage stellt, ohne ihn jedoch zu problematisieren. Vgl. Hua XV,584: „Nicht einmal Strömen und Leben darf hier im ernstlichen Sinn verstanden werden".

[14] Der Umstand, dass etwas nicht erst durch meine Bezugnahme auf es real oder wirklich wird, heißt längst noch nicht, dass der Bezug belanglos oder philosophisch uninteressant sei. Eine Betrachtung der Dinge unter dem Aspekt meines Bezugs auf sie könnte dann einen phänomenologischen Charakter haben, ohne damit aufzuhören, eine „realistische Betrachtung" zu

sein. Und so ergibt sich, wie Figal ganz überzeugend argumentiert, „die Möglichkeit einer realistischen Phänomenologie“ (Vgl. Figal 2015, 108).

[15]Merleau-Ponty argumentiert jedoch an dieser Stelle, dass diese Unvollständigkeit der Reduktion „n'est pas un obstacle à la réduction, elle est la réduction même, la redécouverte de l'être vertical.

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The Ground of Experience: Implications in the Constitution of Judgments in Husserl's Phenomenology

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Abstract

This research will attain mainly in the work of Husserl called *Experience and Judgment*. This book traces the possibility of a common ground for judgments in the way that it can raise new perspectives, facing its limits and variations. Husserl fosters an implication between the Ego and the world through the living experience in the process of constitution itself. Therefore, every abstraction, imagination, subjectivity, objectivity and even hallucinations take a stand on the same ground and follow some same identic logical structures. It does not mean a deterministic point of view, but a latent process of constitution of meaning that goes forever on a march; the march of our living experience.

Keywords: experience, judgments, ego, world, implication

1. The unification of consciousness through the effective power on the Ego

In the chapter I of his book: *Experience and Judgment*, Husserl claims that there is *pregiveness* in perception, feeling, and in the active performance of the *Ego*. What excites the perception is pregiven in the environing world and it is affected on the basis of this world (Husserl 1939, §15, 74). Such pregiveness is given in passiveness; it is already there for us on the basis of previous experiences (Husserl 1939, §16, 75); before the activity of the Ego, but not without a field of determinative structure. In order to comprehend it, there is a pregiveness, and, subsequently, the activity of the Ego upon it, and after the judgment is performed, but not without an operation of

predicative judgment (Sallis 1967, 129). We are involved in a field of sensuous data whereby prominences (*Abgehobenheinten*) come to us. Such prominences already represent a unity that can be thematized. What appears to us in the form of an object is a synthesis performed by the operations of the time-consciousness (*Zeitbewusstsein*). The result of temporal constitution is only a universal form of order of succession and a form of coexistence of all immanent data. However, according to Husserl, a form is nothing without content (Husserl 1939, §16, 76). That means that a form does not come as a thing from nothing, it has content, a unity in time-consciousness, representing a higher level of constitutive activity.

Every field of sense bring the consciousness of a multiplicity of similar things raised to prominence. Such similarity contrast with things in the way it appears in the field of sense. Thus, in every contrast there also remains something on the order of familiarity and fusion (*Verwandtschaft und Verschmelzung*). For Husserl, this unity among a multiplicity is possible immanently in our consciousness in conformity with familiarity (homogeneity) and strangeness (heterogeneity) (Husserl 1939, §17, 77). The unity is possible due to immanence whereby our consciousness associates various objects fostering a unity. Homogeneity and heterogeneity, therefore, are the result of two different and fundamental modes of associative unification (Husserl 1939, §17, 79). In this way, similar is evoked by the similar, and it contrast with the not similar. These syntheses of coincidence (*Deckungssynthesen*) have their affective force; it is not simply passive occurrences in consciousness, but exercise an effective power on the *Ego*, which makes it turn toward with weaker or starker intensity.

Husserl alerts us about discontinuities on the sensuous sphere that come as an obtrusion (Husserl 1939, §17, 80), and that has an affective power on the *Ego* as well. Such effectiveness is also weaker or starker, depending on turning-toward (*Zuwendung*) (Husserl 1939, §17, 83) of the *Ego*. In the example from Husserl, one need not pay attention to a powerful stimulus (like the whistle of a locomotive which passes in front of us) if one is engaged in conversation with an important person.

In the domain of objectivating lived experiences, of doxic lived experiences, in which existents (*Seiendes*) (Husserl 1939, §18, 84) are present to consciousness, we find a belief of existence. However, when we are completely abandoned to the beauty of a picture, we live in the pleasure taken in it and not in the belief in existence. That means that the *Ego* is not tied exclusively to a deterministic objectivation; every nondoxic turning-toward and continuing occupation with something leaves the possibility open for a change of attitude into a doxic one. The tendency of Ego to objectification can be directed into new objectifications. Thus, in the course of the continuity we can find a process of modified modes of fulfillment. Such a tendency is done by an attention in relation to the object that appears as prominence to the *Ego*.

Attention is a tending of the *Ego* toward an intentional object, toward a unity which appears continually in the change of the modes of its givenness and which belongs to the essential structure of a specific act of the *Ego*; it is a tending-toward in realization. Theses realization which is brought into being with the turning-toward is the beginning (Husserl 1939, §18, 85) of a continuing realizing directedness of the object. Thus, the beginning indicates the direction of a further synthetically unified process of realization. In this way, the beginning has an intentional horizon that points beyond itself in an empty mode, which will be filled in subsequent realization.

In this progress of realization, the *Ego* has a tendency of interest in the process of fulfillment. It is a striving toward a new consciousness (Husserl 1939, §19, 87) in the form of an interest in the enrichment of the *self* of the object. In such way, the object is considered by both sides (the seen and the unseen side) whereby a *kinesthesis* (Husserl 1939, §19, 89) approach will be necessary in order to actualized the object in the flow itself. In the process of realization, the *Ego* can stop or let it continue to flow. Husserl speaks of an "I can".

Husserl says that this interest does not mean that it belongs to an act of will (Husserl 1939, §20, 91), but stays in the effectiveness of the object over the *Ego*, in its awaken and motivation over the Ego. It can be an act of the will in the highest level, but not necessarily. Such interest can become a

theme like a scientific research. I can be engaged thematically with something, take a break a drink a cup of coffee, look through the window and see the landscape, to be distracted with the beauty out there, and come back to my research. In spite of this discontinuity, the theme continuous to be my theme, it just sinks into the background for this moment. According to Husserl, this reveals something new about the interest. It is every act turning-toward the *Ego*, whatever transitory or continuous, every act of the Ego's being-with (*Dabeiseins)* (Husserl 1939, §20, 93).

When the perception goes normal in an unobstructed way, it brings the expectation of the fulfillment, giving the satisfaction of the interest. Nevertheless, the processes of perception can be obstructed. The interest can be unsatisfied, or have a disappointment in relation to its fulfillment. Husserl speaks of the satisfaction of the interest (*Befriedigung des Interesses*) (Husserl 1939, §21, 93), whenever the interest is fulfilled in a progressive striving way from one phase of perception to the next, from one mode of givenness of the object to the next, constituting the fulfillment of the intentions of anticipation. In case of obstructiveness of the process of perception, the interest can be maintained or not. It will depend on the very process of the interest itself.

The unsatisfaction of the interest fosters the emergence of the disappointment of conscience of otherness (Husserl 1939, §21, 94). That means that in the very process of fulfillment the interest can persist, because a uniform framework (Husserl 1939, §21, 95) of sense runs together with the interest, acquiring the character - not so, but otherwise. The modalization of negation, in its own way, brings an abrupt change on the believe about the certainty of an object; it appeared to be red, but in fact it is green.

Another kind of modalization is doubt (Husserl 1939, §21, 91), which comes as an enduring state, whereby interpenetrating possibilities about the object can arise. For example, one sees out there what seems to be a man, but he is not sure about it, because it could also be a mannequin. Before certainty, it endures a double possibility of perception that interpenetrates each other. Both perceptions are possible. In

the conflict between the inclinations of belief, correlatively of presumptions of being (*Seinsanmutunen*) (Husserl 1939, §21, 104), emerges the concept of possibility. For Husserl, being-possible, possibility is thus a phenomenon that already appears in the prepredicative sphere and is most originally at home there. Thus, the intention through the objective sense, becomes a questioning intention, involving what Husserl would say - a presumptive possibility. The probability that raises from the presumptions creates a unity of the opposite, so that both are equal possible.

Husserl distinguishes between problematic possibilities that comes as interpenetrating perceptions as above, and open possibility that has the character of an indeterminate general intention (*unbestimmt allgemeine Intention*) (Husserl 1939, §21, 98). The open possibility tends to certainty because all the general particularities drive to it. For example, it is presupposed to see the same color on the backside of a ball when I turn to it. Nevertheless, despite presupposed certainty, still there is indeterminateness.

2. The penetration of the object through the Ego

The *Ego* oriented toward the acquisition of knowledge, tends to penetrate the object, considering it not only from all sides, but also in all of its particular aspects, explicating (Husserl 1939, §22, 113) it. On this way, it is possible to consider the following levels of the considerations perception of an object (Husserl 1939, §22, 114-115):

1. The considered intuition, which precedes all explication, the intuition, which is directed toward the object – taken as a whole. This apprehension and consideration is the lowest level of common, objectifying activity, the lowest level of the unobstructed exercise of perceptual interest.

2. The higher level of exercise of this interest is the true explicative consideration of the object. That means that the interest follows the direction of the expectation, which has been awaken. Explication is penetration of the internal horizon of the object by the direction of perceptual interest, following its internal determinations.

Another level of perceptual operations happens when relative determinations arise which display what the object is in its relation to other objects. In the example of Husserl: the pencil is beside the inkwell, it is longer than the penholder, and so on. The objects will be drawn by their relations to the object, depending on the cogivennes of other objects in the external horizon of the perception.

Husserl starts to analyze each one of these levels. In the simple apprehension, Husserl sees the possibility of an immanent-temporal unity done passively in the activity of apprehension. The *Ego* just hold the continuum fluxes in the appearance of the object, like a sound that rings in a constant tonality. The *Ego* apprehends the sound in his activity of apprehension, as a continuum. In the immanent-temporal flux it remains the same sound, as a thematization, which is preconstitutive. It is a passivity that belongs to the act; a kind of passivity in activity (Husserl 1939, §23, 119). The act has its source in the *Ego*, but through the regularity of the phenomenon, as a still-in-grasp (*Noch-im-Griff*) (Husserl 1939, §23, 118). The act is done passively. Each now is different, where the phenomenon happens, but through the activity of apprehension it receives its unity as the same.

A still-retaining-in-grasp can also take place without the appearance of the regularity of the object. For example: if the sound ceases to ring out or a visual object is removed from the visual field it does not mean that it will not be retained in grasp; it does not merely sink retentionally. The retaining-in-grasp can thus be impressional, a retaining-in-grasp during the continuous givenness of the object, or it can e nonimpressional (Husserl 1939, §23, 121), persisting after the original givenness of the object has come to an end. According to Husserl, thus, every act of the *Ego* appears in the temporal field as a temporally self-constituting datum. Therefore, not only to the retentional extention of the past, but also to the protentional, although completely empty, extension of the future belongs to such field.

Every object has its peculiarities, its internal determinations. It can rise up out of the obscure background of consciousness, affecting and determining the apprehension of the *Ego*. Through such internal orientation bringing-to-

givenness (Zur-Gegebenheit-bringen) (Husserl 1939, §24, 125) emerges a horizon of familiarity, a general essence through which the process of explication is distinguished from a pure and simple act of consideration. If we pass from synthetically, from one color to another, there is already a synthesis of coincidence; the moments which overlap one another coincide according to likeness or similarity. Such process that goes continuously offers the base for explication, which involves property and determinations of the object.

For Husserl, every object is not a thing isolated in itself but is always already an object in its horizon of typical familiarity and precognizance. For this reason, the process taking place in an original intuition is always already saturated with anticipancion; there is always more cointended apperceptively than actually is given by intuition. The object in its horizon is constantly in motion; with every new step of intuitive apprehension, new delineations of the object result, more precise determinations and corrections of what was anticipated. It can be characterized as a lived experience of the apprehension of a substrate and an explicate. This lived experience itself, and the objective moment constituted in it, may become forgotten; but for all this, stay a trace; it merely become latent. With regard to what has been constituted in it, it is a possession in the form of a habitus (Husserl 1939, §25, 137), ready at any time to be awakened anew by an active association.

From now on, Husserl ascend to the more complicated forms of explications, namely, ramified explication (*verzweigenden Explikationen*) (Husserl 1939, §28, 147), and it happens in the following way:

1. The Ego abandons its original substrate instead of continuing to hold it in grasp, while it retains in active apprehension what has just been characterized in explicate. In the example of Husserl, a flower bed attracts our attention and becomes the object of consideration, it may happen that one of the flowers apprehended in the explication attracts our interest so strongly that we make it out exclusive theme, while we abandon all interest in the flower bed. Now, the single flower instead becomes the proper substrate for a continuing act of cognition.

2. In the second case, the original substrate still remains the object of principal interest, and all particular explication, penetrating further into the emerging determination, indirectly serves only its own enrichment. In this sense, the flower bed is still the interest of my grasp, but the way I go further in explicates, I enrich it ever more.

In both cases, the ramified explication comes from a substrate. This substrate produces several explicates, generating news connections, whereby a new substrate can emerge. In the first case, the new substrate lives the old one into passivity and becomes thematically autonomous. In the second case, the new substrate just enriches even more the original one.

Substrates can function as determinations, can take over the functions of parts of wholes. Every substrate has determinations which are not absolute substrates (Husserl 1939, §29, 152). Thus, in the example of Husserl: the shape and color serves as determination of the body of the object, of a spatiotemporal thing which is its substrate. A finite substrate can be experienced simply for itself and thus has its being-for-itself, but it can be a determination, considering a more embracing substrate. For example: The world has a plurality of substrates which can count as determinations, taking the world as a theme, or as an absolute substrate. This implies that everything in the world is ultimately dependent; only the world is independent. That means that absolute substrates are independent and absolute determinations are dependent (Husserl 1939, §29, 156). Husserl alerts that the world of our experience is not only the totality of nature. In the world there are also others, our fellow men (Husserl 1939, §29, 158), and this world is a world for all (Husserl 1976 258). In this way, things do not sustain only natural determinations, but they are determinated as cultural objects, shaped by man, attesting a personal determination.

The cultural object reveals that there are others that are implicated in the constitutions of meaning. In everyday life, we find ourselves constantly before an infinite number of objects which are presented with a cultural meaning (Carroccio 2013, 323), developed in the context of our experience in the *life-world* with other. In this sense, every object is presented with its

burden of traditional meaning by the community as the meaning of that object. The object affects us traditionally before any meaning endowment.

For Husserl, every whole has determinations (parts) that are either independent or dependent. In the case of independent determinations, they are capable of being dismembered into pieces (independent parts) and, by contrast, the dependent parts will be called dependent moments. Husserl brings the example of the a copper ashtray (Husserl 1939, §31, 164) which has a red color characterized as a dependent moment, because the substrate which is explicated as red, and retained in grasp as such, affects us as being at the same time rough or smooth a so on, in a not independent way. The basis of the ashtray is a piece because it is connected in the whole with other parts in contrast with dependent moments that does not have something that completed it.

Husserl brings the illustration of the edge of a material thing or the total surface which defines it as a spatial figure. For Husserl, we cannot consider the edge or the surface as pieces, because they cannot be dismembered into parts. Although, they are dependent moments, they cannot be considered qualities of the thing. Instead, qualities of a thing are its color, roughness, smoothness, and the like. They can even be divided into pieces; like that piece is blue and the other is white. Thus, if we dismember the thing, then the color, etc., of an individual piece is its quality, and only mediately the quality of the whole. The thing is first of all extended, and its extension has a limit of this or that form as its immediate quality, which is them only a mediate quality of the total thing. Dependent concrete moments which do not belong to the thing as immediate qualities thus are mediate qualities. Therefore, qualities are dependent moments of an object which do not belong to its pieces as their moments or to any sum of pieces as their connection.

3. The external explication: the possibility of otherwise

Husserl now will turn his attention to the relational consideration which goes beyond the object *per se*. In this way,

Husserl will enter into the external horizon of the object, whereby we had in view its objectively copresent surroundings, representing a plural unity of the affecting, constituted according to the laws which govern the field of passivity. Thus, instead of investigating the object for itself on the basis of these relations, we can also thematize these relations themselves (Husserl 1939, §33, 172). It works on the level of free imagination whereby it is possible to build up several ways of relations. A fixed order is not prescribed here, as it was in the case of internal explication.

As Husserl points it, we can have changed our place of residence, have come to another country or the neighborhood may have so change that it has simply become another; but, despite all this, all these different remembered environing worlds are pieces of one and the same objective world (Husserl 1939, §38, 189). The same with time, despite all conflict that occurs in sensibility itself, prior to all activity, to all perceived, all perceptible, individuals have the common form of time. Temporality as duration, as coexistence, as sequence, is the necessary form of all objects of intuition as unities and in this respect is the form of their intuition.

According to Husserl, the unity of an *Ego* extends, and can extend, only as far as we have a unity of internal consciousness; and all intentional objects of the perceptions, which appear in this consciousness, must to the same extent, constitute a temporal connection that coincides which that of the immanent time of the acts (Husserl 1939, §38, 193). Therefore, all perceptions and experiences of an *Ego* are in connection with regard to their intentional objects; they are related to a single time. Similarly, all perceptions and experiences of all *ego-subjects* which are in mutual understanding are in connection with regard to their intentional object.

In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl says that volitions, acceptances, believe and so on, develop a particularization of the *Ego* itself, which Husserl calls personal character (Husserl 1973, §32, 101). Nevertheless, the attitude of openness, to the possibilities brought by the *epoché*, lived by our immanent consciousness of time, forming its ideal types

(noematic) together with its implicit flux, develop also our personal character. Thus, our personal character is constituted by our very attitude toward the process itself; may be an attitude of openness, or a natural attitude. So, every *Ego* has his own particular constitution (Husserl 1973, §41, 117), forming a concrete *Ego*. The *concrete Ego* includes also the whole of actual and potential conscious life; it includes all constitutional problems without exception.

Husserl has shown the implication represented by a transcendental subjectivity in relation to the stream of conscience (*the immanent conscious of time*), the genesis process between passive and active constitutions (*passive synthesis*), the constituted and the constituting dynamism of consciousness (*noetic/noematic*), and the horizontality of the world itself with its constancy and claims (*the original world*). Such implications are involved in a transcendental subjectivity by its intentionality. In this way, the intentionality embraces the intentionality of the world (objects) and the intentionality of consciousness in which a unity is performed constantly.

It seems that we have a common constitutive unity structure, an immanent conscious of time, but our judgement goes to different perspectives, forming a variation of personal characters, but all are formed by the same constitutive original structure. Even in our fantasies we can find a representation of time, but it is a time without actual, strict localization of position; Husserl called it a *quasi-time* (Husserl 1939, §39, 196). In the actual world, nothing remains open; it is what it is. The world of fantasy is by grace of the imagination which has imagined it. Nevertheless, we can find a unity of a complex of imaginings; it is the unity of a possible world which is constituted with an encompassing form of the time of imagination pertaining to it. The unity of the intuition of time is the condition of the possibility of all unity of the intuition of a plurality of objects connected in any way, for all are temporal objects (Husserl 1939, §42, 214).

The interest in perception, which guides receptive experience, is only a part of the interest in cognition in the proper sense. In addition, we have a will to cognition (Husserl 1939, §47, 232) whereby the Ego wishes to know the object. The

goal of the will is the apprehension of the object in the identity of its determinations. For this reason, Husserl says that the confirmation of what exists, how and what it is, is the sense of all cognitive activity. The achievement of knowledge is an activity attached to pregiven objects, but attached in a completely different way than the merely receptive activity of apprehension, explication, and relational consideration. Its outcome is the possession of knowledge. Thus, the work of cognition, this higher stage of activity, in contrast to receptivity, is characterized as a creative spontaneity, itself already productive of objects; it is the real of predicates. Such cognition search for logical connections, forming categorial objectivities (Husserl 1939, §47, 233) through which an abiding possession is made which can be intuited as identical by others.

The predicative forming and cognizing is in fact inseparably entwined in the concretion of one consciousness. Thus, each step of the predication presupposes a step of receptive experience and explication. On this way, Husserl asserts that something can be originally predicated only if it has been originally given in an intuition, apprehended and explicated. Therefore, in order for the substrate of the explication to become a subject and for the explicates to become predicates, it is necessary that the regard turns back to the unity which is passively preconstitued within the receptive activity of the process in a changed attitude, making an active synthesis from a passive one. Even the progress of judgment, which goes to various logical combinations, providing an open horizon (Husserl 1939, §51, 258), has its constitution in the unity of intuition.

A spontaneous synthesis of identification can take place only where receptive apprehension and explication have already gone before. The *S* which endures as identical is invested with ever new logical sense. In the example of Husserl:

> if S is determined intuitively as *p* and again as *q*, etc., if in determinative identification the transitions from *S* to *p*, *q*, …, are actively carried out, the *S* which is determined as *p* passively coincides with *S* determined as *q* with certain obviousness. *S* is before us in intuition as the identical, and our thematic interest is directed exclusively toward its ever richer determination (Husserl 1939, §57, 280).

For Husserl, in each step of judgment not only does a determination of the substrate, originally pregiven and already receptively apprehended, take place, not only is this substrate predicatively intended in an ever new way and invested with logical sense, but, at the same time, a new kind of objectivity is preconstituted: the state of affairs (Husserl 1939, §59, 285). Every situation involves several states of affairs. For example: the quantitative situation a – b involves the two states of affairs $a > b$, and $b <$ a. Another form of an objectivity of understanding, in its productive spontaneity, is the set whereby is possible a retaining-in-grasp between objects on their specific sets (Husserl 1939, §61, p 292-293). Thus we have a unity of apprehension in the form of *([A,B], C):* likewise *([A,B], [C,D]),* etc.

Husserl considers that every lived experience, every consciousness, is subject to the original law of flow (Husserl 1939, §64, 304). Every concrete lived experience is a unity of becoming and is constituted as an object in internal consciousness in the form of temporality. In the case of proposition, it has no binding temporal position, which belong to it. The proposition is not like a real object, individuated in an objective point of time; rather, it is an irreal (Husserl 1939, §64, 311) object which, so to speak, is everywhere and nowhere. The irreality of the proposition as the idea of a synthetic unity of becoming; it is referred to all times, to whatever time it may be referred, it is always absolutely the same; it sustains no temporal differentiation.

The world is the universe of realities, among which we count all objects individualized in spatiotemporality, as the form of the world, by their spatiotemporal localization. Irreal objectivities make their spatiotemporal appearance in the world, but they can appear simultaneously in many spatiotemporal positions and yet be numerically identical. It belongs essentially to their appearance that they are subjective formations, therefore localized in worldliness by the localization of the subject. That is, a supertemporal unity pervades the temporal multiplicity within which it is situated: the supertemporality implies omnitemporality (Husserl 1939, §64, 313). We call real a specific sense all that which, in real things

in the broader sense is, according to its sense, essentially individualized by its spatiotemporal position; but we call irreal every determination which, indeed, is founded with regard to its spatiotemporal appearance in a specifically real thing but which can appear in different realities as identical – not merely as similar. In the examples of Husserl: books, states, theories have a mundane reality, but such cultural objectivities have a determination of significance. To understand it better, Husserl makes an important difference between free idealities and bound idealities (Husserl 1939, §65, 321). Both idealities are built through the world, but free ideality, despite being mundane, is omnispatial and omnitemporal. Bound realities, in their being-sense carry reality with them and hence belong to the real world.

4. The simple categorical judgment: *S* is *p*

In order to analyze the act of judgment in the full concrete sense, Husserl starts do consider the phenomena of modalization. The modalities of predicative judgment must be understood as mode of decision (Husserl 1939, §66, 327). Our original experiences; the ground composed of all judgments already passed and all the categorial objectivities already constituted in them, objectivities which depend on the law of sedimentation with possibility of reactivation, taking effect within the new and original reacomplishment of the act of judgment; doubts that brake the chains of certainty; negation that cancels one´s habitual possession, - all these, springs the striving for decision (*streben nach Entscheidung*) (Husserl 1939, §68, 340) and the necessity of a criticism of the judgments already passed, of the categorial objectivities already spontaneously produced; this criticism as regard the supposition of their truth bears on the question of whether they can be brought to a synthesis of fulfillment coincident with the original givens of experience. Husserl notes that the effort to attain a decision and a guarantee of the position-taking of belief does not aim at a mere decision, but to a striving toward cognition, being directed toward truth.

For Husserl, all verification leads back to the substrates of judgment, it returns to the self-giving experience of these

substrates. Thus, the origination of modalized judgments is always connected with the act of empty judgment which goes beyond what is self-giving and with the criticism of these anticipations. In this specific sense, the act of judgment is therefore the *Ego-act* of position (Husserl 1939, §71, 348). The field in which the *Ego* now operates is not only the horizon of free expectation and the intentionality now established in unanimity, but also the *Ego* actively appropriates through its striving an acquisition, therefore an enduring cognition, and this in full consciousness. Husserl says that striving for consistency of judgment and for certainty in thus a characteristic which is part of the general striving of the *Ego* for self-preservation (Husserl 1939, §71, 351). The *Ego* preserves itself when it can abide by its acts of position-taking, its validations and reacts of everything which disturbs this self-preservation, like unmodalized certainties.

There is only one basic form which is the simple categorical judgment: *S* is *p* (Husserl 1939, §72, 353). Accordingly, the favored concept of judgment is that which knows only one quality: the confirmation of what is valid. Thus, in the act of judgment the two terms (*S* and *p*) are put into relation in a peculiar way which yields judgments of a particular kind.

Husserl distinguish the position-taking of doubt from that of supposition (*Vermutung*) (Husserl 1939, §76, p 365-368), which will arise when one of the attracting possibilities obtains the greater weight, when it has more speaking in its favor, when it has a kind of preferential recognition. Thus, position-taking of supposition must be distinguished from passive, affective attractions, because we take one side, admitting the other, although with reduced weight. Another kind of position-taking is conviction (Husserl 1939, §77, p 368-369); while we are so completely certain, many things can speak against the being-thus, that another being presents itself to us as an attracting possibility. Such attractions can have a different weight, they can exert a stronger or a weaker pull, but they do not determine us. Only the one possibility determines us to believe, namely, that for which we have already decided. Husserl presents other kind of certainty, is the mode of

empirical, presumptive certainty (Husserl 1939, §77, 370-371). The certainty of external experience is always presumptive, although this certainty is repeatedly confirmed in the progress of experience. Presumptive because it refers to the realm of open possibilities, whereby they are all equally possible. The mode opposite to presumptive certainty is that of absolute, apodictic certainty.

Husserl also highlights the role of question and answer in judgments (Husserl 1939, §78, p 371-375). For Husserl, questioning is a practical mode of behavior relative to judgments. If we ask a question and fail to reach a decision, we find ourselves in an unpleasant frustration, which perhaps also frustrate us in other decisions of our practical life. According to Husserl, questioning is not merely a state of wishing; rather, it is a striving directed toward a judicative decision, which as such belongs to the sphere of will and becomes a decisive willing and acting only when we see practical ways to actually bring about the judicative decision. The true sense of questioning is revealed by answers, for it comes the fulfillment of the aspiration which relaxes tension and attains satisfaction. Questions involving justification is distinct from the simple questions (Husserl 1939, §79, p 375-380). The question of justification is thus not directed toward mere judicative certainty but toward a grounded certainty. Hence, it is necessary to distinguish, on the one hand, between being certain, being-decide, being-convinced in a subjective way, and, on the other, being-certain objectively, in other words, being-decide from intuitive grounds. The subjective curtains can serve as inducement for the raising of questions of justifications.

For Husserl, empirical generalities are acquired at first on the basis of the repetition of like, having a horizon which presumptively exhibits a broader experience of particulars which can be acquired in free arbitrariness by opening up this presumptive horizon of being (Husserl 1939, §86, 409). The extension is then an infinitely open one, and still the unity of the empirically acquired is a contingent one. The concept opposed to this contingency is that of *a priori* necessity, whereby pure concepts are formed, before all experience (Husserl 1939, §86, 410).

Husserl considers that every abstraction, imagination, subjectivity and objectivity take a stand on the same ground, - in the world and follow some same logical structures. In the example of Husserl (Husserl 1939, §87, 416): the house is an object which, in the realm of the possible, could have other determinations in place of, and incompatible with, whatever determinations happen to belong to it within the unity of a representation. This house, the same, is thinkable as *a* and as *non-a* but, if as *a*, then not at the same time as *non-a*. It cannot be both simultaneously; it cannot be actual while having each of them at the same time; but at any moment it can be *non-a* instead of *a*. For Husserl, in the natural development of universal experience, the unity of which is continually being realized, the experienced world is granted to us as the universal permanent ground of being and as the universal field of all our activities (Husserl 1939, §89, 424). Therefore, what can be varied, one into another, in the arbitrariness of imagination bears in itself a necessary structure, an *eidos*, and therewith necessary laws which determine what must necessarily belong to an object in order that it can be an object of this kind. Husserl says that this necessity holds for everything factual: we can see that everything which belongs inseparable to the pure *eidos* color, the moment of brightness, must likewise belong to every actual color. Hence, these essential truths are called *a priori*, this means, by reason of their validity, preceding all factuality, all determinations arising from experience (Husserl 1939, §90, 427). For Husserl, the whole of mathematics produce its immediate *eidetic laws* as truths, which are *necessary and universal*, admitting of no possible exception (Kant) (Husserl 1939, §89, 425). Kant locates the ground for the a priori structural unity of the natural world in pure understanding, but Husserl implicates this eidetic laws to the concrete Ego. Thus, if transcendental a priori is grounded in the constituting intentionality of the transcendental subject, the transcendental subject, in turn, is concretized in the factual ego (concrete ego) (Murphy 1974, 76). It is possible to say that, the apriori is transcendental since constitutive; the constitutive is transcendental since *a priori* (Murphy 1974, 77).

5. The same structural ground: Conclusion

According to Husserl, we can build various news possibilities of variation; we can, for example, imagine the fountain pen changed into a stone, and there is still something common which runs through them: both are spatially extended, material things. We have thus come to the highest genus t*hing*, which as the highest genus of *concreta* we call *region* (Husserl 1939, §92, 435). Regional essences have no other higher generalities above them, and they set a fixed, unsurpassable limit to all variation. Thus, for Husserl, we also obtain pure and general ideas of collections, of relations, and of every kind of state of affair. We obtain therewith ideas of the *formal region* (Husserl 1939, §92, 436). Therefore, all eidetic possibility, relatively or actually concrete, likewise offers occasions for abstract limitations and free variations.

The constructions of a priori universal judgment reveals its implication. In general, we obtain general states of affairs brought out in a pure *a priori*, states of affairs which have as their form an implication, an into-one-another, a being-included-in-one-another. Thus, in order to build general judgments or particular ones such inclusion must be taken. The particular and the universal, the whole and the parts, the *a priori* and the empirical are included (implication) into one another.

Against the humean argument, Husserl argues that an empirical assertion is justified if it can be grounded precisely on such a principle, if the principle guarantees the ideal possibility of its verification. For Husserl, if we admit that all convictions of the sciences based on experience are illusions, then psychology cannot provide us the satisfaction of exhibition the source of these illusions or even of marking them as illusions (Husserl 1939, Beilage II, 474). Husserl's emphasis is not on how apprehension can fail to be confirmed, like walking in a fog, one sees a person, but when he comes closer, he realizes that, in reality, it is just a tree stum Instead, Husserl works on how the illusions can become adjusted so that we can perceive what is truly there (McKenna 1982, p 190-191). As Husserl points it out:

> Correction continually takes place, or at any rate is always possible. Doubt can be resolved, what is correct underlines what has been

> consciously negated and a new harmony is restored, a unity of thoroughly confirmed experience containing a unity of unbroken and continually held belief lives on. Correlatively, the world, as it is experienced after each correction, counts as the true world. This truth is and remains forever on the march (Husserl 1959, 47).

The fact that corrections can be made means that there is a world which is the ultimate standard against which all mere appearance, error, and illusion are to be measured (McKenna 1982, 191). Thus, the idea of a definitively true world is the idea of the world that we perceive, based on such perception, being an illusion or not. We can conclude that the world traces a limit to our abstractions and, through our living experience, our own judgments are susceptible to change as we go on such march.

The *Ego* and the world are implicated through our living experience, which propitiate(?) judgment of several kinds, but with a same ground. Judgments are constitutive of experience as a whole; it is not separated from the flux of the living psychophysical mode of existence (Junglos 2015, 47). The understanding of such relation gives us the possibilities to understand the character of our judgments; if they are formed in natural attitude or live space for new possibilities. This understanding helps not just in the comprehension of the structure of the judgments, but also in its limits and character. .

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Schopenhauer, Husserl and the Invisibility of the Embodied Subject

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Abstract

For such refined idealists as Schopenhauer, Husserl and Wittgenstein, the correlation between the world and the subject must be recognized. Furthermore, the three commonly emphasize the distinction between the transcendental subject and the empirical subject as well as the distinction between the subject and object's mode of being. They all realized that the confusion of the transcendental subject and the empirical subject causes the paradox of that the subject as one part of the world is at the same time the a priori condition of the whole world. In the history of western Philosophy, Schopenhauer is the first to realize that the subject is no more than the invisible body, or the body playing the subject's role. Our body plays a role both as object and as subject. However, the fact does not mean that the body playing a role as a subject can be identified with the body playing a role as an object. As the subject, the body is the prerequisite of all the representations, but the body itself cannot simultaneously be represented by itself. If objects are always visible to me, then my body as a subject is invisible.

Keywords: Schopenhauer, Husserl, Wittgenstein, the transcendental subject, invisibility, body

Introduction

For both Schopenhauer and Husserl, the correlation between the world and the subject must be recognized. Furthermore, the two commonly emphasize the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical subject as well as

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the distinction between the subject and the object's mode of being. Both realize that the confusion of the transcendental subject and the empirical subject causes the paradox that the subject as one part of the world is at the same time the *a priori* condition of the whole world. On the one hand, the relation between the subject and the object is similar to the relation between the eye and its vision; on the other hand, the relation between the transcendental subject and the empirical subject is similar to the relation between the Seeing Eye and the seen eyes. In each of these relational pairs, the distinction between the former and the latter is that the latter is visible and the former is invisible.

In the history of western Philosophy, Schopenhauer is the first to realize that the subject is no more than the invisible body or the body playing the subject's role. Our body plays a role both as object and as subject. However, before I grasp my body as an object that exists tangibly in time, in space and that is regulated by causality, I must comprehend my body directly as an invisible subject or ego. As the subject, the body is the prerequisite of all the representations, but the body itself cannot simultaneously be represented by itself. If objects are always visible to me, then my body as a subject is invisible.

Inspired by Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein emphasizes that those eyes which appear in my field and can be seen by myself are not the same eyes that allow me to see. They are seen objects rather than seeing subjects. Analogously, as the metaphysical subject and the presupposed condition of the phenomenal world, "I" will not appear in that world. As "the philosophical I", I am the limit of the world rather than an object in it.

Similarly, Husserl strongly emphasized the invisibility of the subjectivistic body in his posthumously published manuscripts such as "*Ideas II"* (Husserl 1952) *and To the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity* (Husserl 1973)*,* etc. For him, the subjectivistic body and the objectivistic body are especially important to distinguish; otherwise, we enter into the paradox of our body as one part of the world while simultaneously the *a priori* condition of the whole world.

1. Philosophy begins with the doubt and negation of the visible world's independence

What is philosophy's starting point? With regard to the world in which we live, how does the philosophical attitude distinguish itself from the natural attitude? This is a question that almost every philosopher must answer.

As the first philosopher who consciously calls upon the rational examination to our social and personal life, Socrates regards "To know yourself" as his own motto, and treats "having recognized the ignorance of myself" as the most significant distinction between himself as a philosopher and ordinary people. To him, this phrase means, in part, that he is the only one who realizes that the knowledge he has about the visible world is not genuine knowledge. Plato expounds on his master's doctrine most impressively in his famous "cave metaphor": people in everyday life possess only illusory knowledge about things in the visible world, not truth about the ideal world. Unfortunately, almost none of them realize this fact in their entire lives, just as the bound prisoners never realize that what they see on the cave wall is nothing but a shadow of real things.

As we have just seen, Socrates and Plato regard the doubt and the negation of ordinary people's natural views as the starting point of the philosophical wisdom. Analogously, Descartes treats the universal doubt of all kinds of beliefs people acquire in their everyday lives as the first step in philosophical meditation. This is the truth he tries to express through his famous formulation, "I think, therefore I am". It is the insight that nothing is more reliable in this whole world than the ego or consciousness. An ego can doubt the existence of anything in the world but itself, because the ego's existence is an indispensable precondition of its activity of doubting. Its doubting activity is exactly the most obvious evidence of its existence.

Descartes's philosophy has overthrown the following prejudice: in everyday life, I tend to think that is absolutely real which I see with my own eyes, hear with my own ears or touch with my own hands. However, in fact, these things are much less real than my action of seeing, hearing or touching or the "I"

who sees, hears or touches. As Descartes himself explained in the end of the *Second Meditation*:

> Surely my awareness of my own self is not merely much truer and more certain than my awareness of the wax but also much more distinct and evident. For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it, clearly this same fact entails much more evidently that I myself also exist. It is possible that what I see is not really the wax; it is possible that I do not even have eyes with which to see anything. However, when I see, or think I see (I am not here distinguishing the two), it is simply not possible that I who am now thinking am not something. By the same token, if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I touch it, the same result follows, namely, that I exist. If I judge that it exists from the fact that I imagine it, or for any other reason, exactly the same thing follows. And the result that I have grasped in the case of the wax may be applied to everything else located outside me". (Descartes 1996, 22)

In short, my seeing and touching of the wax, or "I" as the subject of such activities as seeing and touching, is more certain and evident than the wax. Generally, my experience or consciousness of things is more certain than the things experienced. Consciousness or thought is the only thing that cannot be doubted.

Kant's Copernican revolution of philosophy also starts with the overturn of the common sense, i.e., the following prejudice about the relation between the subject and the object: cognitive objects and their forms of existence such as time, space and causality are independent of subjects, who are negatively affected by them to acquire the knowledges about them, just as Locke's "theory of tabula rasa" has taught us. In contrast, for Kant, objects must conform to my form of knowing to become my cognitive objects. In other words, although objects exist within the forms of time, space and causality for me, this fact does not mean that objects as "things-in-themselves" exist in those forms. Rather, the idea of time, space and causality in my mind causes me to believe that they exist within those forms, just as the earth's rotation rather than sun's rotation around the earth produces the appearance of the sun's rise and fall. The essential meaning of Kant's revolution lies in the fact that we must rid ourselves of the view that the visible objects are independent of the subject's consciousness of them and regard them as dependent on "an invisible subject". The world

and objects in it are treated as appearances or representations that are given through the consciousness of the knower or subject rather the "things-in-themselves", which are independent of the consciousness of ego or subject. Thus, Schopenhauer can understand the Kant's philosophy as "the world is my representation."

On the one hand, the objects in the visible world become appearances depending on an ego or a consciousness, rather than as independent things; on the other hand, in a striking contrast, the ego or consciousness becomes the supreme "Substance", requiring nothing but itself to exist. Just as Feuerbach has noted, Kant and Fichte's transcendental idealism treats consciousness and ego as God. All things exist through the ego or consciousness, which takes the God's place and becomes the absolute reality, the measure of existence and the indispensable precondition.

The supreme ego or consciousness of Kant and Fichte is the prelude of Hegel's absolute spirit. Hegel's philosophy purports to regard the thought abstracted from the human being as "the sacred, absolute essence", as God. Compared to such a God, sensible individual things that are taken by common sense to be true and real become the most senseless and fleeting illusions. Only the universal or everlasting essence grasped by reflection or abstract thinking are the truth. In Hegel's own words:

> The universal does not exist externally to the outward eye as a universal. The kind as kind cannot be perceived: the laws of the celestial motions are not written on the sky. The universal is neither seen nor heard, its existence is only for the mind. (Hegel 1975, 35)

In one word, the invisible universal that our thinking grasps is much more true and real than the individual grasped by the senses. Philosophy's task is to lead us from visible things to an Absolute by which all else is brought into being. This Absolute is an object of the mind and thought rather than the senses.

For Hegel, the negation of all of sensible things in our eyes' vision is the starting point of every kind of philosophy. As an outstanding historian of philosophy, Hegel has much more precise insight into the boundary between philosophy and non-

philosophy. He has an especially clear-minded head on the following point: philosophy must begin with the overthrow of the prejudice formed unconsciously in everyday life that the visible world and all it contains are independent. Just as Hegel emphasizes repeatedly in his *Logic*, philosophy distinguishes itself from ordinary consciousness by the fact that "it sees the merely phenomenal character of what the latter supposes to have a self-subsistent being." (Hegel 1975, 188) In other words, philosophy treats the visible world and all it contains as decided by "the other" – the ego or the absolute spirit.

According to Hegel, this character of philosophy is manifested most vividly in Spinoza's philosophy. The significance or the greatness of Spinoza's theory lies in its abandonment of all particulars and its upholding of the unique substance. For Spinoza, God is the only substance that exists in itself and can be known through itself, while the world's particulars can exist and be known only through the substance, or God. Because Spinoza considers the world and all of its particulars as mere appearances, his philosophy is essentially an "acosmism" rather than an atheism or a Pantheism. (Hegel 1975, 215)

For Hegel, Spinoza's suspicion and negation of the visible world and its things are the first step of all kinds of philosophy and the standard by which the philosophical attitude and natural attitude to the world can be distinguished. Therefore, "thought must begin by placing itself at the standpoint of Spinozism"; to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all philosophy. When man begins to philosophize, the soul must commence by "bathing in this ether of the One Substance", in which whatever man has held as true disappears. This negation of whatever is particular, to which every philosopher must come, is "the liberation of the mind and its absolute foundation". (Hegel 1996, 482-483)

2. The negation of "the pregivenness of the world" by both Schopenhauer and Husserl as solipsists

Even in his later years, Husserl still regarded the discovery of worldly phenomena's subjectivistic aspect as the most significant breakthrough of *Logical investigations*, as he noted in *Crisis* (Husserl 1970):

> What is new in the *Logical Investigations* is found not at all in the merely ontological investigations, which had a one-sided influence contrary to the innermost sense of the work, but rather in the subjectively directed investigations (above all the fifth and sixth, in the second volume of 1901). (Husserl 1970, 234)

For Husserl, the key to understanding his Phenomenology is to feel surprised by the correlation between the world and its subjective manners of givenness. On the one hand, the first significant step leading to Phenomenology is to feel shocked by the inherent correlation between the world and the world-consciousness; On the other hand, within our daily natural attitude, we are inclined to regard the world's pregivenness as reasonable and doubtless. People find it especially difficult to be "free of the strongest and most universal, and at the same time most hidden, internal bond, namely, of the pregivenness of the world." (Husserl 1970,151) And this difficulty causes the following regrettable fact –

> the correlation between world (the world of which we always speak) and its subjective manners of givenness never evoked philosophical wonder (that is, prior to the first breakthrough of 'transcendental phenomenology' in the *Logical Investigations),* in spite of the fact that it had made itself felt even in pre-Socratic philosophy and among the Sophists (…) This correlation never aroused a philosophical interest of its own. (Husserl 1970, 165)

In short, for Husserl, the visible world and all it contains are given as phenomena based on an invisible subject rather than as independent entities. The philosophical attitude distinguishes itself from the natural attitude by its realization of the correlation between the world and its subjective manner of givenness. Likewise, Schopenhauer also thinks that only people who enter into philosophical reflections can realized that "the world is my representation", meaning that the visible world is given as representation or appearance, presupposing an "I". This attitude is confirmed in his words at the beginning of his prominent masterpiece:

> The world is my representation': this is a truth valid to every living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflective, abstract consciousness. If he really does so, philosophical discernment has dawned on him. It then becomes clear and certain to him that he does not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world around him is

> there only as representation, in other words, only in reference to another thing, namely, that which represents, and this is himself. (Schopenhauer 1969, 3)

Insofar as Schopenhauer regards the recognition that "the world is my representation" as the indication of the philosophical discernment, he is shocked by the inherent correlation between the world and the world-consciousness, even before Husserl. With regard to this fact, Husserl seems to have exaggerated the novelty of this breakthrough from *Logical investigations*. In an important note attached to the section 48 of *Crisis*, Husserl describes the course of his mind stretching over several decades:

> The first breakthrough of this universal *a priori* of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness (which occurred during work on my *Logical Investigations* around 1898) affected me so deeply that my whole subsequent life-work has been dominated by the task of systematically elaborating on this *a priori* of correlation. (Husserl 1970, 166)

However, clearly Schopenhauer had been affected deeply by the a priori correlation between the world and its subjective manners of givenness before Husserl. Maybe for this reason he quoted the following sentence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau before he began his own argument at the start of *The World as Will and Representation*: "Quit thy childhood, my friend, and wake up." (Schopenhauer 1969, 2)

The importance of "quitting one's childhood" or "waking up" lies in the fact that people find it difficult to realize that the visible world around them depends on themselves as those who represent. In other words, it is difficult for someone to wake up and quit the prejudice of the world's independence, an idea formed in childhood. The notion is similar to an idea Wittgenstein mentioned in his *Tractatus*: although the field of sight is dependent on the eye, but "from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye". (Wittgenstein 2003, 123) In contrast, the field of sight and the objects in it appear to be independent of their manners of being given through the act of the eye's seeing. Analogously, within the natural attitude of daily life, people are inclined to think that the world is independent of the subject through which it is given.

The inherent correlation between the world and its subjective manners of givenness is difficult to recognize because the prejudice that the world exists in-itself is difficult to shed. People are always constrained by this prejudice, which takes root in childhood, a fact that explains why Husserl called people's prejudice of the world's pregivenness, "the strongest and most universal, and at the same time most hidden, internal bond". (Husserl 1970, 151) Clearly, what Husserl calls the suspension of the natural attitude is essentially the same as what Schopenhauer calls "quitting" or "jumping out of " our childhood prejudice. Both of these states are preconditions to our recognition of the inherent correlation between the world and world-consciousness.

In brief, as solipsists, both Husserl and Schopenhauer regard the negation of the world's pregivenness and the recognition of the inherent correlation between the world and its subjective manners of givenness as the first phase of philosophical discernment.

3. Moving toward "the strictly carried out solipsism": from empirical idealism to transcendental idealism

By suspending the natural attitude, the objective world becomes the subjective consciousness's correlate. However, for Husserl, the difficulty lies precisely here. On the one hand, the subjectivity,

> into which all objectivity, everything that exists at all, is resolved, can clearly be nothing other than the human consciousness; on the other hand, human consciousness itself is only a component part of the world. However, how can the human subjectivity as a component part of the world constitute the whole world? It seems as though that "the subjective part of the world swallows up the whole world and thus itself too (Husserl 1970, 180),

and nothing can be more absurd. While human subjectivity is a part of world, how could it play a simultaneous role as the world's condition? This problem is described as "the paradox of human subjectivity". (Husserl 1970, 182)

According to Husserl, this paradox originates from the confusion of the ultimately functioning-accomplishing subjects with the naively understood human being. In fact, "the

transcendental subjects, i.e., those functioning in the constitution of the world" (Husserl 1970,183) cannot be equated to human beings in the mundane world. After all, the suspension of the natural attitude or the "epoche" has turned the latter into "phenomena". In Husserl's own words:

> (…) in the epoche and in the pure focus upon the functioning ego-pole, and hence upon the concrete whole of life and of its intentional intermediary and final structures, it follows *eo ipso* that nothing human is to be found, neither soul nor psychic life nor real psychophysical human beings; all this belongs to the 'phenomenon', to the world as constituted pole. (Husserl 1970, 183)

In short, the empirical self as a "phenomenon" in the constituted world should not be confused with the transcendental self as a subject who plays the role of constituting the world. Husserl's transcendental reduction mainly distinguishes the transcendental from the empirical consciousness. The transcendental reduction consists of the following two steps: first, the reduction of the world and the objects to the phenomena given by the consciousness; secondly, the reduction of the empirical to the transcendental consciousness.

However, Husserl is not the first philosopher to confront the paradox of human subjectivity. In fact, Schopenhauer met a similar dilemma soon after he proffered his proposition, "the world is my representation". As previously mentioned, for Schopenhauer, the world is entirely a representation; as such, it requires the knowing subject to support its existence, similar to how the field of sight requires the eye as its supporter. In his own words:

> Thus animals existed before men, fishes before land animals, plants before fishes, and the inorganic before that which is organic; consequently, the original mass had to go through a long series of changes before the first eye could be open. And yet the existence of this whole world remains forever dependent on that first eye that opened, were it even that of an insect. (Schopenhauer 1969, 30)

However, the problem is, how can the eye of an insect as the result of a long chain of causes and effects and a component part of the world play as the substance on which the whole world is based simultaneously? As Schopenhauer himself writes:

> Thus, we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent on the first knowing being, however imperfect it be; on the other hand, this first knowing animal just as necessarily wholly dependent on a long chain of causes and effects which has preceded it, and in which it itself appears as a small link. These two contradictory views, to each of which we are led with equal necessity, might certainly be called as antinomy in our faculty of knowledge. (Schopenhauer 1969, 30)

In my view, Schopenhauer here speaks of as the antinomy of the faculty of knowledge, which is exactly what Husserl called the paradox of human subjectivity.

According to Schopenhauer, this antinomy results from the neglecting of the distinction between the subject and object's modes of being. While the object lies within the forms of space, time and causality, the subject – "the knower never the known" – does not; "on the contrary, it is always presupposed by those forms themselves". (Schopenhauer 1969,5) In fact, insofar as it is taken to be a subject, the first knowing being lies outside of the causal chain. On the other hand, when it is taken as the result of a long causal chain, the first knowing animal is no longer a subject but an object. For Schopenhauer, Kant's chief merits is that he suggests the following theory: although the object lies within the form of time, space and causality, these forms are the subject's mode of knowing rather than the mode of the thing-in-itself, so they "can be found and fully known, starting from the subject, even without the knowledge of the object itself". (Schopenhauer 1969, 5) To use Kant's language, "time, space and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but only to its appearance or phenomenon, of which they are the form." (Schopenhauer 1969, 30) On the other hand, although the form of space, time and causality as forms of knowing "reside *a priori* in our consciousness," the subject itself doesn't exist in the form of time, space and causality. In other words, as the seeing subject, "the first eye that opened" does not appear in its own field of sight and does not lie in the forms of time, space and causality. Conversely, when "the first eye" is treated as the result of the biological evolution, or as existing in the form of time, space and causality, then it becomes the seen object rather than the seeing subject. To sum up, the relation of the object and the subject is similar to that of the field of sight

and the eye, in which the former presupposes the latter; the two do not coexist. As the supporter of the represented world, the one who represents never appears in that world; In contrast, the one who represents always lies outside of that world. Thus the above mentioned antinomy of the faculty of knowledge is removed by the following rule: the subject that plays the role of the whole world's supporter cannot be regarded simultaneously as a component part of that world.

Clearly, Wittgenstein was once deeply impressed by Schopenhauer's doctrine, just as we can see in such sentences in his *Tractatus* as: "where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye." (Wittgenstein 2003, 123) In other words, my eye as the precondition or supporter of my field of sight can see anything but itself; conversely, those eyes which appear in my field and can be seen by myself are not the same eyes that allow me to see. They are seen objects rather than seeing subjects. As the result, to prevent the paradox of "the eye in the field of sight plays as the supporter of that field outside of that field", the seeing eye should be distinguished from the seen eyes, such as other people's eyes or my own eyes seen through a mirror.

Analogously, as the metaphysical subject and the presupposed condition of the phenomenal world, "I" will not appear in that world. As "the philosophical I", I am the limit of the world rather than an object in it. In Wittgenstein's own words, "The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit – not a part of the world." (Wittgenstein 2003, 121) In one word, "the philosophical I" shouldn't be confused with "the concrete I" which exists as the unity of the human's body and soul. At this point, Wittgenstein is clearly consisted with Schopenhauer and Husserl.

For Wittgenstein, the subtle relation between the eye and its vision or that between an "I" and its world means, "In fact, what solipsism means, is quite correct, only, it cannot be said, but it shows itself." (Wittgenstein 2003, 121) The reason that what solipsism means cannot be said lies in the following two facts: first, the relation between the subject and the object

cannot be regard as the relation between two parts of a world that is constituted by the subject; Second, as a picture of the world, language can be used to describe the objects in the phenomenal world and their relations, but cannot be used to describe the relation of the world with its presupposed subject.

Nevertheless, when most of the solipsists take the "I" as the basis of the whole world, they are inclined to regard "I" as an object among other objects in the world. For Wittgenstein, such a view neglects the boundary between the "I" and "I's" world and is not the point of a pure and rigorous solipsism. "In the solipsism strictly carried out, the I shrinks to an extentionless point and there remains one reality coordinated with it", and such kind of solipsism coincides with "pure realism." (Wittgenstein 2003, 123) In my view, Wittgenstein's distinction between these two forms of solipsism has a similar motivation and function with the Husserl's distinction between transcendental and empirical idealism.

4. Schopenhauer's exposition of the body's double functions and the subject's corporeality

For Schopenhauer, the world is the subject's representation, and a subject always exists as an embodied individual. To regard the world as a representation means to regard the sun as the sun seen through my eyes, to regard the earth as the earth touched by my hands, etc. In other words, the subject's knowledge of the world as representation is given "entirely through the medium of a body." (Schopenhauer 1969, 99)

In Schopenhauer's view, the peculiarity of my body lies mainly in "its double essences and functions", which means that it is not only an object but also a subject. The distinction between my body and all kinds of other objects lies in the fact that the former appears as "will" in our consciousness. For example, my body appears as the appetite or sexual desire in my consciousness. In other words, "will" gives us information about what the body is, "not only as representation, but as something over and above this, and hence what it is in itself." (Schopenhauer 1969, 103)

According to Schopenhauer, by recognizing the body's double status, we attain the insight that the world is not only

will's representation, but also its manifestation. In fact, if "the investigator himself were nothing more than the purely knowing subject (a winged cherub without a body)" (Schopenhauer 1969, 99), then it would be impossible for him to understand what the world is in itself besides the mere representation of the knowing subject.

On the one hand, as a subject, my body is the precondition of my representation of the whole world; on the other hand, as an object, my body exists in time, space and necessity, like other objects. Furthermore, before I know my body as an object, I grasp it directly as a subject, i.e., as will. As a subject, "which knows everything but is never known", the body is the condition of the form of time, space and causality, and consequently is the condition of knowing any other things that exist as representations in the forms of time, space and causality.

Although the body plays a role as both an object and a subject, the two roles cannot be identified with one another. Before I grasp my body as an object which exits tangibly in time, in space and that is regulated by causality, I has comprehended my body directly as an invisible subject or ego. As a subject, the body is the prerequisite of all representations but the body itself cannot simultaneously be represented by itself. If objects are always visible to me, then my body as a subject is invisible. For Schopenhauer, this truth is exactly what the following beautiful passage from the Sacred Upanishad tries to tell us:

> That which sees everything can't be seen; that which hears everything can't be heard; that which perceives everything can't be perceived; that which knows everything can't be known. It is nothing but that which sees, hears, perceives and knows everything. (Schopenhauer 1889, 166)

Schopenhauer once talked about the fate of his own philosophy as follows: "In short, professional philosophers do not care to learn from me, nor do they even see how much they might learn from me: that is, all that their children and their children's children will learn from me." (Schopenhauer 1889, 166) The prophecy has unfortunately come true. Schopenhauer is the first one in the western history of philosophy to credit the

body with supreme status, he even called "the theory of the identification of body and will" as "the highest philosophical truth". However, only after more than one hundred years is his insight recognized as truth by such philosophers as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, etc.

5. Husserl's phenomenological interpretation of the embodied subject's invisibility

The problem of the body was not a major topic of works Husserl published during his lifetime. Rather, his elucidations of the body's double statues of the body and the invisibility of the embodied subject mainly appeared in his posthumously published manuscripts such as "*Ideas II*" (Husserl 1952), "*To the phenomenology of intersubjectivity*" (Husserl 1973), etc.

According to Husserl's opinion, the body's duality is primarily reflected in the fact that "the body is originally constituted in a double way". On the one hand, as a physical thing, the body has its extension, "in which are included its real properties, its color, smoothness, hardness, warmth, and whatever other material qualities of that kind there are" (Husserl 1952, 145); on the other hand, the body "senses"; that is to say, the body can have "the experience of specifically Bodily occurrences of the type we call 'sensings'." (Husserl 1952, 146) Husserl takes the following common fact as an example to explain his point:

> "My hand is lying on the table. I experience the table as something solid, cold, and smooth. Moving my hand over the table, I get an experience of it and its thingly determinations. At the same time, I can at any moment pay attention to my hand and find on it touch-sensations, sensations of smoothness and coldness, etc." (Husserl 1952, 146)

Those "sensations" occur on my hand and Husserl calls them "localized sensations," but they are the properties of the Body as the organ of an ego or a subject rather than the properties of the body as a physical thing.

Husserl takes the case of the touching of my left hand with the right hand as another example to emphasize his point:

> Touching my left hand, (…) I do not just sense, but I perceive and have appearances of a soft, smooth hand (…) But when I touch the

> left hand I also find in it, too, series of touch-sensations, which are 'localized' in it, though these are not constitutive of properties (such as roughness or smoothness of the hand, of this physical thing). If I speak of physical thing, 'left hand', then I am abstracting from these sensations. (…) If I do include them, then it is not that the physical thing is now richer, but instead it becomes Body. It senses. (Husserl 1952, 145)

In other words, my left hand can not only be perceived as a physical object; it can also play a role as a subject to perceive other objects including my right hand. In later case, it functions as the embodied ego or subject rather than a physical object.

Generally, the Body's properties such as size, shape, color and temperature, etc. are its physical properties. On this occasion, it is viewed as a spatio-thingly object (Körper) rather than as an experiencing subject (Leib). (Moran 2013, 293) Thus, Husserl emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the experiencing Body and the experienced body. The former is given through unthematized pre-reflective body-consciousness, while the latter is given through the thematized consciousness of body obtained through an act of objectivation. (Zahavi 1994, 69)

Only the Body that functions as an experiencing subject is the Body in an authentic sense and in this sense, the Body is an essential precondition of the perception of any object, including the Body itself. In Husserl's own words, "…... in all experience of spatio-thingly objects, the Body is involved as the perceptual organ of the experiencing subject." (Husserl 1952, 144) As an experiencing subject, my unthematized Body-consciousness accompanies and makes possible every spatial experience, including the experience of my body viewed as a spatial thing.

In conclusion, before I perceived my body as an object, I have grasped it as the experiencing subject as "I can", as the organ of will; as such a subject, my body does not possess natural properties related to gender, height, weight, complexion, age, etc. My body possesses those properties only when it is viewed as an object. While my body is visible as an object, it is invisible as a subject. The corporeality of an ego or a subject cannot be viewed as a counterevidence of its invisibility.

The reason why the body which plays the role of a subject cannot be looked upon as an object simultaneously lies

on that it is the precondition of the constitution of an object. In the example of my vision, my eyes which function as the subject of seeing cannot be regarded as the seen objects simultaneously, because they are the precondition of the vision of all other things. Including those visible parts of my own body, all of visible things can be presented to me from various distances and perspectives. On the contrary, the distance between the invisible parts of my body and me is always zero. In other words, the invisible parts of my body is always "here" and never over there. When I see spatial object it necessarily stands over and against my bodily standpoint; it can only be "there", as opposed to my lived-body which can only be "here". (Alweiss 2012, 138) In Husserl's own words,

> Every external perception brings with it its current spatial present and within it, the absolute zero-point of all spatial orientation. The latter is located in the very lived-body of the perceiver (…) The zero-point is itself nothing visible (…) Thus, miraculously a perceptual object that we call one's own lived-body is distinctive in such a way that with each perception of an object, whatever it may be, the lived-body is always there and always co-constituted. And this object is entirely unique by virtue of the fact that it always "bears within it" the zero-point, the absolute Here, in relation to which every other object is a There. (Husserl 2001, 584)

In brief, my lived-body is the absolute zero point of all experience. Farness, nearness, left and right make sense in relation to my lived-body. I cannot be anywhere else but here_ I can never be "there" because "thereness" is possible only in relation to my absolute standpoint. (Alweiss 2012, 139)

According to Husserl's understanding, the embodied subject's invisibility causes people to tend to take the ego or subject as a spiritual substance that exists independent of the body. I see with my unseen eyes, that is to say, I am not conscious of my seeing eyes but of my eye's seeing. It seems as though I am a "Specter" or "ghost" that can see everything in the world without the naked eye. Analogously, I can touch something with my hand and become conscious of touching something without being conscious of the touching hand, and it seems as though I am a spiritual entity that can touch something without hands. (Husserl 1973, 229) Nevertheless, such a spiritual entity is essentially nothing but "the invisible body".

In the final analysis, this mistake is caused by that we neglect the following fact: the body is both an object and a subject; as a subject, the body is incorporeal and invisible. I can be conscious of seeing something without seeing my own eyes and be conscious of touching something without touching my own hands. However, this does not mean that I am a spiritual substance that exists independent of my body. It merely means that, before I seize my eyes and hands as objects, I already grasp them as subjects of seeing or touching. My body is at first the perceiving subject rather than the perceived object.

Enlightened by Husserl's phenomenology of body, Merleau-Ponty bases his entire phenomenological project on an account of "bodily intentionality" (Carman 1999, 205). For him, if the essence of the so-called transcendental subject is no more than the invisible body, then the sensing body itself rather than the pure consciousness should be taken as the starting point of our philosophical meditation. At this point, he tries to distinguish his own philosophy from Husserl's transcendental idealism and assimilate Heidegger's theory of being-in-the-world. In spite of that, he agrees with Husserl on the invisibility of the embodied subject:

> I observe external objects with my body, I handle them, examine them, walk around them, but my body itself is a thing which I do not observe: in order to be able to do so, I should need the use of a second body which itself would be unobservable. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 104)

He thus concludes,

> In so far as it sees or touches the world, my body can therefore be neither seen nor touched. What prevents its ever being an object, ever being 'completely constituted' is that it is that by which there are objects. It is neither tangible nor visible in so far as it is that which sees and touches. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 105)

In another word, if we confuse the body playing a role as a subject with the one playing a role as an object, then we will be faced with the paradox of that the subject as one part of the world is at the same time the *a priori* condition of the whole world. So far as an owner of such an insight is concerned, Merleau-Ponty is completely consistent with Husserl, Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein.

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Being and Metaphysics: A Hegelian Critique of Heidegger's Phenomenological Voluntarism

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Abstract

Hegel and Heidegger are leading figures of modern philosophy, but their interpretation of being, metaphysics, truth, ontology, epistemology, dialectic, alienation and art, among other central questions of philosophy, are radically different. Taking these aspects into account, my paper tries to dismiss Heidegger's critiques towards Hegel arguing that, from the point of view of 20th century phenomenology, and although using a dissimilar philosophical vocabulary, Hegel was rather a phenomenologist than a metaphysician. Not only that: in many respects, Heidegger's Dasein toys with metaphysic to an extent that Hegel's spirit never did.

Keywords: phenomenology, truth, ontology, dialectic, epistemology, art

Introduction

Some scholars identified substantial similarities between G.W.F. Hegel's thinking and that of Martin Heidegger (Heidegger 2002a; Schmitt 1977, 4-14; Couzens Hoy 1976, 404-407; Kolb 1981, 481-499.). This paper is built on a whole different assumption: Hegel and Heidegger's philosophies are, beside some secondary convergence points, incompatible. I intend to support this hypothesis by taking into account several major themes that shaped the thinking of both philosophers and compelled them to offer new and sometimes radical solutions to some of the most enduring questions of philosophy ever.

Just as in the case of Hegel, Heidegger's philosophy offers a remarkable unity and continuity and, regardless of the angle from which is approached, it leads nevertheless to the

tenets, the core assumptions of its thinking, namely the authenticity of the relation between being and being-ness and the many shapes this relation embraces in fields like ontology, epistemology, history or art. Even if Heidegger did not create a proper philosophical system, Hegel being the last of the major Western philosophers that did so, thus willingly placing himself within the filiation of classical philosophy – his works resemble to a certain extent the never finished architecture of a possible system.

The second section of the article tackles the problem of truth and the very different answers offered by both philosophers to it. Since every truth is ontologically dependent, I will explore next the ontologies of both thinkers, aiming to show that Hegel's stance on this matter is far more reaching than that of Heidegger. Epistemology represents another domain in which Hegel and Heidegger adopt incompatible positions. However, Heidegger's critiques of Hegel's concept of knowledge and how is this concept linked to the advancement of modernity are substantial and should not be overlooked. But ontological truths advance epistemically within a far reaching dialectical process, at least for Hegel they do. Heidegger is keen on dismissing dialectic as well, considering it a fraudulent way of embracing dilettantism and avoiding the stakes brought into question. Regarding alienation, both Hegel and Heidegger recognize the issue, but, as expected, they handle it in different ways: if Hegel argues that alienation is to be historically overcome as spirit converts exteriority (nature) into interiority, thus eventually producing a world that anyone can understand and feel at home in, Heidegger considers modern alienation as a process of ontological failure, not success, as Hegel does. This failure can be summed up under a single name: technique. The ontology of modernity is technique, a specific form of epistemology analyzed in the third part of the paper, a being without specific being-nesses and also an alienated being incapable of sublating itself into something superior, because technic is based on standardization and commodification, from which true progress can never arise. While Hegel also recognizes the problem, and refers to it mostly from the prism of mathematics and mechanics, he proposes a different

response to this important challenge of modernity, different from the almost fatalist response provided by Heidegger. Finally, there are some relevant convergence points between what Hegel and Heidegger have to say about art, which is functionally incorporated in both philosophies, but to which Heidegger ascribes a more political role than Hegel does. The conclusions section resumes the fundamental differences between the two philosophies and also the occasional similarities between them and reassesses Heidegger's powerful critiques of the Hegelian philosophical system, especially the allegation that Hegel basically speaks the same metaphysical language invented by Plato.

However, none of the subjects above can be addressed in the absence of a preliminary discussion about phenomenology. The first part of the paper is therefore centered on a comparison between the metamorphosis endured by phenomenology from its Husserlian inception to its Heideggerian development and, I would say, closure.

1. From Husserl to Heidegger: the metamorphosis of phenomenology

Edmund Husserl conceived phenomenology at the end of the 19th century as a philosophical method of investigating processes of conscience and the objects that, despite their apparent exteriority, are inherent to it. Until then, phenomenology was associated, in the Kantian tradition, with the sphere of the sensible as opposed to the sphere of the intelligible or, as Hegel would put it, with the inconsistent diversity of existence projected (in)voluntarily on the path of self-constituting reason.

Partially following Descartes and Kant, Husserl argued in favor of a reevaluation of all sciences on philosophical grounds and warned, like Heidegger would do so later, against the dangers contained by the expansion of positivism, which is incapable of understanding its transcendent presuppositions and, consequently, its underlining philosophy. Husserl was careful to meticulously differentiate phenomenology from psychology, which was, after all, an empirical, positivist science, and to criticize subjectivism, relativism and solipsism

as possible outcomes of phenomenology. Even if it can be traced back to a hermeneutical ego, phenomenology does not question the rational truths of the world, undermining the possibility of shared activities and purposes. It just makes visible the web of intentionalities surrounding and constituting them. After all, everyone has access to existence only through its conscience and his most intimate dispositions that entails him or her in certain scientific and axiological directions and not others. Thinking does not exist outside reality and neither do the things we encounter in different circumstances: there is a wholeness here that exact sciences cannot grasp due to the fact that they fail to understand themselves as part of phenomenological processes that manifest themselves according to the pre-cognitive axiological and intuitive dispositions of their protagonists (Husserl 2001; Husserl 1980, 12-13, 39, 46-47, 82-83; Husserl 1983, 39, 102-103; Husserl 2000, 83, 95; Husserl 1997, 96, 494; Husserl 1990, 18-29; Husserl 2006, 47; Husserl 1977). In the words of Husserl, 'the whole spatiotemporal world, which includes human being and the human Ego as subordinate single realities is, according to its sense, a merely intentional being, thus one has the merely secondary sense of a being for a consciousness. It is a being posited by consciousness in its experiences which, of essential necessity, can be determined and intuited only as something identical belonging to motivated multiplicities of appearances: beyond that it is nothing' (Husserl 1980, 112).

But, although if experienced at an individual level, intentionality is universal (Husserl 1983, 201) because no one and nothing possesses its individuality in itself (Husserl 2000, 313). Husserl's phenomenology is teleological, and it resembles to a certain extent Kant's empire of purposes. Phenomenology is also built on logical foundations that allow it to avoid both the dangers of psychological subjectivism and those of empiricism, due to its circumscription within conscience. The method of this new philosophical approach is that of 'phenomenological reduction': after the mind is emptied of all of its objects, what remains is pure consciousness, the environment that systematizes all objects of experience and

thinking according to axiological and moral oriented intentional dispositions (Husserl 1980, 65-66; Husserl 1990, 34).

In the works of Heidegger, phenomenology embraces a whole new meaning. Heidegger is reluctant to the Kantian legacy identifiable in the Husserlian philosophical project that still distinguishes between subject and object, individual and reason, freedom and nature. Since the beginning of modern philosophy with Descartes, these arbitrary delimitations have hindered our understanding of being, along with the possibility of opening new spaces of apprehending and emancipating this being from the chains of inauthenticity it has been forced to wear ever since. In Heidegger's phenomenology, the 'self' is more important than conscience, and it represents a mere reflection of the world that he lives in. In Kantian terms, the self is transcendent to his world, to the Dasein to which it belongs. There are several types of existence for Heidegger: inanimate existence, or existence without being (rocks, for example), existence poor in being (plants and animals) and, finally, existence that questions itself. Only human existence is capable of this kind of interrogation, and this makes it superior to any other form of existence. Dasein is therefore human existence, but not a general, universal one. Each Dasein has its own specificities, its own limits, its own history, its own aspirations. Heidegger is keen to place the Dasein between effective existence, being-ness, and the superior, ontological existence of being. Only accidentally is the Dasein made aware of its being, and only in crucial historical turning points. However, its being continue to influence it unconsciously in the absence of such events, too. Since being-ness cannot be satisfactorily understood starting with itself, on ontic-existentiel grounds, it follows that being is indispensable in revealing the ontological framework of Dasein, which Heidegger understands, depending on circumstances, both as self and as community (Heidegger 2008; Heidegger 1988a).

It would appear that, by insisting on ontology as the key factor of explaining ontic presences, Heidegger is silently opening the door of metaphysics. But the author of *Being and Time* assures us that this is not the case: for him, contrary to Hegel's conception, ontology is possible only as phenomenology.

Nothing exists beyond phenomena, although things have a way of hiding themselves, corresponding to the actual decay of the Dasein, its lapse into inauthenticity. However, the decline of every Dasein is inevitable and it must not be approached as a fatality, Heidegger ensures us. The poverty of history, combined with frivolous small talk and banal curiosities, place every Dasein under its real possibilities but, in the same time, compels it in a way of another to actualize them. This actualization is materialized only when the Dasein becomes determined to live up to the challenges of its own existence and confront the nothingness surrounding it in creative and meaningful ways. Overcoming this existential-ontological anguish, the Dasein reinvents itself as being-for-death and renounces its inauthentic present by living up to its historic destiny by seizing the moment, which is something very different than a mere second, being almost a form of metaphysical fulguration – and capitalizing it accordingly (Heidegger 2008; Heidegger 1985). By doing so, the Dasein consciously and voluntarily grasps the truth of its own being.

2. Truth

Husserl had meticulously read *Being and Time*, and he thoroughly criticize it as nothing more than a philosophical anthropology that cannot be considered proper philosophy, a mystic endeavor of his once esteemed philosophical successor that regretfully parts ways with the critical legacy of Enlightenment (Husserl 1997, 30, 486): 'A philosophy that takes its start from human existence falls back into that naivete the overcoming of which has, in our opinion, been the whole meaning of modernity. Once this naivete has finally been unmasked for what it is, once the genuine transcendental problem has been arrived at in its apodictic necessity, there can be no going back' (Husserl 1997, 499).

However, this amounted to a small problem for Heidegger, once he paved the way for his own philosophical method. And that method is construed around a whole different truth than Husserl's rationalist, intentional-teleological truth: the truth of being assertively awakening itself from the web of scientific and theoretical sediments that have for far too long

impeded its capacity to see and to understand itself as pure will of becoming (Heidegger 1985). The Dasein is compelled, by being arbitrarily 'thrown' into existence, and also due to its ontic decline, to become less transparent to itself. Not only rationalism with it 'scientification' of the world contributed to this outcome, but also religion. Christianity, with its original sin, induced a feeling of diffuse guilt which, combined to the anguish produced by the Dasein's ontological indeterminacy, usually manifesting itself ontically as daily concern – played its part in maintaining the Dasein under its real possibilities, disconnected from its authentic being. Here, Heidegger is very close to Friedrich Nietzsche's view of morality, who believed that it is enough to stop considering ourselves guilty or evil according to Christian standards in order to become free and therefore good (Nietzsche 1989). For both philosophers, the problem of morality and ethics as well is thereby confined to a simple and most attractive individual choice.

Morality is thus part of the chain that oppresses the Dasein in modern times. Moreover, social conventions are also a burden for the Dasein understood as self, preventing it to achieve its full potential. Everyone is polite and careful in public, but everyone supposedly loathes this attitude in secret and wishes, at least for once, to speak its mind and to renounce this charade of fake amiabilities (Heidegger 2008). To be free, to live and acts in truth seem to mean, for Heidegger, to renounce morality, social conventions and international right, in case of states; only by following this path can an individual or a community live up to the task history has reserved for it (Heidegger 2001, 74; see also Gillespie 1984, 164-176). Although Heidegger emphasizes that the true Dasein must be understood as openness towards the other, he also claims that this form of communion results exclusively from individual resoluteness (Heidegger 1988a). But this Dasein as sum of determined selves does not contradict Heidegger's premise of renouncing morality and social conventions in order to reverse its own downfall. However, what would happen to the other individuals that choose to stick to morality, ethics and traditional rules of politeness? What place can they occupy in this mystic renewal

of Dasein? Heidegger is silent in this respect, but one can effortless draw the appropriate conclusion.

For Hegel, truth is a whole different matter. Truth is conscience, subject that infuses substance as a division within substance itself, raising it to a new ontological level. In this respect, truth is the whole, without being confined to a handful of assertive individualities that allow their imagination to take over their reason: 'the living Substance is being which is in truth *Subject,* or, what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself. This Substance is, as Subject, pure, *simple negativity,* and is for this very reason the bifurcation of the simple; itis the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its antithesis [the immediate simplicity]. Only this *self-restoring* Sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself - not an *original* or *immediate* unity as such - is the True. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual' (Hegel 1979a, 10; italics in original).

Far from laying outside religion and morality, the truth is immanent to them, although religious truth is given to us only in the form of exteriority (*On Christianity...* 1961; Hegel 1995). Philosophy steps in to transform the external truth of religion into the internal truth of reason and to historically render man and God compatible as one and the same being (Hegel 1984, 572; Hegel 1988a). Truth is dialectically conveyed as freedom (Hegel 1988a), as reason affirming itself against necessity.

Truth is therefore the good, what it should be, while evil is the distance between what it is and what it should be (Hegel 1978). While Hegelian truth is available, so to speak, for everyone, and it is conditioned by the inclusion of everyone, the Heideggerian truth represents the prerogative of a self-proclaimed elite of spirit that aims to liberate the Dasein from its historical and theoretical chains. But the Dasein can become free not by renouncing knowledge, but by expanding it, thus fulfilling its divine nature (Hegel 1988a). Furthermore, as Hegel's philosophy of recognition teaches us, no one can be free

against someone, but only together with that particular someone. The tranquility and the judiciousness of the Hegelian truth is superior by far to the sheer aggressiveness and implicit violence that finds its way out of the Heideggerian truth.

In order to fathom the matter, we must turn our attention now to the ontologies that encompass both truths and project them on powerful, yet different paths of becoming.

3. Ontology

Shaking the barriers of the impersonal 'it' that hindered its authentic projection as being-ness aspiring to being, the Dasein must now understand its truth in its ontological plenitude. To do so, it needs apprehended with the help of two other major Heideggerian themes, time and history.

As we recall, Heidegger's ontology rests solely on phenomenological grounds. But the Dasein cannot be explained in a satisfactorily manner starting from itself; after all, the Dasein is nothing more than an unconscious reflection of its own being. In order to properly ask the question regarding being, one of the central endeavors of Heidegger's philosophy, we should start not from ontic, but from ontological premises. This demarche is not a metaphysical one; in only ensures the Dasein's possibility to incorporate and allow the manifestation of its being in certain crucial moments, not to really understand it and consciously appropriate it, which is something the Dasein can never achieve due to its ontic determination.

Ereignis, the event of revealing the intrinsical of the Dasein, represents a pure and spectacular appearance of being that can be understood without appealing to ontic-existentiel elements that constitute the scaffolding of the Dasein (Heidegger 2002a). These events can only occur as turning points of history, and history is nothing more than a product of the Dasein's temporality.

Time depends on being, but does not have a being of its own, just like being develops its temporality out of its own existence, but it does not experience time *per se*. For Heidegger, time does not possess a certain objectivity, like it does for Hegel (Hegel 1970); it is just a vague emanation of the temporality of being and its specific being-ness. On its turn, temporality is

born out of the concern that characterizes the Dasein, an ontic reminder of the ontological anguish that circumscribes the contingency of the Dasein, its arbitrary ejection in a world it is permanently constrained to make sense of (Heidegger 2008).

Temporality entails historicity, just as time opens the Dasein to history, to its own history. For Heidegger, history is not to be equated with historiography, a collection of facticities that cover rather than explain the history of being. Being-ness is temporal, but its being is also temporal: existence itself is not ahistorical. However, the real challenge of the Dasein is not to understand the limits of its history, but to authentically reunite itself with that history (Heidegger 1999). This cannot occur through historiography, through books; as previously mentioned, Heidegger is skeptical towards theory and knowledge as appropriate means of development of being, arguing that, on the contrary, science only disorients the Dasein, preventing it to fully embrace its history. In Heidegger's acceptance, history is nothing more than lived destiny, a revigorated Dasein that manages to overcome its decline and to take possession of its own being, although briefly and unconsciously. 'History is the transporting of a people into its appointed task as entrance into that people's endowment' (Heidegger 2001, 74).

Once posited as determined being-for-death, the Dasein's strangeness towards itself vanishes: it has conquered its world and it is able to see it in its continuity. Now, the former strangeness towards itself is projected upon others, the 'strangers' who are not part of the phenomenological world of the Dasein and can impede its future advancement (Heidegger 1999). If it wishes to raise itself to the task its historical destiny has set up for it, the Dasein is bound to assert itself through creative violence and to leave behind, as we remember, all morality and inappropriate social ties that obstruct its renewal (Heidegger 2000).

In Hegel's system, ontology is also a possibility that being may use in its quest of superseding its condition as being-in-itself in order to become being-for-itself (Hegel 1979a). But the present stage of being is a progression from former historical phases, not a regression, like in the case of

Heidegger. Furthermore, like in the case of truth, Hegelian ontology is built up through the contribution of everyone, although this contribution is rarely a voluntary one, not by the voluntary contribution of a few determined individuals, as it happens with Heideggerian ontology.

Hegel is accused by Heidegger that he is a metaphysician disguised in rationalist clothes (Schmidt 1982, 19). In fact, any thinker that dissociates between being and thinking is, for the author of *Being and time*, a metaphysician (Heidegger 2000). Other philosophers assumed this position as well (Kołakowski 2001). But Hegel does not make this distinction in an arbitrary way; it proceeds so with the purpose of introducing conscience in his system. In Hegel's logic, being and thinking represent, at first, an undistinguished whole, the initial absolute. As quality emerges from its difference with reference to quantity, it becomes the first moment of conscious being. And as the system unfolds at the scale of history, quality converts itself into liberty, the teleology of the modern world which does not seek to fulfill itself in isolation, but by reintegrating quantity, nature, mechanism – the otherness of the Idea – into a speculative relation that does not annul their different identities, but transforms themselves into active parts of spirit. These functional elements of the system are placed within a trajectory towards the future Absolute, one in which being and thinking will assume and voluntarily affirm their identity, being fully aware of it (Hegel 2010; Hegel 1986a). For Heidegger's Dasein, this grand historical unfolding is perceived as a threat to the authenticity of the Dasein, and the lingering of the unconscious absolute is something to be kept and treasured like an ontological landmark, not a limited condition that needs to be overcome.

Most importantly, Hegelian ontology is not metaphysics because quality does not arise as something alien to quantity, laying 'outside' it, but as differentiation within quantity, as limit that understands itself in the form of quantity which has become aware of itself; in this new-found relation, quality is superior, representing the first moment of consciousness, but this consciousness is, in the last instance, quantitative (Hegel 1986a). But this quantitative understanding of itself as quality

advances slowly, with numerous setbacks, within a continuum, a historical dynamic that is in itself the truth of being. This is why ontology represents a permanent succession of phenomenological hypostases; to privilege one of these hypostases at the expense of other means to block the dialectical mechanism infusing them with sense and purpose. Indeed, Heidegger's assumption that ontology is only possible as phenomenology fails to take into consideration that phenomenology in itself is nothing more but pure becoming. This attempt to forcibly fixate a 'now' (Heidegger 1998a) is, like any other philosophy that tries to anchor itself in a certain principle, be that phenomenological or not, bound to err (Hegel 2010). No principle, no stage of development finds the truth in itself, but only in the ones that precede it and will, at a certain point, succeed it. Being aware and knowing only itself, Heideggerian phenomenology is therefore untrue. True knowledge is only the knowledge of the whole in its historical-spiritual becoming.

4. Epistemology

Knowledge, rational knowledge in the first place, but also emphatical, intuitive knowledge – represents one of the key factors of the Hegelian system. Only knowledge furthers the progression of being, be that individual, as concept, or universal, as reason. Heidegger is right to point out the meaning of concept for Hegel: self-thinking, self-conceiving, becoming aware and fulfilling our personal potentialities (Heidegger 1988b; Heidegger 1989). Far from being an idealist, abstraction, the concept is pure immanence, the driving force, the purpose of each particularity, even if the respective particularity is or is not in accordance with its own concept.

Heidegger reproaches Hegel that he treats phenomenology as mere appearance, and this leads him into numerous and irresolvable difficulties. Indeed, Heidegger's critics regarding the Hegelian epistemology are very powerful and pertinent. I shall present and analyze them briefly. First of all, Heidegger is reluctant towards Hegel's ambition of treating his philosophy as a complex scientific system; by doing so, Hegel falls into the trap of modern technics, of positivism that

has infused all sciences, including philosophy, and guides them towards a technocratic world of standardizations and consumerism that is very likely incapable of overcoming this huge inauthenticity that has become the being, the ontology of modernity. Second, if absolute science is thinking's certitude of itself, this being the supreme truth, how can all secondary truths be evaluated if they are not in the presence of the supreme, scientific truth? And how is this truth to be trusted, when it cannot be criticized, on the grounds of its permanent supremacy? Third, Hegel distinguishes between natural, common knowledge and real, scientific knowledge, the latter being superior to the first, but this is similar to the distinction he makes between subject and object, intellect and reason, nature and spirit; this is nothing more than metaphysics and it is also susceptible to positivism, because modern technology praises itself as natural knowledge and turns the world into a passive, knowable object for an all-knowing subject. In other words, 'that man becomes the subject and the world the object, is a consequence of technology's nature establishing itself, and not the other way around' (Heidegger 2001, 110; see also Fink 2016, 181). It should follow that natural conscience, due to its inadequacy with reference to real conscience, would start to become anxious and doubt itself, when in fact it is the scientific conscience which does so, rejecting the effective existences in the name of a future, superior existence, and becoming skeptical in the course of this process. The frustration accumulated by the real, scientific conscience, propels it to invade natural conscience, trying to become one with it and thus violating and ultimately destroying it (Heidegger 1989, 32-82).

Fourth, Hegel's science cannot appropriately measure phenomenological truths, because it is missing a standard; this instrument becomes available only within the emancipatory progression of history. In its anxious isolation, this scientific conscience tries to substitute knowledge for the above-mentioned standard, but it ends up with a paradox: the advancement of spirit is measured through the expansion of knowledge, or with the expansion of knowledge? In other words, what is Hegelian knowledge in the end: what measures or what is to be measured (Heidegger 1989, 100)? Fifth, this conscience

which endlessly tries to separate itself in the form of truth from objects in the form of nature in order to bring them back together as accomplished spirit cannot possibly have this kind of access to the objectivity of nature due to its irreducible subjectivity. Consequently, real, scientific knowledge is nothing more than natural knowledge trying to test itself in this peculiar way of denouncing itself in the first instance as untrue. Not only that, it is also an epistemic impasse: this conscience is positing itself as the standard of absolute knowledge and rejects the outside world as inconsistent phenomenology not worth taking into account. But scientific conscience is and always will be a part of this world. Growing more and more skeptical, scientific conscience realizes that it cannot be a standard of measuring a prospective spiritual truth: the outside world engulfs it and the natural conscience's indifference towards it is also unbearable, because it forces it to come to terms with its ingrate condition: its phantasmal historical ontology irremediably dissolves itself into phenomenology, the existing Dasein which suddenly realizes the futility of such a convoluted journey from its temporarily strayed self to its actual, authentic self (Heidegger 1989, 104-116; Schmitt 1977, 65-69).

In his book about Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Heidegger tackles the problem of philosophy taken as science further: 'why is philosophy called *the* science? We are inclined-because of custom-to answer this question by saying that philosophy provides the existing or possible sciences with their foundations, i.e., with a determination and possibility of their fields (e.g., nature and history), as well as with the justification of their procedures. By providing *all* sciences with their foundation, philosophy must certainly be science' (Heidegger 1988b, 10; italics in original). However, this is not the case. 'One cannot decide whether or not philosophy is *the* science by considering some epistemological criterion or other. This decision can be made only from out of the actual content and the inner necessities of the first and last problem of philosophy-the *question of being*. If we suggest that philosophy cannot and should not be *the* science, then we are also not saying that philosophy should be made a matter of whim. Instead we are saying that philosophy is to be *freed* for the task which always

confronts it whenever philosophy decides to turn into work and become actuality: It has become free to be what it is: philosophy' (Heidegger, 1988b, 13; italics in original).

In close connection to the separation between subject and object, Heidegger places the distinction made by Hegel between being and thought, along with the coercive identity that tries to bring them together as spirit. But this identity is not only destructive, it is also impossible, because being and thought are not and should not be separated in the first place (Heidegger 2002b; Janicaud in Comay, McCumber 1999, 30-31). As Dennis Schmidt points out, Hegel's thought is relevant to the extent it closes the gap between being and thinking, while Heidegger's thought has a precise opposite role: to maintain this difference as a way of placing both parts in an opening that offers them new meanings (Schmidt 1988, 153-154).

On the whole, Heidegger epistemological critique of Hegel is pertinent and extremely powerful, but it is not safe from some major shortcomings and even distortions, as Bernard Mabille observes (Mabille 2004). Heidegger presupposes, wrongly, that Hegel's fondness of the term science is proof enough that he abides to the modern political ontology of technique, to the gradual 'scientification' of the world that turns the subject into a machine and, repeating the same standardization processes required by the market and by the advancement of commodification that hinder a real renewal of mankind (Heidegger 1998b, 183-230, 239-276; Arendt, Heidegger 2004) – conveys this new ideology through his system. But Hegel used the term science with a different purpose in mind: he simply intended to introduce a much-needed rigorousness into the philosophy existent at the beginning of the 19th century, which had decayed into all sorts of popular and amateurish exercises of entertainment (Pinkard 2000); hence his insistence on systems as a means of regaining the exactness and precision philosophy once enjoyed. Moreover, Hegel also perceived and denounced the possibility of a technocratic world taking over modernity; his sharp critiques of mathematics and mechanics are highly helpful in this respect (Hegel 1979a; Hegel 1986b, 145; Hegel 1986a, 6-45; Hegel 2010; Hegel 2006; Posch 2004, 9).

Furthermore, it is precisely the distinction between subject and object that Hegel himself places at the basis of metaphysics. Hegel made this distinction not for subjective ends, but for eventually attaining a self-understanding of the whole. Consequently, even if written in the language of German idealism, his philosophy is highly phenomenological in the sense Husserl and Heidegger attributed the term, because he tries to explain and better the present, and this present is mere appearance not to a future world we are too eager to imagine, but to itself, due to its constant change. Effectiveness is to be understood only in its constant dynamics; any attempts of fixing it are doomed to fail (Bondor 2013, 137-158; see also de Boer 2000, 44-45).

Consequent to his anti-metaphysical position, Hegel does not separate common and rational consciousness in order to impose the superiority of the latter upon the former, but to compel the former to bring itself to the new conditions of the modern world. Heidegger keenly observed that rational consciousness is nothing more than natural consciousness trying to test and understand itself in different ways. This is perfectly true, and Hegel would surely agree with Heidegger's observation, adding probably that natural consciousness must renew itself as rational consciousness but also maintain its own identity nevertheless, in order to be able to tackle the significant challenges entailed by the modern world. Natural conscience must change in a rational way and also remain the same in what is spiritual in it, religious, empathic and so on.

With respect to knowledge, the ambiguity identified by Heidegger is inconsistent. Knowledge is not a standard of measuring progress for Hegel, but a part of that process, among others, a part that also enables the dialectical process to comprehend and meliorate itself whenever the case. Hegel's ontology is totality; the knowing subject emerges from it only to be consciously reunited with it, as he understands the determinations of being and the rational tasks incumbent to him in the present stage of history's spiritual unfolding. However, as Heidegger justifiably points out, the Western subject's conscience was highly destructive with reference to other, non-Western forms of conscience; is rational knowledge

underlined by violence after all? This is a question worth asking, especially in the light of Hegel's troublesome ambivalence towards colonialism. But not before addressing Heidegger's issues with the dialectical philosophical method brilliantly theorized by Hegel.

5. Dialectic

Heidegger's quarrel with dialectic is outlined in detail in his *Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Although he recognizes the 'magnificence' of this method and how deeply it is rooted into Hegel's system (Heidegger 1988b, 112), Heidegger nevertheless considers it inferior to phenomenology, in an attempt to defy the long post-Hegelian canon that stated otherwise. 'Dialectic places itself in a position of superiority over phenomenology from two related points of view, both of which have to do with the dignity of the knowledge it purportedly attains. 1. Dialectic sees in phenomenology the stage of the most immediate immediacy of grasping. This immediacy can only become acquainted (…) with something-knowing (…) remains beyond its reach, i.e.: it does not attain the higher kind of immediacy, i. e., mediated immediacy. The best it can do is to define the appearance of Spirit in its first stage – the authentic being of Spirit in its self-knowing remains closed off to it. 2. Moreover: owing to its higher authentic possibility of knowledge, dialectic alone succeeds in penetrating the irrational, and if not completely, then nonetheless more so than in phenomenology-the irrational, something spoken of at the same time as the transcendent and the metaphysical'. But phenomenology is immediate knowledge, appearance, only through the lens of dialectic. On its own, it represents the basic philosophical method (Heidegger 1999, 35).

But Heidegger is not merely over: 'Regarding what it procures in philosophy, *all dialectic in fact always lives from the table of others*. The shining example: Hegel's logic. That it simply assimilates and reworks the one traditional form of logic leaps into view after just a cursory examination. And not only this, but he himself expressly underscores it: "this traditional material": Plato, Aristotle, is "an extremely important source, indeed a necessary condition (and) presupposition to be

gratefully acknowledged". (In addition: when Hegel picked up his material, what state of interpretation was it in?) Thus dialectic lacks radicality, i.e., is fundamentally unphilosophical on two sides. *It must live from hand to mouth and develops an impressive eloquence in dealing with this readymade material*. If it gains acceptance, the burgeoning Hegelese will once again undermine even the possibility of having a mere sensitivity for philosophy. No accident that Brentano, from whom came the first impulses for the development of phenomenology, sensed in German Idealism the deepest ruin of philosophy. A year of reading and one can talk about everything, such that it really looks like something and the reader himself believes he's really got something. One ought to have a close look at the sophistry being pursued today with schemata like form-content, rational-irrational, finite-infinite, mediated-unmediated, subject-object (Heidegger 1999, 36-37; emphasis mine; see also Heidegger 2002a, 4).

Indeed, this is a blunt and direct attack to dialectic. Phenomenologically, however, it is not without substance. Heidegger argues that only from the point of view of dialectic is phenomenology immediate and therefore frivolous knowledge; in itself, phenomenology does not have to proceed dialectically to discover its own truth, but only to reveal itself to itself by determinately leaving the state of concealing its decline brought upon it. Furthermore, from a phenomenological perspective, dialectic is incapable of fixating its own object of analysis and 'lives from the table of others', as Heidegger contemptuously presumes. But when did dialectic affirm an objective like this? Never. Hegel's *Science of Logic* is very clear in this regard: a proper philosophy cannot allow itself to be immobilized and incapacitated by a certain principle, because a principle like this is basically an impossible abstraction. 'It is only in recent times that there has been a new awareness of the difficulty of finding a *beginning* in philosophy, and the reason for this difficulty, and so also the possibility of resolving it, have been discussed in a variety of ways. The beginning of philosophy must be either *something mediated* or *something immediate*, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other; so either way of beginning runs into

contradiction. The *principle* of a philosophy also expresses a beginning, of course, but not so much a subjective as an *objective* one, the beginning of *all things*. The principle is a somehow determinate *content* – "water," "the one," "nous," "idea," or "substance," "monad," etc. – or, if it designates the nature of cognition and is therefore meant simply as a criterion rather than an objective determination, as "thinking," "intuition," "sensation," "I," even "subjectivity," then here too the interest still lies in the content determination. The beginning as such, on the other hand, as something subjective in the sense that it is an accidental way of introducing the exposition, is left unconsidered, a matter of indifference, and consequently also the need to ask with what a beginning should be made remains of no importance in face of the need for the principle in which alone the interest of *the fact* seems to lie, the interest as to what is the *truth*, the *absolute ground* of everything' (Hegel 2010, 45; italics in original).

This long quote is highly useful in determining the purpose of the dialectical method. Since philosophy cannot start neither with something mediated, because it has to reach that mediation, not take it for granted, nor with something immediate (phenomenology), it follows that only dialectic can avoid the inconsistencies of both these inadequate philosophical beginnings. Dialectic is mediation, but mediation achieving itself along with the development of the system, not one of its premises, being it the same time a mediation of immediacies acknowledged in their speculative succession. Dialectic cannot stay true to a specific object because this is what it denounces in the first place, this unphilosophical attachment to an abstraction and not to change, to movement, which is the real philosophical principle, if there ever was a need for one (see also Xiaomang 2009, 294-307). On the whole, dialectic is ontological, not metaphysical, being, in Hegel's logic, the finitude's consciousness of itself in the process of acquiring infinity, in the process of developing its own concept, that is, under the form of reason, which represents the true and ultimate concept of reality (Lugarini 2004, 286-287).

As for the allegation regarding the lack of seriousness of dialectic, which can be acquired by anyone, in a short time and

without a considerable effort, because is nothing but a facile interplay between pair of opposites, I have partially dismissed it in the epistemology section of the paper. I will only add that the institutionalization, reification and often the ridiculous simplification of Hegelian philosophy that took place (and still takes place) in the decades after Hegel's death in 1831 and almost transformed it into a caricature of its former self represents a regretful turn of events that has nothing to do with Hegel himself. To find the culprit for this denouement in Hegel's writings is similar to finding the incipient doctrine of the Spanish Inquisition in the gospels of the New Testament.

6. Alienation

As we have already seen, Heidegger's treatment of ontological alienation resides in awakening the Dasein from its prolonged state of decline induced by its own lack of seriousness, its own lack of capacity and will to unveil itself to itself as pure intentional phenomenon reflected by its specific world - to fulfill its historical task of manifesting itself regardless of the costs, and doing away with the guilt and social solidarity deeply seeded into it by religious moral principles and modern day sciences and/or socialist or conservative ideologies (Heidegger 1971, 74).

In Hegel's case, Heidegger considers that alienation is concealed in the sole method destined to expose and finally eliminate it: dialectical knowledge, a knowledge that cannot understand without aggressing what it postulates as its object. I will not repeat here the details that have already been presented within the epistemology part of this article, but pick up the debate regarding colonization as it was left in suspension there.

Heidegger may be up to something when he accuses modern philosophy and especially modern sciences of unconsciously internalizing the inherent violence of capitalist colonialism in the quest of expanding the being of technique worldwide. 'Now that modern technology has arranged its expansion and rule over the whole earth, it is not just the sputniks and their by-products that are circling around our planet; it is rather Being as presencing in the sense of

calculable material that claims all the inhabitants of the earth in a uniform manner without the inhabitants of the non-European continents explicitly knowing this or even being able or wanting to know of the origin of this determination of Being. (Evidently those who desire such a knowledge least of all are those busy developers who today are urging the so-called underdeveloped countries into the realm of hearing of that claim of Being which speaks from the innermost core of modern technology.)' (Heidegger 2002a, 7; see also Heidegger 1977, 3-36).

Although he recognizes that European expansion may induce alienation among non-European peoples, Hegel considers this process to be somewhat justified in the light of his master-servant dialectic: in order to make their entrance into history and be worthy of recognition as (second hand) Europeans, non-European peoples must first endure the violence of colonization (Hegel 2003, 269; Hegel 1979b, 176; Tibebu 2011). Indeed, this is a highly sophisticated form of Eurocentrism that Heidegger was aware of and, to his merit, exposed and condemn it. But Hegel does not fully endorse colonialism; he perceives it as a potential solution for overpopulation, another solution to this problem consisting in state intervention oriented towards minimizing the social inequalities induced by the political economy of capitalism (Hegel 2003). Furthermore, the displacement and alienation produced by colonialism are subsumable to quantity, to necessity awaiting to be sublated into its constitutive other, rational liberty. This historical dialectic cannot proceed from mere moral abstractions, but only from sheer existence, which is to be overcome through itself and by itself, as it ethically incorporates rational liberty into its political project. If it fails to become necessity, liberty will amount to nothing by persisting in its limited condition of moral, isolated particularity.

Colonialism is, however, only a single element in Hegel's ontological economy of alienation, despite its continuous relevance. Alienation is both natural and socially induced. At first, nature represents the necessity of the Idea. As nature is transformed from hostile, alienated exteriority into acknowledged interiority, alienation can move on to specific being problems, in the transition from being-in-itself to being-

for-itself. As spirit thinks and constructs itself historically, people become more aware of each other both individually and collectively, as communities, societies and states. This new level of recognition, and the ones that will follow it, can only be attained through work. Meaningful, dignified work is what allows man to liberate himself both from nature and from distorted projections of himself that hindered his emancipation (Hegel 1983, 120-121). However, just like in the case of dialectical knowledge, the process is never ending and develops along with the entire human history. Consequently, alienation becomes tantamount to representation and hence it will never disappear completely because being is not fully transparent to itself, not to mention nature, which will always maintain an impenetrable rest of incommunicability (Fink 2016, 182).

One final remark, before moving on to the next section. Despite the major shortcomings of Hegelian alienation, the fact that it is both materially and spiritually grounded, no matter how scornful Heidegger is with reference to distinctions like that – makes it more aware of and allows it to avoid the mystical and ultimately metaphysical traps that Heideggerian alienation finds itself tangled into (see Marga 2014a, 61-78). Although I am not implying that Heidegger's philosophy is actually a philosophy of national-socialism (Marga 1994, 33-36; Marga 2014b, 334-363), there is without doubt a worrisome ontological continuity between Heidegger's phenomenological voluntarism and the militant irrationality of the ideology of the Third Reich.

7. Art

As Alain Badiou remarked, Heidegger's philosophy is highly esthetical (Badiou 1999). Art plays therefore a big role within its economy, and it is quintessentially related to what we have analyzed in the first section of the paper – truth. 'Art is the setting-into-work of truth. In this proposition an essential ambiguity is hidden, in which truth is at once the subject and the object of the setting. But subject and object are unsuitable names here. They keep us from thinking precisely this ambiguous nature, a task that no longer belongs to this consideration. Art is historical, and as historical it is the

creative preserving of truth in the work. Art happens as poetry. Poetry is founding in the triple sense of bestowing, grounding, and beginning. Art, as founding, is essentially historical. This means not only that art has a history in the external sense that in the course of time it, too, appears along with many other things, and in the process changes and passes away and offers changing aspects for historiology. Art is history in the essential sense that it grounds history.

Art lets truth originate. Art, founding preserving, is the spring that leaps to the truth of what is, in the work' (Heidegger 2001, 74-75). Only in art, philosophy, politics and sacrifices one can find truths; there is no thing such as a scientific truth, because 'science is not an original happening of truth, but always the cultivation of a domain of truth already opened, specifically by apprehending and confirming that which shows itself to be possibly and necessarily correct within that field' (Heidegger 2001, 60).

As technics and its scientific truth gradually take over the world, art seems to remain for Heidegger the only remedy we have left in order to reverse this ontological tragedy. 'Whether art may be granted this highest possibility of its essence in the midst of the extreme danger, no one can tell. Yet we can be astounded. Before what? Before this other possibility: that the frenziedness of technology may entrench itself everywhere to such an extent that someday, throughout everything technological, the essence of technology may come to presence in the coming-to-pass of truth. Because the essence of technology is nothing technological (but metaphysical, m.n.), essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art. But certainly only if reflection on art, for its part, does not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth after which we are *questioning*' (Heidegger 1977, 35; italics in original).

Heideggerian art is therefore intimately connected to politics, although not immediately, but on an ontological level. Only the rediscovery of a poetical way of living that could kidnap us from the prosaic and enclosing realm of technic can

save us nowadays (Heidegger 2001, 209-227. The unchaining of the Dasein can only occur through its determination to esthetically renew itself.

What about Hegelian art? Located somewhere between nature, phenomenology and spirit, Hegel's art represents an alienated form of thinking. A very important aspect that Heidegger notices is that the spiritual tasks of art in modernity are pretty much over: art survives as a form emptied of content, because is no longer able to truly move the world: the age of heroes is long gone. Art matters to us now strictly for philosophical reasons: 'art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past. Thereby it has lost for us genuine truth and life, and has rather been transferred into our *ideas* instead of maintaining its earlier necessity in reality and occupying its higher place. What is now aroused in us by works of art is not just immediate enjoyment but our judgement also, since we subject to our intellectual consideration (i) the content of art, and (ii) the work of art's means of presentation, and the appropriateness or inappropriateness of both to one another. The *philosophy* of art is therefore a greater need in our day than it was in days when art by itself as art yielded full satisfaction. Art invites us to intellectual consideration, and that not for the purpose of creating art again, but for knowing philosophically what art is' (Hegel 1988b, 11).

Even so, art remains very important for us. Its modern mission is not to arouse feelings and passions, because feelings and, to a certain extent, passions, are confined to the narrowness of the intellect, just as miracles are, when art is replaced by religion. Although it uses sensible, phenomenological means to present itself, the message of art goes beyond the immediate world and it is internalized by spirit. This is why art is not destined to reproduce nature, thus ignoring its spiritual tasks. Furthermore, one more clue that proves the philosophical affinities of modern art is that the intellect cannot interact with art in the way it usually interacts to things, by consuming them; on the contrary, art compels the intellect to advance beyond its limited, phenomenological condition and intuitively grasp spiritual truths. What reason accomplishes through philosophical, theoretical means, art

accomplishes through esthetical means. On the whole, the intellect is not capable of beauty, because it is not free; only the concept of beauty is free, due to the fact that it has access to the universal, although only as shape, not as pure concept: 'beauty can devolve only on the *shape,* because this alone is the external appearance in which the objective idealism of life becomes for us an object of our perception and sensuous consideration. *Thinking* apprehends this idealism in its *Concept* and makes this Concept explicit in its universality, but the consideration of *beauty* concentrates on the reality in which the Concept *appears*' (Hegel 1988b, 124-125; italics in original).

It would be wrong to consider that Hegel treats art like a poor relative of philosophy. Art is just another possibility to achieve the universal, like religion, politics and philosophy, each requiring their own methods and conceptual instruments (Grossman 1990, 115). But, although it considers it highly important, Hegel does not invest art with the militant-political mission of changing the modern ontology, like Heidegger does. For him, despite potential accidental outbursts in this direction, the political role of art is over. However, the spiritual role of art is only at the beginning.

8. Conclusion: Hegel and the challenges of Heideggerian phenomenology

Appealing to numerous and diverse domains of analysis, that sometimes can induce the reader a sensation of exaggerate eclecticism, even pointing maybe towards a lack in the overall coherence of the paper, the present endeavor is nevertheless a unified one in its striving to extract from the comparison of Hegel and Heidegger arguments that give credit to the hypothesis that the critiques of the latter towards the first are ultimately vulnerable and even unfounded, to some extent. Hegel was not the metaphysician Heidegger accused him to be; on the contrary, his *Phenomenology* and his *Logic* make important phenomenological claims, although without using the vocabulary of the 20th century phenomenology. But this phenomenology cannot be understood as an end in itself, but only taking into account its intimate dialectical dynamic, its prospectivity; in its absence, phenomenology is nothing more

than isolated abstractedness devoid of spirit. On its turn, spirit is not ontology in the metaphysical sense of the term, not even in the Heideggerian sense, as possibilities of being that await the Dasein to reach up to them. Spirit is immanent to phenomenology, to quantity, and arises as a differentiation within phenomenological quantity that propels it within a new, qualitative perspective. Spirit is thus not the beyond of phenomenology, but its inherent driving force. Hegel approaches therefore the Dasein (spirit) in an immanent way, and, beginning with the being-in-itself he sets out to seek the being-for-itself, and not the other way around. The rational Idea represents the otherness of nature only from the point of view of isolated intellects, unable of understanding this relation in its entire network of mediations, unable to approach the problem from a speculative angle, to place effectiveness into perspective. But when we look at it rationally, the Idea negates nature only to the extent it is negated by it; the exteriority of the Idea and the interiority of nature seek to become one another, within a historical process that is ongoing and represents the overcoming of ontological alienation through spirit. Gradually, the Idea recognizes nature as itself-other and returns to it with the power of conscience. After all, the Idea is nothing but a means through which nature understands and accepts itself within a new and rewarding dynamic. On short, the whole Hegelian system is some kind of dynamic phenomenology that unavoidable alienates itself as differentiations within itself arise, seeking to negate the whole and to assert its superiority with reference to it; however, these alienations are not permanent. They are to be understood and superseded in historical terms, in the contexts that have produced them.

By arguing that the Dasein cannot be understood starting with itself, but only with its being, its ontology, where it occasionally manifests itself as a celebration, an event of its singularity that is abruptly connected with its history understood as the possibilities of the Dasein to assert itself in the most appropriate ways as being-for-death and thus to overcome its structural contingency, its Angst - Heidegger makes use of a method that is highly non, even anti-Hegelian.

As previously argued, for Hegel, the ontic creates ontology from itself, while for Heidegger it is precisely the other way around: only being (ontology) has the capacity of offering meaning to being-ness, to the ontic level of existence. It follows that Heideggerian phenomenology is inextricably linked to ontology and has, so to say, a more pronounced metaphysical touch than Hegelian phenomenology.

Leaving aside the Husserlian phenomenology in favor of a more determined and less ethical, I would add, Dasein, which is ultimately an individual construction of conscience, even if that particular conscience is on its turn a phenomenological, contextual product, Heidegger's truth is a unilateral, assertive truth, while Hegel's truth is an all-comprehensive, equilibrated truth of the whole, a truth of mediations. It is exactly these mediations that Heidegger's Dasein is trying to overcome, perceiving them as the premises of the decay that impedes the possibilities of an authentic rebirth of being through being-ness. Projected into the realm of ontology, that truth aims to rip out the veil of opacity and superficiality that the Dasein has surrounded itself with and compel the Dasein to live up to its being and to its history, without being diverted from this immensely important task by moral or ethical concerns. Here, the influence of Nietzsche on Heidegger is very visible. Basically, following Nietzsche, Heidegger warns the Dasein not to crumble upon history as openness and diachronically shared guilt, because this guilt weakens the vitality the Dasein needs in order to shake itself from the slough surrounding it. For Hegel, the historical understanding of the Dasein means reconciliation with other communities, as the divine spark of history materializes itself as redemption available for everyone, everywhere. Of course, this is not a peaceful process, and the contradictions between communities will never disappear entirely; after all, they provide a form of constructive emulation that helps better communities both in themselves and in relation to one another.

Next, Hegelian epistemology is not metaphysical in the sense it arbitrarily postulates a subject and an object, and it is neither imbued with the scientific positivism that allows modern technique to devoid the Dasein of a proper being. Hegel

clearly specifies that the subject and the object cannot be understood separately, but only in their speculative unity from which agency first arises as a split within the object, within substance, only to return to itself in a new intelligible and assumed way. As for technique, Hegel and Heidegger share in fact a similar position: Hegel is also critical towards mathematics and mechanics to the extent their development threats to signify the development of the world in repetitive, non-dialectical terms. And dialectic, another field of quarrel between Heidegger and Hegel, is not without object, as the first claims; on the contrary, as I insisted in the section of the article that dealt with this issue, Hegelian dialectic poses its own object as finitude, as quantity, but finitude that is not reduced to itself and is constantly on the search for infinity, for quality. This particular search is acquired through the dialectical method, because philosophy in itself is change and cannot allow itself to be restrained to a principle or another, and thus to be transformed into common knowledge, no matter how elevate or scientific that knowledge may appear.

Finally, alienation is produced for both Hegel and Heidegger by the Dasein, but while Hegel understands it as an unavoidable result of the transition from being-in-itself to being-for-itself, a result that it is also diminishing in time, Heidegger refers to it as a weakness of the Dasein that allows itself to be seduced by maundering and frivolities of all sorts, thus furthering itself from its historical task. Simply put, if for Hegel alienation is a progress, because the advancement of spirit keeps on reducing and taming it, for Heidegger, alienation amounts to a shameful regress, one that needs not be approached passively as a fatality of a cruel destiny, but as a challenge the Dasein needs to overcome if it is to be authentically reunited with its being and with its history. However, in this challenge otherness does not matter, even more, it can impede on the task of the Dasein, while for Hegel the Dasein cannot truly reinvent itself and progress on its own, as an isolated entity, separated from its constitutive otherness, from mediation, from the absolute. Art represents one of the most important possibilities of the Dasein to reconcile with itself. If Hegel refers to modern art as an art that has lost the

political influence it held during the ancient times, but remains nevertheless important as a privileged connection between effective existence and spirit, teaching the intellect how to go beyond its daily pragmatism and thus perceive beauty in a rational, non-selfish way, Heidegger's hopes for art are much more militant: aesthetics offers a much needed escape from the technique that modern Dasein tries to posit as its being but is irremediably doomed to fail.

Heidegger was perfectly aware of the distance separating him from Hegel: 'For *Hegel,* being (infinity) is also the essence of time. For *us,* time is the original essence of being. These are not theses which can be simply played against each other antithetically. Rather, the term *essence [Wesen]* says something fundamentally different each time, precisely because being is understood differently' (Heidegger 1988b, 146; italics in original). Simply put, Heidegger seems to be more Kantian when it comes to concepts like time and space than Hegel. Although he was highly skeptical regarding Kant's revolution in philosophy and to the Kantian thesis that being does not expand existence in any way, arguing that even if Kant successfully dismissed the old theological metaphysic, he still appealed to it in order to develop his theory of the subject, therefore metaphysically postulating a knowing subject surrounded by an infinity of knowable objects (Heidegger 1988a, Heidegger 2008) – Heidegger interprets time as an emanation of being, in a manner reminding to that of Kant from the *Critique of pure reason* (2008). Hegel, on his turn, tries to regain a certain objectivity for time and space, without pushing them away from the subject's experience; they are both elements for the dialectical understanding of movement (Hegel 1970).

However, when it comes to Heidegger's comments on Hegel's notion of time, things may not be that simple, Stefan Kaufer warns us. Heidegger's presupposes a far too abstract and tranquil identity between being and time in Hegel's philosophy and fails to comprehend that being converts itself into spirit only by essentially fighting against time, not by allowing itself to be passively carried out by time into history. 'Heidegger does not grasp Hegel's conceptions of time and spirit in sufficient detail or at a sufficiently fundamental level. Only

by overlooking the common origin of time and spirit (...) can Heidegger reduce their commonality to a mere empty, formal structure. For Hegel, spirit falls into time as the actual historical struggle to appropriate its externality, or as the detailed unfolding of the notion. In this conflict-ridden effort of becoming itself spirit *struggles against* time (...)' (Kaufer 2012, 132; italics in original; see also Surber 1979, 358-377 and Trawny 2000, 12-39). Or, in the words of Howard Trivers, 'Hegel's view is rather that the power of the spirit over time lies in the intimate and direct conceptual relation between the two, through which relation time is, as it were, included in the spirit. Thus it is not through the aspect of time as external, but rather as internal to spirit through which the spirit's sway over time is mediated' (Trives 1942, 165). Even Hegel himself, in his *Philosophy of Nature*, defines time (and space) not as abstractions able to be filled with and emptied of content, but as reflections of finitude. 'It is said that everything *arises* and *passes away in* time, and that if one abstracts from *everything,* that is to say from the content of time and space, then empty time and empty space will be left, i.e. time and space are posited as abstractions of externality, and represented as if they were for themselves. But everything does not appear and pass in time; time itself is this *becoming,* arising, and passing away, it is the *abstraction* which has *being,* the *Cronos* which engenders all and destroys that to which it gives birth'. And better yet: 'Time does not resemble a container in which everything is as it were borne away and swallowed up in the flow of a stream. Time is merely this abstraction of destroying. Things are in time because they are finite; they do not pass away because they are in time, but are themselves that which is temporal. Temporality is their objective determination. It is therefore the process of actual things which constitutes time, and if it can be said that time is omnipotent, it must be added that it is completely impotent' (Hegel 1970, 230-231; emphasis in original). It would seem, therefore, that Hegel and Heidegger's notions of time are much more similar than the latter is willing to admit.

I have argued, in this article, that Heidegger's claim of a metaphysical Hegel preoccupied more with ontological being

than with effective existence is not valid. Although written in an idiom highly different than Heidegger's, Hegel's philosophy is, by the standards of the 20th century phenomenology, substantially phenomenological. In all the themes approached – truth, ontology, epistemology, dialectic, alienation, art – Hegel emerged not as a metaphysician dressed in the suit of reason and making use of its vocabulary, but as a cornerstone thinker of modern philosophy that managed to dismiss all of Heidegger's accusations, some of them truly challenging. On the contrary, Heidegger's mystic of being-for-death turned out to be more metaphysical than Hegel's spirit. By combining Husserlian phenomenology with German political romanticism, Heidegger ended up in the metaphysical depths of a dense irrationalism that is still to be fully elucidated. What is the praising of the 'overwhelming' and of creative violence if not the culmination of the romanticist metaphysic that could so easily be channeled on the path of fascist ideologies? 'Violence-doing, the human being disturbs the calm of growth, the nourishing and enduring of the tireless one. Here the overwhelming does not hold sway in self-devouring wildness but as that which, without toil and without tiring, from out of the superiority of the calm of great riches, ripens and dispenses what is inexhaustible and rises above all impatience. The violence-doers break into this sway, year by year they break it up with plows and drive the toilless earth into the restlessness of their toiling' (Heidegger 2000, 164).

Still, Heidegger always recognized Hegel's magnitude, arguing that he has seen farther and better than anyone else in philosophy (Janicaud in Comay, McCumber 1999, 28). He did that also with the involuntarily help of language which is, especially in the Western world, infused by metaphysics; this is why for Heidegger language creates thinking, while, for Hegel, the reverse is true (Janicaud in Comay, McCumber 1999, 39-40). We should concede, at least in this regard, Heidegger's ascendant on Hegel.

By criticizing Hegel's work, Heidegger aimed to actualize it and also to prove its respect for it: 'We protect the uniqueness of Hegel's work only when we take the trouble to confront it thoroughly' (Hegel 1988b, 74). Heidegger's work is

also challenging and unique. Yet, as a successor of Hegel, Heidegger does not achieve, in his own words, more than a 'mutiny' against him: 'People speak of a collapse of Hegel's philosophy after his death and see in that collapse the collapse of previous philosophy generally, which, presumed to be finished, is awarded the consolation prize of being condescendingly called ... classical philosophy. However, it is not that Hegel's philosophy has broken down. Rather, his contemporaries and successors have not ever yet stood up so that they can be measured against his greatness. People managed to "stand up" to him only by staging a mutiny' (Heidegger 1988b, 40).

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On Formativity: Art as Praxis

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Abstract

Luigi Pareyson's concept of formativity is one of his most relevant and original concepts. In this paper I will give a short exposition of this concept in Pareyson's *Estetica* and try to show how it can account, better as other object, subject-, target- oriented theories, even of some features of contemporary art. The very relevant innovation that we can find in this concept is the shift from a concept of art as poiesis—as it is in Aristotle, namely, as a production of an object—to the concept of art as praxis, that is, as an activity which involves the entire doing of the artist. As a doing that invents the form of doing, formativity appears as a kind of schematism that operates, not only without concept, as it is in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, but even without object. The thesis here suggested is that formativity can be understood as a transcendentalism of invention.

Keywords: Pareyson, aesthetics; formativity, work of art, invention, poiesis, praxis

I

The goal of this article is to discuss the concept of 'formativity' formulated by the Italian philosopher Luigi Pareyson, the teacher of more well-known philosophers as Gianni Vattimo and Umberto Eco at the University of Turin.[1] This concept is presented by Pareyson in his book *Estetica*, published in its first edition in 1954, with the subtitle *Teoria della formatività* (*Theory of formativity*). The word 'formativity', a neologism that Pareyson himself defined as "inelegant", expresses one of his most innovative ideas. As it is clear from the very beginning of the Preface, Pareyson avoids 'form', which would mean the conclusive and definitely static moment of a

process, and instead chooses 'formativity' in order to denote the generative process, the dynamical and processual moment of forming. The 'aesthetics of formativity' concerns then the creative, poietical process of art.

"To form means to make – *poiein*", so Pareyson writes (1974, p. 59). It is a definition that at first seems to be consonant with a long standing tradition, since it associates formativity, as the peculiar nature of art, with *poiesis*, that is, to production. However, the concept itself of formativity and the central position it assumes in Pareyson's aesthetic theory make this definition, not so much problematic, but at least reductive, risking the concealment of the truly innovative import of such a theory. If forming, as the particular character of art, were only *poiesis*, i.e. the production of objects, the capacity of the theory of formativity to explain some phenomena of contemporary art would be significantly downsized. I would like to show, instead, that merely by assuming formativity as the essential nature of art, Pareyson can account (even if not intentionally) for some of the peculiarities of contemporary art, but only at the price of challenging (which is not a loss) the coincidence of formativity and *poiesis*.

II

The definition of art as *poiesis* dates back to Aristotle. In fact, in the sixth Book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle includes *techne* among those dianoetic virtues that concern not knowledge, but making: more precisely, it regards the production of objects, or *poiesis*. Art is a part of that field of human acting which deals with the production of objects that are not generated in nature, and that differs from another kind of doing, namely, *praxis*. "While making (*poiesis*) has an end other than itself, action (*praxis*) cannot; for good action itself is its end." (Aristotle 2009: 1140b)

By referring to their end, Aristotle then established a clear distinction between productive, heterotelic doing, whose end is external to the action itself, and non-productive, autotelic doing, whose end is the fulfilment of the good. He in fact writes that "neither is acting making nor is making acting". (ibid., 1140a) *Poiesis* and *praxis* therefore cover two fields that do not

overlap, and that are not included one into the other (ibid.), just their corresponding virtues do not overlap: *techne*, on one hand, and *phronesis*, on the other.

Another difference between *poiesis* and *praxis* concerns the very nature of these virtues. In fact, *techne*, which corresponds to *poiesis*, makes use of a knowing that relates to the nature of the object, while *phronesis*, the virtue of *praxis*, cannot rely on such a thing: the fact that it does not produce an object removes the possibility of ruling its acting on the basis of some eternal or contingent nature. Therefore, it is neither science nor art (ibid., 1140b), but an experiential knowing, which has evermore to cope with unscripted situations, and thus is intrinsically innovative.

Beside these differences, there is something common to *poiesis* and *praxis*: deliberation (*bouleusis*). It is in fact necessary in all those acts that depend on human being, whether they are productive or non-productive, and concern not the end, but the means, i.e. what leads to the end: "We deliberate not about ends but about what contributes to ends. […] The subject of investigation is sometimes the instruments, sometimes the use of them; and similarly in the other cases – sometimes the means (*di'oû*), sometimes the mode (*pôs*) or the means of bringing it about (*dià tínos*)." (Aristotle 2009, 1112b) What *poiesis* and *praxis*, the productive and non-productive doing, have in common is then the deliberation on the means, or more generically, *on the way of achieving or carrying out the action*. To this aim, art can rely, as we said, on the materiality and specificity of the object to be produced, which orients the choice of the more suitable technique for its fulfilment, whereas praxis is uniquely oriented by the good, and by its inevitable contingency, since it depends on the *kairos*, on the opportune moment. The absence of the object in praxis makes the value of the deliberation consist completely in the way of doing, in the *eu* of the *eupraxia*.

III

We can then say that the choice of the way of doing, the deliberation, represents the common trait to both, *poiesis* and *praxis*, although with different presuppositions and conditions.

Pareyson's aesthetics—because it takes formativity, that is, the invention of the way of doing, as its basic concept, —posits itself exactly in this field common to *poiesis* and *praxis*. Moreover, by assuming formativity as the essential nature of art, it extends the concept of art beyond the restricted field to which Aristotle limited it, that of the production of objects, and turns it, I would say, into a transcendental dimension of every human operativity, that is, of human acting in general-- thereby ridding itself of the fact that it aims at the production of objects. One can then say that formativity is not properly *poiesis* but *praxis*. This is the idea I would like to support here, which questions the clear separation that Aristotle traced between them. In essence, with his theory of formativity, Pareyson undertakes a double operation: he finds in the invention of the way of doing the specific trait of art, but, at the same time, assumes it as the specific character of every human acting, even if it is non-productive. The following quotation states this very clearly:

> Every human operation is always formative, and even a work of thought and a practical work require the exercise of formativity. A virtuous action [also *praxis*, G.C.] must be invented as that which is required by the moral law in that specific circumstance, and must be performed and achieved with a movement that at the same time invents the better way of carrying it out; in posing and resolving a problem, in deducing consequences from a principle, in conducting a demonstration, in connecting arguments in a systematic whole, the implementation of movements of thought is always needed, and so the discovery, through an act of invention, of what reason requires in that specific case, as well as the explicit formulation of thoughts. Productive force and inventive capability are then required by thought and by action, since the speculative and practical operations are made by a formative activity that in that specific field performs and produces the works at the same time it invents the way of doing them. (Pareyson 1974, p. 23)

In this long passage it is clear that for Pareyson formativity is not the exclusive territory of art in a strict sense (that is, as *poiesis*), but covers all human operations, and thus also praxis and even thought, or theory. This entire field requires formativity, the invention of a way of doing, at the same time that it is the production of an object.

In order to better understand this point, we could refer here, I suggest, to the Kantian schematism. The schematism is for Kant "a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty." (Kant 2000, p. 273 - B 180-181) In the *Critique of Pure Reason* the schematism mediates between concepts (i.e. forms of a necessary synthesis) and sensibility, and consists in the production, not of objects, but of methods, of operative monograms, in order to give images or objects in experience to concepts. In the *Critique of Judgement*, instead, the schematism of art consists in schematizing without concept, and is therefore free, because unbundled of the necessary synthesis of the understanding. Like this kind of schematism, formativity is certainly free; indeed, it schematizes without concept, without a category of the understanding. However, its peculiarity is that it can schematize even without object. It is actually a schematism that concerns principally, and even uniquely, the way of doing as such. That's why it is not *poiesis* but *praxis*. What in the Aristotelian classification was a trait, not of a *poiesis* but of a *praxis*, namely, the autotelic nature and the central position of the *way of doing*, becomes for Pareyson the essence of formativity as distinctive of every human action. Every human action is art, and as formative – autotelic – is praxis. In this way a conceptual shift is achieved where art and praxis, aesthetics and ethics, indeed, aesthetics, ethics and theory find a significant point of conjunction. It is a shift whose first movement can be found again in Kant, in the *Critique of Judgment*, where this point of conjonction appears as a bridge connecting the territories of pure reason and of practical reason. Judgment is a function of the imagination, that is, of the capacity of forming, of creating forms. Here for Kant – and evidently also for Hegel and for Pareyson – the space of freedom opens: works of art, as well as every human operativity, are traces of this freedom in the world. Freedom appears, gives itself a sensible existence in the work of art – which is the invention of a way of doing – and art is nothing other than freedom which manifests itself in the world. Among all the definitions of art that have been created and can ever be done, this one remains, in my opinion, far and away the best.

Nevertheless, freedom, which appears in art, does not consist so much in the creation of new objects, but rather in the invention of new ways of doing, of acting, of representing, of thinking. Every human acting is art inasmuch it shows this freedom, which distinguishes its doing and producing from the natural, more precisely automatic, production. A technique as a mere implementation, exempt of deviations, of a pre-fixed and pre-established plan, is not actually human; it is the activity of a machine, which therefore is not free. The possibility of inventing the way of doing is then what makes formativity the peculiar trait, the very essence, of human existence. No properly human acting is possible without being formative, that is, without being free, and then art.

IV

Now let's test Pareyson's theory, which unfortunately is little known by the international public, in relation to contemporary art. It indeed has resources that can better interpret the peculiarity of contemporary art than other aesthetic theories - object, subject or target oriented - do. The limit of all these aesthetic theories is that they only work so long as one already knows how to identify an object of art, since all, at the very end, are focused on the object. Alternative theories, such as Arthur Danto's relational theory or George Dickie's institutional theory, as far as they can have several points of contact with the Pareysonian theory (in particular the former one), nonetheless have the flaw of assuming a factual field – the world or a group of critics, scholars, historians, institutions – as a basis for the decision about what is art. They therefore risk developing into a sort of 'artistic positivism,' which is actually the greatest enemy of every artistic creation. According to these theories, a work of art is such when it is accepted and included in a world or in an institutional system. Pareyson's concept of formativity, instead, avoids the flaws of these theories, whose limit is represented by the very 'litmus test' of every theory of art: the ready-made. Duchamp's *Fountain* or *Bottle Rack* indeed challenge every objectual conception of art, as well as every expressive or functional conception, and have with every institutional theory an

evidently ironical relation: in the moment they are accepted in the world or in the field of art, they are *de facto* 'sterilized'—they lose their critical, unconventional, innovative import, that is, their opposition to every institutionalization and positivization of art. On the contrary, from the point of view of Pareyson's theory of formativity, ready-made works show that the very essence of the work of art consists in the 'way' it has been done and not in its objectual properties. As we read in the previous quotation, even a conceptual operation is for Pareyson *formative*, and thus art. The simple idea – and I say just the *idea* – of signing a urinal and displaying it in a museum, and not the mere *fact* of displaying it, is what makes it art, as invention, never before made, and the expression of an act of freedom. What is decisive is the formative process that led to this outcome, its invention, the idea behind it, which has to be grasped, has to be understood. Conceptual art challenges every theory of art, every a*esthetics*, inasmuch as every aesthetics concentrates on the sensible qualities of an object, to which we traditionally refer when define it as a work of art. Formativity, on the contrary, makes clear that a work of art, in order to be grasped just as art, has to be, not perceived, but interpreted.

In the case of the ready-made, the theory of formativity provides then us a criterion for evaluating the artistic nature of the work: it consists in the invention of a new, unprecedented way of fulfilling, and at most even of considering the object, be it a urinal, a bottle rack or a Brillo Box. This new way can consist in something minimal, and negative: that is, in *not considering* the object as it appears, that is, as an object of senses, or as it is understood by common opinion. Consequently, and this is the point I would like to stress, by suspending its everyday reality, this minimal negativity makes the work of art in principle irreconcilable with every institutional, that is, every positive theory of art. The invention of a new way of doing confers to the work of art a differential trait, which constitutes the unity of originality and continuity, which is, as Pareyson writes, the very temporality of a work of art. But just for this reason every work of art brings with itself, in the form of a difference, a negativity that no positivization or

institutionalization of art will never be able to efface and shall never efface

V

These considerations might encounter an objection. We can indeed say that with his definition of formativity Pareyson succeeds in explaining the artistic nature, even purely conceptual, of Duchamp's works only because, eventually, formativity covers all of human doing, and thus lacks that specificity that should distinguish art from other human activities. Every human operation is artistic,

> so that we can say that the whole of spiritual life is, in some way, 'art': in every field of human operativity nothing can be done without inventing in some way the way of doing. Whatever we do, we need 'art,' and no thing can be done without 'art': there is no human business, albeit humble, tenuous and insignificant, that does not require, in him who attends to it, 'art', that is, the capacity of inventing the way of doing by doing [inventare il modo di fare facendo], and of doing by knowing how to do, and nothing can be reached if doing does not become inventive as well as productive, attempting and figuring as well as performing and achieving [inventivo oltre che produttivo, tentativo e figurante oltre che esecutivo e realizzatore]. (Kant 2000, p. 273 - B 180-181)

If every operation is formativity, then everything—from the *Gioconda* to the ready-made to the chairs in this room—is art. However, this generalness, or better, this generality of formativity, which covers any human activity, even the more humble and utilitarian ones, does not trim away and efface the specificity of art. Indeed, art is that sphere of human acting where formativity emerges *as such*, where it becomes dominant, since it is the aim itself of acting. It is a 'forming for forming', just as in the case of the ready-mades: they can be very trivial, everyday, already made objects, so that the operation that elevates them to art really produces nothing, and confers to them no utility (indeed, it consists in the suspension of their utility). The artistic operation that makes art a certain production of human activity concentrates in the *way* of doing, in the form, and then at least in the *way* of considering them. The specificity of art consists for Pareyson in being *pure formativity*:

> The artistic operation is a process of invention and production performed not in order to fulfill works that are speculative, practical, or whatever they can be, but only for itself: forming for forming, forming by pursuing uniquely the form for itself: *art is pure formativity*. (ibid., 64)

Works of art are thus not forms insofar as they are works, that is, because they are material objects, but are works insofar as they are forms, because, namely, they are formed objects:

> formativity succeeds in being pure [and thus art], that is in forming forms, which are nothing other than forms, and which require to be considered only as forms, only if it is formation of a physical matter, given that only physical matter, once it is formed, is form and only form. (ibid., 42)[2]

What makes art a work of art is not then its materiality but the fact of having a form. The ready-made shows then the purely transcendental nature of artistic invention, which invents a 'condition,' in the double meaning of the term: a possibility that produces a new status, an operation that is then *formative* and *transformative* at a transcendental level, a level of a higher-order praxis, which is not that positive of the empirical object. Formativity, as a general trait of every human doing, therefore finds its purity in art, which the ready-made expresses to the highest degree.

VI

The theory of formativity differs, as I believe I have shown, from all the aesthetics that today occupy the scene of philosophical debate. Pareyson's is not, actually, an object-oriented aesthetics, since it does not focus on the object, on its qualities, on its properties, does not assume, above all, the object as the determining factor for deciding what is art. Neither is it a source-oriented aesthetics, similar to that of Collingwood or Croce, which when Pareyson published his *Estetica* dominated the Italian philosophical scene: an aesthetics that sees in the work of art the expression of feeling or subjective contents of the artist. It is not even a target-oriented aesthetics, since it is completely alien to a functional consideration of the artwork, that is, to a consideration of the

effect that it provokes or should provoke in the user or the spectator. It is not a relational or institutional theory of art, because these theories result in a positivization of the world of art and of what is art. Unlike these aesthetics – that take into account firstly the object, the subject or the goal of the artistic creation, or lose the negative nature of art – Pareyson's aesthetics is focused on formativity, the character of every human activity, "for which it is, at once, production and invention," a doing that, by doing, "invents the way of doing." (Pareyson 1974, p. 18). Therefore, it cannot but challenge what is already constituted and established. The very object of Pareyson's aesthetics is here: neither the work, nor the subject, nor the end, but the *way* of doing.

I believe that we could call this aesthetics 'transcendental'– which in this sense is, as I said, Kantian – since with the word 'transcendental' we mean a knowing that concerns not the object but the way of relating to the object. It is, however, a transcendentalism in which the form, the way of this relation, is itself invented, is even the real object of the creative act: the aesthetics of formativity is what we could call a 'transcendentalism of invention,' meaning what is primarily invented through the creative act is the way of doing. The form, which Pareyson points out with the word 'formativity,' is the form of doing. What the artist invents is first of all a technique, or more precisely, a style.

> There are works that do not express anything and do not say anything, but their style is very eloquent, because it is the spirituality itself of the author. One will say that, just in this sense, art is expressive, and the feeling is present inasmuch it results completely in the form; but we do not see then why it would be necessary to claim that only through feeling the spiritual life could penetrate in the art, and that only through a lyrical condensation it could turn into an image; because the spiritual life, in the infinite richness of its aspects, makes itself, as a whole, style and way of forming; in the same way, even the more stylized arabesque, the coldest architecture and the more elaborated counterpoint, which do not express for themselves any feeling, and do not have any lyrical character, contain a whole civilization made style, a whole way of interpreting the world and of acting in front of life, a whole way of thinking living and feeling, a whole collective and personal spirituality in the infinite richness of its aspects.(ibid., 38-39)

By assuming formativity as the distinctive trait of every human operation, and then of praxis, which finds in art its highest purity, Pareyson tried to say, in conclusion, that all of human life, from the more elevated to the more humble, does not express, at least not primarily, a content, a feeling or a specific meaning, but a way of being, a 'style': he tried to tell us that every human operation, and perhaps more deeply the human life as such, is ultimately a work of art.

NOTES

[1] The bibliography of Luigi Pareyson accessible to the English readers is till now not so wide. I can point out Pareyson 2009 and 2013. For a general presentation of his philosophy, see Chiurazzi 2015.

[2] The observation in square brackets is mine). The same idea is expressed in an essay in which Pareyson sums up in few pages and in a very comprehensive way his aesthetic theory. See Pareyson (1965, p. 103).

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Le Soi comme « oeuvre d'art »

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Abstract

The Self as a Work of Art

More and more aesthetic projects seek to converge art with real life, up to becoming coincident. The expressions 'art of living', 'art as way of life', 'to live artistically' illustrate precisely such an overlap. The body can be an interface in relation to the others, but also the instrument by which we can gain our confidence and self-esteem. This is the context in which Richard Schusterman speaks of 'the self as a work of art'. 'The somaesthetics', in the form promoted by the American aesthetician, is concerned with the 'styling of the self' by modeling one's own body. This has as object the body, as perceived by each, in order to provide pleasant sensations or beautiful depictions. In general frameworks, it can be described as a critical and philosophical study of experience, regarding the use of the body as a place of sensorial aesthetic appreciation and creative self-modeling.

Keywords: 'art of living', The Self, body, 'somaesthetics'

1. Le corps symbolique

L'image peut être perçue comme phénomène anthropologique, médiateur entre le corps regardant et le corps regardé. Le corps, à son tour, constitue un lieu des images » ainsi que leur « support » (par exemple, le corps peint en *body art*). Le corps et l'image entretiennent un rapport d'analogie, l'un qui permet de suivre les métamorphoses de la notion de corps tout au long de l'évolution de l'image, et, inversement, « toute modification de la vision sur l'image », à partir de la manière d'envisager le corps (Belting 2004, 169). L'image du corps s'inscrit donc en un scénario anthropologique plus vaste,

avec des vertus spéculatives, censées reconstruire une certaine image de l'homme

Le corps même constitue une image, non seulement dans l'art, mais aussi dans la vie quotidienne. En tant que représentation du corps, l'image est quelque peu artificielle à cause de notre penchant à la simulation. On est perçu tel que l'on est ou qu'on voudrait l'être. Quand les autres le regardent, notre corps devient image, l'une à laquelle on travaille ou qu'on cherche à retoucher. Maurice-Merleau Ponty décrit le corps comme « le symbole de tous les symboles existants ou possibles ». De même, Michel Bernard le considère comme « ouverture et carrefour du champs symbolique », « le symbole dont use une société pour parler de ses fantasmes » (Bernard 1995, 133-134). Est-il possible?

2. Les « imperfections » de la perfection

Tirée du contexte et utilisée dans une direction philosophique et littéraire, la métaphore chrétienne du corps comme temple du Saint Esprit a pu être récupérée de plusieurs manières. L'une de ses réutilisations appartient à l'Américain Henry David Thoreau (le père de l'idée de « désobéissance civile ») qui a vécu au XIX^{e} siècle : « Chaque homme est le bâtisseur d'un temple appelé son corps. (…) Nous sommes tous des sculpteurs, des peintres et notre matériel est notre propre chair, le corps de sang et d'os. La noblesse commence tout de suite à paufiner les traits humains, que la bassesse et la sensualité ramènent à la bestialité ». En d'autres termes, l'intérêt pour son propre corps, pour le soigner et pour l'embellir, fournit les meilleurs indices concernant la personnalité d'un individu.

Les affirmations de Thoreau étaient pourtant contredites par sa propre allure. Le romancier Nathaniel Hawthorne, un de ses contemporains, utilisait dans son portait des termes assez durs : « [Thoreau] est on ne peut plus laid, le nez long, la bouche tordue, rustre, bien que poli à sa façon, ayant des manières qui correspondent parfaitement à son allure. Mais sa laideur en est une d'honnête homme, et, en quelque sorte, agréable, en lui allant mieux que la beauté ». Ni

pour Thoreau ni pour plusieurs des gens considérés comme « importants », les petites infirmités ou défauts n'ont pas constitué d'obstacle à l'articulation de carrières vraiment remarquables. La beauté est-elle toute-puissante ? Aurait-elle des désavantages ou des imperfections cachées ?

Le profil de l'homme puissant qui laisse « des traces » profondes dans l'histoire ne ressemble guère à celui d'un Casanova séduisant ou à celui d'un *dandy* irrésistible, en s'emparant facilement des redoutes de précieuses frivoles. Comme il a des buts difficilement réalisables, il néglige sa forme et ses qualités physiques, en sacrifiant parfois sa vie privée, sa famille et sa santé. Dans son cas, l'entrainement mental dépasse celui des muscles. « Les conquêtes » avec lesquelles il peut se vanter sont rangées plutôt du côté de la connaissance, de la créativité, du pouvoir politique, que de celui des satisfactions immédiates.

Le préjugé de la beauté dévastatrice est contredit par la réalité. Dans la politique, par exemple, combien de ceux qui ont détenu ou qui détiennent le pouvoir ont eu (ont) la chance de l'intégrité physique et/ou de la perfection corporelle ? Les hommes considérés comme « grands » ont eu des problèmes de taille. Napoléon, on le sait, non seulement il était petit et replet, mais il souffrait d'épilepsie et d'hypo-leucophobie (la peur des chevaux blancs) ; la révolution bolchévique a gratifié Lénine de syphilis (maladie qui lui a causé la mort) ; Staline était et paralytique et paranoïaque ; Franklin Roosevelt – le président des Etats Unis pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale – dirigeait son pays d'un fauteuil roulant ; Hitler avait la maladie Parkinson et, semble-t-il, une dysfonction érectile ; Ceauşescu luttait contre le bégaiement congénital et, plus tard, contre le diabète. Les politiciens de nos jours ne sont pas non plus très proches des modèles esthétiques idéaux. Combien de défauts et de faiblesses pourrait-on leur trouver ?

La beauté est rare et sélective, mais aussi une « excellente recommandation » (Montaigne). On ne choisit pas son corps et on ne peut pas s'en débarrasser non plus. Mais, pourrait-on compter seulement sur ses charmes ? Les critiques de la beauté exclusiviste ont, à leur tour, des arguments sérieux. Rappelons ici Horkheimer, Adorno, Cioran, C. Noica.

Les deux premiers critiquaient toute tentative d'exagérer le soin pour le corps, en la trouvant aliénante. Les nazis seulement imposaient les standards physiques opprimés, en éliminant ceux qui ne répondaient pas au type physionomique arien. Dans son *Précis de décomposition*, Emile Cioran parle des « avantages de la débilité » (Cioran 1949, 139-141). Si la beauté ne connaît pas la souffrance, le désespoir ou la maladie, elle reste dans le registre médiocre du dérisoire cosmétiqué.

Constantin Noica, lui aussi usait d'un pareil argument quand il montrait que les grands systèmes de pensée étaient le plus souvent des refuges de « grands frustrés ». On pourrait très bien parler d'une « philosophie ésopique » propre à ceux qui ont philosophé par ressentiment, aux malades et aux malformés. On ne manque pas d'exemples. On dit qu'Aristote souffrait d'ulcère et qu'il était assez frêle ; saint Thomas d'Aquin était gros et taciturne (on le surnommait d'une manière ironique « le bœuf muet ») ; Descartes est tombé malade de pneumonie en tenant des cours de philosophie pendant l'hiver, à cinq heures du matin, pour une reine capricieuse ; Kant était mince, bossu et austère ; Voltaire, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Sartre, Jaspers – laids et maladifs.

Dans les représentations plastiques traditionnelles, on rend la perfection par des touches diaphanes, harmonieuses, bien proportionnées. Mais, la beauté est-elle exclusivement dépendante du corps ? Les artistes Jake et Dinos Chapman proposent un changement de perspective. *Le Surhomme* (1995) – une de leurs œuvres – fait l'éloge de l'homme supérieur dont la beauté est totalement indépendante des standards habituels. Le modèle est réel ; Stephen Hawking – le physicien de génie – représente la possibilité de dépasser la condition biologique précaire par le pouvoir de la pensée et de l'intelligence. Dans son cas aussi, le corps reste un temple, même si le temps ou les mauvaises circonstances l'ont presque ruiné. .

3. Les caprices de la beauté

Les traits physionomiques sont, on le sait, décisifs dans la relation avec l'autre ; ils peuvent rendre quelqu'un agréable ou, par contre, désagréable. Les compatibilités et les affinités

réciproques sont dirigées par les repères extérieurs. D'où l'intérêt pour l'image ou pour l'aspect physique. Quels sont les atouts du corps parfait ? Vaut-il la peine de le soigner d'une manière excessive ? Quel est le « prix » de la beauté ? Faut-il beaucoup investir en elle ? Comment pourrait-on amortir les coûts, étant donné le fait que le temps « ne pardonne pas », mais qu'il agit d'une manière irréversible ?

Si les signes de surface sont encourageants, la perception du corps – son propre corps ou le corps de l'autre – nous procure, en général, du plaisir. La beauté est une prémisse du succès ; celui qui possède un visage naturel, une « carcasse » attractive, a à la portée de main un meilleur répertoire de possibilités pour réussir. La culture occidentale a encouragé ce modèle, en stimulant en même temps tous les fantasmes de la perfection accessible. En investissant dans sa propre image, dans son propre corps, on augmente ses possibilités. A côté de la cosmétique et du design vestimentaire, la chirurgie esthétique intervient avec des instruments spécifiques pour corriger ou augmenter la beauté extérieure. Les défauts peuvent être corrigés avec la seringue et le bistouri, et les qualités – mises en évidence par des retouches spécialisées. C'est dans ce but que toute une industrie est mobilisée chaque jour pour soutenir le mythe de la beauté éternelle. Le prix de la beauté augmentée artificiellement est exprimé non seulement en argent, mais aussi en souffrance : tatouages, piercing, implants, liposuccions, tous équivalant à un nombre égal d'interventions douloureuses pour obtenir le « capital » de beauté espérée.

Il y a de nombreuses personnes qui critiquent ce genre d'efforts, en y voyant les indices de l'aliénation et de la superficialité chronique. On perçoit de cette manière le soin presque métaphysique de mesurer sa pesanteur, l'angoisse provoquée par le désir que ses épaules, seins ou hanches correspondent aux canons idéaux, les heures de préparation physique qu'on dédie avec assiduité aux muscles abdominaux, aux jambes et aux fesses. Obsédé par l'esthétisme des formes anatomiques, le culturisme se présente sous la forme d'un sport des apparences ; il défie l'humain en affichant des modèles difficiles à suivre, mais que la publicité et la propagande

exploitent amplement par scrupules commerciaux, en réifiant, en déformant et en fragmentant le corps. L'individualité et la liberté de chacun sont ainsi sabotées, les gens étant invités à se conformer à des étalons publics inaccessibles ou oppressifs.

La négligence envers son propre corps peut être aussi agaçante que les excès « décoratifs ». Si l'on donne raison aux signaux récents, on pourrait dire que les modèles de beauté agréés par le monde actuel sont en train de se compromettre. Le manque de naturel du corps et son artificialisation ostentatoire stimulent les gestes de repliement et de réfutation. On oserait dire ici que la beauté elle-même a perdu son identité. .

4. Le Soi comme « œuvre d'art »

L'un des clichés souvent utilisés dit que l'art « imite » la vie. Le sens mimétique a une tradition vénérable ; il suggère que l'artiste prend un modèle et que son ouvrage doit être situé en rapport d'adéquation formelle avec celui-ci. La diversification des pratiques artistiques a obligé les esthéticiens de faire des repliements conceptuels. Aujourd'hui, les arts prétendent de plus en plus *transfigurer*, *intervenir*, *transformer* et *modeler* la réalité. La « transfiguration » implique le détachement du modèle, l'utilisation de l'imagination euristique, l'avancement dans une direction inédite et créatrice. Emprunté à la biologie, le synonyme « métamorphose » fait référence à cette disponibilité même d'opérer des modifications au niveau formel. L'art corporel (*Body art*), par exemple, exhibe le corps physique en en faisant un lieu des masques et des dissimulations identitaires.

Si l'on regarde autour de nous, on pourrait dire que la vie quotidienne arrive à imiter de plus en plus l'art. Dans cette situation le corps continue à rester le champ d'essai préféré. L'incompatibilité avec les standards situationnels de beauté donne naissance à de grands complexes et frustrations. Certains ne sont plus à l'aise dans leur peau. La « réconciliation » avec son propre corps est toujours douloureuse. Les interventions chirurgicales, les injections de silicone, de botox et d'acide hyaluronique donnent pour le

moment l'impression d'un façonnement esthétique salvateur ou opportun. Dans ces circonstances, et le corps et la manière dont on se voit dans le miroir peuvent subir des modifications. Pourrait-on modeler la personnalité sans recourir à des interventions sanglantes, à des seringues ou des bistouris ?

Richard Shusterman, l'un des philosophes contemporains de grande notoriété, est l'auteur de quelques projets qui visent le rapprochement de l'art avec la vie réelle jusqu'à ce que les deux coïncident. Les syntagmes « l'art de vivre » ou « l'art comme manière de vivre » illustrent une telle superposition. De plus, le corps peut être interface par rapport aux autres, mais aussi l'instrument par l'intermédiaire duquel on peut récupérer la confiance et le respect de soi. Voilà le contexte argumentatif où l'esthéticien pragmatique parle du « soi comme œuvre d'art » (*The Self as a Work of Art*) en ébauchant les lignes d'une « esthétique somatique », préoccupée de la « stylisation du soi » par le façonnement du corps.

L'erreur fondamentale qu'on fait couramment, croit Shusterman, est de mettre en opposition l'esprit et le corps. Ce dernier ne doit être considéré ni robot ni cadavre ; il est perceptif, pensant et intelligent ; il est la source principale des capacités sensorielles et cognitives. Dans le livre *Body Consciousness (La Conscience du corps* (cf. Schusterman 2008) *Schusterman* aborde le problématique des liaisons entre la philosophie de l'esprit, l'éthique, la politique et la dimension esthétique de la vie quotidienne. L'auteur parle de la conscience du corps, de la conscience somatique, et de la culture somatique. Il montre que parmi les thèmes de la philosophie traditionnelle (la connaissance, la connaissance de soi, la vertu, le bonheur, la justice) il y en a qui n'ont pas perdu de leur actualité. Une bonne conscience somatique associée à des pratiques corporelles adéquates peuvent nous aider à améliorer nos capacités de perception, d'action et de satisfaction, mais aussi la sensibilité envers l'autre.

Donc, l'esthétique somatique a pour objet le corps, tel qu'il est perçu par chacun, de manière qu'il offre des sensations agréables et de belles représentations. En grandes lignes, on peut la décrire comme une étude critique et philosophique de l'expérience, ayant comme but l'utilisation du corps en tant que

lieu de l'appréciation esthétique sensorielle et de l'auto-façonnement créatif. En admettant la fonction esthétique du corps, on peut mieux valoriser le potentiel dont il dispose. L'esthétique somatique pragmatiste a un caractère prescriptif en proposant des modèles à suivre, des méthodes pour perfectionner la « forme » corporelle et des exercices simultanés pour l'instruction de l'esprit. Quelques méthodologies (« représentationnelles ») insistent exclusivement sur la forme externe du corps, sur son esthétisation superficielle. On y inclut les méthodes sophistiquées de maquillage et d'entretien, la chirurgie plastique, les techniques de bodybuilding. Par contre, les méthodologies « expérientielles » se concentrent sur la qualité esthétique de l'expérience interne, en encourageant les pratiques méditatives orientales (par exemple, le yoga). Une troisième possibilité est représentée par l'esthétique *performative* (pratique) ; on range ici les disciplines dédiées surtout à la force physique et à la santé du corps (les arts martiaux, l'athlétisme, la gymnastique, le soulèvement des poids). L'enjeu de ces démarches serait l'expérience de son propre corps *perçu de l'intérieur* en termes de satisfaction et de beauté.

Beaucoup de cours de Richard Shusterman ne sont pas donnés dans des amphithéâtres, mais dans des salles de sport. L'esthétique somatique vise en fait l'homme ordinaire, simple, préoccupé de la connaissance de soi. La forme physique et la santé, associées aux activités mentales créatives, augmentent amplement le respect de soi. En ce sens, on pourrait considérer le « soi comme une œuvre d'art » – une œuvre indivisible et perfectible qu'on a toujours sur soi. Cela voudrait dire que l'on est, même à l'insu parfois, nos propres artistes mobilisés dans un imprévisible *work in progress.*

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Changes of Personalistic Identity Meanings in Modern Technosphere: Interaction, Loneliness, Narcissism

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Abstract

The paper analyses the interaction-loneliness in the context of shifts in the personalistic identity meanings triggered by the development of the information and communication technologies. The theoretical framework of the research is Bakhtin's existential theory of meaning that allows to apply the method of existential analytics. It is aimed to reveal the meanings of human existence in alienated contexts getting increasingly complicated. The research identifies the connection between the extensive development of the information and communication technologies and the changes in existential parameters of a human existence, which is expressed in extreme narcissism. This negative phenomenon of human loneliness indicates an original self-identification through self-isolation of their existence, preventing comprehensive social interaction, a loss of their spiritual reasonability. The obtained results add into the integration of academic knowledge based on philosophical methodology and specify the object of interdisciplinary studies on personalistic identity and the socialization in a modern technosphere.

Keywords: meaning; personalistic identity; technosphere; social interaction; loneliness

1. Introduction

In XX - early XXI centuries, along with pragmatic, i.e. instrumental, meaning of the technical world, which has allowed a person to fulfill many potential creative tasks of their existence, the incongruity for a human hidden in the development of technosphere manifested itself in a particularly acute way. The relations "human being - technology" not only determine the shifts in human nature, but also predefine new

conditions and possibilities for personal identification, especially in the area of information and communication technology. These conditions and possibilities tend to be indirect and alienated compared with the direct traditional experience of identity in social practices. Therefore, we should admit that "these days one cannot speak about the appropriate understanding of the reality with no account of the technologies penetrating into all areas of life" (Leshkevich & Kataeva 2013, 17).Meaning that new technological processes that are coming from new types of mass media have speedy absorbation and implemention without any prior reflection and proper understanding (Mironov & Sokuler 2018, 5).

Academic knowledge immanent to the technical world appears to be incapable to absorb the humanistic issues of a social technical civilization, which becomes the subject for the philosophy raising a number of crucial questions about the meanings of what is going on. What happens to the actual existence of a human being determined by a technosphere? What new meanings are uncovered for a person "from inside" their world, in their event experience, in new indirect socializing contexts? What "experimental ontology" (Smirnov 2015, 46), that "opens up" an individual existence, appears to be inherent to a personality with its only place in it? Answering these philosophical questions, we eager to understand a new type of person in a new context, through the lenses of meaning of his existence, expected responsibilities and choices that a person makes while communicating with the others.

The concept of a "meaning" is one of the main for the philosophical research of a technosphere and its impact on the personality existence and its capability for social interaction, since it helps focus on understanding oneself, one's own specific "place" in new contexts where they are involved due to the technology development and its extensive introduction into everyday life. A person cannot escape their belonging to the gadget epoch. The technology aims to transform a person themselves and the traditional meanings of a personal identity through changing their labour activities. However, a person remains to be a personality with the meanings of the singularity (uniqueness) of their existence, freedom, creative

potentials for self-realization and social interaction with other personalities. As an open, incomplete, under-realized being, a person claims their meaning in the strive for creative existence and inevitably articulates their life building meanings in a creative existence of the technical world. However, the spiritual nature of a personality cannot be only determined by these or those technologies, since it embodies a special "intangible" reasonability. In our research, we primarily use the concept of "meaning" as characterizing a person's existence in terms of realization of a spiritual reasonability of social interaction. Generally, the actualization of a concept "meaning" meets the trends in the development of social humanitarian knowledge in XX - early XXI centuries, omitting both the personality elimination and completeness of its existence that was inherent to the classical science and the escape from rational understanding into the irrational experience. This concept can correlate the development of the technosphere with the contemporary shift in meanings, i.e. the outlook.

The roots of the technogenic civilization lie in particular worldview beliefs of a representative of the European culture. These beliefs started its formation long ago and covered a number of historical facts and motives. Epstein (2009) makes a very interesting observation and, in fact, claims a personality meaning of technology, “advanced technology is a complete embodiment of a romantic perception of environment” (ibid., 22), since it hides “a vital drive of people towards each other” (ibid.) in terms of developing new means of communication, challenging long distances. Instrumental “conventional” meaning of this technical world as a possibility for new contexts of dialogue-interaction is definitely hard to overestimate. However, Epstein focuses on a kind of spiritual reasonability of the technology, which lies in the contribution into a closer and more various interaction between people and in this sense, the realization of a romantic drive of people towards each other. How far does it fit into the reality, the daily experience of a modern human being? Epstein admits that this is where the controversial implications exist for a man. The experience of overcoming physical limitations thanks to technologies does not raise the person to the spiritual level of existence, nor add any

spiritual meaning to them. It is more likely to be a reverse process of dementalization of a person's spiritual life and depersonalization in a standardized technical world. The process of overcoming the physical limitations in a modern information and communication environment is accompanied by the articulation of new tasks for a fully-fledged spiritual dialogue-interaction. In the context of aggressive penetration of information and communication technologies and the space of interactive screened reality into the daily life, there arises a need to elaborate the theme of personality existence and interpersonal interaction, which is expressed, for example, in an old-age philosophical problem "the Self –the Other".

Thus, the purpose of the present paper is to analyze the issue of interaction and loneliness in the context of the changing meanings of personalistic identity connected with the development of information and communication technologies.

2. Literature Review

In the first half of XX century, the existential philosophy extensively analyzed the technical world in terms of ontological, meaningful aspects for the human existence since the clarification of these aspects could uncover the challenging moments in technosphere development. A number of existential philosophers who argued for the technical "perfection" of a human existence starting from the first half of XX century revealed some kind of a loss of spiritual and creative fulfillment of interaction between people as personalities (Berdyaev 1934; Sartre 2000), and warned about an escalating crisis in personalistic identity connected with this loss. This analysis still remains relevant and significant, despite the fact that the development of technosphere has elevated the determination of personal existence since the second half of the XX century.

Along with that, recent decades saw the emergence of academic studies determined by the modern development of technosphere in different areas of knowledge, such as, first of all, psychology and sociology. These studies mainly document some changes in humans' bevahiour and self-perception through surveys and other empirical methods and primarily focus on categorizing the acquired data and do not dive into the

philosophical issues about the meaning of the events. The observations of such psychologists and sociologists as Burgo (2015), Lunbeck (2014), Blackburn (2014), Green (2002), Chowdhry (2016), as well as the studies done by large scientific and research institutes (for example, a large-scale sociological survey carried out in 2014 by the Center for Research on Media, Technology, and Health at the University of Pittsburgh (2017)) are sure to be valuable empirical basis for philosophical analysis. However, these studies do not present the required level of philosophical generalizations.

Before these empirical studies, the works of Post Modernist philosophers had analyzed and documented the changes in values and meaning of human existence in the context of the developing technosphere, including within the interaction issue (Deleuze 1998; Baudrillard 1994). In fact, some aspects of analysis of the implications of changes in personalistic identity meanings in technosphere for the human existence are reflected in the studies devoted to such a cultural phenomenon, which emerged in the XX century, as loneliness (Baudrillard 1994). In the course of XX century, psychology considered loneliness manifested in narcissism mainly a subject for psychoanalytical practices. However, it was Freud (1914) who first claimed narcissism to be "a diagnosis of modern days". Psychologists studied narcissism from different perspectives, proposed and justified a number of theories as a result of modern practices of psychological work with the patients, for example, Burgo's (2015) "extreme narcissism" and Green's (2002) "dual theory of narcissism".

In philosophy, narcissism as a loneliness manifestation first became the subject for research in the 1920-40s in Berdyaev's (1934) existentialism, which analyzed the technosphere impact on human existence and identified its trends. Later, in his works, Bakhtin (1996), who originally synthesized and developed Berdyaev's existentialism and personalism in terms of personality existence, interaction, and loneliness, developed the existential theory of meaning. We believe that it could be beneficially applied to study the impact of modern technosphere on personal identity, which is connected with existential introduction of information and

communication technologies into daily life. Crisis states of personality in a modern world of technosphere connected with the phenomena of loneliness and narcissism are examined from different perspectives in the philosophical works of a number of Russian scholars (Dedyulina & Datchenko 2014; Krasnukhina 2010; Tikhonov 2013).

3. Theoretical Framework

According to the criteria for modern academic knowledge about a man as "comprehensive human study", a research into the meanings of personal identity in modern technosphere in the context of the issue of interaction and loneliness requires methodology contributing into an integral philosophical and anthropological analysis and deepening the understanding of ontological grounds of human existence. Empirical data from different applied knowledge areas (psychology, sociology) should be looked upon from philosophical and anthropological perspective. For philosophical anthropology, which is genetically and by nature connected with the existential anthropology, the method of existential analytics, which is aimed to reveal the meanings of human existence, is efficient. According to this method, a person being a unique personality is determined by their *a priori* ontological structure which has an embedded attitude to the Other rather than by external circumstances. Thus, the theme of interaction and loneliness will be interpreted as a problem of interaction "request" which is inside the ontology of the personality and as an appropriate/inappropriate realization of this request in different contexts of personality existence.

The research takes Bakhtin's existential theory of meaning as the theoretical methodological basis. This theory efficiently applies the method of existential analytics in comprehending humanitarian aspects of developing technospheric existence due to information and communicative technologies connected with the topic. This theory could partly be compared with the research methods applied to social interactions in everyday activities in a symbolic interactionism (E. Hoffman) which focuses on the analysis aimed to understand the inner "face-to-face" interaction logics. However,

in comparison with Bakhtin's approach, the symbolic interactionism undervalues ontological structure of a personality connected with the mainstream spiritual values which determine both situational, pragmatic, and non-utilitarian spiritual reasonability of interaction. Bakhtin's theory combines such part of a unique ontological eventful ("participatory") personality structure as an attitude to the Other and extending contextuality, meaning determination, which allows one to study the extending virtual contexts of social interactions as a situation of personality "outsidedness".

4. Bakhtin's Theory of Meaning and the Theme of Interaction and Loneliness

Bakhtin's philosophy unites the concept of meaning with the understanding of specific ontology of personal existence. A Russian philosopher explains an essential difference in cognitive "dimensions" of any natural or technical object of "a thing" and "personality" connected with a uniqueness of the latter - "expressive and explanatory" existence (Bakhtin 1996, 8). Personality existence "never matches itself" and is therefore strong and aimed to realize itself in its creating otherness, but at the same time it possesses uniqueness and "pure unselfishness" (ibid., 7), which differs from the existence of a "thing" that can be of utilitarian interest only. Bakhtin sees the meaning, first of all, in the spiritual sphere of existence, but, at the same time, it is not anything irrational to the human nature, on the contrary, it is the evidence of human participatory conscience, an ability to interact with another personality, an opportunity of being-for-the-other. The personality itself goes through a meaningful development, which is expressed in the form of its emotional and value-based attitude expanding and defining the meanings of existence. Such development is possible due to the internal intentionality of a personality that is able to comprehend the spiritual reasonability of existence 'from inside', seeing itself as a hero performing different deeds. A human personality turns to its own reification in an attempt to deny its meaningful existence, becoming obsessed with the things in existence.

In fact, Bakhtin's philosophical dialogism is characterized by an all-embracing personalistic paradigm that intricately develops Berdyaev's ideas. Bakhtin focuses on the fact that a personalistic meaning is built in the area of human "Self" (a personality in his own ontological structure is dual "Self" –"The Other") and is characterized as an "expressive", "explanatory" existence. It is in "expressive" empathy towards the other (existence) that a new existence unit arises, as if from the abundance of seeing the other in time and space. Being Self the personality develops into a "hero", while being the Other it develops into the "author" similar to a fiction writer. Along with that, if the "hero" being united with the environment is given the major part in the meaning, then the "author" owns the reflection over the cognition (meaning). Meaning is always personal and dialogistic, it is born in a dialogue – response to the "exactingness" to my temporality, historicity, an answer to the "questions" of the existence. Meaning is revealed in interaction with other meanings - interaction with other personalities. One of the component in meaning theory is "outsidedness", Bakhtin's term, which is an essential ground for his anthropology and characterizes the image of personality's existence embedded into the Other's perspective. Meaning develops in this or that context which determines the mainstream spiritual values in the society where a person experiences his unity with the environment, but at the same time, in the situation of self-alienation, or – in terms of Bakhtin's theory – "outsidedness" as the author's act of self-reflection.

The created world of technosphere gave a human being more potential contexts for personality identification, including within interaction, communication, a significant expansion and sophistication of personality's contacts. Modern studies on the essence of technosphere tend to see it from the perspectives of the virtual contexts created by technology. Here this is not only about an additional component of virtualistics connected with the digital computer technologies, the area of the social networks and information flows. Here we are talking about a new world perception where fullness, sustainability, and determination of the value dominants of the conscience are replaced by the understanding of their mobile, probabilistic,

and pluralistic structure. A person fulfills themselves in new characteristics which are not actualized or underactualized in the reality, in Otherness, and thus is involved into new life-constructing meanings with the possibilism nature. However, this ability to present in virtual contexts is not evident in terms of personality ontology.

For example, how can we comprehend the ability of a personality to change their identity in embodiment mode, that is the ability to un-shape or re-shape in its unique place in existence, and just keep other dimensions inside, not just with the help of devices, but participating in an alienated virtual reality created through the development of technology? The answers to these questions could be promising with the term from Bakhtin's theory – outsidedness. Along with that, there is some experience in applying this term to the analysis of personality self-presentation forms in the Internet (Tikhonov 2013, 5). It is quite reasonable here to expand the application of Bakhtin's term to characterize the whole information and communication area of technosphere in the context of actualization of personality existence and interaction. Technosphere in this area saturates human existence with new multi-layered determined contexts. First of all, personality experiences these new contexts directly, from inside, in its internal intentionality, acting as a Hero of its own life world. Secondly, personality acts as an alienated Author (of different derived images, symbols) who is engaged in reflection in the meaning perspective "from" the Other, in a reverse direction towards itself – the situation of outsidedness in virtual contexts, for example, in the social networks. At the same time, every piece of existence in the information and communication area contains a personalistic dialogue, and, ultimately, a person being personality is looking for another personality in the most, one would think, lifeless objectified forms – moving to itself and overcoming alienated forms of its own selfhood. There arises tension between thriving alienated self-presentations which start to live their own life and "speaking" existence of personality which is trying to find the way out from an enclosed area of own subjectivity but doesn't find the time to comprehend this way out in terms of spiritual reasonability.

For example, in the hyperreality of the Internet a person being the Author creates his Heroes indirectly connected with the world of reality. However, being the Author requires the ability for self-understanding. This requirement is implicitly involved into the relevancy of the problem of the correlation between personal real – virtual identities. However, an increased importance of the personalistic identity in the Internet can sometimes result in simulative processes of transmitting the content of the inner world since it is at the very least difficult to transmit this content only with the verbal means of digital technologies. The problem when a personality cannot contain new contexts of its existence is connected with an inevitable lack of a self-understanding act due to the dissonance of this act with the utilitarian tasks requiring prompt mobile solutions and creative products. Meanwhile, being able to become anyone (for example, in the social networks of the Internet) and not being able to maintain Author's spirituality (self-understanding) in a creative act, the personality can lose its own spiritual self-identity and represent itself in a variety simulative manner. Thus, one can reveal that the technosphere shows some changes in the meaningful identificational characteristics of the personality.

The Internet and other communicative mobile technologies compensate for the lack of interaction in reality, limited space, and time. The situation with greater variety and time intensity of interaction occurs. To a certain extent, the lack of positive emotions and social recognition of a person is compensated for. In a virtual reality, a person could take on the form which he/she could not be in reality due to some circumstances, and this appears to be important for the physically disadvantaged people. A circle of the social relations becomes wider since new factors in developing a social identity arise – being created outside the typical social spaces and institutes of virtual communities with their impact on the reality outside virtual networks. However, on the other hand, communication networks and technologies brought some negative transformations of identification. There is a risk of becoming addict to the parallel life (for example, in the social networks or games) which gives simulative meanings in the

real human life in critical masses. Being anonymous in the Internet results in no responsibility for the only place in existence and destroys the psychological status of a person since the ultimate misalignment, non-integrity of a personalistic identity are a sign of a schizophrenic disorder.

5. Loneliness and Modern Narcissism

We can observe a paradox: a technology-based expansion of the person's virtual world actualizes the meanings of his real existence (outside conventional possible contexts) where he inevitably, by his personalistic nature, aims, is interested in real interaction, in the possibility for the existence-for-the-other. A phenomenon of a virtual (submerged into the interactive computer screen and other modern screen technologies) person gave birth to a trend to find ontological grounds for personality's existence and his identity with the focus of interests in reality culture "stripped" from simulative spaces and in the peculiarity to personality's reality and its correlation with the reality of other people.

Modern technosphere is developed as a kind of "revitalized monument" of a human creativity, which is given in the form of what Baudrillard called "the truth" for a modern person – his "manipulative test" (Baudrillard 1994, 29). In other words, this is something similar to once created perfect artificial intellect in a science fiction book by Lem (1999) "Golem XIV"). Something that shines through, palpates, probes, asks a person about their creativity in the future (and, what is more, gives a very disappointing verdict for a person concerning the non-compliance of modern requirements of technological progress with the speed and scope of procedural thinking). Thus, the technosphere forms a particular context of outsidedness of a personality and claims to play the role of the necessary Other, at the same time, the idea of the artificial intelligence exposes person's disappointment in their own natural intellect. By delegating the intellectual functions to technical devices and artificial intelligence, a person creates some kind of artificial prostheses for their own bodily existence (which, according to Baudrillard, just manifests thinking, but does not produce it) trying to get rid of any pretension for the

author's knowledge of spiritual, transcendent nature rather than to compensate for one's own imperfection.

At first glance, modern technology (information technologies, virtual social networks) produces a kind of new spirituality, adds into personalistic social content, because the development of technologies produces an "escape" from the individual and biological boundaries of a person, overcomes the distance between people, one could observe more variety and mobility in interaction. One may believe that modern communications must contribute into the improvement of fruitful interaction between people. People try to avoid a natural limitation of their interaction environment, to avoid loneliness by compensating for the lack of interaction in the social networks. Meanwhile, this does not occur, a reverse process is more likely to take place. For example, Brian A. Primak, Director of Center for Research on Media, Technology, and Health at the University of Pittsburgh (2017), and a research group in the USA did a remarkable survey in 2014. It revealed that among young people aged from 19 to 32 who are registered with popular social networks (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Google Plus, Instagram, Snapchat, Reddit, Tumblr, Pinterest, Vine and LinkedIn) the frequency of checking the social networks is directly proportional to the feeling of their own loneliness ("social isolation"). The scientists admit that it still remains unclear what was prior and determining in the social experience of those young people. It could be being in the social networks followed by the feeling of isolation from the real world or conscious social isolation (alienation from the real world) which was the reason for staying in the social networks, or it is a combination of both. In any case, this survey does not prove that social networks solve the problem of filling in the social emptiness. On the contrary, it shows that a wide usage of social networks adds into the feeling of social isolation. And one of the proposed reasons for it is that "the usage of the social networks forces out a more authentic social experience since the more time a person spends in the Internet, the less time he has for real interactions" (University of Pittsburgh Schools of the Health Sciences 2017). Another reason is discrepancy between the social relations in the real life idealized in the social

networks, which causes depression resulting, in its turn, in a wish for impossible compensation in these very social networks, which does not help escape loneliness and develop the Internet addiction (Chowdhry 2016) and the phenomenon of endless circles of depression.

In reality, a person does not achieve a higher level of spirituality in the terms of the dialogue with the Other. Full interaction is replaced by the world of external communications, in other words, "sliding" interaction. There takes place a kind of an intensive "self-closure" reifying a personality and actualizing its variable self-presentation at the level of utilitarian existence of a thing (in Bakhtin's terms), that is at the level of wishes of an individual body. A person as a personality alienates from their only place in existence, while their images disappear and alienate from the unique experience of the personality generating them. The images function in multiple information flows, which results in their enormous reproductions-repetitions, replication of "plagiarism" of personalistic identification limiting the fulfillment of proper interpersonal interaction. "Spirituality" in interaction loses its social cultural roots and is only manifested in the presence of possibility – "variability" of interaction but with no fully-fledged hearing each other. A person comprehends oneself via their own body as existence-for-Other as a result of the loss of its meaning as a unique sacral "cover" for the soul and spiritual unity of the society and replacement by an eclectic unity with blurred values of casual acquaintances. Such a reification and unity may result in the fact that a person can consider themselves eligible for getting married with both other human personalities, and animals, things, as well as robots, virtual heroes, if they do not impede their egoistic narcissism and compensate, to a certain extent, real emotions with no need for a reflexive "self-portrait". However, today's examples of sexual relations with special dolls, laptops, cars, TV sets, park fences, bicycles have nothing in common with sacral marriages of a person with rain, thunder, ocean, fire in ancient pagan cultures since they do not have vertical value dimensions of "spiritual" – "mundane", "body" - "soul".

In the context of the need for interactions, which is actualized in increasingly value-free forms, simulative presentations of a personality on the dating websites and rational interpersonal communications replacing typical social experience successfully function. A romantic impulse towards each other in the modern technosphere, an impulse of hope and dream that sometime in the future we will "interact more", "keep in touch", or be readily available for our relatives and colleagues remains to be an illusion within the frames of "spirituality" of possibility and utilitarian (functional) meanings of technosphere. Being focused on an individual body and connected with its technical maintenance deprive a human personality of a number of existential parameters and, first of all, its spiritual meaning references, its expansion to the other unique personality, which inevitably results in the feeling of loneliness. The speed and shortness of a person's reflection in virtual reality (photos in the social networks, being in several screens of communicative spaces at the same time) give the feeling of loneliness since this reflection of "telematic" person does not include all existence meanings of a personality. Modern technosphere with its virtual mirrored worlds does not hold any life excess for a person (excess of seeing the Other in time and space, according to Bakhtin's statement given above), which will assist in entering the interaction process and overcoming loneliness. Trying to overcome loneliness, a person hides in it "against their will" and does not notice that they hide from their own inner (spiritual) activity (in fact, handing it over to the interactivity of the technology world). Devices exhaust the sources of inner (spiritual) activity of a person together with absorbing a human sight, thinking processes (in the corresponding interfaces embedded right into the body). That is why real meetings after virtual interaction (for example, at many dating websites), even if they are seen as "serious relationships", disappoint people, show real lack of will and responsibility of their parties. A modern person is not ready for real co-feeling spiritually, for improving emotional sensitivity outside their represented bodily wishes.

For the real human existence, superiority of the revealed meanings in daily life results in the phenomenon of growing

feeiling of loneliness (social isolation) and is manifested in modern narcissism – a diagnosis of our epoch. Presently, in the context of the social network technology development, narcissism becomes the subject of a number of empirical studies proving a kind of connection between the identified phenomena. For example, "sociologists' surveys among Facebook users showed that the majority of them are narcissists by their psychological type and, what is more, do not hide it" (Dedyulina & Datchenko 2014). Along with that, the humanitarian science lacks theoretical and terminological studies about narcissism. Even the definition for "narcissism" is problematic. Very often, it is looked upon at a "healthy", corresponding with social norms angle, in case it is supported by personality self-fulfillment, its social "achievements" and is realized to the extent of being appropriate to them. However, this angle is rather superficial, connected with the description of socially useful functional characteristics only. Along with that, narcissism phenomenon as a manifestation of loneliness for a modern person becomes the subject of different humanitarian studies in psychology and philosophical anthropology. This phenomenon is uniquely interpreted both in the philosophy of psychoanalysis and postmodernism and in the existential philosophy. It should be noted that at the beginning of XXI century narcissism presupposes antinomy not typical for its antique image. Here narcissism is caused by a wish to escape from the simulative world of culture and social determinants to one's own Self environment, to the natural loneliness. In this case, we can use the terms from psychology about "healthy narcissism", and this is an important component of personality's self-conscience in the social society and supports the integrity of personality. But at the same time, modern narcissism is nurtured by the involvement into communication which was not adequate to personality's needs and his real social experience and by becoming lonely "against one's will", in existential self-sensation post factum.

The reference to the phenomenon of loneliness and narcissism is connected with psychoanalytical practices and theories over the recent century. The scientists who are close to this tradition conduct analysis mainly reducing spiritual and

rational nature of a personality with its ability to live and to be free, to experience the impact of unconscious pre-reflective instincts and impact of the social surroundings. The scientists' evaluation ranges from recognizing narcissism as having a healthy self-admiration ("normal narcissism", according to Kohut (1966) and justifying positive, creative meaning of love towards oneself to arguing for the domination of narcissism pathological forms in modern society which are defined by such a feature as "closure from the world" which is typical for narcissism (Green 2002, 272). The problem of narcissism regarding a modern person is recognized in the studies of the recent decades done by psychologists and sociologists. Burgo (2015), a clinical psychologist, speaks about the relevant interaction problems with the modern extreme narcissists ("Extreme Narcissists"). Lunbeck (2014) analyzes the phenomenon of critical expansion of self-admiration in the Western mass culture in the context of everyday interaction and self-representation language, advertising industry, and the arts for the recent decades and critically assesses the predominance of special personal pronouns connected with alienated economic trends in this language. Blackburn (2014) observes and critically evaluates the problem in the same direction. For example, he admits the value of "normal narcissism' and notes and at the same time a modern "industry of self-evaluation" lacks the proper balance between vested interests and care about the others, and a healthy development of love towards oneself is distorted under the influence of economic trends similar to a sign slang "*You deserve it!*".

Narcissism meaning transformations connected with the modern development of information and communication technologies could be observed in postmodernism philosophy. Psychoanalysis sees narcissism as a manifestation of real subconscious wishes of personality (erotism of narcisstist type is determined by imagining in the mirror of subconscious), while postmodernism refers self-admiration to the wish to "own" selfness in some mirrored reflection of one's own duplicate Self, not the Other rather than to a sign of manifested reality – original of our selfness. This duplication through the metaphor with the mirror means, according to Deleuze, that "It

is never the other who is a double in the doubling process, it is a self that lives me as the double of the other: I do not encounter myself on the outside, I find the other in me" (Deleuze 1988, 98). In an ancient myth, Narcissus takes his image in the mirrored waters for his dead beloved sister. For postmodernism interpretation, "mirror" of narcissism does not hold the meaning of just reminding of the desired, but rather lost in reality. What is it in this case? We believe that it becomes a manifestation of possibility "existence-under-observance" (Sartre 2000) of the other, who is understood in such as a way that he does not a real author-hero of the communication, but rather in the situation of virtual outsidedness (Bakhtin 1996) in some objectivized alienated world – as an ideal person made from the sample of the idealized heroes from the social networks.

Generally speaking, the metaphor of a mirror (reflection), genetically connecting the topic of interaction with the phenomenon of narcissism, gave rise to different interpretations of personal existence meanings and interaction (communication) in the philosophy of XX century. People interacted following the principle of mutual reflection of two (and more) mirrors. Philosophers-postmodernists claim that the development of multiplying technologies helps to characterize the narcissism in the contexts of "xerox depth" (Baudrillard, 1994: 144). Here the mirror of narcissism has no depth, is a flat mirror of itself, as a feeling of "being mesmerized by the reflection of each other … of all large-scale and batch-produced" (Krasnukhina 2010, 48), mind-blowing identity of large-scale, batch-produced reproduction. A personality reifies in this "culture of xerox" and batch-produced reproduction of identities. At the same time, the real, social when being turned into "the production of "social relations."" (Baudrillard 1994, 146), as it happens in the social networks in the Internet, appears to be some "residue" or a kind of surplus to exaggerated subjectivism and self-admiration of a person and therefore does not remove the existential feeling of loneliness (social isolation).

In the history of philosophy, Berdyaev seems to be the first to pay attention to complicated changes in the phenomenon of narcissism and its "high demand" in culture

and everyday life in XX century with no reduction of spiritual nature of a personality to instincts, typical psychoanalytical traditions.

He analyzed the phenomenon of narcissism in the context of loneliness as a result of some kind of controversy between ontological existence of personality and its social objectivation. He believes that loneliness is naturally embedded in the personality as a result of comprehending one's own uniqueness and singleness and at the same time – as a painful sensation of dependence and slavery from this objectivized non-Self area. The personality objectivizes its own Self in a society and loses a number of its own unique existential parameters, including freedom, singleness, Loneliness, thus, has a moment of understanding the difficulty of coming to the Other. "I deeply feel and comprehend my personality, my uniqueness and singleness in my loneliness, in my existence in myself, and I am also sick for my escape from loneliness, sick for interaction with the other, with you, with we, not with an object" (Berdyaev 1934, 268). Narcissism, in Berdyaev's theory, is one of the specific forms of loneliness where it is not overcome, is the extreme manifestation of subjectivity, and gives maximum objectivation to the personality. Here loneliness is experienced "as an incomprehensibility, as a wrong reflection in the other…" (ibid., 269). He argues that "narcissism is a deeper phenomenon that others think, it is connected with Self. Self looks in the mirror and wants to see its reflection in water to prove its existence in the other. In fact, Self wants to be reflected in the other Self, in You, in interaction rather than in a mirror, in water. Self longs for the other Self in the world, any friend (not an object) ultimately to recognize, to confirm, to see him in beauty, to hear, to reflect. This is the deep meaning of love. Narcissism is a failure of love, reflection in an object, where the object remains in itself, does not go beyond itself" (ibid., 269). Misunderstanding in personalistic self-identification of a narcissist is, thus, misunderstanding in an impulse to the Other, misunderstanding of love as well as other spiritual features of interaction (empathy, mercy).

Bakhtin developed the theme of loneliness and Berdyaev's ideas of personalism, although he did not analyze

the phenomenon of narcissism on purpose. Considering Bakhtin's theory of meaning as an area of spiritual emphatic existence of personality, the conclusion is that modern narcissism means a lack of unique act of referring Self and the Other to some higher spiritual resemblance and generally speaking a lack of recognition of unique, under-reproduced reality of the Other. The point is that, as Bakhtin showed, a constant comprehension of self in the presence of the Other even when experiencing a real situation of social loneliness destines a person for "a request", a dialogue and thus for self-comprehension. Therefore, typical – "social" loneliness is a natural reason for solving the problem of interaction, the problem of actualization of love "pre-comprehension" as moving towards the Other. However, loneliness in modern narcissism is another by nature, is mainly the result rather than the reason for being plunged into the social communicative networks. An advantages of Bakhtin's approach over the modern psychological and sociological theories is in a possible analysis of personality's existence at the level of its rational and cognitive nature with regard to both ontical (situational) and ontological levels where this existence is not reduced to individual psychophysiological or social factors. This approach differs his position from atheistic type existentialism (Sartre 2000; Camus 1990) that sees s brave recognition of life absurdity and escape into conscious loneliness to be an indicator of the higher reflection of personality existence.

Based on Bakhtin's concept, one can explain a number of empirical observations concerning the problem of loneliness - narcissism of a modern man. For example, a lack of desire for empathy and understanding of the Other's boundaries is considered to be a widely recognized characteristic of a psychological image of a modern narcissist. One can claim that in this case an inherent ability for fully-fledged interaction-dialogue with the Other is blocked in a number of existential parameters (first of all, in the parameter of love as spiritual interaction). In the social networks a narcissist-person appear to be unable to wish to hear the other, to think over his actions, to test them in practice, to evaluate oneself, he gives out some images of his actions or others's actions outside and endlessly

swirls in their flow. Another typical example is narcissism as a continuous "freezing" in the social networks waiting for the likes and comments to the posted photos and videos. People spend their free time in front of computers or cell phones more often to find new contexts and possibilities for interaction, at the same time people avoid live interaction. By provoking an escape from reality which is typical for narcissist (for example, when a virtual image of a person in the social networks becomes more relevant than real one), loneliness does not exclude, strengthens a burning desire to "show off" in the eyes of others. Thus, at least in a simulative manner acquire the depth of self-admiration mirror. It is simulative, because this opinion of the Other helps a person actualize in himself, in terms of Sartre, only ontic, situational existence, existence where "I do not know what I am, what my place in the world is" (Sartre 2000, 291), that is I do not have reflection of self-comprehension.

In fact, modern narcissism is a kind of personalistic self-identity where the virtual replaces the real (real social experience) in many aspects since the real appears to be too demanding to personality. For some people, especially among youth, the feeling of impossibility to change the world around as easy as in virtual, artificial environment, turns into the search for self-sufficient forms of their own individuality that require no feedback from the real Others. This feeling discredits their completeness for being in love, feeling empathy, and compassion. Being obsessed with the social networks means the real feeling of loneliness rather than variable expansion of contacts. Modern narcissism is both a wish to be oneself and to dive into one's own mirror with no higher spiritual resemblance by trying on the features of nice heroes in a gamely manner, to see what you could be without them, not doing any deed. Technological possibilities help a person to show this – attractive, trend image of identity in the social networks, while they also reify and enslave a personality turning it into a next "trend". For example, here one should refer to different Internet installations in future age changes (flattering the original image of a Hero), which give an opportunity for a technical programme to "diagnose" and "assess" a person, that is those

who are afraid of real assessment of the other personalities. Thus, a reason to distance oneself from the real social practices with its "natural" social networks turns into a denial of spiritual interaction and absence of the wish to achieve real self-comprehension.

6. Personalistic Identity and Crisis of Spiritual Reasonability of Interaction in the Context of Information and Communication Technology Development

Loneliness in the existential self-comprehension of a person manifested in the phenomenon of modern (so-called extreme) narcissism as a peculiar personality's self-identity in its self-closure of its existence, staying away from fully-fledged interaction has become one of the negative consequences in changing the meanings of personalistic identity in technosphere. Extensive development of information and communication technologies brought the changes in the existential parameters of a personality's existence - singleness, creativity, freedom, love, interaction. This is manifested, on the one hand, in a wider scope of interaction variability and the inclusion of new virtual contexts of creative personality's self-actualization and self-presentation into social practices, which fits into the possibilism worldview. On the other hand, in it destroys the traditional hierarchy of life interaction values, in reification of a personality in a mechanized and computerized space and time, under-understanding of other personalities' boundaries, over-self-admiration to oneself (self-affection), existing lack of feeling to be responsible in the real social practices, blocking human-natured empathy, which speaks about a peculiar crisis in personalistic identity. The meaning of personality's existence as a way to actualize spiritual reasonability of interaction appears to be faulty. Real identity (spiritual sameness of a personality) is mainly substituted by a mobile identity in the world of ever expanding possibilities for personalistic sameness, which a personality does not manage to experience and to comprehend, "freezes" in "outsidedness" (Bakhtin), does not perform the act of self-comprehension and meaning reference to the Other. The possibilities of

personalistic identity in the meaning of spiritual responsibility for the event generation are fading.

7. Information and Communication Technologies and Anthropologic Meanings of Daily Life

Quite often various philosophical works focus on optimistic scenarios of the present and future of the human subjectivity in technosphere determined by new emerging creative possibilities and a wider variability of interaction. These present and future are connected with the actualization of self-presentation and self-actualization of personality and the development of social interaction area. A debatable issue of personalistic identity in national philosophy is concentrated around the link between new communication technologies and anthropological meanings of daily life. The scholars propose new areas of research connected with comprehension of new technosphere-determined contexts of human existence where "issues that were traditionally looked upon as value and anthropological ones are considered as manipulative an processual questions, as actualization of particular social and communication technologies" (Tulchinskii 2002, 145). For example, it is claimed that today there are new possibilities of "self-projectivity" (Shichanina 2009, 137) uncovering hidden sides of personalistic freedom and creative self-development. Some modern Western scholars (Burgo 2015; Green 2002; Lunbeck 2014), as we have already noted above, see the excuse for self-admiration, which is a creative ground for personality development and contributes into its free self-actualization, in the modern phenomenon of typical narcissism connected with the application of information and communication technologies.

However, in reality one can observe that the introduction of information and communication technologies into human daily life is negative by nature, which is connected with a particular threat to personality existence, with blocking its abilities for fully-fledged spiritual interaction and self-comprehension. Berdyaev was very insightful by pointing out a dramatic historic antinomicity of a spiritual act of personal creativity – its objectivation in a created artificial (technical) world and antinomicity of personality existence connected with

this objectivation – its social contexts with the result being excessive objectivation towards spiritual and creative act, which appears to be too damaging for a personality. "Immortality" in the final masterpieces very often does not correspond to the eternality of personality's "nature", in fact, a reverse effect of personality enslaving by technosphere created by it is developed, which was analysed by philosophers-existentialists in the first half of the past century. However, the their subjects of research were not new contexts of personality existence connected with the development of information and communication technologies in the second half of the past century – the beginning of this century which gave an impetus for the development of new models of daily life. Now "immortality" itself acts as a continuing "life" or as functioning of images of multi-image alienated personalistic identifications in virtual reality (Internet, flows of information messages in a mobile network) – this space where a personality "freezes" in the situation of "outsidedness", even in cases if a human being stops his individual biological existence.

Considering philosophical "delay" of existential analytics among scientists, one could say that the area is mainly dominated with the studies useful in terms of functional implications of technosphere development for a man. At the same time, it is not for nothing that some academicians (Przhilenskii 2009; Rozin 2009) doubt the appropriateness or sufficiency of a term "self-projectivity" which works for the evaluation of external, functional existence, but does not reflect ontological sophistication and ambiguous dynamics of personality existence, presence of splitedness, non-freedom, and passivity in alienated information and communication spaces despite inherent positive potential of freedoms and "healthy" self-admiration. Therefore, the scientists discuss such a phenomenon as new atomization of a society caused by "development of global information technosphere" and leading to the distortion of traditional identity (Skorik 2008, 6). This is especially manifested in the phenomenon of "impersonation" or "self-identification" (the term is introduced by Prigov (2013)) in modern communication space (social networks) (Shichanina 2009). Probably today, even more than it used to be several

decades ago, more attention is paid to inadequate symptoms of self-affection and following disorders in daily social practices. The works of some western scholars (Green 2002; Burgo 2015; Lunbeck 2014) refer to quite large-scale sociological and psychological dimensions.

Our paper develops existential philosophical studies of crisis phenomena of personalistic identities in an anthropogenic society in the context of interaction (Berdyaev, 1934: 14) and applies a number of evaluative observations of postmodernists of the second half of XX century (Baudrillard 1994; Deleuze 1998). Bakhtin's existential theory is used as a synthesizing ground for the analysis of modern data from applied sociological and psychological studies about social practices of a personality. The paper focuses on the transformed existential parameters of personality existence in terms of such a phenomenon of daily life as loneliness.

8. Conclusion

Acknowledging the existence of many theoretical and empirical (applied) studies on different aspects of the issue of interaction and loneliness in such humanitarian areas as psychology, sociology, philosophy, one should agree that "studies into the unfolding situation do not keep pace with the real changes taking place", while we practically lack the studies into "an integral analysis of social implications of information technology impact on a person, on his comprehension of the interaction with the society" (Skorik 2008, 3).

In fact, we should admit that many aspects of changes in personalistic identity in the technosphere and their implications for the reality of human existence remain to be only articulated, under-analyzed in philosophy despite the relevance of studies into crisis phenomena of these implications for the modern society. For instance, in applied psychology, existing descriptive characteristics of such a typical modern daily phenomenon as selfie-narcissism are disconnected from "delaying" philosophical reflection and therefore dominate over the theoretical evaluations and conclusions. This is explained by a rocketing development of information and communication technologies determining significant changes in reality (daily

life) model for the last two-three decades and trigging a lot of new alienated contexts of human existence as a personality. These contexts of human existence form a space of blurring the meanings of traditional values, unlocking the meanings, opposition, and "overlapping" of the meanings of traditional personalistic identity (as spiritual sameness) and ("mobile", "project", "game"). We believe that an expected integral philosophical analysis of crisis phenomena of personality existence in the context of development of modern information communication technologies is relevant. It should include various applied (empirical) humanitarian studies, as well as be based on the synthesis of philosophical theories and methods responding to the ideal of modern humanitarian knowledge, for example, Bakhtin's theory, and methods of existential philosophy. This will contribute into the integration of academic knowledge and specification of the object of interdisciplinary works in personalistic identity and in the theme of interaction in modern technosphere. This can help to implement a possibility of modern identification of new, open meanings of personalistic identity from an ontological perspective, a possibility of identification of objectivations in the information and communication space of technosphere which are inadequate for the inner spiritual space of a personality.

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Small Talk in Our Digital Everyday Life: The Contours of a Phatic Culture

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the present trend in media use that emphasises the social connection over the content of the speech. Small communicative processes and indexical gestures are numerous especially in the digital area and they are symptomatic for the category of phatic communication. The article explains the concept of "phatic", from Malinowski and Jakobson to the contemporary approaches that propose terms such as "phatic technologies" and "phatic systems". Also, revisiting Heidegger's arguments on the concept of "idle talk", we grasp several key aspects of understanding phatic communication. The characteristics and possible negative consequences of a raising phatic media culture are discussed, underlining its complexity and the modalities in which it can re-shape our behaviours and our valuable cultural tools (dialogue, conversation or narratives).

Keywords: small talk, phatic communion, phatic communication, unimportant language, phatic culture

1. Introduction: everyday life, technology, and small talk

Technology is routinely embedded in our everyday life in more advanced ways than before; the mobile communication made an important step towards a latent "permanent" presence in the network. The contemporary human uses the new means of communications not only as tools but also as significant ways to define and present themselves. In this vein, maintaining the digital ties becomes an important task to manage and a new vocabulary of online conviviality has been developed. The technological convergence (Jenkins 2006) determined also a

social convergence that nowadays acts as a norm, even if many people manifest a discomfort about this situation. The mixture between public and private and a continuous demanding of presence altered the traditional social conveniences. As Boyd emphasised, "social convergence requires people to handle disparate audiences simultaneously without a social script. While social convergence allows information to be spread more efficiently, this is not always what people desire. As with other forms of convergence, control is lost with social convergence." (2008, 18) Moreover, there is a hidden pressure of the network to be always online, always present and available. The communication technologies provide continuous mediated interactions, blurring also the boundaries between presence and absence. As Licoppe stated, we are living into a "connected presence", described by "the proliferation of interactions to maintain a link which is constantly threatened by distance and absence" (2004, 153), but could also represent a veritable "technology of power" (2004, 153). Anyhow, this connected presence can be so fatiguing, so that simulated presence would replace the former in multifarious modalities of being "present" when you are, in fact, absent. In this respect, new media can also provide the context for the "connected" absence and delaying engagement. "The emotional architecture" of social media (Wahl-Jorgensen 2018) contributed to the "glue" that determined people to be attached to online activities. The algorithms used in the construction of these platforms facilitate, in many situations, pro-social emotions, affective expressions and call-to-actions behaviours. Also, the emotional register of connected presence "exploits non-dialogic means of communication" (Licoppe and Smoreda 2005, 330), that give rise to small communicative gesture whose functions are the recognition, the maintenance of relationships, the demand for attention or the expression of the self in the network. The distinction between communication and expression, made by Goffman in 1969, is still relevant today. If communication is related to utterances rich in content, expression is represented by gestures, noises, signs that do not say something about things, but can be meaningful for the person who produced them. The large amount of posts (such as "How are you?", "Good

morning", "It's snowing") and online gestures (such as the like, the poke) flood the Internet constantly. Their large use raised numerous questions about their significance and about the general orientation towards sociability. Idle talks, unimportant messages, small communicative processes became central in our everyday social fabric and many people use new media merely for these objectives, as indexical signs that attest their existence in the network and the interest for the others. These phatic messages challenge the role of the dialogue and of the substantive content in our media environment, the consequence being that "in phatic media culture, content is not king, but 'keeping in touch' is. More important than anything said, it is the *connection* to the other that becomes significant, and the *exchange* of words becomes superfluous" (Miller 2008, 395).

In this respect, I will discuss the significance of phatic communication and I will also re-visit Heidegger to catch a glimpse of "idle talk" and its importance in our daily lives. For the purpose of my paper, small talk and idle talk are used interchangeably.

2. From phatic communion to phatic technologies

The anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1923) introduced the concept of "phatic communion" as a type of speech oriented towards union and not towards ideas or in-depth information exchanges. The phatic discourse is irrelevant at the content level, but of maximal importance for the construction of a human communion. Although it can be perceived as a trivial kind of speech, "it serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the need of companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas." (Malinowski 1935, 316) The quality of information is mundane and it is not communicated to convey meaning or as an intellectual reflection, because "the language does not function here as a means of transmission of thought" (Malinowski 1935, 315). Albeit it is content-free, phatic communion has three important functions: a social function (establishing, developing and maintaining social ties), a communicative function (indicating that the communication channel is open), and a recognition function (validating

potential interlocutors). Radovanovic and Ragnedda observed that Philip Riley has supplemented these functions with three more: "to provide indexical information for social categorization (that is to signal different aspects of social identity); to negotiate the relationship, in particular relative status, roles and affectivity (which clearly could be seen operating if we look at the various forms of greetings and address that some individuals use according to his or her social or affective relationship with the interlocutor); to reinforce social structure" (2012, 11). Even if phatic communication does not intend to transfer substantive information for the interlocutor, it concerns the very act of communication by keeping open the path of communication and by strengthening the existing connections. Justine Coupland, a well-known specialist in the field, noted that "the legacy of Malinowski's treatment is therefore a systematically ambivalent view of small talk, talk which is aimless, prefatory, obvious, uninteresting, sometimes suspect and even irrelevant, but part of the processes of fulfilling our intrinsically human needs for social cohesiveness and mutual recognition" (2014, 4). Moreover, Coupland and her collaborators worked hard in the quest of reassessing the individual, social and cultural implications of small talk and in removing the sign of equality between small talk and unimportant talk. There are many situations in which small talk means more than a simple chat or gossip. For persons who lived in unsafe economic or politic conditions (such as emigrants or refugees), to send and receive just a few lines signify a lot more than just the words transmitted.

Another pillar of the concept of "phatic" is Roman Jakobson's theory that attributed a function to each of six factors of communication: context (the referential function), message (the poetic function), sender (the emotive function), receiver (the conative function), channel (the phatic function), and code (the metalinguistic function). Using Malinowski's term, Jakobson defines phatic messages as "primarily serving to establish, to prolong, or to discontinue communication, to check whether the channel works ('Hello, do you hear me?'), to attract the attention of the interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention ('Are you listening?' or in Shakespearean

diction, 'Lend me your ears!' – and on the other end of the wire 'Um-hum!')" (Jakobson 1960, 355) Phatic communication is abundant in ritualized formulas and is the first verbal function that an infant gained (and also the only feature that humans share with talking birds).

The question is: do some technologies voluntarily emphasise the phatic function and develop platforms to respond to this personal and social needs of the people, putting aside the other functions of communication? Even if phatic technologies are not very recent (the telephony inserted levels of phatic use), the rise of the social software as the Internet developed conducted to another degree of phaticity. A technology can be named phatic if "its primary purpose or use is to establish, develop and maintain human relationships. The users of the technology have personal interactive goals" (Wang, Tucker, and Rihll 2011, 46). The phatic technologies are designed to sustain social interaction and they are not at all interested in the usefulness of this interaction, because they are measured "by the degree to which they contribute to a feeling of ongoing connectedness" (Vetere, Howard, and Gibbs 2005).

Moreover, using Giddens' ideas of abstract system, Wang and Tucker (2016) expanded them in a new sociological concept – "phatic system" – which "disembed and re-embed personal and emotional relationships across time/space" (Wang and Tucker 2016, 141). A phatic system has two components, one representing personal identity and the other engaging in relationships. Conceived as closely related to modernity, phatic technologies are able to sustain intimacy and to reduce alienation. Supplementary, they can even resolve some issues actually created by modernist structures: "such technologies are a novel attempt at solving an unprecedented problem: producing a sense of presence and belonging in an uncertain world of constant movement and change" (Miller 2011, 205). Phatic messages have an important role of reassuring that interaction is "alive and well", because "machine must be 'humming' if we are not to think it has broken down" (Wang, Tucker, and Rihll 2011, 48). The immense social fabric has to be maintained not by sophisticated content and deep reflections, but by the possibility of keeping in contact with others, with the

latent potentiality to develop these signals in a more comprehensive conversation or story.

3. A small return to Heidegger: Dasein and "idle talk" ("Gerede")

Phatic communication has been reduced at small talks, ritualistic conventions, indexical gestures, casual conversations (the epitome being the discussions about weather), forms of gossip and chat. In short, phatic communication could be equated with banality and unimportant language. But, as Coupland asked, "who is to judge the banality or significance of a talk?" (2014, 4). In a very postmodern spirit, the dichotomy small talk – big talk could be deconstructed; the metanarrative of important conversations could be dissipated in a myriad of *petites histoires* or, why not, casual conversations. Of course, the criteria selected are decisive: the small talks are important for the sender and, in this respect, they can be considered as "big" conversations and not such as peripheral ways of discussions. Jan Blommaert and Piia Varis observed a paradox: "people often produce 'unimportant' language, when seen from the viewpoint of denotational and informational content, but still attach tremendous importance to such unimportant forms of communication" (2015, 5). The banal interaction is otherwise significant, functional and meaningful, pointing at the self and at her or his relationships.

For a more accurate understanding, as Miller (2017) suggested, the appeal to Heidegger could be enlightening. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger affirms that "The expression 'idle talk' ['Gerede'] is not to be used here in a 'disparaging' signification. Terminologically, it signifies a positive phenomenon which constitutes the kind of Being of everyday Dasein's understanding and interpreting" (1962, 211). As Haugeland noted, that does not mean that "idle talk is just fine and dandy, but rather that his purpose in discussing it is not simply to denounce some commonplace human failing (like laziness or dissembling)" (2005, 428). For Brandom, the examination of small talk belongs to an argument with four steps: "1. There can be no Dasein without *Rede* (discourse). 2. There can be no *Rede* without *Gerede* (idle talk). 3. There can

be no *Gerede* without *Sprache* (language). 4. There can be no *Sprache* without *Aussage* (assertion). This argument will then be situated within a larger frame, which argues more generally that 5. There can be no Dasein without *Verfallen* (falling)" (2002, 331).

As we can see in Brandom's and especially in Haugeland's treatment of Heidegger's fragments from *Being and Time*, an essential ambiguity seems to be present in the very nucleus of the matter. On the one hand, it seems like idle talk produces a sort of negative impact on the Dasein. The being-in-the-world becomes separated from *articulated understanding* and closed. Trying to translate Heidegger, Haugeland (2005, 425) proposes the following phrase: (idle talk, Gerede) "covers up intraworldy entities". This entails the fact that the "natural" openness of the being-in-the-world is actually replaced by this form of covering, which becomes exactly the opposite of what regular talk should be. Robert Brandom also finds suitable evidence of this position in *Being and Time* (1962, 212): "Idle talk is constituted by such gossiping and passing the word along – a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on [*Bodenständigkeit*] becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness [*Bodenlosigkeit*]".

It seems that at least two problems arise here. One, underlined by Brandom, consists of the fact that idle talk seldom takes the form of "thoughtless passing on of what is said-in-the-talk" (Brandom 2002, 337). It is surely an activity that misses the point of talking, which is actual communication and making things known. The second problem concerns the lack of ground for what is said. We should understand, perhaps, *gossip* as rather unproved assertions than anything else. The difficulty brought about by idle talk is the fact that its content spreads in (vicious) circles, being based merely on the authority of the speaker ("A is B because X says it is so"). Brandom (2002, 337) believes that "although Heidegger is far from recommending this structure of authority, he thinks that it provides the pervasive background against which alone it is possible to understand the possibility of more authentic justificatory structures".

On the other hand, as Heidegger himself states at the beginning of section 35, we should not see idle talk in a derogatory manner. First and foremost, it encapsulates our everyday talk. There can be no talk without idle talk should be understood as the fact that we distillate deeper layers of meaning after we have previously passed by the phase of the implicit content. Second, as Haugeland put it, genuine understanding and communication are based on a prerequisite provided by idle talk. So, even if idle talk could close things off for the Dasein, it also represents the key to creating meaningful conversations. Even if it proves shallow and ambiguous, idle talk "serves as a fundamental reservoir of conceptual resources and distinctions" (Haugeland 2005, 425). It represents, in fact, a cultural mechanism for preserving and propagating cognitive schemata, information or practical advice. The negative aspect of *Gerede* is nothing else, Haugeland feels, than the imprint of the pressure of preservation.

I would like to add that this *enabling function* that Haugeland points to continuously is also responsible for the phatic element. In order to open itself to "some adequate degree of understanding" (Haugeland 2005, 427) which is not yet available in idle talk, the Dasein must establish first suitable contact. The possibilities of the *Gerede* ensure exactly the latter. As Miller (2017, 262) thinks, Heidegger's depiction of idle talk is close to the concept of phatic communication because the process itself of "passing the word along" (Heidegger 1962, 214) proves to be more important than the content of the talk.

4. Towards a phatic media culture?

Online media is an ideal arena for phatic processes, the digital communication having an important indexical component. Even "the foundational metaphor for the paradigmatic online action is a deictic gesture: a hyperlink points to another web page" (Schandorf 2012, 325). The tweets, hashtags, direct posts, avatars or Facebook gestures are deictic, pointing to different things: the message, the receiver, the sender, the channel itself. By their pervasiveness, digital phatic interactions are often embedded within the daily routine and could be peripheral but also focal (Vetere, Howard, and Gibbs

2005). Even if we produce "smart" talk it is also indexical: "'Smart talk' on Facebook is indexical rather than symbolic, pointing at the often bizarre incidents of the everyday being acknowledged so as to make an extraordinary observation out of the ordinary and idiosyncratic – without relying on direct feed-back from individual others, but rather on the flux of the networked communication" (Jensen and Scott Sørensen 2013, 60). When phatic messages meet virality, their transmission becomes spectacular in terms of dissemination (the memes, GIFs or emoji being used frequently). Anyhow, we have to point out that this kind of communication requires phatic skills and above the functions already mentioned, phatic messages could avoid conflicts and could maintain the right social balance in our relationships (Radovanovic and Ragnedda 2012). Also, the inclusiveness offered by the trivial and accessible nature of such posts is well perceived by the users (Hopkins 2014).

In the online environment, the body itself is phatic and this trait is easily visible in the practice of *selfie* as a deictically indexical form. It creates a "kinesthetic sociability" (Frosh 2015), being inscribed "in the kinetic and responsive social energy among users of movement-based digital technologies" (Frosh 2015, 1623). The gestural register and the corporeal energy complement the mediated communication and become a vehicle for sociability with distant others. In this respect, it represents another form of phatic message that verifies the functionality of the channel by demanding a response. As for the entire range of phatic forms, selfies are posted with the inner expectance of the response, because "response is crucial. […] Failure to acknowledge the nod of a passing acquaintance or her casual 'How are you?' is easily perceived as an expression of nonrecognition and social exclusion" (Frosh 2015, 1623).

The complex combination between new technology of information and the social software can lead to a new culture, understood as a "set of values and beliefs generated by repetitive patterns of behaviour, reinforced by both formal social systems and informal social organisations" (Wang, Tucker, and Haines 2012, 86). Cyberculture is emerging from the use of new media for multifarious purposes, including a variety of "ways of life" in the wired global society. Miller (2008)

sees Facebook and Twitter in the forefront of the phatic media development, but he expressed some concerns related to the potential nihilistic consequences of phatic culture. The multiple functions of phatic messages discussed by researchers and users seem insufficient to respond completely to the main interrogation: are phatic media real useful? Miller recognized the connected presence offered by phatic communication, but he is wondering why this specific mode of communication is encouraged by new media enterprises. He continued his research in the field of social media activism, where he observed negative aspects, too: "the rise of a phatic culture in social media activism has atrophied the potential for digital communication technologies to help foster social change by creating a conversational environment based on limited forms of expressive solidarity as opposed to an engaged, content-driven, dialogic public sphere" (Miller 2017, 251). His conclusions challenge the mainstream research that considers the Internet as a big catalyst for civic and political activism (Occupy movement or Arab Spring protests). For Miller, the distinction between "social talk" (based on connection and expression) and "political conversation" (based on goal orientation, problem-solving, and dialogue) remains crucial for the correct positioning of the analysis. Social media politics produce, in many times, just another form of idle talk without real effect or engagement. The "clicktivism" is only an example of the phatic media culture and of the mechanism of self-expression in the online. As McLuhan stated, "the user is content" (McLuhan, Nevitt 1972, 145) in social media and the very thing "consumed" in the network is the images and representations of other people and the social connections with them. Indeed, "the medium is the message", and the medium is now consumed in itself. In Baudrillard's terms, the communication has got its excess, the channel is the one that is communicated and used, and the architecture of the network – transposed in the social architecture of acquaintances – is important to be accessed and integrated.

Indeed, online phatic communication can create affective links, a sense of belonging and togetherness, a social meaning, but as Heidegger interpreted it, it supposes every time a serious

closing-off (Heidegger 1962, 213) and a "non-committal just-surmising-with-someone-else" (Heidegger 1962, 218). The relationships with ambiguity and curiosity transform idle talk into a lack of action, because the users do not dwell on a topic sufficient time to be fully internalized and the restless curiosity for the next subject is too big for us to take the right time to better interpret what it is going on: "Curiosity, for which nothing is closed off, and idle talk, for which there is nothing that is not understood, provide themselves (that is, the Dasein which is in this manner [dem so seienden Dasein]) with the guarantee of a 'life' which, supposedly, is genuinely 'lively'" (Heidegger 1962, 217). The cultural and media logic that stimulates the public to remain in the area of phatic communication seems to be one that precludes the audience from real dialog, emaciating the abilities of having a conversation, of debating, of following and understanding large discourses. The possibility to produce changes is lower when the public is "fed" with phatic messages in a large amount so that the study of phaticity today is one of the most important area of research.

5. Final remarks

The paper tried to present the articulations of phatic communication in our contemporary techno-sphere, with some emphasises on the concept and on the potential development into a culture. The small talk – as an epitome of phatic communication – was the reason for our brief inquiry in its philosophical interpretation made by Heidegger in *Being and Time* and updated for the actual technologies. Thus, Heidegger's ideas proved to be actual and provocative because the "idle talk" does not represent for the Dasein just a mode of being and a discoursing one, but also is pointing out to the power structure embedded in these modes: "the dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibilities of having a mood – that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world 'matter' to it" (Heidegger 1962, 213). Also, because the "idle talk discourages any new inquiry and any disputation, and in a peculiar way suppresses them and holds them back" (Heidegger

1962, 213), Heidegger emphasises the "natural" distance that exists between idle talk that is uprooted existentially and other modes of discourse.

The phatic communication proved to be a fickle concept – while it is very well theorised in various research fields, in practice it seldom leads to paradoxes. If sometimes it is just superfluous and meaningless, in other contexts it proves to be full of significance. If in many cases it is just the opposite of the dialogue and conversation, in other ones it provides the clues for curdling an entire story. While it is the antonym of the narrative, it also can construct the personal storytelling for someone.

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China as Superpower: A Super-Vision of Power?

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Abstract

One wonders whether or not, as alternative to an American-style use of power considered too intimidating, and as such counterproductive, China's productive fervor means in fact to revamp the old idea that there are, after all, happy slaves despite an overrating of freedom spread globally by the West. To the libertarian ideology claiming that freedom is worth the highest sacrifice, China can be perceived as opposing the naturalism of the wu wei doctrine: avoid confrontation whenever possible and live within your means. Politically, this means accept your stance in life for the sake of general stability and peace, or apply for approval from above if obsessed with change. How does this compare to the Western quest for the next stroke of salutary genius capable of leading the world out of its present crisis into a new horizon? To find out, one needs to disclose the fundamental existential assumptions that exert their unquestioned fascination upon the Chinese mind, inciting it to export its way of being, and not just trinkets. The essay's conclusion favors the idea that a political super-vision must liberate the minds from the spell of any model and flirt with a dangerous loss of control.

Keywords: pacifism, mimetism, ideology, virtual liberation, managerial genius, karoshi (lethal overwork)

1. Introduction

With China poised to move center-stage in the near future, trying to figure out how its exercise in supremacy might unfold expresses more of an existential necessity than a simple curiosity. And certainly, Beijing's keeping the most crucial of its agenda secret is not meant to dull the general interest in the specifics of this envisaged takeover; quite to the contrary: the less explicit its layout, the more it incites to a speculative articulation thereof.

Hence, the present attempt to disclose some of the subtleties implied in this would-be super-vision of power aimed at reordering the world. Considering that a clear rendition of it by its authors is neither extant, nor likely to emerge anytime soon—secrecy obliges—at least the criticism of reading intentions into the Chinese leadership's minds loses much of its force for lack of an alternative.

Moreover, with dialog at the top of China's political hierarchy getting scarcer since transfer of power has been deemed an unnecessary perturbation in the system's already good functioning, debate has no choice but to relocate at lower levels, or cease altogether. How much an imperially re-empowered Xi Jinping is able and willing to examine his own vision of superpower without pressure from political rivals remains uncertain; much surer is that, with the explicit intently withheld, the best one can do is venture some educated guesses at the implicit.

The crucial issue dealt with here is whether or not, as alternative to an American-style use of power considered too intimidating, and as such counterproductive, China's productive fervor means in fact to revamp the old idea that there are, after all, happy slaves despite an ideologically promoted overrating of freedom. To the libertarian ideology spread globally by the West, and basically claiming that freedom is worth the highest sacrifice, China can be perceived as opposing the naturalism of the *wu wei* doctrine. In social terms, this comes close to the *real* law of the jungle, to be sharply distinguished from the anthropocentric caricature thereof that extolls the superiority of human organization over an allegedly chaotic nature. Its maxim: avoid confrontation whenever possible and live within your means; politically, that means accept your stance in life for the sake of general stability and peace, or apply for approval from above if obsessed with change.

Assuming this comes close to China's vision of the world order to be ushered in—an interpretation defended all along here—how does it compare to the Western quest for the next stroke of salutary genius capable of leading the world out of its present crisis and into a new horizon? This boils down to

disclosing the fundamental existential assumptions that exert their unquestioned fascination upon a fifth of the world's population to the point of making it want to export its way of being, and not just trinkets. One should not forget that every single item imported from China comes with a certain worldview embedded in and accompanying it clandestinely—a tag enfolded upon itself many times over and carrying inscribed on it the social price of China's aspiration to global hegemony.

2. Naturalizing Confucian humanism

Calling China's view of world order a *naturalized humanism* would not be a misnomer. For, to trust biologists, there are unwritten laws in nature, which want that creatures exert only a freedom commensurate with their natural clout rather than inflated by artificial ideas, such as the right to get fair treatment form the political power, or to question the latter's secretive ways. Authoritarianism merely enforces this naturalist ideology as the ultimate truth, even though superlative beyond doubt is only its fervor to propagate.

A transparent Great Wall supposed to limit the quest for truth is thus erected: if it fails to stand naturally, by virtue of the sheer cohesion between its building blocks, this construct can be held together artificially using a binder—a man-made mortar that imitates the homogeneity of natural stone well enough to escape notice.

In China, such realism by decree is inspired by Confucius' teachings. Taking human nature to be essentially malleable, educable, the revered sage opined that, if systematically imitating the good action, eventually humans really become good—from this point of view at one with Kant, it should be added. The Great Wall of ideology is meant precisely to curb the transgressive, outbound explorations into a repetitive reinforcement of the already found common good. And mimetic education works, which means that a successful mass production of good individuals is just a matter of political patience and resources allocated. In this view, the difference between willingly changing and doing so only under pressure remains a trifle—one retarding factor among others in building the great manufacture of consent, to use Chomsky's simile.

Note that the alleged superiority of the view reinforced through repetition appears to be not intrinsic but extrinsic: it owes its 'greatness' to the great numbers mobilized in support of it and to their even greater fear of dissent. In this attempt to optimize living together, survival ranks above freedom and a resigned compliance with the dictates of power above the risks inherent in the liberation struggle.

But deference toward the hierarchy in place at a given time needs to harmonize with the order of things beyond the realm of human affairs in order to be taken in stride. It is supposed to get 'naturalized,' which means made to look rooted in the immutable 'course of things'—terrestrial and celestial. Without undergoing such a conceptual intervention its legitimacy remains questionable; the traces of artifice, of being manufactured, are meant to disappear literally in plain sight—in the rift between fact and opinion, to be precise—swallowed by what aspires to pass for apodictic evidence. The mortar holding the transparent Great Wall together works best when mistaken for natural stone (the way things themselves are).

Fringing on magic and mystery, the due experimentation in this sense is to be credited to Taoism that shaped the Chinese ethos with its own quest for the elusive 'order of things themselves' and the supernatural decrees that occasionally amend it. The good butcher does not use brute force but finds instead between bones, in the joints, the natural passageway for his knife, according to the teachings of Chuang Tzu. The political upshot of this could be that the whole world forms a bull carcass to be carved up non-violently, simply by clearing the naturally pre-existing fault lines between chunks. But, alas, the anatomy of the world remains elusive, for which reason Beijing prefers to beef up its military, just in case the subtle art of finding the natural interstices for the right global partition fails.

Deep reluctance to use violence also received an additional and most explicit support from Buddhism. Without getting into details, let us retain only that, at the confluence of these three major currents of tradition, the idea of harmonious, smooth developments deeply appeals to Chinese sensibilities. Although perception of the obscure order supposedly emerging from the background has significantly and repeatedly changed—

especially over the last century, or so—the deep belief in it has not. Actually, its spell on the minds gets merely reinforced by the government-imposed media censorship and additionally justified by the contemporary environmental crisis.

This said, Beijing's manifest efforts to offer a major alternative to, and thus depart from, the strand of Western rationality globalized by the US and its allies cannot for long avoid a highest-level, philosophical confrontation with the worldview it wants to dislodge from a supposedly obsolete centrality. Unless, of course, the new order China wants to inaugurate will see might become right to the point of suspending the need for *any* justification whatsoever—by far the most disturbing scenario for Western political sensibilities.

But there is actually more, and more recent, to China's naturalization of truth: not thinking through the Great Wall of transparence also *pays*. Money is the latest evidence that Beijing might have finally got things right. If money is taken to talk so eloquently and unambiguously as to render the order of human affairs self-evident, then perhaps China does deserve to win world supremacy without arguments, simply by flashing this countable 'evidence' of superiority to the point of blinding everyone. Yet money does not talk *by and of itself;* it only does so in ventriloquist fashion, i.e., by distorting the voice of its owner with his/her interests and allegiances. What it says never comes from a putative 'belly of things themselves' (essence of nature) no matter how masterful the deception.

Tracing the discourse 'of money' back to the human manipulation behind it is the business of educated minds; to break the magic spell cash exerts means in the first place to dismantle its counterfeit appearance of naturalness. Notwithstanding its tremendous persuasive power, it is mostly the very needy and the very greedy who are at high risk from its direction—those whose common sense becomes uncommonly insensible due to either brute need, or unbridled desire. At least in principle, everyone else remains capable of hearing human voices coming through the interruptions in the sweet talk 'of money.'

For the rest, Beijing's preparations to make its great splash get the benefit of the doubt here. The big problem with

neglecting the Tao of words is that, *without the lubrication of soft power, hard power needs to get ever harder in order to prevail*—more and more insensitive and crushing, increasingly identical to the inanimate nature where it sought its law in the first place. In this sense, the African reaction to the awkward Chinese advances of the last decade and a half is particularly telltale.[1]

So, squeezed between nature and society, how *wild* could the card of "socialism with Chinese characters" become when played by a pair of hands concentrating powers to unprecedented levels? After all, wild is nature at its most natural, which means least predictable.

3. Biding one's time vs. seizing the opportunity

In particular, China's prolonged reluctance to respond to the North Korean crisis with an ultimatum brings into question its taste for tough measures in international relations—coherent with the older, equally carefully measured approach to the reunification with Taiwan.

But how exactly does the game of waiting work? What makes a semblance of alliance with time itself—the supposedly 'natural unfolding of things'—effective and to what extent? If waiting works, could it also work *too well,* so that the alliance with time, once concluded and hardened into habit, becomes an inertial trap? Granted timing is crucial to the exercise of power, how does patience stand in relation to impatience once a genuine super-vision has struck the mind? One probably agrees that the superiority of a vision can only be judged by its perceivable effects.

It all looks as if, with remarkable prudence, Beijing deliberately refrained from touching upon the limits of its powers, at some level aware that, once those reached, any power inevitably embarks upon its own decline. This is to say that, when doing *everything* within one's power, one has already gone too far and imprudently—terminally, one might say—*over*played one's hand. Extreme play is already overplay, and as such harbinger of the endgame.

Noteworthy for theorists and practitioners alike insofar as it departs from the Hegelian struggle for power *to death*, this approach deserves renewed attention. Without exaggeration, it

can be considered the third millennium Chinese twist on the Western cocktail of power theories, the main ingredients of which remain largely distillates of Hegel's thought.

Arguably, what runs against the prevailing Chinese political sensibility is the unjustified fear its Western counterpart experiences with regard to enslavement. A priori preferring death to subjection, which is what the warrior ethos basically inculcates, contradicts the more longevity-oriented tastes cultivated in the Middle Kingdom. This is due primarily to the belief that, with patience and fortitude instead of *furor heroicus*, eventually the slave can triumph of the master—an observation that Hegel, but especially his student Marx, would readily endorse. Seen through the prism of Chinese political prudence, the readiness of the contenders to fight *all the way to death* suffers from not having quite assimilated Hegel's lesson.

As if in the West one failed to tap deeply enough in the wisdom of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which reveals within a conceded defeat the dawn of a deferred victory. If, in good Hegelian fashion, history is understood as the slave's preparation to eventually overthrow his/her master, mistrust in and eventually despair of this process—with one word, impatience—appear as the main culprits for that all too hasty decision to settle the issue in one single heroic battle for supremacy no matter the costs.

By and large, East and West may agree that time works basically as the slave's ally. But there is a long shot from accepting this as a theoretical conclusion to actually cultivating a social taste for patient expectation over and above resolute initiative.[2] And few would seriously dispute that, when it comes to effectively inculcated, deep-level patience, the West in general, but its present self-appointed leader in particular, are no match for China with its venerable apprenticeship. To treasure longevity as the latter does means to trust in waiting more than in immediate intervention, on some level firmly believing that the best is yet to come; but so is the worst, a Blanchot would rush to point out.

So, granted slavery is undesirable, how *bearable* can one find it, which boils down to how *comfortably* can one travel through time toward the proverbial end of the dark tunnel? If

anything, a long history like China's teaches that prolonged deprivation of freedom turns the latter into something one has to begin by learning how to wait for. Regaining liberty requires that the craving for it be armed with hopeful patience in the first place—the main virtue of the downtrodden, also recognized as indispensable by Christianity. It may well be that a given battle for power decides which of the two combatants subjects which, but this is by no means the end of the story; rather, it inaugurates a dialectical reversal, a *sub*version whereby the slave will eventually replace his/her master.

Note that trust in the alliance with this subterranean current of becoming has to be as deep as the comfort one effectively feels while waiting for its disruptive emergence in the future. And when it comes to easiness at dealing with uneasiness—the capacity to take the latter in stride—China stands out far above the relatively self-indulgent, desire-driven West of the last seven decades.

Obviously, a comparison between levels of adaptation to the wait for the next historic upheaval presupposes that the slave has stopped short of dying for freedom, thereby preserving his/her capacity to intervene in history. Hence, the wisdom of bowing out of a struggle with only a relative result, not to be unduly absolutized by pushing the conflict all the way to death. To someone with superior waiting skills, time will sooner or later grant the expected support; the only problem is to what extent, after prolonged inaction, he/she will still be able to fructify this opportunity. An unflinching trust in the future makes for the passive warrior's most indispensable training, *but also most severe handicap*. This is because the promptness of snapping into action at the opportune moment can very well be lost during the long wait.

Enters work as preparation for the awaited takeover. Insofar as warrior cultures deem death preferable to subjection, they can be seen as suffering from a naiveté and impatience typical of newcomers on the stage of world history. In their impetuous rush, these hotheads omit to place events within a larger context where, in due time and following convoluted paths, any unfavorable trait of the present cannot fail to get undone.

Nonetheless, this is not how Alexander the Great saw things when slashing the legendary Gordian knot presented to him by the sages of Asia—to some, the paradigmatic gesture of Western political sensibilities. The young strategist must have sensed that the task we take up to solve inexorably weds us to its specific temporality, surreptitiously casting our being in its mold. Praxis roots humans in different strata of temporality—the deeper, the more immobile, which means the more harmoniously attuned to that utter inertia timelessness stands for.

Many are the cultural injunctions that shape the Chinese aversion toward an extremism bent on pushing one to take unreasonable risks for the sake of freedom. "We know how to drink bitterness" runs a Chinese proverb—a skill credited with heartening one to traverse periods of hardship while waiting for a change of luck. Or, formulated as "the good general wins with a mere frown," Sun Tzu's well-known adage corroborates the same judiciousness of avoiding a heroic bloodshed by patiently nurturing the enemy's worst fears. Not to mention the powerful Confucian promotion of filial piety, which makes dying before one's parents—typical of the heroic destiny of an Achilles, for instance—appear as condemnable dereliction of social duty.

If traditionally Chinese sensibility already inclined strongly against killing as being too extreme, the decades of Communism could only have added to this deeply lodged suspicion. For, following Hegel, Marx largely elaborates on the positive, empowering role subjection ultimately has on this class of modern slaves that proletarians are. As their class enemy, the bourgeoisie was to be re-educated through hard labor rather than exterminated. Is not work, after all, the continuation of the master-slave power struggle by other means, to paraphrase von Clausewitz—a kind of diplomacy of the destitute, as it were?

With its constructive fervor, China implicitly raises the question anew: why die fighting heroically in battle when enslavement contains the promise of a future domination over today's dominators, and when defeat ultimately represents the antechamber of a victory to be prepared through work? In favor of this approach, its history offers spectacular evidence in the

Yuan Dynasty's rapid collapse, to mention just one episode. So quickly did the fierce Mongolian rulers degenerate and end up assimilated by the ruled Chinese that Hegel's talk of accounts being settled only at the end of history must read unwarrantedly pessimistic by Middle Kingdom standards.

Besides, there's another reason for optimism among slaves: from the many of their kind subjected by the master, some fare better than others thanks to their superior waiting skills honed through cultural sophistication. Undoubtedly and universally, slavery is hard to accept; but, apart from trust in the alliance with time itself, the *variety of strands* subjection allows of makes it easier to bear. Because there are hierarchies among slaves, which introduces a most noteworthy mediation in the otherwise too dichotomous, oversimplified master-slave scheme of power.

4. Slave to some, master to others

What substantially alleviates the suffering of the slave, thus contributing to the stability and maintenance of the system, is that there are even worse-off slaves the master rules over. Bad as it is, slavery can get better or worse, which appears reflected in the specific position of different slaves vis-à-vis their master and in their hierarchical relations with one another. Identification with the master works within the limits of that micro-universe where the slave has others of his/her kind in subordination.

Based on this insight, slavery can be made to look all relative—just like mastery, for that matter. What is more delightful to a slave than to see his/her master humiliated by an even greater master—idea that defines God's sense of justice, according to Christianity (Luke 1:52)? If, among slaves, some wield more power than others and enjoy more freedom, by moving them around and keeping them at varying distances from him/herself, the master can produce very persuasive *liberation-effects*. That is, virtual liberations: not in fact but in effect.

The biggest question is to what extent this brow-raising deal tacitly aspires to pass for China's ultimate vision of global managerial genius.

In a stimulating analysis focusing on Beijing's handling of the North Korean crisis, Rodger Baker strives to convince of China's traditional preference for a passive rather than active use of power: "So long as the neighbors did not fundamentally counter China's core interests," he writes, "they were largely left to their own devices." (2017) According to him, a desire to influence from a distance without coercive interference would characterize Beijing's understanding of the right international exercise of clout. In this theory of concentric circles of power, a multi-layered mediation bridges the antagonism between center and periphery. Hence, why overemphasize one agent's enslavement in relation to those situated closer to the center, when the opposite can also be done in relation to those placed farther out, thus preserving a certain optimism indispensable to the idea of systemic harmony?[3]

The last Congress of China's Communist Party disconfirmed Baker's thesis on the regional limitations of Beijing's ambitions. But his analysis still remains valuable insofar as it highlights a system of vassalage where a mere frown of the supreme master becomes effective enough to deter from more risky, possibly desperate and, because of this, extreme forms of contestation. No longer insisting on the simplistic difference between master and slave, this more complex arrangement shifts the emphasis on the position within the whole system of a hybrid agent whose existential condition results from a conflation of the two classical Hegelian roles—the *masterslave* that each of us basically is.

Using the same logic, nowadays financialization exalts everyone's status of potential investor, just as yesterday's neoliberal rhetoric undercut class consciousness by featuring everyone as a capitalist (possessor of something marketable). Differences of degree replace allegedly more fundamental differences of nature, class, or condition as oversimplified by classical Marxism.

If Hegel saw in the slave bowing before the master a sign of weakness concretized into a socially unfavorable role, China's fixation on pacific solutions attempts to rebrand this weakness as deep wisdom of waiting for emancipation. And definitely the confusion gets at least maintained, if not

increased, through the incentives the master offers to help defuse his/her old armed antagonism with the slave and pursue instead a more 'constructive' path together. If only construction did not cover a more obscure, less acknowledged destruction taking place without belligerence in the strict sense…

So far at least, China's would-be super-vision of power has little to offer the world apart from its much touted constructive approach epitomized in the 'Belt and Road' mega-project. But, even though the superiority of pacific construction over military destruction is supposed to go without saying for China's very busy masses, it appears far less self-evident to others who have the leisure, freedom and willingness to look deeper.

This is partly because, apart from representing the disreputable existential choice of a death-fearing slave, pacifism at all costs also bespeaks a dubious incapacity of governance to diversify the roles played within a given society so that heroic ideals can flourish. A managerial shortcoming, in other words, a lack of broader comprehension. Past a certain point, consensual homogeneity compromises the masses' very capacity for dialectical self-overcoming, rendering them unable to wrestle a future for themselves through that riskiest and most problematic of human actions, which is the heroic one—killing others at the risk of being oneself killed. For it is the consensus-breaking hero who extends the social contract beyond ordinary praxis, into that realm of shadows where praxis makes room for its conditions of possibility.

The hero's self-sacrifice can win his/her society nothing short of a future by dealing the apparent impossible a glorious yet exorbitant blow, in the wake of which fresh possibilities emerge.[4] The drawback of this uncanny magic is that the presence of heroes in a society poses a major threat on the stability of the power in place, according to the principle 'that which preserves stability and continuity can also most severely compromise them.' In addition, one of the founding clauses in the social contract wants that, in exchange for the highest risks assumed, the heroic elite can claim the lion's share—a demand that encroaches upon the bureaucratic management's ambitions. Instrumentalizing its heroes, in the sense of making

their moves predictable and controllable, remains one of the most daunting tasks governance faces.

5. Work as wait for *both* liberation *and* death

Despite inevitable fluctuations, the value of self-sacrifice has remained high since the dawn of human organization, which cannot also be said of the emancipatory virtues ascribed to work in general. Hegel's emphasis on the latter as the specific means through which the slave can overcome his/her initial weakness and gradually acquire the capacity to subdue the master is two centuries old now. As Foucault has convincingly shown, not only the specific methods of exerting mastery have evolved, but also the nature of work itself—in particular, its potential to empower the worker.[5]

Indeed, massively assisted by technology as it became nowadays, work in general has lost a good deal of its formative virtues extolled by Hegel and Marx. Automation reduces the risk of human error, but it proportionately diminishes the educational value of work, since mistakes happen to double as great opportunities for learning and self-growth. That which may still hold for the upper, more creative echelons of the workforce no longer applies to the lowest, least free basis tasked mostly with drudgery. Within the confusingly comprehensive category *workforce*, the middle is rapidly eroding and a growing majority is settling for the unenviable status of slaves among slaves and tools among tools. Mass adoption only lubricates the exploration of this nadir of the human.[6]

Because of this, the special knowledge of drinking bitterness proverbially extolled by the Chinese turns out to be highly ambiguous—potentially self-constructive *or self-destructive*. For one can also become too skilled at neglecting one's frustrations to still heed the call for help they voice, just as in the Greek myth King Oedipus became too knowledgeable to remain in control of his excessive knowledge, ultimately responsible as it was for the knower's self-mutilation. As Freud rightly pointed out, when internalized as super-ego, the master can become way more merciless than his/her external model.

Mastery at drinking bitterness renders the latter *imperceptible*, which means that its 'disappearance' is not

factual but effectual. Instead of triggering an empowering, history-changing revulsion from the depths of one's being, in some cultures the absorption of bitterness gets perfected to the point of inducing nothing but a fatefully resigned, routine and limitless acceptance of self-degradation. This passively expectant resignation marks the limit where, adrift on the fluid instinctual magma within us, as it were, the human existential plate undergoes a subduction by the neighboring inhuman one.

A discomfortingly massive evidence—felt as such acutely mostly by the leisure-loving, self-reflective West—indicates that large swaths of work have turned into a deferred, barely disguised suicide, to echo a Cioranian reflection.[7] Among others, the spate of suicides that plagued China's workforce not long ago served as grim reminder of the self-destructive force this less-than-liberating experience of work can also have.

All in all, if slave prudence is the halo circumscribing what China has to offer in terms of a new vision of power and as 'constructive' alternative to the realpolitik of "peace through strength," it smacks of déjà vu and less than excellent, to put it euphemistically. It may still be inevitable for managing large social systems likely to veer into chaos if granted Western-style freedoms, but is far from making it exemplary on a world scale. The grindingly dull work of the manufacturing majority and the self-fulfilling activity of a creative minority of workers appear to have quite different existential impacts.

Absorbed in work, more often than not one fails to notice and seize the opportune moment of emancipation, which consequently slips by. Loud government-orchestrated praises to work in the heroic spirit of self-sacrifice help greatly with this process by downplaying the self-destructive aspect of it. Arguably, *in China the social image of work is by far more lethal than all the work accidents combined*. If focused on work to the point of unreflective self-abandonment, the slave is likely to keep deferring the decision to part with it and *break* free: strangely, the very preparation for liberation stands in the way of its advent.

Between death by *karoshi* (Japanese for lethal overwork) and death on the battlefield the latter choice might have the advantage of offering more unknowns, and therefore

more unforeseeable chances of survival worth exploring. The scientifically organized self-destruction that large areas of work have become, especially in its ruthless extreme-Oriental version introduced to the world in the 1970s by Japan, brings 'the Chinese dream' too close to a nightmare to really inspire daydreaming among the deeply suspicious Western workforce. Among the management, though, the authoritarianism encouraged in the East does make dream and exhilarates. Which partly explains why, unlike its American counterpart, the work-inspired Chinese dream meets significant resistance abroad, at least among those who can still afford to question before unconditionally losing themselves in work.

Precisely because a vast majority of the 1.4 billion Chinese can boast unmatched mastery at drinking bitterness, the political vision that extolls their exploit before the world *inspires very divisively*: met with enthusiasm at the top, it sends shudders across the basis of the social pyramid. Now, dividing happens to provide great preparation for ruling, as the Latin adage goes. *China's mediocre vision of superpower becomes a super-vision insofar as, wedge-like, it splits the global public opinion graciously, with little more than a polite Confucian smile*. Sun Tzu's excellent general capable of avoiding bloodshed with a mere frown is nowadays surpassed by a premier who can get the same done with less than that—a reassuring smile that his 'Belt and Road' is all for the better.

To the question, 'Can you still sell individual self-sacrifice in the very age of individualism and in plain sight?' Beijing tacitly but confidently answers, 'Yes, we can, since we are the world's biggest market and the world understands itself to be essentially a market.' It is not an overstatement to claim that, in terms of efficacy, the politically induced narcosis that abets China's penchant to mass-masochism rivals the Macedonian phalanx of ancient times, or the swarming Mongolian cavalry of the Middle Ages.

6. Vision and the entrapments of patience

Does political vision acquire excellence simply upon being adopted by large numbers, or does the nature of this vision alone determine its value? Notwithstanding its indispensable social transmission, vision remains an

expression of individuality—a breakpoint, a potential interruption of imitative repetition, the possibility for action to strike off the routine course followed by most. But, insofar as it disrupts this business-as-usual functioning, the new vision encroaches upon the previously adopted, politically guarded version of common good.

Under the conventional name *genius* individuality spearheads necessary social change.[8] A superior vision empowers its visionary receiver to cross the limits of prudence into a highly exposed domain where a new order lies concealed. Against all odds, the opportunities it articulates might let themselves be wrestled out of concealment. As this feat of daring seems unfeasible to most, its value is proportionate to its social rarity and to the risks incurred. Most remarkable about this act is that, in it, impatience brings prudent patience to an end. *A super-vision signals itself most distinctively through an irrepressible sense of urgency toward action*—a breaking of routine patterns under the pressure of what the visionary genius experiences as necessity.

Inasmuch as it displaces the ultimate initiative from the established site of political power to an outsider, this necessity envisioned by the genius can be expected to encounter passionate resistance. Fortunately, it comes prepared to break through various obstacles, which means backed by a firm resolve capable of defying the ordinary injunctions of prudence and of assuming the risks involved in the clash. Its greatness translates most directly into greatest courage and highest urgency to act. As countless examples of self-sacrificing visionary heroes have shown since at least Empedocles and Hermias of Atarneus—including Giordano Bruno, Galileo Galilei, and the white-shirted man who stopped the column of tanks rolling into Tiananmen Square in 1989—the resolve accompanying a super-vision can fringe on madness; it is impatience at its most burning.

Prudent patience makes for but a poor suitor of a super-vision; if controllable, the passion simmering in it is mediocre enough to raise doubts about their match. Continuing to wait as before after receiving an enlightening insight constitutes evidence that the insight in case did not quite capture the next

necessary step of becoming. By definition, necessity tolerates no delays; expectative inertia in response to a great vision speaks either against the latter's greatness, or against the visionary's capacity to deliver it to the world immediately and regardless of costs (lack of real genius, which consists in the effective power to initiate a major game change in response to a super-vision). Haggling over the price of their action is not for those touched by grace to the point of actually feeling resourceful *beyond calculation*. Indeed, what could one still be waiting for once the right thing to do appeared to him/her as such—as both *the right* thing and the one *to do*? Only to hopeless procrastinators the moment is never opportune enough.

In short, vision cannot be separated from its propagation: the more excellent, the more irresistibly and promptly it musters the means for its actualization. If it does not start by empowering its receiver to actualize it superlatively—urgently and unconditionally, that is—its alleged superiority fails the reality test. A super-vision is supposed to induce a super-mobilization against inertia, as necessity dictates more authoritatively and efficaciously than any political leader. Hence, the socio-physiological question: to what extent the *social* body will respond to the inspired vision with the same unflinching compliance as the genius's own *physical* body?

It is the physical response that makes the genius stand out from the crowd of mere dreamers lost in endless deferrals when it comes to actualizing their dreams—those beautiful but impotent souls Hegel called *die schönen Seelen*. By analogy, one could say that it is the mobilization of the social body—people's acting in sync with one another and with their political leader—that makes the fundamental difference between nations that deliver and those that indulge in mere fantasizing. Now, if anything, China is delivering spectacularly; but vigilance needs to be increased precisely when the show unleashes its most captivating radiance.

Because it works, the Chinese model risks to work *too well* to still be human: tranquilized through the massive ingestion of ideological opium—the religion of work, to paraphrase Marx—will the slave even remember that he/she is

enslaved, let alone seize the opportunity for liberation? By empowering Xi Jinping in unprecedented ways, implicitly the Chinese people want him to keep the good work going *without unproductive interruptions for debate*, as if more good were always better than just good. But is it really?

An automatic functioning under narcosis jeopardizes the system's capacity to dispel its lucrative torpor and rethink its stance in life from the ground up in accordance with changes of the overall situation. Once humans reach great mastery at imitating the planned functioning of machines, will not the 'stop' button appear obsolete? Massively doped through ideology, the worker can prolong his/her productive but self-destructive inertia all the way to suicidal *karoshi*, just as the martial hero can keep delivering his/her grim destruction long after the war is over. The problem with this generalized state of war through 'peaceful' and 'constructive' work is that it may never really cease of itself; one needs to keep in mind Heidegger's simple observation that it takes a break in the hammer for the worker to pause.

In the end, China's immoderate fear of uncontrollable situations faithfully parallels the West's visceral phobia of over-controlled ones. But no super-vision can claim excellence past its expiry date. In and of itself, China's productive fervor is no better than the US's military zeal, as Chinese-style work only exerts its destructive power in slower and less conspicuous ways than battlefield brutality. Is it conceivable that, at some point in a brighter future, unbridled work propaganda will become chargeable crime (incitement to suicide)? For work—the drug that life cannot do without—is also capable of terminating it if taken without a limiting prescription. What to say of a political prescription that abets, instead of preventing, workaholic excesses?

Crucial when judging the next world order is not the choice between construction and destruction but that between interruptible and uninterruptible visual contact with any model image. The penchant for stability veers into a ruinous passion when seized by fascination, which is just another name for the control images can assume of human minds. Insofar as 'the Chinese dream' refers to this irrational surrender to the spell of

work *at all costs*, nothing distinguishes it from a self-actualizing nightmare of the worst kind.

7. Conclusion

Superiority of vision might be literally in the eye of the beholder—to be precise, in the eye's kinesthetic ability to avert its gaze from excessive exposure to any given image. The ancient wisdom of '*festina lente*' should be applied to blinking in the first place: visual contact with any image should be generously interrupted in order to let the mind 'ruminate' the latter as due. A political super-vision appears as the mind's ability to exert self-supervision—to extricate itself from its own ongoing act and hang above the latter like an impatient guillotine.

One is never too impatient when it comes to mental readiness for change: rupture for rupture's sake, desisting in the name of a salutary non-coincidence with oneself is a necessary exercise for whoever feels the entrapments lurking in stability. Constructive fervor, just like its destructive martial counterpart, can be a slow-drying concrete whereby rigor mortis surreptitiously and untimely sets in. There is no point in exalting longevity as long as the liveliest moment in it—life's very capacity to differ from itself—has disappeared engulfed by hardened routine.

It did not take much genius to see that the China of Deng Xiaoping badly needed to address its poverty and backwardness problems; even less was required for adopting the model of more advanced societies. But seeing the existential threat imitation poses might take nothing short of prophetic clairvoyance.[9] The problem with the Confucian injunction to imitate the good is that, once people get the hang of aping and applaud it uncritically, in principle nothing can stop them from faking their own humanity with ever grosser approximations.

In order to reach farther than it already did, China's leap forward might need to flirt dangerously with *instability and fragility*. The greater the advance, the more frail and flexible the social body needed to sustain the forward movement; after all, upon thrusting one's feet away from the rest of one's body as if meaning to break apart, one can never be quite sure of remaining in one piece, never mind landing upright.

Without somehow shaking off their ideologically baked rigidity, how could China's terra-cotta warriors come (back) to life? Stuck in intimidating martial postures, they fascinate the gaze with their image of past greatness, inducing their stiffness in the beholder's mind. But only a would-be step *out of control* on their part could make the world beyond China believe that they actually are, and not just look, real.

NOTES

[1] A good example of hard power without the backing of its soft counterpart comes from China's recent African adventure, in which the series of infrastructures Beijing offered in exchange for local natural resources failed to win it a sustainable welcome. This weakness is precisely what India, arrived in Africa behind China and way less financially comfortable than its predecessor, is trying to exploit in the name of business sustainability. Philosophically, the fate of this competition for Africa's favors is interesting insofar as it pitches mostly soft against hard power.

[2] One can also wait until forgetting what one is waiting for, according to Maurice Blanchot. (1962) The issue acquires particular political importance when this awaited thing is nothing other than the return to a state of humanity beyond doubt. For our humanity is a quality possessed only uncertainly, i.e., susceptible of being lost through self-complacency and self-neglect—indeed, sometimes lost to the point of forgetting this very loss and taking abject degradation in stride. Which not by accident echoes the argument imperial Japan invoked to justify its Nanking massacre of 1937: past a certain point, patience dangerously skirts a state of resignation with the very worst.

[3] Interestingly, Yanis Varoufakis denounces the same logic at work in the European Union's painful spasms of self-redefinition, supposedly ". . . leading to a Europe in which a coalition of the willing will proceed with the original ambition while the rest form outer circles, connected to the inner core by unspecified bonds." (2017).

[4] One remembers that, in his Alkestis, Euripides depicts the heroic engagement with death in this most heuristically convenient way, which is a wrestling match.

[5] In the interview published under the title 'Truth and Power,' Foucault points out that, upon closer inspection, this particular exercise of power known as work appears as war by 'peaceful' means: "Peace would then be a form of war, and the State a means of waging it." (123, 1980).

[6] A most telltale omission in this sense occurs in Kojève's commentary to Leo Strauss' appropriation of Xenophon and dealing with the worker's motivation for work. After an initial admission that "the joy that comes from labor itself, and the desire to succeed in an undertaking, can, by themselves alone, prompt a man to undertake painful and dangerous labors (as is already shown in the

ancient myth of Hercules)" in the next sentence Kojève lets the reference to painful work slip out of attention in favor of that to dangerous labor: "A man can work hard risking his life for no other reason than to experience the joy he always derives from carrying out his project or, what is the same thing, from transforming his 'idea' or even 'ideal' into a reality shaped by his own efforts." (1991, 140) The argument for joyful work has no problem passing, but the one for painful work is simply trying to take a ride on its back. The big problem is that motivation for success at all costs cannot be completely freed from the suspicion of masochism—that most dubious alchemy of the human psyche responsible for making pain pass for pleasure. In the language of our epoch, this foul deal allows the mind to sell the body a ruinous toxic derivative: joy—the hard currency of vital exchanges—gets counterfeited in the darkest recesses of one's individuality.

[7] "A book is a deferred suicide," rules Cioran on what remains one of the most stimulating, creative, and therefore intrinsically rewarding human activities. (1995, 1332) But, if interacting with a book—presumably both writing and reading it—has the virtue of chasing away thoughts of utter meaninglessness, the same cannot be said of other, less interesting objects one gets involved with in most other types of work. In parallel with the rise of technological alienation and despair at the dullness of the tasks performed, overwork is becoming the rule for the ever fewer who manage to find employment at all. Which supports the idea that, past certain levels of competitiveness, work turns against the worker—either directly, as self-destructive behavior, or indirectly, as readiness to eliminate the competitor at all costs.

[8] This account of genius is based on Heidegger's description of the authentic Dasein in his Being and Time. Cf. especially Division II, Part 1: "Dasein's Possibility of Being-A-Whole, and Being-Towards-Death."

[9]Or the genius of Matsuo Bashō: "Don't imitate me;/it's as boring/as the two halves of a melon."

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Post-Historical Factor in the Contemporary Political Process: a Philosophical Analysis

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Abstract

The article aims to reveal the features of how the ideas of the end of history and post-history influence the contemporary political process. The adherents to the concept of the end of history, while considering the collapse of authoritarianism and totalitarianism and the withdrawal of any alternatives to liberalism from the historical scene, ignore the deep crisis of the liberal ideology and liberal-democratic regimes. The main fallacy of the adherents of the end of history and the post-history concepts is the confusion of the sense of the end of history that has developed in the public consciousness with the completion of historical development. The way out of this situation is developing the paradigm of linear historical development, which can adequately respond to the current political crisis, rather than claiming the end of history.

Keywords: end of history; post-history; political process; ideology; philosophy of history

1. Introduction

In the late 20th century, the ideas of the end of history and of humanity entering the post-historical era became frequent. For a while, these two ideas were subject to active discussion among scholars and even covered in newspapers and journals. Nowadays, at first glance, they seem to recede far into the background. For this reason, one may see all that as of a

temporary interest; the ideas are out of fashion now and have fell into oblivion. However, it is a deceptive impression.

One should assume that the notion of the end of history or at least that of the deadlock state into which humanity has entered are deeply rooted in the contemporary public consciousness. It should be emphasized that the concepts of the end of history and post-history are not the cause, but the consequence of the uncertain situation in which humanity has found itself.

This uncertainty is especially dangerous in the political process, which ultimately defines the direction of social development. In this respect, philosophy should aim at revealing the onset and background of a theory rather than overthrowing it. In the view of philosophical analysis, the nature of paradigm sets formed by post-historical ideas concerning political processes triggers particular interest within the current article.

This article aims to reveal the peculiarities of how the ideas of the end of history and post-history affect the contemporary political process.

2. Ambivalence of Contemporary Criticism of Concepts of the End of History and Post-History

The concepts of the end of history and post-history are not the fruits of some philosophizing intellectual's imagination. They result from comprehending real tendencies incident to the contemporary political process. Along with that, they represent metaphysical (in the traditional sense) one-dimensional perceptions of contradictory characteristics of the contemporary political processes.

The idea of the end of history was always present in linear concepts of philosophy and history, for example, in the studies by Hegel, Marx, Jaspers, etc. Nevertheless, it was Francis Fukuyama (1990) who first transferred this idea from the exclusively philosophical and historical dimension to political philosophy. He defined the competition of political ideologies as a content of an historical process. In his opinion, as it was the liberal ideology, which has no serious alternatives

hereafter, that won in the ideological struggle, the historical process is complete.

Very few scholars share his conclusion about the end of history. However, his statement about the victory of the liberal ideology was indirectly – if not directly – supported by many. It can be confirmed by existing conclusions about the integration of modern ideologies mainly based on liberal values (Dalton, Welzel, 2014), the transition of political struggle from strategic problems to daily, routine tasks (Dalton & Welzel 2014; Grant 2001), universal recognition of liberal rights and liberties (Akram, Marsh & McCaffrie 2014; Kimlicka 2014; Richards Smith 2014), etc.

But the majority of researchers, including the adherents to the post-history concept, evaluate the contemporary political process in the opposite way. The concept of the end of history was subject to the most severe criticism by Jacques Derrida (1994), who qualified Fukuyama's work *The End of History and the Last Man* as 'new testament rhetoric': he considered frivolous the apology for the triumph of the capitalism or economic and political liberalism, for the 'universalization of the Western liberal democracy as the final point of human government,' and for 'the end to the problem of class antagonism'. 'What cynicism of "pure consciousness" what intellectual blindness can make one write, and even believe, that "everything that stood in the way of the reciprocal recognition of human dignity, always and everywhere, has been refuted and buried by history"' (Derrida 1994, 98). Besides, Baudrillard (1983) convincingly demonstrated that the peculiar feature of modernity is the end of the political rather than the triumph of democracy. It is appropriate to mention as well the theorists of multiculturalism admitting that the contemporary liberal democracy requires significant corrections (Grant 2001; Guo & Wong 2015; Wieviorka 2014).

It is slightly more complicated concerning the theory of post-history. It is also evoked by the contemporary political process, but by its crisis manifestations. Firstly, its adherents stress that currently there is no political ideology capable of addressing all the critical problems of modernity. According to Derrida, 'A set of transformations of all sorts (in particular,

techno-scientifico-economico-media) exceeds both the traditional givens of the Marxist discourse and those of the liberal discourse opposed to it. Even if we have inherited some essential resources for projecting their analysis, we must first recognize that these mutations perturb the onto-theological schemas or the philosophies of technics as such. They disturb political philosophies and the common concepts of democracy, they oblige us to reconsider all relations between State and nation, man and citizen, the private and the public, and so forth' (Derrida 1994, 88). Secondly, they prove that the peculiarity of the contemporary society is its increasing political indifference (Baudrillard 1983).

On their parallel ways to the conclusions of the theory of post-history there were also the social and humanitarian sciences. Originally, the linear understanding of the historical process was based on the philosophical studies by Hegel, Marx and other thinkers of the Modern History. It implied the human ability to comprehend the meaning and orientation of the historical process. However, as soon as in the late 19th century, neo-kantianism, neo-hegelianism, neopositivism and postpositivism as well as many others questioned this ability. And indeed empirical historians initiated the transition from macro- to micro-history. Therefore, as Franklin Ankersmit reasonably underlines, the transition from speculative philosophy of history to historism and then to postmodern philosophy of history, i.e. post-history, is a fairly consistent outcome (Ankersmit 1994).

Invidious postmodern conclusions about the wreck of the 'Enlightenment Project' were most substantially grounded by Jürgen Habermas (1987). His criticism of posthistorical views on the political process was supported by adherents to both antimulticultalism (Joppke 2004; Malik 2015) and liberal ideology (Akram, Marsh & McCaffrie 2014; Dalton & Welzel 2014; Thomassen 2015).

This notwithstanding, the criticism of both the theory of the end of history and that of post-history seem one-dimensional. In other words, while revealing their theoretic and methodological drawbacks critics fail to pay enough attention to

a certain legitimacy of their argument. Therefore, this research attempts to conduct a dialectical analysis of these theories.

3. Main Approaches to Interpretation of Concepts of "The End of History" and "Post-History"

In contemporary science the concepts of 'the end of history' and 'post-history' have two interpretations. The first of them – within linear philosophy – implies that 'the end of history' means the termination of the historical development of humankind, while 'post-history' ('post-historical society') is the name of the final stage. In particular, this is how they are understood in the famous concept of Francis Fukuyama (1990). According to the second interpretation, which derives from postmodern philosophy, 'the end of history' and 'post-history' mean that the previous understanding of the historical process becomes a thing of the past. In order to prevent confusion, this article understands the end of history according to the first definition and refers the second one to post-history.

The theories of the end of history and post-history are sure to affect public consciousness in various ways. Therefore, it should be taken into consideration in the course of studying the influence of post-historical ideas on the contemporary public consciousness. Taking this circumstance into account is possible due to the application of comparative analysis.

Along with that, the peculiar feature of the contemporary time is a curious combination of the ideas of the end of history and post-history that exists in the public consciousness in many countries. In other words, researching the influence of post-historical ideas on the contemporary political process implies separate consideration of how both ideas affect practice, while public consciousness should be considered as something synthesized from these both theories. The consideration of these both circumstances is only possible by relying upon analysis, synthesis and a system method.

The problem of correlation between social theories and political practice is most completely solved through dialectical method. In particular, it implies that social theories reflect fundamental tendencies of political practice, but they also significantly influence its course.

It should be noted that the idea of the end of history has nothing new – it was present in all linear concepts of the philosophy of history. It functioned as a kind of historical orienting point, then, in Fukuyama's concept, where it obtains another meaning and turns into a kind of starting point. Therefore, this research applies historical method to take into account historical variability of methodological and worldview-related (axiological) dimensions of the concept of the end of history.

Lastly, it should be clarified that this article understands the end of history according to Fukuyama's interpretation. As for 'post-history', there is no consonance concerning its definition in postmodern philosophy, and so the main reference is made to Jean Baudrillard's interpretation.

4. Liberalism, the Social, the Individual: Post-History versus the End of History

The main argument of Fukuyama in favour of the end of history is the collapse of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, the oblivion of all the alternatives to liberalism, and 'final' establishment of liberal ideology in the public consciousness of the humankind. It is very hard to object to the first part of the argument, while the second one is completely unacceptable. The point is that Fukuyama did not pay attention to the fact that liberalism (both as ideology and as practice) was also involved in severe crisis. In this regard, postmodernism seems more consistent because it declares the 'decline' of modernist metanarratives in general, including universal ideologies.

It is mainly agreed that contemporary democracy faces a serious crisis. All the manifestations of the crisis can be divided into two groups based on their temporal dimension. In other words, it is the crisis of democracy today and that in the future.

The crisis of democracy today is primarily manifested in the decline in confidence in contemporary democratic institutions. For instance, according to Richards and Smith (2014), the proportion of those who had 'almost never' believed that the British government prioritized social needs over political interests increased from 10% in 1974 up to 40% in 2009. Akram, Marsh & McCaffrie (2014) draw attention to the widespread drop in political participation in developed liberal

countries. Although the authors specify the emergence of new forms of political participation, the crisis of traditional forms is obvious. Thus, in post-war Great Britain about 80% of the population took part in general elections, while in the early 21st century this figure accounted for only 50-60%. According to Akram, Marsh & McCaffrie (2014), Armingeon & Guthmann (2014), and Thomassen (2015), party membership fell by half or more in France, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Ireland compared to the 1980s.

In this regard, one even concludes that in developed democratic countries a devoted, loyal citizen is being substituted by a new assertive one as a type of political culture (Dalton & Welzel 2014). The previous political culture was characterized by high confidence in institutions, high participation in elections and other conventional forms of legitimate activities. A new political culture is characterized by low confidence in institutions and the participation in non-violent activity that is provocative towards elites. On the one hand, the new culture bearers are adherent to democracy, but on the other hand, they are unsatisfied with the realization (implementation) of democracy in their country (Dalton & Welzel 2014).

It should be underlined that the crisis began back in the 1960s. The research conducted then demonstrated the same data. Thus, the group of scholars led by Dalton (2002) reported that the proportion of strong party adherents declined by 26% in the Great Britain; in Sweden, Austria and Australia – by 15%; in Norway – by 9% and in the USA – by 7% (Dalton & Welzel 2014, 262-263). Webb, Farrell & Holliday (2002) conducted similar research and revealed the same data in all the 16 Western democracies under study, which allowed the authors to state the impossibility of denying the weakening of public support for political parties in the majority of Western democracies. In Canada, the number of those who trust political parties declined from 30% in 1979 to 11% in 1996 and in Germany – from 43% in 1979 to 26% in 1993 (Dalton & Wattenberg 2002, 28).

An ideology should conform not only to the present but also to the future. In other words, it should be capable of solving possible prospective problems. If looking at the problem

under study through this lens, the prospects of liberalism are far from being positive. Dahl (1989) convincingly demonstrated that the modern liberal democratic system may function efficiently only in a nation-state. However, nowadays, as a result of globalization, nation-states are becoming a thing of the past and national identity is diffusing, i.e. the foundations of liberal democracy are being demolished.

In this respect, the ability of liberal ideology to extrapolate its values and practices to new social relations assumes significance. In this regard, it is sure that the most serious challenge for liberalism is multiculturalism. Some prove that it represents a new stage of liberal development, is consistent, getting widespread, and takes root; (Kimlicka 2014; Guo & Wong, 2015; Wieviorka 2014), others claim its failure and that it undermines the foundations of liberalism (Joppke 2004; Malik 2015). Although there is no consensus concerning the achievements of multiculturalism, the fact that liberalism has to solve this problem is undeniable. If one manages to insert the provisions of multiculturalism into liberal ideology, it may safely be said that it will not be the same (i.e. current) liberalism.

Fukuyama does not mention anything concerning these manifestations of crisis that the contemporary liberal democracy is involved in. Acknowledging that contemporary democracy faces a large number of problems, he refers to drug abuse, homelessness, criminality, ecological catastrophes, and thoughtless consumerism. He states that 'these problems are not obviously insoluble on the basis of liberal principles, nor so serious that they would necessarily lead to the collapse of society as a whole, as communism collapsed in the 1980s.' (Fukuyama 1992, xxi).

As there does not yet exist any proper solutions to these problems, it is untimely to claim that one has found the optimal ideology. In this respect, the theory of the end of history has an extremely negative influence on the solution to the stated problems, creating an illusion of solving all the critical problems and channeling ideological struggle in the wrong directionsure enough that historical process is infinite, applying the terms used by Karl Popper (2013), and represents a

sequence of shifts from a less perfect ideology to a more perfect one.

Unlike the adherents of the end of history, their counterparts supporting the theory of post-history bring the crisis of contemporary democracy to the forefront rather than turn a blind eye to it. In particular, Baudrillard explicitly states, 'the only genuine problem today is the silence of the mass, the silence of the silent majority' (Baudrillard 1983, 23-24).

One has to agree with him that such political indifference should not be explained through the manipulation of consciousness, although it should not be completely ignored either. Baudrillard explains the indifference of the masses through being ontologically inherent in them: 'this indifference of the masses is their true, their only practice, that there is no other ideal of them to imagine, nothing in this to deplore, but everything to analyse as the brute fact of a collective retaliation and of a refusal to participate in the recommended ideals, however enlightened. Nevertheless, this is the very thing that makes the masses be what they are' (Baudrillard 1983, 14).

According to Baudrillard (1983), Modern History saw the "rise and fall of the political". He states that the political and the social were inseparable since the French Revolution. The political manifested the social, with the latter becoming its content. However, the emergence of Marxism initiated the hegemony of the social and the economic, with the political converting to its reflection. Having expelled the political and become omnipresent, now the social backfired; it suffered the same fate as the political: '...the social itself no longer has any name. Anonymous. THE MASS. THE MASSES' (Baudrillard 1983, 19).

Baudrillard interprets the social as a feature that is only inherent to modernist society. However, now 'chaotic' society replaces that with fixed structure and relations. Baudrillard states: 'the social has well and truly existed, but does not exist anymore' (Baudrillard 1983, 82). Along with the social, the political is also becoming a thing of the past.

There is a need to dwell on two key problems that Baudrillard raised, namely, the end of the social and the nature of the masses. He understands both definitions ('the social' and 'the massess') in a specific way.

Conventionally, social relations are defined as those that people establish in the course of the reproduction of social being. Such understanding of social relations exists in any society, while, according to Baudrillard, the social exists only in modernist society. Is such understanding of the social legitimate?

On the one hand, no one would question the specific features of social relations in modernist society. Baudrillard attached great importance to the temporal factor, stressing the sustainability and stability of social relations.

On the other hand, when accelerating and changing quite rapidly, do they stop being social? Yes, sure, in its classical meaning. Indeed, social relations change more rapidly than one can comprehend them and develop a strategy for their adaptation, let alone the inability to foresee and, certainly, to regulate them. Nevertheless, in their conventional meaning, social relations still exist. Consequently, a point should be made about new means to comprehend and regulate social relations.

In this respect, the explanation of the specific feature of postmodern social relations, which the adherents of the theory of post-industrial society suggested, seems more substantial. In particular, concerning the transformation of education, Alvin Toffler stated, "in stagnant societies, the past crept forward into the present and repeated itself in the future. In such a society, the most sensible way to prepare a child was to arm him with the skills of the past" (Toffler 1971, 398). The industrial education of the masses focused on (1) teaching well-known skills and (2) making a person disciplined. However, this system becomes obsolete in the post-industrial society. If knowledge gets out of date quickly, there is no need to remember it. In post-industrial society, 'education must prepare people to function in temporary organizations—the Ad-hocracies of tomorrow' (Toffler 1971, 400).

Conventionally, the term "the masses' refers to atomized and alienated individuals. Such individuals are known to appear during the decomposition of traditional society and the establishment of the industrial one. These processes leave some individuals outside the system of traditional relations. Therefore, such an individual seeks to connect with those of

their kind and blend into the society of such individuals. José Ortega y Gasset noted, 'The mass is all that which sets no value on itself—good or ill—based on specific grounds, but which feels itself "just like everybody," and nevertheless is not concerned about it; is, in fact, quite happy to feel itself as one with everybody else' (Ortega y Gasset 1932, 14-15). Erich Fromm made a legitimate comment that one of the main mechanisms of 'escape from freedom' is a transformation of person into an 'automation': 'the individual ceases to be himself; he adopts entirely the kind of personality offered to him by cultural patterns; and he therefore becomes exactly as all others are and as they expect him to be. The discrepancy between "I" and the world disappears and with it the conscious fear of aloneness and powerlessness' (Fromm 1960, 160).

It would be quite appropriate to stress that Baudrillard's statement about the masses generally contradicts the postmodernist idea of a fragmented world, society and subject. The fragmentation of society means that a single social environment is torn into separate pieces, with every individual being isolated in their own little world. Such an individual does not seek to blend into society, nor become similar to others, but, conversely, he/she tries to stand out from the society, become nothing like others.

This contradiction is likely to be triggered by the following circumstance. On the one hand, postmodernists had an intuitive feeling of an unusual type of society being established. On the other hand, different representatives of postmodernism prioritize various characteristics of this society. What is that new society like?

Social sciences provide the knowledge that in the infancy of mankind, people lived in communities (that sometimes called 'Gemeinschaft'). This community was based on 'natural', tribal relations. Then, it has been substituted by society in its modern meaning, i.e. based on rational relations (defined as 'Gesellschaft'). This society is where a nation is formed, i.e. individuals that realize their interests and rationally regulate their relationships.

However, the transition from community to society can trigger the emergence of the masses, i.e., as said, individuals

that seek to blend into a community of their kind. In post-industrial society, it is not unexpected that individuals increasingly focus on satisfying their personal needs. Such society makes an impression of being a mass society, in the sense that all the people are involved in solving their personal problems in similar way. They are not a nation determined to pursue collective interests any more. However, it is not a mass society in its traditional meaning as individuals act separately. Baudrillard pays attention only to one feature of a new society – the unwillingness of individuals to be concerned about common problems. Along with this, he is right that the established society is strikingly different from the former, industrial one and requires deep research.

There is no doubt that there are many factors that cause this political indifference of the masses, with the delegitimization of modern democratic institutions being a major consideration. These institutions were meant to solve the problems of the development of the modernist society, so they do not correspond to a further development of the post-industrial one. This problem produces a fundamental issue of orientation and points to the further development of society. Besides, researchers are both concerned (Kutyryov 2016; Omelchenko 2017) and optimistic (Mattern & Floerkemeier 2016; Santucci 2016) about the opportunities of further scientific and technical progress influencing social and human relations.

Neither the concept of the end of history nor that of post-history contribute to the solution of the stated issue. Their main drawback is the excessive influence of determinism. This is a paradox, especially for post-modernism. Claiming the end to metanarratives (universal theories) (Chotchaeva & Sosnovskii 2017, 179), it implicitly proposes a new one. It can be said that it is the metanarratives of the past, not metanarratives in general, that have become obsolete.

5. Conclusions

The concepts of both the end of history and post-history manifest the contradictory nature of the political processes that unfold nowadays. Along with that, they are one-dimensional expression of various tendencies. The concept of the end of

history expresses such features of the contemporary political process as the end of ideological struggle, the priority of short-term factors over long-term ones, worldwide spread of liberal values and practices. The concept of post-history expresses such features of the contemporary political process as the crisis of democratic institutions and the decline in political participation. Both concepts mix the ideas of the termination of the historical process and that of the (real) historical process itself in the public consciousness.

The concepts of both the end of history and post-history have a reverse influence on the contemporary political process. The concept of the end of history, while substantiating the end of political and ideological struggles, drives away from the comprehension of the increasingly fundamental contradictions of modern society. The concept of post-history, while substantiating the end of the political, creates the wrong idea about the insoluble social and political contradictions.

The main fallacy of the concepts of the end of history and that of post-history is the interpretation of the feeling of the end of history and the deadlocked state of the historical progress formed in the public consciousness as the termination of historical development. Stressing this aspect of the situation, the theories unconsciously worsen it.

The way to overcome the current state of affairs is to avoid claiming the end of history and to work out a paradigm of linear historical development that is able to become a new political ideology that would adequately respond to the political crisis. That said, suggesting working out a linear paradigm, no single option of development should be claimed as the only possible way of considering the contemporary methodology (involving the synergy of diverse perspectives.

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The Theory of Contractual Monarchy in the Works of the Huguenot Monarchomachs

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Abstract

The French Wars of Religion (1562-1598) were often characterized in historiography as a revolutionary period, when some very advanced political theories were put forward by the parties in conflict. Some historians spoke of the existence of a form of popular sovereignty in many of the political writings produced during that time, where different constitutional mechanisms for restraining the powers of the monarchy were imagined. The first to propose such theories were the Huguenot theorists, especially those which would gain fame as the "Monarchomachs" (François Hotman, Theodore Beza, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay), a term coined by the royalist writer William Barclay at the beginning of the seventeenth century to describe the promoters of a political model of a limited monarchy where the ultimate sovereignty rested with the people. With Huguenots in active rebellion against the Crown, especially after 1572, when the defiance against the king (and not just against his "evil advisors" anymore) became openly acknowledged, the Monarchomachs strove to demonstrate that the people had a lawful right to actively resist (and even overthrow) a tyrannical monarch. The basis of their argument rested upon the concept of a political contract between the king and the people, which made the submission of the latter dependent on specific conditions set at the ascension of the king: if those conditions were violated, then the people were automatically released from their obligation of obedience.

Keywords: French monarchy, wars of religion, Monarchomachs, resistance, political contract

1. The Medieval Precedents of Political Contract

The medieval theory of government did not acknowledge an unrestricted power on the part of the king: despite being

God's anointed, despite the sacral aura which surrounded medieval kingship, reinforced through so many quasi-religious ceremonials, there were in place serious restrictions on the unlimited exercise of royal power compared to the absolutist monarchy of the seventeenth century. A fundamental factor which determined this situation was the fact that medieval kingship had a judicial character, first and foremost: the king was, before anything else, the fountain of all justice and the supreme judge. One of the most potent images of the French monarchy, for instance, was that of its most revered king, Louis IX (1226-1270), doing justice under the oak tree at Vincennes. On the other hand, during the Middle Ages, law meant custom and tradition, which the monarch could not easily change or create anew. In the words of the great historian of medieval political thought, Walter Ullmann, "feudal society was governed by the law of contract and once feudal kingship became operative, the unilateral royal creation of law became severely limited": by the eleventh century a system of feudal law had developed, through the transfer of feudal arrangements from the private to the public sphere, which was "in form, substance and structure customary law" (Ullmann 1975, 216). These feudal arrangements meant the existence of a contractual relationship between the king and his vassals, doubled by a similar relationship between the king and the urban communities of his realm, which was acknowledged on a case by case basis through the royal entry ceremonies, when the king received the homage and the gifts of his faithful cities and, in return, confirmed their privileges or granted them new ones. In the words of Neil Murphy, "urban elites embedded the confirmation of municipal liberties within the extramural greeting as a means to emphasize the contractual nature of monarchical rule" (Murphy 2016, 73). This legal bond made it possible to conceive the king as a member of the feudal community and made possible the operation of consent with regard to those measures which affected all parties involved (Ullmann 1968, 147-148) and, as a result, these arrangements would provide a pattern which the theories of resistance could be moulded upon, with the sixteenth-century resistance theorists eagerly seizing these precedents. One of the clearest

examples of such contractual relationships which involved the French Crown were the conditions upon which the former imperial province of Dauphiné passed under the rule of the French heir to the throne: every new Dauphin from the ruling house of France had to swear that he will preserve all the privileges and liberties of his province and all the nobles and the communities of Dauphiné were not bound to obey him or his officials until he swore to do so (Carlyle 1962, 67-68).

But the medieval idea of a contractual monarchy was not based exclusively on the feudal relationship, which was individual and relied on personal oaths. There had been theorists who brought up arguments from Roman law such as Manegold of Lautenbach, who argued for the existence of a contractual arrangement between the monarch and all his subjects: for many advocates of Roman law, imperial authority derived from *lex regia*, the original law by which the Roman people passed all its powers to the emperor, but, for Manegold, this was a revocable grant (Ullmann 1975, 249). The fourteenth-century civilians recognized that the prince might enter into contractual relationships with his subjects and he was bound by such contracts; they were also clear that the extra-legal powers of the prince did not entitle him to deal at his pleasure with private property (Carlyle 1962, 131). According to David Parker, many Romanists concluded that the grant of sovereignty embodied in the original *lex regia* ought to be interpreted in a constitutionalist sense, where power is delegated by the people, and the general renewal of interest in the law under the impact of Renaissance humanism had the effect of developing an understanding of feudal, customary and Germanic traditions with their emphasis on a contractual and limited exercise of authority (Parker 1996, 9). The emergence of the first proto-representative institutions during the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries was another expression of this contractual relationship between the monarch and his subjects, as they were often accompanied by statements of mutual obligations between the king and the people: as John Russell Major convincingly argued in many of his works, the medieval and Renaissance kings needed the consent of their subjects, especially on the matter of taxation, and they saw such

institutions, like the Estates, as a necessary instrument to make their subjects accept more easily their fiscal policies[1]. The gradual centralization of the French government during the Valois dynasty necessarily included such contractual arrangements, as the French kings needed "the support, or at least neutrality, of the chartered towns, ecclesiastical corporations, and the lesser nobles, and the price of this support was the willingness and ability of the kings to guarantee existing privileges more effectively than the feudatories they replaced", an obligation which was "often made explicit in contractual agreements between the king and the provincial estates" (Franklin 1973, 2-3).

The most significant evidence of the contractual nature of the medieval monarchy was the oath included in the coronation ceremonies: between the king and the people, but also between the king and God, through His Church. During the coronation of the kings of France, the new monarch was taking a solemn vow to drive heresy out of his kingdom and thus show himself worthy of the title of "Most Christian" which the Church bestowed upon him: and this aspect was going to play a fundamental part during the sixteenth century, when it became the cornerstone of the Catholic League's propaganda. Yet the obligations imposed by the coronation oaths, and not just in France, were not limited to protecting the Church, but also illustrated the limited nature of medieval kingship, something which was emphasized by the sixteenth-century jurists: legal minds such as Christopher St.Germain, in England, and Jacques Cujas, in France, insisted that princes were bound by their coronation oaths to obey the laws of the realm (Carlyle 1962, 258-259; 311-318) – a religiously-neutral argument which could not have gone unnoticed by the Protestant polemicists and was, therefore, enthusiastically exploited by them.

2. The First Huguenot Rebellions and the Emergence of the Concept of Contract in Huguenot Political Thought

The concept of a contractual monarchy gained significant ground during the French Wars of Religion, when

the factions which came into conflict with the Valois monarchy, first the Huguenots, then the Catholic League, used it in order to justify their arguments in favour of resistance against the king or even for tyrannicide. When the Reformation had started to take roots in France, one of the main charges which their opponents brought against the Protestants was that of sedition: an accusation which the latter had strenuously denied by constantly professing their loyalty towards the Crown. The accusation was not without basis, because the separation between state and religion which the Huguenots were trying to propose – where they could remain loyal subjects of the Crown while practicing a different religion than that of the monarch – was an idea fundamentally alien to the thinking of the Catholic majority. The traditional political thought, up to that period, had constantly associated religious heterodoxy with rebelliousness, due to the close relationship between the monarchy and the Church. The contract between king and God compelled the former not to allow any deviations from religious dogma in his kingdom – else he would violate his covenant with God and his coronation oath and bring down God's wrath upon himself and his realm. There were also more secular reasons to consider, as many sixteenth-century political theorists argued that there was no greater cause for conflict in a kingdom than religious differences – and to allow the existence of two religions would have destroyed the unity of the kingdom. After the persecutions which occurred during the second half of the reign of Francis I (1515-1547) and especially during Henry II (1547-1559), it became more and more clear than there was no certain way for a forceful eradication of Protestantism in France. In search of another solution, there was a short hope for a reconciliation during 1561, when Catherine de Medicis, who had assumed the regency in the name of her son Charles IX, supported by the chancellor Michel de l'Hôpital, extended an olive branch to the Huguenot leadership and convoked the Colloquium at Poissy, where a debate between Catholic clergy and Huguenot religious leaders, led by Theodore Beza, was supposed to find a way to bridge their differences. Yet, they proved impossible to overcome and, despite the attempt to find a *modus vivendi* through the Edict of Saint-Germain, which

granted the Huguenots a limited degree of religious freedom, the tensions exploded in the spring of 1562, when a full-scale Huguenot rebellion broke out, in answer to a massacre of a group of Protestants at Vassy, on 1 March 1562, by soldiers in the service of one of the major Catholic figures of that era, François de Guise. Over the next decade, there were three major outbreaks of war in France, in 1562-1563, 1567-1568 and 1568-1570, with changing results.

Despite the warfare between the Huguenots and the Crown during this period, the political thought of the Huguenots remained conservative, continually protesting their loyalty towards the king and rejecting the charges of sedition launched by their adversaries. During the first war, which took place in 1562-1563, the manifesto issued by the prince of Condé after the start of hostilities asserted the intention to free the king from his evil advisers and defend the laws of the kingdom – by which the Huguenots had in mind the Edict of Saint-Germain from January 1562, which was not observed, according to the Huguenots, contrary to the king's wishes. According to John Salmon, Huguenot political rhetoric during the first phase of the civil wars remained dependent upon constitutional precedent and reiterated the charges against the radical Catholics from the king's entourage, such as in 1568, when Jeanne d'Albret "issued a bitter indictment of the Guise as foreign usurpers after her arrival at La Rochelle" (Salmon 1979, 181). Still, despite the obvious unease of most Huguenots with a direct challenge to the existing status-quo, more radical voices were starting to be heard: a key reason was the fact that, after 1567, the Crown took a more active role in the fight against the Huguenots, unlike during the first civil war of 1562-1563, when the hostilities were directed mostly by the Catholic triumvirate consisting of François de Guise, the constable Anne de Montmorency and the marshal of Saint-André. But François de Guise and Saint-André had both been killed during the first war, while Montmorency became a casualty at the start of the second, so there were not that many prominent hardline Catholic leaders left around the king for the Huguenots to blame. Such circumstances made possible for some Huguenot polemicists to target the monarchy itself and one such tract,

which prefigured the resistance treatises from after 1572, was the anonymously published *Discours par dialogue sur l'édict de la révocation de la paix:* it argued for the Estates General having the right to consent to taxation and to modify the law, and – quite surprisingly, having in mind the hostility of the Parlements to the Huguenot cause – for the Parlement's right to act in place of the Estates General, when the latter was not in session, and disallow legislation contrary to precedent and fundamental law (Salmon 1979, 181). But the most significant issue expressed in this pamphlet was the idea of a reciprocal contract between the king and the people, where obedience was conditional upon good governance. Similar ideas could be found in another tract, written probably between October 1568 and March 1569, called *Question politique: s'il est licite aux subjects de capituler avec leur prince*, where the author describes an original contract between the people and the prince, at the election of the latter, which implied reciprocal obligations and conditional obedience on the part of the subjects and which left its traces in the coronation oath and the urban and provincial charters such a contractual nature of the monarchy also involved a divided sovereignty, which the king had to share with the Estates General, the Parlements and the Council of Peers (Jouanna 2009, 453-454). But all these restraints were going to be abandoned after 24 august 1572, when the Massacre of Saint-Bartholomew's night occurred. It is very likely that the decision taken by the king and his council on that fateful occasion involved only the elimination of the Huguenot leadership, but what the government of Charles IX failed to take into account was the religious fervour of the population of Paris, which had been constantly stoked by popular preachers over the previous decade. This fervour manifested itself through an intense hatred of the Huguenots, which burst when the king's order to kill the heads of the Huguenot faction was interpreted as the signal for a general massacre of the Protestants – a massacre which, during the next days, did not remain limited to the capital, but spread into the provinces. Many Catholics welcomed the massacre, as it seemed to mean that the policy of conciliation was abandoned and the monarchy was about to embark on a decisive anti-Protestant campaign.

Many (at the behest of the government itself, who was mindful of the negative impact which the massacre might have abroad, especially upon the Protestant powers, but also even among its own Catholic subjects less inclined towards radicalism and violent solutions to the religious problem) published works of propaganda in an attempt to justify the king's action (Yardeni 1971, 112-119). If, for these Catholic propagandists, the Huguenots deserved their chastisement because they were bad subjects always prone to sedition, for the Huguenots the event represented a major breach of faith on the part of the monarchy.

3. The Contractual Monarchy of the Monarchomach Triumvirs: Hotman, Beza and *Vindiciae*[2]

As often pointed out in historiography, it took the shock of Saint-Bartholomew's massacre to make the Huguenots abandon their previous deference towards the monarchy and make solid arguments in favour of resistance against kings turned tyrants and in favour of some versions of proto-constitutionalism, where the monarch shared part of his attributes with representative institutions like the Estates General. John Salmon suggests a much more radical trend in Huguenot political thought, namely, that "some Huguenot polemicists attacked the king as a tyrant, calling for his deposition and even for his death", because "doctrines of constitutionalism and limited monarchy no longer seemed adequate for the situation" (Salmon 1979, 188). But Salmon's assertion is questionable, because the concept of a limited monarchy where the king's authority was checked and even censored by other institutions became the cornerstone of the new Huguenot anti-royalist propaganda: it advocated resistance, yes, in face of abusive actions from the king and it even devised a constitutional mechanism for removing an unrepentant tyrant, when all other options had been exhausted, but it generally shied away from tyrannicide. There was no shift from "constitutionalism" to doctrines of deposition and tyrannicide, as John Salmon claims: instead, what we witness is the movement of the idea of limited monarchy from the periphery to the center of Huguenot political thought. On the

other hand, John Salmon is correct when he points out that theories were developed about the responsibility of the ruler to the ruled, which were "expressed in terms of a contract of government between king and people, and sometimes in terms of a contract with God, which, if voided by the monarch, might be enforced by the society", resistance being thus "not a matter for personal decision, but a duty to be performed corporatively when the lead was given by lesser magistrates, the natural leaders of society" (Salmon 1979, 188). According to Arlette Jouanna, the notion of contract expresses the abandonment of the ideal of trust and natural obedience, as such constitutional mechanism of control reveals the fear of possible royal abuses: in her words, we are looking at the old medieval defiance becoming thus institutionalized, with the paternal monarchy being replaced by the contractual monarchy (Jouanna 2007, 262). In order to provide a viable political mechanism which could actually function in practice, the monarchomachs developed "federal or aristocratic systems, where the *senior pars* (nobility, officials, urban elites) possessed extensive local powers and rights of consultation and control with respect to the sovereign" (Garrisson 1995, 293). The most significant Huguenot political writings in favour of resistance which were published during this period were those belonging to what modern historiography named "the Monarchomach triumvirs": François Hotman's *Francogallia*, Theodore Beza's *Right of Magistrates*, both appearing in 1573-1574, and *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*, published in 1579, whose likely author (who used the pseudonym Stephanus Junius Brutus) is thought to be the Huguenot political figure Philippe Duplessis-Mornay.

François Hotman's *Francogallia* is a work which makes extensive use of historical precedents (many of them fictional) in order to argue that France originally possessed a form of government which combined monarchic, aristocratic and democratic traits, whose roots could be traced back to the ancient Gauls. For Hotman, the original kings of "Francogallia", in the pre-Capetian era, were actually elected by the people and there was no automatic hereditary right to succeed the throne – and, equally, the people retained "the power and sovereign authority to depose them" (Hotman 1574, 59-71). Second,

Hotman argues for the existence of an Assembly of the Estates as early as the Merovingian and Carolingian eras, which gathered yearly "on the first day of May, where they would deliberate by the common council of the Estates on all the great affairs of the kingdom" (Hotman 1574, 99). Hotman invokes here an imaginary past, as the real Estates General had absolutely nothing in common with the version depicted by him, but these fictional Estates provide an institutional mechanism which could serve as a check on the king: the popular sovereignty which he advocated needed a place and a way to manifest itself and in ascribing this role to the Estates, Hotman was following a trend which was becoming quite popular during that period. Even though few besides the Monarchomachs (and, later, the League) had gone so far as to make the Estates a possessor of sovereignty superior to the king, there was a deeply-held belief during the late fifteenth century and the sixteenth century in the ability of this institution to provide a remedy for the problems of the realm, in concert with the king. But even though he grants such an important role to the people and the Estates, Hotman does not explicitly refer to a contractual relationship between the monarch and the people. Yet it can be concluded that Hotman's vision was not far from such an opinion. Julian Franklin establishes a direct connection between the Huguenot concept of popular sovereignty and the idea of contract, since the monarchy was "qualified by an historical contract between the people and the king, the terms of which could change by mutual agreement", which thus explained the evolution of the monarchy as "the outcome of successive delegations, which were accomplished either by express consent or else by gradual changes in accepted custom" (Franklin 1973, 103) and this makes him argue that Hotman depicts the election of kings as "a contract between king and people that was repeated with every new incumbent" (Franklin 1973, 44-45). The terms Hotman uses in order to depict the relationship between the king and his people strongly point out towards the existence of mutual obligations, which can void the respective relationship if one party is found in breach and where the king is the inferior partner: he is to his kingdom "as a father to his family, a guardian to his ward, a custodian to his

charge, a pilot to his ship or a captain to his army"; and therefore, "a people is not created for the sake of the king, but the king is established for the sake of the people, because a people can exist without a king, like those which are governed by more noble men or govern themselves, but we cannot find, or even imagine, a king who could exist without a people" (Hotman 1574, 157).

If the concept of a contract between king and people is only implied in *Francogallia*, this idea is openly proclaimed in Theodore Beza's *Right of Magistrates.* Like Hotman, Beza takes many examples from history, in order to construct his argument, but he does not show a special preference for the history of France; and, unlike his colleague, he also deploys a vast array of biblical references and principles of natural law. Beza's argument is that the people possesses a right of resistance which derives from the inherent superiority of the former over their monarch, as the people was not created for its rulers, but the rulers for their people, which is proven by the fact that even the first Jewish kings of the Old Testament, who had been selected by God, had to be elected and receive the consent of the tribes of Israel (Béze 1970, 9). In Beza's opinion, it was impossible that the people had submitted to the king without any conditions and, therefore, renounced all its liberty, because such an act would have been contrary to all law and equity (Béze 1970, 24). Such a contract based upon the consent of both parties, according again to "equity and natural law", can be dissolved if a flagrant violation of the obligations originally agreed had occurred – from which it results that those who have the power to create a king, also have the power to depose him (Béze 1970, 44). That was even more so because the creation of a polity did not involve only a contract between king and people, but also a covenant with God: relying on the Biblical example of the foundation of the kingdom of Israel, Beza points out that both the king and the people took first "a solemn oath by which they submitted to God and promised to observe His Law, both ecclesiastical and political", which preceded the oath between the king and people (Béze 1970, 30).

The next issue Beza addresses is against whom can this right of resistance be exercised. Beza identifies two types of

"tyrants": those who have acquired their power illegitimately and those who abuse an authority which they would otherwise hold legitimately. While the former case does not raise any dilemma, as there was a common consensus, which Beza shared in, that they could be resisted and even killed by any member of the polity subjected to their tyranny, the latter case is more problematic, because opposing a legitimate authority, even if it became tyrannical, came into conflict with the traditional duty of obedience the Huguenots themselves had professed and with the widespread revulsion against sedition. A legitimate authority involved the consent of the people and even an initial usurper could have become, according to Beza, a legitimate ruler if such consent was obtained later: but such consent is always conditional and Beza invokes in support the principle of natural law that no people, knowingly and without constraint, could submit to someone to be destroyed and pillaged, therefore the original consent could be rescinded if it came into obvious conflict with equity and honesty (Béze 1970, 14). Beza is quite clear that a lot of criteria had to be met in order for this to happen and a private individual would have no right to initiate resistance by himself. There are two reasons for this restriction: first, because it would have created the risk of anarchy and "a thousand tyrants would emerge for the sake of supressing one" (Béze 1970, 17) and second, due to the contractual nature of the relationship between king and people. Since the latter entered into a contract with the king by public agreement, as a corporation, it stands to reason that no individual can legitimately void the respective pact, especially when taking into consideration that even private contracts often had to be kept even when they prove damaging. But, if the contract denies the possibility of resistance to private subjects, it also opens the door to legitimate resistance for the "lesser magistrates", who, unlike simple subjects, can act in the name of the corporative people, within the limits of their office. Beza categorically points out that "the sovereign himself, before being granted his sovereign administration, swears fealty to the sovereignty under the conditions attached to his oath" and "he administers the oath to the said officers", therefore there is a mutual obligation between a king and the officers of a kingdom

which allows one to act against the other when the obligation is broken (Béze 1970, 19-20). The contractual relationship between the king and his people makes such actions of the officers not to be regarded as seditious, thus avoiding this common accusation coming from the radical Catholics, because it creates a legal framework where rebellion against a tyrannical king becomes lawful. In this context, the resisting magistrates would be "loyal and keeping their oath to those from which they received their authority, against the one who had broken his oath and oppressed the kingdom which he should have protected" (Béze 1970, 21). On the other hand, the power to resist which the magistrates possessed was subjected to certain limits specific to their office: in particular, they did not have the power to overthrow a tyrant. Since the people-corporation entered into this compact with the king, only an institution which could claim to represent the whole people, in this case the Estates General, could remove a king who broke the compact. The task of the magistrates was to protect the realm against any damage until the Estates could be convened and could find a remedy to the problem.

Beza argues for the existence of an Assembly of the Estates in the Merovingian and Carolingian period, which exercised the right of electing and removing kings, while taking an active part in the governance of the realm. Naturally, the sixteenth-century Estates General no longer wielded such extensive powers, but for Beza, regardless of how long they had fallen into disuse, such rights could never be legally voided, as the right of prescription did not apply in such matters (Béze 1970, 41-42). Even if the Estates no longer acted as such a powerful check on royal power, the fact that the kings were required to swear an oath at their anointment, to confirm the privileges of the towns and of the officers of the kingdom and that the Estates were tasked (in Beza's opinion) with deciding who would administer the realm during the king's minority, represented for Beza evident proof of their ancient authority (Béze 1970, 42). The legislative power of the Estates means that the original contract between the king and the people was not unalterable and violation of the agreement was not limited to breaking the initial conditions upon which a king had assumed

the throne: in fact, the king was supposed to respect subsequent laws as well, not only because the author of laws must observe them to the same degree as anyone else, as Beza does not hesitate to point out, but also because the Estates possess a legislative sovereignty superior to that of the king. More so, new agreements between the king and the people can be concluded, which are equally binding. In this, Beza touches an issue which was extremely sensitive for the Huguenots and his language takes a more sectarian tone, as his argument is an obvious allusion to the several edicts of pacification which preceded the massacre of Saint-Bartholomew and which, according to the Huguenots, were never respected. Without referring explicitly to the French civil wars, Beza justifies the Huguenot rebellion, by arguing that, if there were edicts promulgated by a lawful authority which permitted the exercise of the "true religion", they could not be arbitrarily repealed by the monarch and if he does so, he becomes guilty of tyranny and could be lawfully opposed in the manner previously described (Béze 1970, 66-67).

The same concept of contract appears in *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*, but the main difference from Beza is that the author develops in much greater depth the notion of a double contract, which had been only briefly mentioned in *Right of Magistrates*. Just like Beza (and common political wisdom of that time), *Vindiciae* differentiates between tyrant "without a title", who does not possess a legitimate authority, and tyrant "by practice", who does – but the former does not have any relevance for the concept of the contract, because, governing by force only and without the consent of the people, he could not be involved in any such contractual relationship. In *Vindiciae*'s scheme, the state is the result of two contracts, actually, which Paul-Alexis Mellet refers to as a "double alliance", because it was a covenant not only between the king and the people, but also between king, people and God, binding the obligations of the first two to a superior authority (Mellet 2006, 182-183). Nancy Roelker speaks of the transformation of the concept of "covenant" into that of "contract", which was represented in France at the time only by Huguenots, easily recognized in the formulations of Beza and the *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*

(Roelker 1996, 111-112). This assertion is erroneous, though, because, instead of such a metamorphosis, what one can see in the Huguenot literature of resistance is the cohabitation of the two concepts: this phenomenon is especially obvious in *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*, where the covenant between God, on one side, and the king with his subjects, on the other, is complemented by the "contract" between the king and the people. The author uses at first medieval legal tradition in order to construct his argument: God is "dominus" and "proprietarius" of heaven and earth and those who inhabit the earth are his "tenants" and "copyholders"; "those who have jurisdiction on earth and preside over others for any reason, are beneficiaries and vassals [*beneficiarii* and *clientes*] of God and are bound to receive and acknowledge investiture from Him" (Brutus 2003, 16-17). The feudal relationship is contractual and involves the loss of fief in case the vassal does not fulfil his obligations and the same principle applies to the relationship between kings and God, which is indicated as much in the covenant (Brutus 2003, 20-21). Even though this covenant originated in the Jewish kingship of the Old Testament, the transition from the Jewish royalty to the Christian one did not alter the manner in which kings were created or the conditions their ascension depended upon and, therefore, the consequences for transgressing against God's command remained the same (Brutus 2003, 25-26). The role of the people in this covenant is to guarantee that the king fulfils his duty to God faithfully: *Vindiciae* describes its task by referring to the Roman legal mechanism of debt, God acting "as creditors are accustomed to do with unreliable debtors, by making many liable for the same sum, so that two or more promissory parties are constituted for the same thing, from each one of whom the sum can be sought as if from the principal debtor" (Brutus 2003, 38-40). By making the king and the people responsible for each other's behaviour, *Vindiciae* introduces thus the possibility for the people to act as God's enforcer against a disloyal king and develops a divinely-sanctioned right of resistance. Yet, just like Beza before him, the author of *Vindiciae* makes it perfectly clear that this right of resistance does not extend to private individuals and for the exact same reason, that the people entered into its compact

with God and the kings as a corporation and, therefore, only the corporation was entitled to react and correct a breach of the contract by the king. The only ones who possess the right to enforce the contract are the magistrates of a kingdom, a point which is repeated extensively through the text, and, if they did not do so, then they became culpable themselves. The relationship of the magistrates with the people is comparable to that of a tutor and his ward: the former had both the legal capacity and the duty to protect the interests of its ward (in this case, the people), because the latter cannot act itself (Brutus 2003, 49-50). But, if *Vindiciae*'s advocacy in favour of the lesser magistrates serving as a bulwark against tyranny was inspired by the support the Huguenots were expecting and receiving from the princes of the blood belonging to their cause, there is one further aspect of the right of resistance which *Vindiciae* emphasized and which reflected the realities of the Huguenot opposition to the Crown: that right was granted not just to the magistrates representing the entire realm, but also to those which acted only in the name of some specific parts of the kingdom. An important element driving the Huguenot resistance had been the municipal governments. According to *Vindiciae*'s argument, they were permitted to lawfully do that (within the limits of their jurisdiction) because they were independent parts of the contract: "the king swore to observe the law of God, and that he vowed, in so far as he was able, to preserve the church. In just this way the whole of Israel, like a single person, promised the same at God's stipulation. We now say that individual cities, and the magistrates of individual cities which form part of the kingdom, individually promised the same in explicit terms, in so far as it concerned their own interests. It follows that all Christian cities and societies have done so tacitly" (Brutus 2003, 52). This argument was possible because sixteenth-century political thought (and the medieval, before that) was not beholden to the principle of majority: on the contrary, what theorists termed the "senior pars" could often prevail against the will of the majority and so did the existence of a privilege which a specific part of the kingdom could avail itself of.

In addition to the covenant between God, king and people, there is a second contract, this time only between the last two: this is necessary because, in the establishing of kings by God, the people plays the role of intermediary, as the role of the king is not only to preserve God's law (albeit this always comes first), but also to defend the interests of his people. In this, *Vindiciae* brings an addition to the well-known Pauline maxim that all authority comes from God, by pointing out that authority comes from the people as well, through the mechanism of election. In the opinion of the author, there were multiple precedents, both biblical and Roman, which confirmed this trait of the ancient monarchies, and the purpose of the election was mainly to serve as a "reminder that such a great dignity was conferred by the people, so keeping kings mindful of their office" (Brutus 2003, 68-71). While hereditary succession became the norm in most Christian polities during the Middle Ages, *Vindiciae* argues that this was more a *de facto* situation and the elective character of the monarchy had never been completely abandoned. The principle which *Vindiciae* employs in order to justify what would otherwise seem a strange idea in a world where lineage determined succession, is one which had been previously known and used by French jurists in order to justify the inalterability of the so-called French fundamental laws: according to this principle, kingship was a dignity and not an inheritance, therefore the king, even for the more absolutist political writers of the sixteenth-century, could not dispose of his kingdom as he saw fit. *Vindiciae* extends this principle to all "well-constituted kingdoms" and argues that "children do not succeed to the dead before they are constituted as if anew by the people. Nor are they born to their fathers as heirs, but they are only considered at last to be kings when they receive investiture of the kingdom, as if through the sceptre and diadem, from those who represent the people's majesty" (Brutus 2003, 71). In order for the son of a king to assume the throne, even if a tradition of hereditary succession existed, the confirmation by the Estates was required – and the same Estates could have chosen a different candidate from the same family or even a different dynasty if necessary, because the

original selection had not been unconditional, but the result of the above-mentioned contract.

The consequence of these two contracts is that the officials of a kingdom depend upon the people first and foremost, "give fealty first to the kingdom - that is, to the whole people - and then to the king as its protector [*curator*], as is manifest from the very formula of the oath" (Brutus 2003, 83). Just like Beza, the author of *Vindiciae* is perfectly aware that this system of government, which he claims to have existed in the past, became "corrupted" over time and many of the original checks upon royal power had fallen into disuse. But, in a manner similar to Beza's, the anonymous author is adamant that prescription could not have deprived the people of its original rights: this was because those rights rested on two contracts, with God being part of one, but also because the people was a sempiternal corporation and the contract was renewed upon each succession.

The double contract described by *Vindiciae* illustrates the main responsibilities of the king as they were perceived during the sixteenth century: to protect the faith and provide his subjects with justice. The first covenant, between God, king and people, imposes piety as the main obligation of the parties, which are both equally compelled to observe it; but, in the second, the king becomes directly bound to the people, as the contract was modelled upon the civil law, where "the people stipulated and the king promised; for the parts of stipulator are considered to be stronger in law" (Brutus 2003, 130). Therefore, the king's obligation is absolute, while the people's was only conditional and the latter could be released from their oath of obedience in the circumstance that the king became a tyrant. But, if Hotman and Beza were quite explicit that only an Assembly of the Estates, which was the foremost manifestation of the popular sovereignty they were advocating, could actually depose a king, *Vindiciae* grants this right to the magistrates of a kingdom as well: in fact, the Estates play a much less prominent role in *Vindiciae*'s constitutional scheme, while the importance of the Parlement was emphasized more, likely because the Estates General of France were proving to be a body hostile to the Huguenots' interests and goals. Julian

Franklin argues that the intent of the author was "not to diminish the rights of the Estates but simply to show that they may, if need be, be represented by the magistrates" (Franklin 1969, 41). Still, it was an extremely bold move by the author of *Vindiciae*, which made Ralph Giesey consider that, by expanding so much the magistrates' power, through the analogy with the individual cotutor's responsibility as set in Roman law, the book might suggest "the possible rightfulness of singlehanded regicide" (Giesey 1970, 51-52). There is just one example in the text where the author seems to give his consent to such an action, when he cites approvingly the fate of Manlius Capitolinus – who came into conflict with the Roman Senate, was accused of aspiring to kingship and executed – and claims it would be lawful to pass the same sentence on a tyrant (Brutus 2003, 156): but since Manlius was a *former* Roman magistrate, no longer in office at the time of his sentencing, he would classify as a "tyrant without title", in whose case there was little doubt that could be resisted or killed by anyone, even private persons. Whether such sentencing would apply to "tyrants by practice", namely, legitimate kings who abuse their power, is unclear, because, overall, the remedy which *Vindiciae* usually envisions against an unrepentant tyrant was removal from office, with the magistrates using "whatever is permitted against a tyrant either by right or just force" (Brutus 2003, 155).

The author of *Vindiciae* points out many examples from the history of France which, in his opinion, prove the previous existence of a contract between the French monarchy and the people. For him, the contract does not represent only a memory from a distant past. Even though its presence has become less obvious over time, *Vindiciae* argues that the contract is still embedded within the fabric of French political practice and it persists within certain traditions and customs: chief amongst them is the coronation, which the anonymous author refers to as the moment when the obligations stipulated in the original contract are reasserted by the new king and the people's consent is explicitly reaffirmed (Brutus 2003, 134-135). By defining the relationship between king and people in such terms, the coronation gives a legal sanction to the right of resistance and *Vindiciae* emphasizes the role of

the magistrates as supervisors of the king and guarantors of the agreement, by claiming that "nor yet do the peers swear to him until he has pledged faith to them that he will guard the laws strictly" (Brutus 2003, 135). The participation of the magistrates in the swearing of the oath taking place at the coronation binds them to act against a king who violates his pledge, because otherwise they would themselves become perjurers: "just as the king promises to care for the welfare of the commonwealth, so do they. So if he breaks faith, they will not consider themselves absolved from their oath as a consequence, any more than bishops are if the pontiff is protecting heresy or destroying the church. Indeed, the more of a perjurer [*foedifragus*] he is, the more will they consider themselves obligated to fulfil their oath" (Brutus 2003, 160). And *Vindiciae* does not limit itself to referencing only the coronation, but digs even deeper into French political practice in order to bring out further evidence of the contractual character of the monarchy. First, the author argues that taxation always required consent (Brutus 2003, 118) and in this he merely gives voice to a long-established tradition, which maintained that kings could not dispose at will of their subjects' goods. Second, the existence of privileged towns and provinces, whose rights the king was compelled to confirm, represents another proof of this, because such agreements "would all be in vain, unless they were considered to hold the place of a condition in contract" (Brutus 2003, 135). Third, the author brings up the so-called fundamental laws of France: if the first of them, the Salic law, which established the principle of agnatic succession to the throne, does not concern him because it deals only with the manner of succession and not with the powers of the king after assuming the throne, the other, the inalienability of the royal domain, provides him with an extremely valuable support for his initial argument that kings were mere administrators of their kingdoms and did not enjoy unlimited rights to them: "But to make it even clearer that the kingdom is to be given precedence over the king, and that he who received majesty from the people could not impair it on his private authority, he can banish no one from his realm, nor can he cede from the right of highest

command [*summi imperius*] over any part of the kingdom" (Brutus 2003, 123).

Vindiciae contra tyrannos was by far the most elaborate expression of the Huguenot theory of resistance and contractual monarchy. But, at the same time, it was also its swansong. The fundamental weakness of the Huguenots' attacks against absolute monarchy was the fact that they were not a choice: the Huguenots had originally been extremely attached to the French monarchy and they were pushed towards more radical positions only when a *modus vivendi* with the Crown seemed to have become impossible. If the circumstances which emerged after 1572 changed, so could the opinions of the Huguenots on the matter of resistance – and this is what happened. But the impact of the proto-constitutionalist literature produced by the Huguenots during the 1570s was powerful: it arose strong reactions among the partisans of an absolute monarchy, who answered with their own rebuttals, among which the most celebrated is Bodin's *Les Six Livres de la République*. Despite these attacks, the idea of resistance against a tyrannical monarchy was not going to fade away yet.

4. The Legacy of the Huguenot Contractual Model of the Monarchy

If the Huguenot political theorists largely abandoned their notions about resistance and contractual monarchy during the 1580s, because the leader of their faction, Henry of Navarre, found himself in the position of heir apparent to the throne in 1584, after the death of Henry III's brother, these theories were appropriated (and radicalized further) by their Catholic opponents. During the first phases of the religious wars, between 1562 and 1576, the radical Catholics tried to portray themselves as ardent supporters of the monarchy seeking to supress the "seditious" Huguenots – and the revolutionary rhetoric which the Huguenots indulged in especially after 1572 seemed to provide them with vindication. But, while it is true, as Mack Holt asserts, that such claims that kings contracted their authority from the people struck at the heart of the sacral foundations of the French monarchy, the notion that the respective rhetoric "went a long way alienating

many Catholic nobles further from any lasting peace" (Holt 2005, 76) is much more questionable. The greatest opponents of the theories of resistance and contractual monarchy came from the legal class, the so-called *robins*, while many Catholic nobles were comfortable with many aspects of the limited monarchy of the sort proposed by the Monarchomachs. The noble revolt of the "Malcontents" from 1574, which shared many of the Monarchomachs' ideas, such as distinction between king and Crown, sovereignty of the law, political dignity of the subjects, the role of the Estates General and the duty of revolt (but not the idea of a contractual monarchy) (Jouanna 1989, 351) and the revolt of the League, which pushed forward theories even more radical than the Monarchomachs ever dared to propose, without losing the support of their Catholic noble adepts, shows that to be the case. In fact, the political ideology of the radical Catholics, either noble or commoners, was consistent only with respect to their deep hostility towards Protestantism and their insistence that the king of France had to be a Catholic. On the question of the status of the monarchy and the right of resistance, on the other hand, the Catholic radicals vacillated much more and, even during the 1560s, there were some opinions similar to those which were declared seditious when coming from the Huguenots: as early as 1561, discontented with the policy of toleration apparently initiated by the government of Catherine de Medicis, one Parisian preacher defended the proposition that the pope could excommunicate kings who favoured heretics and free their subjects from their obligation to obey them (Holt 2002, 152). The next years will see popular preachers, especially Simon Vigor and René Benoist, getting closer, in their sermons, to Monarchomach discourse: while steering clear from advocating resistance against the monarch itself and chastising instead only his advisers, such preachers started delivering more and more dire warnings about the consequences which might befall a king who failed in his duty of eradicating heresy[3]. In the context of the religious division, violence against heretics became a sign by which the subjects could recognize the king's justice: just like the Monarchomachs were to invoke the covenant with God in their writings, the radical Catholics were not slow to point out that

"God forbade his enemies to live amongst His people" and that, in exterminating the Huguenots, the king fulfilled the sacred mission for which he was elected by God (Crouzet 2008, 339). When the League moved towards open rebellion during the 1580s, the duty of submission to God engendered a right of resistance.

The idea of an ancient constitution guaranteeing the liberties of the French, which was corrupted over time, was not something created by François Hotman, but had deeper roots in French political thought and was shared by many Catholic nobles, as it showed during the Estates General of Blois from 1576-1577, when Claude de Bauffremont, addressing the king on behalf of the nobility, said "the French nobility only request of you what they asked of Charlemagne…that is that you let us live and grow old in the ancient laws, customs and ordinances of France" (Parker 1996, 162). But the most radical political theories proposed by the exponents of the Catholic League were put forward during the rebellion of the latter against Henry III and, after his death, against Henry IV, which broke out in response to the assassination of the League's main leaders, Henri de Guise and his brother, cardinal Louis de Guise, on 23 and 24 December 1588, during the second Estates General from Blois. This event triggered a deluge of attacks against Henry III, as the League abandoned any facade of respect and submission to the king, which, previously, it had tried to preserve to a certain extent. One of the most vocal characters in this rhetorical war waged by the League was the preacher Jean Boucher, who published in August 1589 a treatise called *De justa Henrici Tertii abdicatione*, a bitter attack on Henry III, where not only he reiterated some of the previous arguments of the Monarchomachs, such as the sovereign power of the people which retained the right to depose a transgressing king, but goes even further, by advocating tyrannicide, even by private individuals[4].

Boucher justifies this right by invoking the concept of a contract between God and the people, by which the latter transferred sovereignty to the king, who becomes thus bound by this contract and the submission of the people is conditional upon the observance of its terms. According to Mack Holt, Boucher equated the people with the *respublica* and thus placed

it above the monarch (Holt 2005, 134): in this, Boucher was following the lead of the Monarchomachs, who were also arguing for the superiority of the people as a corporation. Boucher, though, went one step further when he claimed that any private individual could take up arms against the tyrant, even absent a formal excommunication by the pope, as he judged the Sorbonne's pronouncement from January 1589, which absolved the people of France from their oath of obedience towards the king, as having been sufficient.

The same argument is developed by another League theorist, Guglielmus Rossaeus, author of *De justa reipublicae Christianae in reges impios et haereticos authoritate* (1590) – whose target was now Henry IV, since his predecessor, Henry III, had been assassinated one year before – where "obedience to the king is made to depend on his observing the contract by which he was raised" (Knecht 2010, 76). The notion of contract involves a set of conditions upon which someone could ascend the throne and the League argued that the Catholicity of the king should be the first of those – trying to raise this condition to the status of first fundamental law of the kingdom, even superseding the Salic law. Since Henry IV was still a Huguenot at the time, he was automatically in breach of that condition, therefore, according to this logic, in attempting to assume the throne he became just an usurper and, thus, killing him was licit for any individual. John Salmon claims that Rossaeus "refers fleetingly to a pact between king and people", but it occupies no central role in this theory, and instead he "attaches great importance to the coronation ceremony, for it is only when the consent of the people is signified there that the king is invested with authority" (Salmon 2002, 149).

The political choices of the League, which were on the brink of making France subservient to Spain in order to prevent the ascension of Henry of Navarre, served to thoroughly discredit the theories of resistance and contract. Previously, Henry III and his royalist partisans had rejected the attempts to make the Estates General a legislative body, possessing of sovereignty independent of the king, which could censor or even depose him. During the 1590s, the balance started to tip decisively in favour of the absolute monarchy,

"free of any institutional control and moderated only by the king's will alone to submit to the law of God and certain fundamental laws" (Jouanna 2007, 303-304). But the ideas of resistance and contract, even though they were forced to take a step back, overshadowed by the new absolutism, still did not disappear completely from French political thought and re-emerged, albeit timidly and without gaining much influence, on some occasions during the seventeenth century. The last Huguenot rebellions at the end of the 1610s and during the 1620s were such an occasion, when Huguenot theorists like Lambert Daneau or Theodore Brachet de la Milletière resurrected some of the old Monarchomach tenets: Daneau tried to combine older ideas concerning the ancient political privileges of the Béarn province (the *fors*) with the notion of a mixed monarchy in which the prince's oath was a mutually binding contract with his subjects, while Brachet, not returning to the old Monarchomach idea about the rights of the lesser magistrates to resists a tyrannical prince, invoked the rights of "ancient and natural subjects" of kings as the basis of a "mutual obligation" between subjects and rulers (Bergin 2014, 173). These new versions of early modern constitutionalism retained the idea of contract, but they no longer dared to proclaim the final power of the people over the king, as the Monarchomachs did – and they were overwhelmed by the voices which were rejecting any sort of limited monarchy.

NOTES

[1] See Major, *Representative Institutions* and Major, *Representative Government*.

[2] Since the authorship of the treatise *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* is not definitely determined as belonging to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, even though most of the historiographical opinions incline in this direction, I will avoid referring to him as the author when analyzing the text: instead, I will use the terms "the author", "the anonymous author" or, simply, the title of the treatise, "*Vindiciae*".

[3] For a more detailed account of the activities of the radical Catholic preachers in Paris during the 1560s, see Diefendorf, *Beneath the Cross*.

[4] For a thorough analysis on Jean Boucher's book and the Leaguer radicalism, see Baumgartner, *Radical Reactionaries*.

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Ideological Diversity and Cognitive Difficulties

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Abstract

In the last decades we can observe a large number of ideological changes and hybridizations. In the same time, it has also been developed a new academic field reserved for researching the political ideologies. Nevertheless, a large number of the papers, dedicated to this study, announce the theme of the end of the ideologies. Even if, in the monistic meaning of the term, the ideology lost its legitimacy and postmodernism has abandoned the hard thinking, political ideologies still remain an evident presence. Political ideologies are characterized by continuous diversification and fragmentation produced by the late modernity. In this context, we cannot observe the end of ideologies, but rather a process of multiplying. This fact signifies the complication of the ideological sphere and difficulties in political orientation. In consequence, several roles of political ideologies cannot be performed anymore. According to these theoretical statements, a large number of political ideologies could negatively affect the system of beliefs and the mental short-cuts about social and political reality. A large number of political ideologies create superficial beliefs about social and political life.

Keywords: cognitive bias, ideology, left-right cleavage, political cognition, ideological diversity, political sophistication, end of ideology

1. Diversification or the End of Ideology?

After the crystallization of the modern ideological perspectives from the XIXth century, the sphere of political ideologies was very well defined. However, in the last decades, we can observe a continuous ideological diversification and hybridization. Today, the scientific works about political ideologies are characterised by a large and varied number of political *–isms*. Without any explicative schema, all these

ideological changes could determine difficulties in political orientation and errors in political understanding. Together with ideologies as liberalism, conservatism, communism, social-democracy, anarchism, nationalism, fascism we can notice the crystallization of christian-democracy, libertarianism, green ideology, populism, republicanism, imperialism, feminist movements, ideologies of Latin America, Africa, China, South and South-East Asia (Freeden, Sargent and Stears 2013). Other theoretical approaches (Hoffman and Graham 2006) are based on the distinction between classical ideologies - liberalism, conservatism, socialism, anarchism, nationalism, fascism - and new ideologies, where are integrated feminism, multiculturalism, ecologist movements and fundamentalism. With several exceptions (for example, the theme of fundamentalism which is analysed from two major directions: i. starting from the relationship between politics and religion and ii. from a point of view exclusively Islamist), we meet the same ten ideological perspectives in other theoretical or philosophical works (Geoghegan and Wilford 2104; Wetherly 2017a, Heywood 2017).

Several books are characterized by significant and important ideological challenges. On the one side, we can notice the extension of the new political categories as ideologies of liberation (in this context are integrated a large number of militant movements along with feminist approach) and on the other side, these works exclude political ideologies as multiculturalism, anarchism and nationalism (Ball, Dagger and O'Neill 2014). Anarchism and nationalism are analyzed as political forces rather than political ideologies. The lack of autonomous and stable ideological corpus facilitates the interference between anarchism and nationalism with other political ideologies (Ball, Dagger and O'Neill 2014, 13).

In other works, dedicated to the presentation and analysis of the political ideologies, either the multiculturalism is absent (Vincent 2010), or is replaced by the new ideological perspectives related to globalism and postmodernism (Adams 2001). We can identify broader perspectives which place ideologies in relation to broad criteria such as the pluralist, ethical-democratic horizon. Thus, the taxonomy of political ideologies leads to the emergence of new categories such as

pluralistic ideologies, border ideologies and monistic ideologies. The pluralist ones are represented by liberalism, feminism, christian-democracy, conservatism, ecology, libertarianism, globalism, multiculturalism; in the category of border ideologies we can integrate anarchism and populism; the last category of monistic ideologies is represented by communism, extreme right and fundamentalism (Miroiu 2012). Thus, if we intend to account the current political ideologies, our enumeration being selective in several cases, we could obtain the following list: anarchism, communism, conservatism, christian-democracy, fascism, feminism, fundamentalism, globalism, African ideologies, Latin America' ideologies, Asia and South Asia's ideologies, China's ideological perspective, Islam, green ideology or ecology, imperialism, liberalism, libertarianism, multiculturalism, nationalism, populism, postmodernism, republicanism, socialism, social-democracy and extreme right. If we include all systems of ideas sustained by important political movements we can obtain a larger series of political ideologies (Riff 1987, XI). Therefore, some academic dictionaries, which have as major topic political ideologies, expose over forty labels with ideological meaning (Riff 1987).

In the last decades, new challenges, the process of ideological hybridization and the diversity of political ideologies have generated a new academic field of research for political ideologies. At the beginning of 1990s, the study of political ideologies was viewed as a rather narrow chapter of political theory - as academic approach, this field of study was reduced to a general presentation of the classical ideologies (liberalism, conservatism, socialism) with openings to the new ideological perspectives (Freeden 2016, 1-2). Today, this kind of scientific approach is seen as an important element of political sciences and political process (Freeden 2016, 2). Separating from the abstract, universal and normative study of philosophy, the current analysis of political ideology has to be seen as a manner of understanding the core of political reflection and practice (Freeden 2006). This kind of analysis generates the premises for creating an important tool for understanding the importance and influence of particular thinking or different political vocabularies on political behaviour, action and decision

(Freeden 2016, 2). The rise in importance of the research dedicated to political ideology is confirmed by the emergence of several consistent journals like *Journal of Political Ideologies* (JPI). Seeking what is published in these journals, you can have a clue about what kind of ideologies hold the attention in this moment. Starting from the titles of articles published in JPI, Freeden observed, for the last two decades, several tendencies: i. a large number of titles is related to classical ideologies - in descending order the topics are: liberalism, conservatism and socialism; ii. the academic studies associated to populism begin in the early of 2000s, and then we assist to an accelerated growth. These studies are closer to the number of articles dedicated to anarchism. The articles about populism are beyond the articles about globalism or anti-globalism, Islamism and green ideology; iii. the last topic as number of titles is represented by feminism (Freeden 2016, 5).

Paradoxically, although we observe this kind of ideological vivacity and diversity, many of the current works dedicated to the study of political ideologies propose us the theme of the end of ideology (Moya 2014; Heywood 2017, 324-331; Wetherly 2017b; Brick 2013; Ball, Dagger and O'Neill 2014, 329-331). This topic is quite old, being manifested since the beginning of the last century (Brick 2013, 93). This theme is met in the public space after the Second World War. For obtaining the most effective resistance to the potential Soviet threat, in Western societies had appeared political appeals for overcoming and abandoning ideological discords (Brick 2013, 95). In the early of 1960s appeared the most known thesis of the end of ideology. In this context, Daniel Bell's famous book is published - *The End of Ideology*. The book presents aspects of the exhaustion of the redemptive political ideology, particularly of the Marxist revolutionary socialism, and the transformation of the strong concepts, as the social class, into some unusable notions, at least for the Western post-industrial societies (Bell 2000, xi). This type of society couldn't be described with the political thinking schema inherited from the pre-war world (Brick 2013, 104). "Historical materialism had been torn to shreds. But so were tens of millions of persons, as the regnant ideology sought to transform history and peoples [...] The

crossover has ended. That was the thesis of the end of ideology." (Bell 2000, xv-xvi) In the further decades, the thesis of the end of the ideology was resumed both by supporters and contestants (Brick 2013, 105-110). There are different episodes for announcing the end of ideology. We can remark two main episodes. The first is associated to the emergence of postmodernism based on cultural factors. The second episode, based on economic and political considerations, is represented by the collapse of communism.

The postmodern movement celebrates the weak thinking (Vattimo and Rovatti 2012), a thought which accepts its limits, which does not believe that it can discover certainties, ultimate and objective realities or metaphysical realms of absolute justice. The weak thinking abandons the support of the pre-eminence of the metaphysical thinking, theoretical thinking, on practice (Vatimo 2012, 50). It seeks exit from what Crespi (2012) entitled, the logic of absolutisation (256-257). This kind of thinking, part of the postmodern field, announces, naturally, a long series of the ends: the end of philosophy, of metaphysics, of epistemology, of the progress of the science or of the ideology. It's not a real extinction than a real diminution of their relevance or an abandonment of the illusions about what they can offer. Thus, this is not the death of ideologies, than is the end of their claim to be in the possession of the universal and eternal political axioms, or to be the only foundations which legitimate the political order.

Now takes place the death of hard ideology, in the meaning used by Hannah Arendt. Arendt (1962) shows that political ideologies are able to generate explanations about any event, starting from a single premise (468) and using dialectical logic beyond any experience (470). For Arendt (1962), all the political ideologies contain elements of totalitarianism (470). Thus, "in their claim to total explanation, ideologies have the tendency to explain not what is, but what becomes, what is born and pass away [...] Ideologies are always oriented towards history [...] The claim to total explanation promises to explain all historical happenings, the total explanation of the past, the total knowledge of the present, and the reliable prediction of the

future" (Arendt 1962, 470). Then, ideologies claim that they could eliminate the false reality and reveal us the veritable reality - "ideological thinking becomes emancipated from the reality that we perceive with our five senses, and insists on a 'truer' reality concealed behind all perceptible things, dominating them from this place of concealment and requiring a sixth sense that enables us to become aware of it" (Arendt 1958, 470-471). Political ideologies (Arendt 1962) are characterized by an unrealistic consistency with their axiomatic premises - "ideological thinking orders facts into an absolutely logical procedure which starts from an axiomatically accepted premise, deducing everything else from it; that is, it proceeds with a consistency that exists nowhere in the realm of reality" (471).

The critiques proposed by Hannah Arendt in the sphere of political ideologies open a significant series of debates in post-war political philosophy. The post-war political philosophy is characterised by a large number of theoretical rejections of the claims of political ideology for holding the objective truth. In this context are sought discursive channels for obtaining inter-subjective validity of political judgements (Schwartz 2018). However, this perspective doesn't mean the end of ideologies or their overcoming, but the abandonment of monistic and objective theses of the total ideology. Paradoxically, in fact, the end of ideology is intensified in postmodernism (based on both the collapse of strong thinking and the celebration of differences, diversity and variety). At the same time, this kind of process has as main effects the multiplying of political ideologies, internal diversification and ideological hybridization. In this context, we cannot observe the end of ideologies, but rather a process of multiplying.

The second significant episode for the theme of the end of the ideologies is evident when we refer to the collapse of the Communist bloc. It seems that the economic and political collapse of the communist order means the triumph of capitalism and liberalism. Thus, in the early of the 1990's is reiterated the Hegel's thesis of the end of the history, which includes the perspective of the end of the ideology. For exemplifying this episode we have to emphasize the importance

of Fukuyama's book – *The end of the history and the last man*. Here, we can identify, on the one side, a description of the struggle for recognition. The recognition, from several points of view, is the main feature for liberal democracies. The liberal democracy seems to have a decisive victory against other rivals ideologies. On the other side, the work of Francis Fukuyama (2006) presents an incursion into the world of the last man, of the dangers which characterize the dimension of both abnegation and supra-individual ideals. This kind of victory seems to be a Pyrrhic victory, because, as the same author shows in his later works, it is accompanied by the new social reality, profoundly altered by the new technologies, where the moral norms are characterized by an accelerated dissolution process (Fukuyama 1999). Moreover, the threats regarding human life and liberty are so powerful, that they could transform the future into a post-human one (Fukuyama 2017). But, in such a context, it doesn't seem to have any sense to theorize the end of the ideologies. At least, it is not a glorious sense, in which the progress of humanity through history ends triumphal, with the reaching of the luminous point sought for the centuries. Now we can stress the need of the reiteration of the social, moral and political guidelines. Political ideologies have to sustain and spread in the world all these social, political and moral principles.

Moreover, ideologies have been criticized from realistic positions. The history of modern political thought presents a large and significant list of authors which have tried to reveal us the real aspect of social and political reality and to heal ourselves from perturbing political ideologies (Mihailescu 2013, 52). These attempts fail every time. No one is able either to practice total objectivity and completely historical self-extraction or to impose a single axiological perspective to the political space. Thus, the thesis of the end of the ideologies doesn't refer to a post-ideological time or to a socio-political reality without ideologies. This thesis has several hypostases: i. a kind of desideratum revealed by the history as being unrealisable; ii. a description of the particular cultural, social, economic or political situation. This situation is characterised by the fact that a large number of ideologues have lost their incisiveness, have abandoned their

redemptive mission or have recognized the domination of any of them. Although we discuss about the loss of the legitimacy, in the meaning proposed by Arendt (1962), political ideologies remain an obvious presence. This situation is also very clear in the case of postmodern movement, which celebrates the weak thinking (Vattimo and Rovatti 2012), and where meta-narrations are regarded with suspicion (Lyotard 1984), and pragmatic and dialogical criteria are considered better situated for responding to the current social and political needs (Rorty 1995).

Moreover, the recent studies in political psychology and neurosciences demonstrate the presence of ideological schemas in political cognition and behaviour (Grecu 2016; Jost 2006). Therefore, ideologies cannot disappear, because "ideology is a 'natural' part of our psychological functioning and will always be present in one form or another" (Jost 2006, 667). But, political ideologies are characterized by a continuous diversification corresponding to the fragmentation process developed in the late modernity.

2. Diversity, incoherence and disorientation

This kind of diversification is seen as a complication of the sphere of ideological differentiations from modern European political process. This sphere is structured on the dichotomy between left and right. The left side is characterized by the ideologies of freedom, ideologies which sustain emancipation, ideologies of the progress, egalitarian ideologies, ideologies which sustain human rights, ideologies of the militant protest and liberation. The intellectual origins of all these ideologies are met in the Enlightenment's cultural and political project (Mihailescu 2015). The right side is characterized by the ideologies of preserving values, traditions, order, authority, nations, cultural particularities, community specific, history or hierarchy. All these ideologies derive from both the Counter-Enlightenment movement and post Enlightenment positions (Mihailescu 2015). These differentiations are corresponding to fundamental human attitudes and dispositions, oriented to preservation or equality, which coordinates the whole scaffold of thoughts, values and actions (Jost 2006, 667). Thus, "there is reason to

assume that human beings have required and will continue to require the characteristics that are associated with the political left as well as the political right" (Jost 2006, 667).

Therefore, the mixture, fragmentation and ideological diversification from the last decades generate new ideological forms which disturb the coherence of ideological sphere. There are ideologies like multiculturalism which sustain both the preservation of memory, historical peculiarities and tradition, and the egalitarian militancy, the recognition of the equal value of all the cultures (Murphy 2012, 84-95). The interest for the understanding of the role played by the communitarian and cultural framework, related to the formation and self-expression of the man, generates a new doctrine, such as communitarianism. This doctrine offers both right, traditional and conservative hypostases and left, universal and egalitarian perspectives (Brugger 2004; Miller 1999). Similarly, the libertarianism, the descendant of the classical liberalism theorized by Locke, opens its political approach to left, centre and right (Vallentyne and van der Vossen 2014). Starting from the need of liberation from the state, the anarchism promoted diametrically opposed post-state perspective (Graham 2013; McLaughlin 2007, 155-168). Fundamentalism could pass from the glorification of the religious perspective and its political instrumentalization to the fanatic celebration of the free market and equality (Vincent 2010, 261-291). Populism builds its recent and remarkable ascension on the ability to hybridize with almost all other ideologies - it keeps their initial message and adds the appendix of the purity of the simple people, which must be saved from the corrupt political system and elites by a group of honest political representatives (Müller 2016, 1-6; Mudde 2004). Based on either the movements for sustaining marginal and particular identities, or the liberation from the great narrations and illusions of the modern world, postmodern movement develops a counter/post/ Enlightenment perspective; at the same time, the postmodern movement recommends the modernization of modernity (Mihailescu 2017).

However, the classical ideologies didn't remain stationary in the old ideological sphere. For exemplifying we can stress the case of liberalism. Initially, liberalism was an

illuminist ideology, focused on the defence of the individual rights and freedoms through the constitutional order (Sartori, 1987, 379-383). Nevertheless, in this moment we can underline a significant variety of the perspectives about what political liberalism can or should represent. There are several derivates from classical liberalism with several significant differences: i. liberals, descendants from John Locke philosophy, interested in the generalisation of the individual natural rights; ii. positivist liberals, inspired from the epistemological optimism of Mill; iii. liberals, with origins in the philosophy of Kant, interested in deontological and procedural approach; iv. there are, also, liberals interested in keeping distance from the Enlightenment project, as liberals which sustain the moderate pluralism, politically pure liberals, which seek the reasonability theorized by Rawls and the consensus through overlapping; v. liberals which sustain the Berlin's opinion about radical pluralism; vi. liberals which stress the need of post-illuminist liberalism, which assumes the inevitability of the conflicts between different values conveyed in the contemporary societies, and whose management means a kind of *modus vivendi* based on negotiations in search of the peace; vii. liberals which are advocates of the deliberative democracy and public communication sphere (Gauss 2003, 1-5; 12-21). This classification could be completed by other political types of liberalism such as pragmatic liberalism proposed by Rorty, based on special type of irony (Rorty 1995). This type of ideology is a postmodern bourgeois liberalism that attempts to defend liberal practices and institutions by appealing to solidarity and empathy and not by theoretical foundations (Rorty 1983, 584-585).

In this complicated ideological framework, political orientation may be difficult. One of the major roles played by political ideology, in conditions of irremediable incertitude, is to be an informational short-cut, but this route, used by rational citizens for reducing the costs (Downs 1957, 98-100), seems to be in danger. When you are wandering around the world of various proposals and political actions, you try to identify guidelines for a better orientation. This fact could be easier

realized through political ideologies (Downs 1957, 99). If you cannot preserve the simplification produced by ideological labels, political ideologies are seen as complicated and costly tools. This is also available in the case of ideological incertitude. Thus, although there is a large number of ideologies and ideological hybrids, you don't know how to label, if your tag is a correctly one, or if you have coherence during the labelling process. The increasing of the ideological diversity could create difficulties for political parties, which, given their need of coherence with their past actions, tend towards a relative ideological immobility (Downs 1957, 110). However, when faced with the ideologically variety much beyond the level they were accustomed in normal social uncertainties, political parties could be disoriented and, in order to gain as many votes as possible, could accelerate the natural process of ideological changes and hybridization (Downs 1957, 100-102) beyond the limits of political rationality.

Also, the accelerated diversification and the increasing of the ideological hybridization could negatively influence the ability of making one of the key gestures that political life involves. This is reduced to the distinction between those with whom you have common visions or interests, and those with who you are in the position of rivalry or incompatibility. Schmitt (2007) shows, in one of his most important paper, that: "the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy. [...] The antithesis of friend and enemy corresponds to the relatively independent criteria of other antitheses: good and evil in the moral sphere, beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on. [...] The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation." (26) Under the conditions of reducing, complication or changing the ideological borders is possible to create dysfunctions in the classical model left–right and to create overlaps or convergences between different ideologies (Swedlow 2008). However, it is expected that in the case of ideological confusion the separation between friend and rivals cannot be done with sufficient clarity.

3. Cognitive bias and the diversity of political ideologies

This section intends to illustrate that ideological diversity could create both cognitive dissonances and alienated political behaviors. As mental representation of the social and political world, political ideology has to create the guidelines for political orientation. This is the main purpose of the political ideologies: to create premises and guidelines for political orientation (in classical manner: left/ right). Also, the ideological representation has to create an optimum field for political assessment and political action. Moreover, political ideology could be seen as a mental short-cut for understanding, explaining and acting in political world. In modern societies, political ideologies were the main vector of the political culture. In contrast, we can observe that the new ideological agenda is the "effect" of the social and political demands. This dual quality of the contemporary ideological process (cause for political culture; effect of the social demands) creates premises for defining political ideology in terms of ambiguity/ incertitude.

For arguing the impact of the political ideology at psychological level, we propose to define and analyze several perspectives regarding social and political cognition. Starting to these theoretical assumptions, the research will create the nexus between cognitive bias, lack of accuracy and the new sphere of ideological diversity. As psychological process, cognition is seen as a mental process regarding the manner of internally storing of information, recognizing objects, learning, using language, reasoning or navigating (Druckman and Lacey 1989, 7). We can underline that the main attribute of the cognitive process is related to memory (ability to store information). In this respect, human memory "is not a static container of corpuscles called items, neither is it a store in a technical sense. It is, on the contrary, a highly dynamic and active organ, the function of which serves the orientation and regulation of all behavior." (Klix 1980, 11) The human behavior could be analyzed in a dualistic manner: cognition (as expression of rationality) and emotion (as expression of sensitivity). "We mean that whenever a behavior is occurring, the central nervous system (CNS) is processing cognitive-data

content, either consciously or unconsciously, and the feeling sensitivity associated with the cognitive content, also either consciously or unconsciously. Both the cognitive component and the feeling-sensitivity component form part of the experienced-memorized knowledge we call beliefs" (Perez-Alvarez and Timoneda-Gallart 2007, 5). From the neurobiological point of view, cognition is seen as both psychologically and physiologically, based on functional neural networks. Moreover, the neural network is the key-concept for explaining different social political or biological behaviors. In the field of neurosciences, researchers create the equivalence between cognition and mind – "as a set of functions for processing information" (Brook and Mandik 2005, 3). Also, the main attribute of cognitive process consists in learning and thinking (Fuster 2005, 88-89).

The nexus between political sphere and political cognition is realized by political ideology. Although the concept political ideology is used in different political and social context we have to stress that "but it is notoriously vague" (Van Dijk 2006a, 728). Moreover, political ideology has to be seen as a complex channel for transferring political knowledge through political discourse. In this context, political ideology is a specific form of social representation shared by a social group. If we define political ideology in terms of social representation we have to stress the fact that political cognition is a "special kind of social belief systems, stored in long-term memory. Socially as well as cognitively these ideological belief systems are socially shared by the members of specific social groups, or ideological communities." (Van Dijk 2006a, 729) As social beliefs, "ideologies often appear in polarized thought, opinions, action or discourse. This suggests that somewhere in the representation of ideology, we probably find basic categories that represent this opposition between Us and Them." (Van Dijk 2001, 14)

Although the contemporary researchers in the field of neurobiology consider political ideology a kind of „list" of social and political ideas, we emphasize the idea that this type of social representation has a proper structure. In this context political ideology could control the dynamics of social and political knowledge inside the group. Moreover, political

ideology should shape the social principles, political convictions, attitudes and beliefs. This fact is concretized in political discourse and social practice. In accord with social representations, political ideologies are located in social or semantic memory. Thus, is very important to describe the role played by mental models for understanding political reality through political discourse and ideology. In this sphere mental models couldn't address and define social or political facts than could represent facts as people define them. Starting from these assumptions, mental models express the subjective opinions or personal manners for understanding political reality. Beyond mental models, Van Dijk underlines the role played by context models in spreading political ideologies. "People not only form mental models of the events they talk *about*, but also of the events they *participate* in, including the communicative event of which their ongoing discourse is an inherent part. [...] These subjective, mental representations of the communicative event and the current social situation as it constrains current discourse, will be called context models, or simply contexts" (Van Dijk 2001, 17-18). Political discourse creates premises for political cognition. This relation between political discourse, political ideology and political cognition depends on the context models. In the cognitive approach, context models refer to personal or individual political knowledge and beliefs.

Another important feature of the context models, related to political ideology, is represented by the fact that this context is seen as an interface between social structure and political discourse (Van Dijk 2006b, 163). Contexts refer to personal and subjective representation and couldn't be observable. Thus, "defined as mental constructs of relevant aspects of social situations –influence what people say and especially *how* they do so " (Van Dijk 2006b, 165). In this meaning, context models could be seen as the "pragmatic understanding" of the political discourse. Beyond this feature, context facilitates understanding and interaction and, also, controls the discursive understanding and production (Van Dijk 2006b, 170-173). Synthesizing, "there is a close relationship between discourse, ideology and politics, in the sense that politics is usually

discursive as well as ideological, and ideologies are largely reproduced by text and talk" production (Van Dijk 2006a, 739).

Another perspective related to political cognition consists in describing and explaining the role played by the biological architecture. This kind of structure facilitates human interaction, social relationships and orientation in the world. Practically, researchers have observed a high level of similarity among human cognition and primate cognition. In this meaning, Michael Tomasello argued that: "human cognition is a specific, in the literal meaning of the word, form of primate cognition. Human beings share the majority of their cognitive skills and knowledge with other primates - including both the sensory-motor world of objects in their spatial, temporal, categorical, and quantitative relations and the social world of behaving conspecifics in their vertical (dominance) and horizontal (affiliative) relationships" (Tomasello 1999, 201). Thus, an important aspect of the human cognition is represented by the orientation in the world, evaluation of the world, social behaviors and emotional responses. Related to the emotional dimension, scholars demonstrated that there is a strong association between cognitive skills and emotional mood. Although there are two different biological systems for emotion (amygdala) and for cognition (hippocampus and neocortex), in practice there is a strong correlation between emotional and cognitive sphere. "The (conscious) experience of emotion is the product of simultaneous projections of the affective and cognitive products into working memory." (Mandler 1999, 375)

Starting from this general view of the cognitive process, this section will underline the social dimension of cognition. In association with the social perspective, we intend to discuss a particular case of the cognitive process: *political cognition*. From this point of view, both affect and cognition are influenced by "people's social motives and intentions" (Forgas 2001, 19). Social cognition could be seen as a mechanism for selecting and processing social strategies and interpersonal behavior. Social cognition is reduced to people's knowledge about the social world. Also, we can insert in this sphere judgments about social situations and individual decision in different social contexts (Moskowitz 2005). Beyond this general approach, social

cognition depends on the cultural variables (Vallée-Tourangeau and Villejoubert 2013) or the linguistic/ communication factors (Chemero 2009).

One of the most important normative approaches in the field of the social cognition is represented by the "sharing reality" theory. For Gordon Moskowitz, a common social experience generates a particular form of social cognition, based on "shared reality". Moreover, "shared experience links specific interpersonal relationships to specific cognitions, thereby simultaneously binding social relationships and maintaining the individual's grasp of a dynamic world." (Moskowitz 2001, 8) This form of social cognition derives from the mutual understanding of reality. For example, people who are parents share the same social and cultural experience with other parents. This is a volunteer and motivated psychological activity to understand their personal and inter-subjective experience. The same case could be met for the political party membership. In this situation, the quality of membership derives from the common ideological perspective shared by individuals involved in political activity. In contrast to these situations, we can stress the same social and political experience for the citizens from authoritarian political regimes. In this case, citizens are exposed to the cult of leader's personality, non-democratic political symbols, political mythology and similar forms of professional activities. In this case, we can discuss about a model imposed by political authorities/leadership to create the same level of cognitive bias or cognitive retard/delay regarding political system. This theoretical model shows that relational connections between individuals are necessary for creating social relationships and for generating social cognitions (positive or negative) (Moskowitz 2001, 10).

From the constructivist point of view, all social objects are mentally and socially constructed. Objects from reality exist if only an external observer accords sense and significance to these objects. In this meaning, "so far social cognitive neuroscience has been mainly, if not exclusively, focused on interaction between minds and brains […] Being material and social at once, social objects may serve as a platform to

understand how interacting minds/brains" (Becchio and Bertone 2014, 131). Social conventions and social intentions generate significance to social objects. People intentions make things what they are. Deriving from these premises we sustain the thesis that social cognition operates with "socially constructed/constituted" objects (Millikan 2014, 27-41).

If social cognition operates with "socially constructed/ constituted" objects, political cognition operates with "politically constituted" objects. In this field could be inserted objects like: political parties, political institutions, political rules, human rights, state intervention in society/economy etc. Thus, all the objects which form the whole sphere of the political cognition are placed in several theoretical schema/representation embodied in political ideologies. Beyond classical division into left/right, friend/enemy, power/opposition (and other dualistic perspectives of the public life) political ideology tries to order political objects and to guide citizens in political life. This social and mental schema is useful for a simple and accurate understanding of the social and political rules. Despite the type of political regime, political ideology could be very well integrated in the sphere of social representation and political cognition.

Political cognition could be explained through the theory of "sharing reality". Citizens with common political experiences tend to develop the same cognitive shema. Lupia et.al demonstrated that the common experiences of understanding the role played by the political objects in the public space create a common mental disposition (Lupia, Mccubbins and Popkin 2000). Citizens will engage in different forms of cognition when political circumstances will generate specific emotional moods (Lilleker 2014, 215). In this case, we can observe several forms of political cognition both in elections and in the case of public plebiscites. This kind of cognition generates, in political practice, political beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. The size of cognitions, the structure of beliefs and the type of political behavior are integrated in the sphere of *political sophistication* (Luskin 1987, 857-860).

The contemporary ideological framework has a negative impact in political cognition. For several scholars, at the psychological level, we can observe elements of cognitive

inaccuracy. The end of classical ideological perspective creates a lack of logical consistency and internal coherence for ordinary citizens (Jost 2006). Another psychological impact of the ideological diversity consists in the lack of the cognitive mobilization. "A second and related claim is that most people are unmoved by ideological appeals and that abstract credos associated with liberalism and conservatism lack motivational potency and behavioral significance" (Jost 2006, 651). This fact is in opposition with natural psychological predisposition for liberalism and conservatism. Recent trends from neurosciences demonstrate that there are two different neurophysiologic processes associated with liberal and conservative attitude. Ideological appeals have to activate both neurophysiologic areas and social behaviors. Liberal attitudes are associated with anterior cingulated cortex ($p < 0.001$) and conservative attitudes are related to right amygdala ($p < 0.05$) (Kanai, Feilden, Firth and Rees 2011, 678). "Moreover, the amplitude of event-related potentials reflecting neural activity associated with conflict monitoring in the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) is greater for liberals compared to conservatives" (Amodio et al. 2007, 1246-1247). But, the end of classical ideological perspectives could generate psychological ambiguity and behavioral disorder. In the traditional manner, ideology reflects "an organization of opinions, attitudes, and values — a way of thinking about man and society" (Adorno et al. 1950). The new ideological hybrid, with elements of liberalism, socialism, conservatism, populism etc., generates inaccuracy and cognitive bias when we think about the role of man and society. We have to underline the fact that only traditional ideologies create different ways of expressing political attitudes and specific, but coherent, manner of understanding the role played by the citizens in social reality. Evidences from political reality reflect a strong statistical correlation between political preferences for American president and ideological perspective (Jost 2006, 658-660).

As comprehensive manner of understanding the social and political world, the new framework of political ideologies could create premises for cognitive bias and errors in attribution. Generally speaking, both personal disposition and environment influence the crystallization of the cognitive

errors. "Our exploration of the intuitive psychologist's shortcomings must start with his general tendency to overestimate the importance of personal or dispositional factors relative to environmental influences […] He too readily infers broad personal dispositions and expects consistency in behavior or outcomes across widely disparate situations and contexts. He jumps to hasty conclusions upon witnessing the behavior of his peers, overlooking the impact of relevant environmental forces and constraints." (Ross 1977, 184) A large number of political ideologies could represent an environment variable for citizens. It generates radical views on political process or overconfidence in different doctrinarian perspectives. If we see political ideologies as situational factors, we can stress the idea that any situational factor could determine, with a high level of likelihood, errors in attribution or correspondence bias (Gawronski 2004).

Beyond the cognitive psychological approach, we have to underline the fact that political cognition implies, naturally, a high level of emotion. In this respect, individuals have political emotions related to the classical ideological sphere: left/right. Conservative citizens are more predisposed to develop emotional attachment to traditional values, than while socialists are more predisposed for sustaining with enthusiasm social progress. Academic studies reflect the fact that this cognitive strategy is genetically transmitted. Starting to these assumptions we can observe that the large number of political ideologies could create confusion or ambiguity in elections, in political preferences or in political decisions. The normal cognitive process related to political sphere is characterized by "political sophistication". In this meaning, political sophistication refers to the existence of the clear cognitive schema. The role played by this cognitive schema is to intermediate political orientation and evaluation. Without the main guidelines of the classical ideologies citizens could have difficulties in political orientation. In the field of political schema we can integrate the political ideologies. In this meaning, "given the assumption that social representations such as knowledge and attitudes of groups are organized by a non-trivial structure, it is plausible also that ideologies are not merely a list of basic beliefs. The acquisition, the changes and

the uses of ideologies in social practices suggest that we should try to find schemata or other structural patterns that are typical for ideological systems." (Van Dijk 1998, 65) For social and political psychologists, ideologies have an important cognitive impact. However, the cognitive component of the political ideologies is based on several criteria as: i. ideologies are system of beliefs; ii. ideologies reduce the social complex phenomena; iii. ideologies are a special type of social shared mental representations; iv. ideologies have social foundations (Van Dijk 1998, 126).

According to these theoretical statements, a large number of political ideologies could negatively affect the system of beliefs and the mental short-cuts about social and political reality. First of all, a large number of political ideologies create superficial beliefs about social and political life. It's very difficult to have a strong, stable and accurate system of beliefs when you have a large list of doctrines, characterized by hybridization processes. Human brain (mind) functions normally when it has the ability of distinguishing between few options. When we have a large number of political options we assist to the mental process of overconfidence and inaccuracy. Thus, the postmodern world, based on the weak thinking, is the propitious framework for generating intellectual confusion or ambiguity. The large numbers of ideological approaches create premises for expanding social or political reality. We can remark the bias between the main features of the ideology (to reduce the complexity of social reality for a better understanding) and the postmodern perspective, based on the increasing number of the social and political approaches. However, it is very difficult to create a realistic representation about the political life when you have different, divergent and dissipated ideological perspectives.

Synthesizing, the cognitive component of the political ideologies is influenced due to the ideological mixture, fragmentation and hybridization. Recent trends from cognitive and neurocognitive social sciences reflect that behavioral patterns are strongly related to classical ideologies. There are two main cortical responses when an individual is exposed to political stimuli. In this case, we can stress the idea of the

correlation between brain architecture and ideological perspective. Although, in contemporary political thinking, where we meet a large number of ideological perspectives, is very difficult to modulate political process and political decision in accord to all these perspectives. Moreover, several new ideologies are unable to offer economic "therapy" or to manage deep social problems. Thus, we sustain the fact that ideological laxity, ideological fragmentation or the ideological cross-cutting process could create cognitive difficulties for the simple citizens.

4. Conclusion

This article sustains that the ideological diversification could interfere with individuals' psychological processes influencing their political attitudes and behaviors. However, in the last few decades, we are the witnesses of the crystallization of the large number of political ideologies. But, no one is able either to practice total objectivity or to impose a single axiological guideline for political life. Therefore, the current doctrinarian mixture disturbs the coherence of the political ideology sphere. We observe several new ideologies which sustain in various degrees elements of the classical liberalism, conservatism and socialism. This kind of ideological approach could have a negative impact on political cognition, creating disorientation and overconfidence. This could be a way for sustaining radical political perspectives. The large number of political ideologies creates superficial beliefs about social and political life. It's very difficult to have a strong, stable and accurate system of beliefs when you have a large list of fragmented political doctrines. The revival of the classical ideological approach could be a good "therapy" for reducing the political cognitive bias.

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Aurel Codoban – an Existential Stylist: From Desire to Love as Communication Instrument

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Abstract

Philosophical counseling proves to be today among the most complex intervention forms in the postmodern individual's daily life. Aurel Codoban, existential stylist, proposes a way to interpret and act in the existential field. He starts from the premise that philosophy must propose a way of life. He takes on a philosophical practice that builds an ontology of detail in which the fundamental element in the human condition definition is no longer rationality but desire. As existential stylist, the philosopher elicits in his analyses the benefits of philosophical counseling on the love-desire relationship in the context of transformations in individuals' lives along five dimensions as an existential datum of the human being: physical, social, personal, spiritual and religious. In this context, love as a cognition instrument denotes the way postmoderns use the resources of desire for personal development, alterity cultivation, and subject instituting as relational reality. Bringing together erotic desire and the desire for transcendence, love proves to be a transfiguring force in the postmodern world, even if some of the forms we used to associate to love are blurred or metamorphosed.

Keywords: Pre-theoretical, ontologizing, factual life, facticity, self-world, original science, categorial explication, hermeneutics of facticity

1. Philosophy as a way of your life

I propose an encounter with love in a philosophical perspective developed by an existential stylist. He challenges us to understand philosophy as an existential style that should bring balance to our life. This philosophy is designed so that you, postmodern human being, may find yourself in it. If positive results in your professional life were not lacking; if you

live with an innocent freedom everything emotional you take upon yourself responsibly; if you have a living standard above average in your generation; if the educational system has provided sufficient resources but your option for personal development at a new level is still open; if you are comfortable when you look in the mirror but nevertheless you feel that something is not visible enough on your face, that something is missing which you were never willing to admit was absent in your life, it means you are at a stage in your personal development that needs the support of an existential stylist. Philosophical counseling may be a solution to take one more step forward to personal accomplishment and growth together with the others. I do not want to exclude the fact that you may call on a variety of counseling forms for this purpose. But I believe that philosophical counseling is an alternative not to be refused.

One name in the Romanian cultural context that we associate to theoretical reflection and philosophical practice is that of philosopher Aurel Codoban. In his most known book, *Amurgul iubirii*, he states: "I do not aspire but to be an existential stylist". (Codoban 2004, 15) In view of this statement, Aurel Codoban reveals himself as a hermeneut of love who construes an ontology of detail. The starting point is the relationship between reason and desire. His philosophical reflections on desire are meant to take us out of the traditional way of thinking about existence and invite us to take a road to "recover what was existential and initiatory in the old philosophy, accepting criticism and going from philosophizing to interpreting, because interpreting involves understanding and only understanding may change life. This hermeneutic of love belongs to the ontology of detail as its finality aims to change our life in view of what for reason is merely detail. The ontology of detail in the existential sense, a philosophy reaching its purpose, that of a profane initiation in the absence of any assumed charisma". (Codoban 2004, 15) Philosophy as a way of life must be understood as a form of life representation in a lived intensity similar to the one described by Nietzsche when he talks about cultural styles and associated ways of life like an art of living. (Nietzsche 1994; Codoban 2011; Bondor 2008) Aurel Codoban does not intend to provide an efficient method to

guarantee results at the end of the road you have followed. His proposal is for a philosophy as a way of life, an existential style.

2. Love and the ontology of detail

The new philosophy proposed by Aurel Codoban is centered on love, because love is the most complex communication way that Western man has developed so far. Considering one of the most famous statements by the philosopher: "communication construes reality" (Codoban 2009), we had to anticipate that love and communication would always be at the base of the existential construction style proposed by Codoban. To him, love institutes significance, it is a mode of existential expression. Even when we deem it the most important of expressions, it still remains among the possible ones. Love, therefore, pertains to a register of interpretation that we achieve in the realm of a symbolic world conscience. (Codoban 2011; Frunză 2014); Frunză 2017a; Frunză 2017b)

Such an understanding of love has its place in the interest zone of Aurel Codoban whom Elvira Groza adequately describes as "a restorer of symbolic messages and trainer of messengers, who proposes a philosophy model that recovers signifying rationality, truth's perspective as interpretation and world metaphor as cryptic text to talk about being's absence-presence and about divinity's silence". (Groza 2015, 120) In the journey to symbolic systems that he proposes, the philosopher advises to take for main companion not modern rationality but desire, the postmodern opposition of that rationality. Aurel Codoban notes that in the past desire was treated as something secondary, as a detail of man's feelings as a rational being. With postmodernity, what used to be a detail becomes central in man's experience. Human nature has to be explained in terms of this ontology of detail. Guided by such companion, we shall learn how up-to-date is the ancient philosophy in which, together with Plato, we find that "the presence of desire tells us that we are not from this world in which we are now but rather belong to the other world, namely to the absolute. Desire is the way in which our hunger for the world of essence as prisoner beings in the world of appearances". (Codoban 2044, 27) Although this feeling of the absolute is always present in the

Western man, Aurel Codoban proposes being aware of and appropriating a few details that have intervened in the cultural development of the Western man, whom we find at the end of a creation process culminating for the moment in the postmodern thought. Choosing desire is the most important nuance of all accompanying life registers.

So as to understand the complexity of relations involving desire and love understood as a cultural phenomenon, let us remember that philosophical reflections have the tendency to distinguish between desire and love, positioned at two different levels of human being accomplishment. A classical example is that of Jose Ortega y Gasset, who separates desire from love. He opposes desire to love because desire involves a tendency to possess the desired reality, to such extent that it gets to be part of the one experiencing the desire to possess. This explains the fact that desire disappears as soon as it is satisfied, while love is an ever renewing desire, endlessly growing. The philosopher argues the passive nature of desire, which demands that the desired object settle in its world, and the active nature of love par excellence, which supposes going out of oneself to live in the other, to assert the other as one's gravity setting the whole existence into motion. (Ortega y Gasset 1957, 11) In this way, a hierarchization of desire and of love is instituted, in which love is always in the privileged place. Such positing of love, deeply rooted in the Christian culture, belongs to the history of the Western spirit and permanently adapts to it.

However, irrespective of the philosophical distinctions that we could make regarding the behavior of the one who desires and of the one who loves, or of the alternatives in the accompanying emotional registers, we cannot ignore the fact that love cannot oppose love and cannot be separated from desire. Among the multiple facets it may display, especially two specific types of desire may account for the way love functions: on the one hand the erotic desire, on the other the desire for transcendence. Both forms of desire appear to be fundamental because they pertain to the existential datum of the physical world – the first of the worlds we can highlight when we see man as inhabiting the five worlds: the physical world, the social and interpersonal relations world, man's internal world, the

spiritual world and the world of the sacred. This world structure that man inhabits with his entire being was showcased by the existential therapy theorizing man's belonging to four dimensions. (Deurzen & Martin Adams 2011; May 1986; Staicu 2017) Given the context of Romanian spirituality, and the fact that Aurel Codoban is a remarkable philosopher of religions (Codoban 1998), I preferred to divide the fourth dimension into the spiritual world and the world focused on assuming the sacred and religion as such. In terms of this existential datum, of the man inhabiting the five worlds, we have to accept that the physical world is a permanent concern to the human being who is at the intersection of several energies under the form of desire.

The erotic desire is based on the fact that existence is a source of pleasure and we have to fully enjoy its pleasures. Among the sources of pleasure, the erotic pleasure is most intensely experienced by the human being. It is physical and metaphysical at the same time, being always accompanied by a symbolism integrating it into a symbolic construction form that favors the unification of the worlds successively inhabited by man. World plurality pertains to the way in which we try to describe, understand and conceptualize the five worlds. Desire is abandoning oneself and returning to oneself at the same time, and this aspect is best revealed in the way man valorizes this dimension of the eros in the daily life.

As regards the desire for transcendence, it also belongs to the physical world. This explains it in close connection to the existential datum of man's finitude. Finding oneself as a finite being in a universe perceived to be either vast or endless, man experiences the need to go beyond the limits of human finitude as a desire for transcendence to the infinity. The desire for transcendence is, in Paul Tillich's terms, a quest for the ultimate reality (Tillich 1961, 3-11), that we normally include in the Western concept of God. It is present in the physical world tightly linked to limited corporality and earthly life finitude. The desire for transcendence is tied to the presence of death and appears often associated to its overcome. The two desire forms, suggestive in the understanding of the physical world, are part of a wider complex of desire that we call love. Often in

symbolic thinking analyses we find references to the proximity of death and love or even to their bound. Love and death togetherness is facilitated, among others, by this encounter of erotic desire and the desire for transcendence in the intimacy of love. We may ask – like Rosenzweig (Rosenzweig 1971) – whether love comes from the divinity and man lives all his loves with God's love over him. Or we may ask whether God is loved with extremely human love extrapolated and totalized in the imaginary of the sacred in divinity – like Feuerbach does. (Feuerbach 1881) Irrespective of the way in which we ask the question, there is no shred of a doubt that we cannot separate the idea of love from the idea of transcending and transcendence, even if we may open a debate on the authentic forms of its representation. Love includes the two desire forms (erotic and transcending), no matter how transfigured its hypostases might appear to us. Aurel Codoban has in mind this "desire metaphysics" when he states that "the Western representation of love is the specific product of a religious sacralization of sexuality, whose interdictions and tabooings add to the Platonian ontology of transcendence". (Codoban 2004, 8) The metamorphoses series known to love reveals an axis that crosses the worlds shaping the personal ego. It is born in the physical dimension and takes an ascending path in the experience of each world to the religious one. In this way one should understand the statement: "in philosophy, love is the shaped, tamed, cultivated desire". (Codoban 2004, 7) As an existential stylist, Aurel Codoban possesses the art of this philosophical cultivation of the passage through worlds, of unifying ruptures and concepts settling in a germination for an ever new crop, for a growing feeling that life is worth living.

3. Taming desire and raising the subject in communication

One of the resources, in desire theorizing, remains beyond time, the Freudian theory of the libido. (Freud 1961) Eros, be it together with Thanatos or not, is often deemed to be a permanent resource of spiritual energy and personal development. One of the major forces used by Aurel Codoban to build his vision on desire is a personal understanding of Freud's

idea about desire as an organizing and transfiguring factor of the entire human existence. Quite importantly, he notes that in the impulse theory, "desire is in the sphere of what we traditionally call love, because it is linked to sexuality, the protean and metamorphosing nature of satisfying it is probably the most explosive of psychoanalysis discoveries". (Codoban 2004, 61) The need for love of postmodern man and man of all times is what triggers most complex forms of integrating perspectives of erotic desire and elements of "metaphysical desire" in a joint discourse, with impeccable internal logic – love discourse and its varied spiritualized nuance. This resignification of sexuality leads the philosopher to a new image of the reconstruction in desire dynamics. Desire is valorized as a form of subject's self rediscovery which becomes actual desire. Such desire celebration is based on a postmodern discourse on the libido as relational communication structure. In terms of love as communication form – proposed by the existential stylist Aurel Codoban – in fact, "desire is the wish to be desired". (Codoban 2004, 67) The subject construction in relationship with the other is based on the individual's capacity growing to become both subject and object of desire in a logic of being and nonbeing, presence and absence overlap, of recognized alterity and self-totality.

It is no mere accident the fact that such philosophical perceptions may be found, in various forms, in the motivational literature. One of the most substantive proposals to valorize sexual desire transfigured for personal development, success and even substantial financial gains is that proposed by Napoleon Hill. Erotic desire taming, shaping and cultivation are important to Napoleon Hill for one's health, stimulated creativity and even genius-quality. Emphasizing the extraordinary power of sexuality when shaped as a transfiguring force, Hill states that "the libido is the highest and most subtle form of human emotion. It increases the mind's vibration pace like no other emotion and turns the brain's imaginative faculties to function along the parameters of a genius". (Hill 2013, 86) In terms of communication, Napoleon Hill posits his analyses against the background of energies put together by the minds deciding to participate in the Superior

Intellect. This way, he opines that erotic energy may participate in the mind-to-mind communication in which the enhanced creativity translates into greater success.

Although as an existential stylist he let himself be fascinated with the various forms of combined feeling and imaginary, Codoban does not go so far in his reflections like Napoleon Hill in valorizing erotic desire. In view of bringing together in the act of love the two types of desire (erotic and transcending) it is significant that he is interested in "setting coded coordinates of interpersonal relationships based on desire (appetite capacity), feelings and sexuality, with the purpose of eroticism (pleasure), in their historical variants and actual status. It is a hermeneutics of interpersonal relationships, interested in the way these relationships have been shaped by the religious and philosophical definition of desire and by their representation in the Western novel series of love types: Greek-Latin eros, Christian agapè, passion-love, Don Juan love, romantic love, confluent love (corporal-symbiotic)". (Codoban 2004, 13) All these elements that make the subject of the book *Amurgul iubirii* construct the idea of an irreversible transformation: that of substituting the position of the soul in Western tradition by the centrality of the body. Aurel Codoban shows the way previous eras imposed love forms such as passion love or romantic love that generated changes in the rapport body and soul that were reversible. With postmodernity, a phenomenon appears that the philosopher deems irreversible – the subject is born not from rational philosophical reflection but from desire, and through generalized desire as the centre of existence. The soul is no longer the main support, the body is and its new mythology of postmodern corporeity. As a matter of fact, in the spirit of such a mythology associated with science, religious studies abound in texts bringing together religion, nature, the body, medicine and spirituality, in an effort to reunite the natural and the supernatural, the material world and its hidden spiritual qualities. (McDonough 2016; Mironiuc et al. 2017; Untu et al. 2017) In such a context, unlike the unifying tendencies of the soul (and the imagined stories of the soul mates are relevant in this sense), the body brings separation and difference, that is

the alterity, "pleasure reconsiders difference versus unity, diversity versus uniqness". (Codoban 2004, 90) In view of philosophy as a way of life, a field of reflection and hermeneutical practices opens to valorize personal development starting from corporal communication and non-verbal communication practices. It is one of the fields in which Aurel Codoban excels as an existential stylist, as we shall see in his studies on gesture semiotics.

4. Love, ideology and political correctness

Aurel Codoban's reflections are valuable to the understanding of what occurs in the physical world because "our corporal existence is the one that provides the possibility for love, passion as well as violence and domination". (Codoban 2014, 149) Consequently, the physical dimension is the support to the other worlds, may they be personal, internal or social. The social world of interpersonal relationships may serve personal development as long as it is shaped by the love principle. Thus, the social world combines with the spiritual dimension of the religious and ideological creation. In a world in which intolerance is growing, we may use the tools proposed by Aurel Codoban as existential stylist to promote cohabitation and tolerance, even if wet risk getting farther from the philosopher's intentions. When we highlight such development of Aurel Codoban's thought, we have to mention that he is not a theorist of multiculturalism and political correctness, but has substantial reflections on art sociology, anthropology of religion, sociology and philosophy of ideologies. So that, showcasing the potentially positive consequences of the resignification of love and ideology relation is benefic to the understanding of the opening that philosophy as a way of life may have.

Let us remember that Aurel Codoban noted: "the feeling of love seems to be universally spread. But we have to distinguish between the feeling of love and the idea of love adopted by a certain society and a certain era. The idea of love represents a set of rules, norms and codes based on which we can locate, identify, recognize and define love. Sometimes reflections on love become the ideology of a society and then we deal with a way of life, an art of love, an ethics, aesthetics and etiquette of

love". (Codoban 2004, 23) We may notice today a particular mode by which love may be associated to the ideology of the Western society. In philosophy's view as an existential style, we may valorize this art of combining ethics and etiquette.

In postmodern world, a series of metamorphoses of the sacred occur in social, organizational, and institutional practices, and in inter-human relationships. (Boldea 2017; Rhodin & Mao 2017) The art of love, associated to a way of life and a new world vision manifests in a way that diminishes previous forms but takes over part of the contents of traditional etiquette. In the Western world in which love used to be the organizing factor of the entire existence, we note that love's central place is taken by the centrality of the respect as a foundational value for social conventions. Respect becomes the central value cultivated in professional environments and involving diverse forms of public cohabitation. Love culture is doubled by the culture of respect, and the choice to position oneself in one or the other culture does not seem simple. To emphasize the new encounter mode between love and ideology, I shall mention that one of the forms of harmonious cohabitation is generated by tolerance practices. In terms of communication, a special phenomenon is asserting tolerance as political correctness. Such a practice of tolerance would not have been possible without an increased importance of communication in the life of postmodern man. Political correctness is a consequence of the development of a tolerance discourse in the communication-built society. As a complex communication phenomenon, it brings about a new philosophy of linguistic practices and of interpersonal relationships construction languages. Considering that "Tolerance is the respect, acceptance and appreciation of the wealth and diversity of our world's cultures, ways of expression and manners of expression as human beings" (*Declaration of Principles on Tolerance* 1995), political correctness must be associated to the respect and balance that man puts into interhuman relationships. Giving too much emphasis to the extreme manifestations of political correctness practices in certain specific American social and political contexts (Behr 1995), we risk eluding the benefits brought by multiculturalism

and political correctness in the American cultural millieu and subsequently extended as practice to of dialogue in all the regions where the will to construct open societies existed. Its beneficial effect lies first of all in the fact that it represents the indulging eye of tolerance we turn to the other. Its benefits are visible especially in the situation in which, since we do not have something positive to say, we plan at least to have the decency to not say anything negative about the realities we perceive to be different from our normal expectations, irrespective of our usual representations about life and the others. (Edward 2016) From this perspective, as we tolerance, political correctness is the capacity to refrain from doing harm. Political correctness is tolerance. Political correctness is one's assumed wish to do good. It does not function as a threatening *big brother*. It represents the good eye and the wish to do good and the joy to share the world's kindness with those who appear to belong to other worlds but with whom one lives every day. As a practice of tolerance, political correctness does not resemble love, but it teaches us that being good means all or nothing.

Although different from it, like love, political correctness is, in the postmodern terms of tolerance practices, a kind of call from paradise, a nostalgia of the being that comes for each and situates all differently and equally authentically in existence. Let us not forget, however, that the virtue of love may grow until it reaches the paradisiacal state. It can also suffocate us and take us to its hell if, step by step, we go deeper in its extreme and obsessive forms of its practice. Aurel Codoban says that "Excessive love, fetishing sacralization of the loved object or of love are pathological. Excessive love that we direct to someone unsettles – by infatuation or pride – or leads to misfortune". (Codoban 2004, 11) Likewise, political correctness, when out from the comfort zone of respect, pushes us to the hell of violence and to an empty wish for understanding among people. In interhuman relationships, a sense of measure must be promoted as a constant moral and spiritual growth. It makes tolerance a practice of respect, capable to reach everyone's heart and clear the way for all following it. Tolerance is a complex form of appreciation and self-respect that one gracefully and gratefully turns to the others.

This is the main reason for which we should turn tolerance into a way of life. It must not develop into an ideology nor be abandoned to ideological practices, because they are inclined to take extreme forms. The sense of measure must govern it in all the particular aspects we may find in our daily life. Tolerance must be a way of being and of encountering the other in an existential dialog opening continuously towards respect and reciprocity. The essential is given by the light each one puts into the other to lit one's own life. In the philosophical thought, Levinas provides a constructive view fighting any violence, in which alterity is valorized by the very fact that the Infinite may be read on the Other's face – a good opportunity to bring it into existence. (Levinas 1969) In Christianity, this light was called love, love for the one close to you which is built on the love for oneself. Although routinely it is not associated to love, political correctness is a secular value rising from the urge "but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (KJV, *Leviticus* 19: 18). If we bring into discussion the interpersonal relationships sphere and place it on the grounds of the need to cohabitate, we may note one of the most generous ideas which, although not enunciated for this purpose, is in support of the need to recognize alterity: "What we may hope for from love is to impose alterity, difference, nonidentity and the obligation to recognize it… The alterity we have the occasion to meet is the presence of the other. If there is a place in which the other may be credited, may become a purpose for us not a means, this place is love" (Codoban 2004, 12), states Aurel Codoban in his reflections on the hermeneutic of love.

We are, thus, before an existential style practiced under the sign of presence, ethics and imperative respect. Recognizing the value of alterity includes this existential style built on the value of the human being in intersubjective relationships, even if it already coexists with several existential styles.

5. In lieu of conclusions: desire reconstruction and philosophical counseling

When self-identified as an existential stylist, Aurel Codoban merely proposes an intellectual exercise more often called philosophical counseling. Such a proposal brings a major

benefit to the one accepting it, because it is a type of service of limited circulation on the ideas market, of support and services. Aurel Codoban carries out such an activity as a volunteering service to his community. In this sense, he calls on informal meeting and dialogue frameworks, in the proceedings of the professor of philosophy, love hermeneutics, non-verbal communication or effective communication. In addition, there is his quality of theorist of multiple modes to reconstruct reality in the communication process, which brings additional contribution to his professionalism as an existential stylist. Such a source to improve life's quality and beauty should not be eluded because although it has developed very much in the past years and has penetrated Romania too (Marinoff 2018), philosophical counseling should be seen as a rare blue flower one must enjoy every time one has the chance to access it. Philosophical counseling is learnt over long periods of time, is lived and experimented permanently. A good philosophic counselor is the one who allows being invaded by text complexity to the same extent he/she allows the turmoil of life's complexity. The mystery of texts and of one's own life are useful instruments to decode the unknown in other people's lives, may they be metaphysical crises or simple approaches of philosophical dilemmas marking one's existence. All these ought to be visible but leave gentle traces in the other's world. As a philosopher one cannot enter the other's life and not make your presence felt, as much as one cannot enter the others' souls like you went into mud with your boots. Once the process is closed, philosophical counseling should leave the impression that it came with a flame born in the personal concerns from people's wisdom and the experience of lived life.

Such a flame belonging to natural world but always feeding on its own supernatural resources is, in its turn, love. If you listen to Aurel Codoban's thoughts on love, you will find that love is such a powerful force that is available to you because its source is not outside but deeply rooted in yourself, in the totally special energies born from desire. This explains the fact that love brings you closer to Being, it is manifested as an internal peace of your presence aspiring to reach transcendence. As long as you exist in the physical dimension,

you cannot lose love and love cannot leave you unless you have abandoned yourself. Love brings the graceful state of your presence with all the other beings in the calm energy you use to connect with those you wish to live the same life. Precisely for this reason, we say about love that it is a form to manifest communication. It aims for the depth of each man and each human being, as it indicates the imaginary world beyond finite forms, a model of any connection expansion. In this sense, we need to understand Aurel Codoban's statements which give love the quality of "paradisal legacy".

However, we must not forget the existential philosopher's statement that "we are witnessing the dusk of love as metaphysical desire. Pushing it on a secondary plane in the love dynamics of this metaphysical dimension leads to a favoring of erotic desire. At the same time with the consecrated centrality of the body in the postmodern experience, "love – or "relationship" – no longer functions based on the archetype model, which was that of the androgyny and soul mate, but rather based on the difference and plurality of egos constituting us. Having thus access to multiple egos of various bodies, the sexual, erotic collector or even belonging to passion-love and romantic love, builds a collection of bodies or even souls that in late postmodernity, different from Plato, keeps tem disjoint, does not want to amalgamate as archetypes. From the detail of uniqueness, one moves to the uniqueness of detail. (Codoban 2004, 97)

There is, however, a turning point that we may note as a potential field of desire reconstruction through specific intervention by an existential stylist. As a cognition instrument, love supposes a very complex dynamic. It keeps to itself the possibility to recover a permanent aspiration to transcendence and a presence of the Transcendence in the ideal of this aspiration. It is true this form of metaphysical love, that involves ascertaining the subject in rapport to the absolute, no longer has the face described by Christianity. It did not evade into the postmodern representations of the sacred either It starts from the reality of the body and its spiritual integration in the ego construction imagined along the five dimensions

(physical, social, personal, spiritual and religious) that appear to us as an existential datum of the human being.

Such a process consecrating the human being, that supposes all existential dimensions, is possible because an indicator of postmodern crisis is the fact that "Personal life has become an open project: sexuality is now accessible in the development of various life styles in which interactions must be permanently negotiated and solved". (Codoban 2004, 100) It is only now when love is threatened with emptying its metaphysical content, that the accompanying desire and pleasure are not reduced only to sensuality and physical pleasure. Pleasure always has a camouflaged spiritual tension, even if this is not always determining to the contextual significance that pleasure, and love implicitly, may have. This may be a starting point to develop a connection and a dialogue with the way love is understood in the community one belongs to. In such a context, philosophical counseling may create solutions to solve the crisis and may provide instruments to negotiate authenticity.

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Les limites de la discursivité : « honorer par le silence » chez Maxime le Confesseur

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Abstract

Limits of Discursivity: "Honor by Silence" in Maximus the Confessor

Maximus the Confessor granted in his works a certain attention to the issue of *silence* (σιωπή). The majority of the researchers that interpret the Maximian writings, especially, E. Michaud, V. Grumel and H.U. von Balthasar, have approached the theme of *silence* by referring to the difficult issue of the *apocathastasis*. Recently, C. Boudignon discusses about silence as tightly related to the Maximian exegesis. In this study I aim to highlight the interpretations of modern scholars in order to show, on one hand, that in the writings of the Confessor the influence of monastic sources is evident and, on the other hand, that one may observe many contexts in which silence occupies a meaningful place.

Keywords: Maximus the Confessor, silence, *honor by silence*, anagogy, tradition, interpretation

Maxime le Confesseur (580-662) appartient à une tradition qui a accordé dans ses textes une importance assez grande à la question du *silence* (σιωπή), qui s'étend chronologiquement – sans syncopes, mais avec les nuances de rigueur –, de Pythagore jusqu'à Wittgenstein. Généralement, les chercheurs qui se sont penchés sur les écrits maximiens (notamment E. Michaud, V. Grumel, H.U. von Balthasar), ont abordé le thème du *silence* dans le cadre du problème ardu de *l'apocatastase*, analysé par Maxime dans *Quaestiones et dubia*

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19 (Daley 1982, 309-339)[1]. Christian Boudignon a analysé la place qu'occuperait le silence dans le cadre de l'exégèse maximienne − vu surtout *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, Prooemium, 43 et 44 (Boudignon 1998, 353-363). En ce qui suit, après une brève énumération des auteurs qui auraient pu influencer Maxime à cet égard, je me propose de nuancer les interprétations que proposent certains exégètes contemporains et de montrer qu'on peut rencontrer dans les œuvres du Confesseur des contextes où le silence joue plusieurs rôles.

Je suis enclin à croire que ce registre ambivalent du silence qu'on rencontre dans les œuvres de Maxime se présente dans une progression qui part du *silence* (vu comme la solution la plus adéquate, apophatique concernant les questions divines), et va jusqu'à *l'abandon du silence* (lorsqu'il s'agit de la défense de la foi). Le silence, *maintenu* à propos de mystères divins, est *abandonné* lorsque la défense de la foi est en jeu.

I. Du point de vue historique, Platon, sous l'influence de l'école pythagorique (qui « imposait à ses disciples un silence de cinq ans » − Sénèque 1897, 114), est parmi les premiers auteurs à parler d'un « solennel silence » (Platon 1989, 180), tandis que Plutarque nous dit que « le silence a quelque chose de profond, de religieux, de sobre » (Plutarque 1975, 232). Une source très importante pour notre sujet est Damascius, qui affirme : « mais celui-là [l'Indicible], c'est par un silence parfait qu'il faut l'honorer, et d'abord même par une inconnaissance parfaite, celle qui tient toute connaissance pour indigne » (Damascius 1986, 11). Dans l'espace latin, Sénèque écrit à Lucilius que « la philosophie veut un culte muet » (Sénèque 1897, 115). On a assez parlé de l'influence d'Évagre le Pontique sur Maxime[2], pour notre cas est utile l'affirmation du moine Évagre conformément à laquelle « la contemplation de la Trinité sainte c'est la paix et une quiétude ineffable » (Évagre le Pontique 1958, 46). Parmi les auteurs que Maxime a lu directement on compte aussi Diadoque de Photicé (env. 400-486), dont on a gardé l'apophtegme suivant : « Abba Diadoque dit: „De même que les portes des bains continuellement ouvertes font très vite partir la chaleur au-dehors, ainsi l'âme, lorsqu'elle veut dialoguer beaucoup, même s'il lui arrive de dire de belles choses, dissipe sa propre chaleur par la porte de la parole. II est

donc beau, le silence opportun, puisqu'il n'est rien d'autre que la mère des pensées les plus sages" » (Diadoque de Photicé 1943, 130). Dans le cadre de cette tradition qui a précédé Maxime, une place importante revient, certainement, à Denys l'Aréopagite, qui conseille maintes fois de pratiquer le silence, ce « chaste silence » (Denys l'Aréopagite 2016a, 325). En synthétisant l'attitude des Pères Grecs, H.U. von Balthasar disait que « la pensée grecque s'abîme dans un silence de plus en plus profond devant l'ultime mystère de Dieu » (von Balthasar 1947, 59; Ică 1998, 447).

Pour ce qui est du silence, de l'attitude d'« honorer par le silence » du mystère, Maxime se revendique d'une tradition monastique[3], et notamment d'Évagre, de Diadoque et de Denys, qui, à leur tour, ont assimilé la tradition philosophique (notamment l'École pythagorique et Platon, Sénèque étant ici un exemple qui annonce le passage de cette problématique dans l'espace latin aussi).

II. Je considère que, du moins dans les textes des Pères de l'Église, chez Maxime en particulier, il ne faudrait pas voir le discours humain seulement comme un acte de communication d'un message précis, parce que le discours patristique visait toujours la finalité sotériologique pour la personne à laquelle on adressait le message. « Je t'en prie, Père, dis-moi quel a été le but de l'incarnation du Seigneur ? » demande souvent le disciple au vieillard (*geron*) et il répond « c'est notre salut qui a été le but de l'incarnation du Seigneur » (Deseille 1990, 227-228). Comme on peut voir de ses textes (en particulier dans les prologues à la *Mystagogie* et aux *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*), Maxime n'aurait peut-être eu l'intention d'écrire *Liber Asceticus* non plus, si ce livre n'avait pas été utile aux moines, qui l'ont probablement demandé d'ailleurs[4]. Maxime n'écrit jamais pour le simple plaisir d'écrire, comme le pense J.-L. Marion sur la théologie : « il ne devrait falloir aucune justification à s'essayer à la théologie, que l'extrême plaisir d'écrire. La seule limite à ce plaisir, en fait, se trouve dans la condition de son exercice » (Marion 1991, 9; Crîşmăreanu 2016, 59-71), mais toujours à la demande des frères, qui attendent l'éclaircissement d'une certaine question difficile. Faute de pareilles demandes explicites, Maxime se serait tu.

Surtout lorsqu'il s'agit du discours sur la divinité, *se taire* ne signifie point *ne pas parler*. « Honorer la vérité par silence » est une expression qui se réfère à la voie apophatique, notamment quand il est question d'un dogme. « Silence divin » (Maxime le Confesseur 2010, 123) est pour Maxime similaire aux « ténèbres divines » (Denys l'Aréopagite 2016b, 291-295). « Honorer par le silence » s'applique à ces parties de la théologie, comme par exemple l'eschatologie, la christologie, la doctrine sur la Trinité où notre langage et notre compréhension sont tout impuissants (Maxime le Confesseur 2010, 145). Autrement dit, il s'agit de cet aspect « *impensé* de la question de la science divine » (Boulnois, Schmutz, Solère 2012, 16), ce reste-là impossible à exprimer par des paroles. Paul Evdokimov donne une interprétation intéressante dans ce sens: « Quand les Pères ressentent l'impuissance des mots, leur conseil est d'honorer le mystère par silence. C'est précisément le cas de l'icône. L'icône d'un saint ne nous dit rien à propos de son anatomie, ne nous en offre nul détail historique, biographique ou sociologique. Elle nous montre l'éclat d'un homme au-delà de l'histoire » (Evdokimov 1964, 107).

Les endroits où Maxime parle du silence sont *Quaestiones et dubia* 44; *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* Prologue, 21, 43, 44 (Blowers 1991, 231-232). Là, d'habitude, Maxime associe *la méthode anagogique* et l'expression *honorer par le silence*. C'est Christian Boudignon (1998, 353-363) qui entreprend son analyse à partir de la thèse posée, entre autres, par P. Blowers, selon laquelle Maxime utilise dans son exégèse l'anagogie dans le sens origénien et monastique du terme, à savoir une pratique spirituelle par laquelle l'âme est élevée vers la connaissance véritable. L'exégète français se demande quand même si « l'ἀναγωγή est-elle […] distincte d'un sens plus mystique qui serait voué au silence ? »; la réponse affirmative à cette question suppose « la distinction entre un sens pédagogique, ascétique et anagogique d'une part et un sens mystique et ésotérique d'autre part ». Après plusieurs questions et distinctions qu'il propose, C. Boudignon affirme: « Maxime renonce en fait à cette loi du silence » (Boudignon 1998, 356). Situation d'emblée évidente, autrement, nous ne pourrions lire aujourd'hui aucun texte maximien !

Pour ce qui est de l'exégèse maximienne, le silence me semble plutôt lié à la problématique de la réceptivité de l'homme par rapport à Dieu. Dans ce sens, saint Ignace d'Antioche (*Ad Magnesios* VIII, 2) considérait qu'il faut être silencieux pour recevoir les paroles du Sauveur, silence qui implique à la fois notre présence et notre réceptivité (Louth 1989, 92-93). Dans le même registre, comme en anticipant *intentio lectoris* dont parlait Umberto Eco, Maxime se réfère aux destinataires de la parole divine (les lecteurs ou les auditeurs) quand il leur recommande le silence: la valeur et la profondeur d'une interprétation ne dépend pas exclusivement de l'interprète, mais aussi des destinataires du message. Dans ce sens, Maxime est assez explicite lorsqu'il affirme que « les docteurs de l'Eglise, qui, par la grâce qui est en eux, sont capables de parler abondamment sur la recherche proposée, ont estimé qu'il valait mieux, parce que la réflexion de beaucoup d'entre eux n'étaient pas capable d'atteindre la profondeur de ce qui est écrit, honorer plutôt ce passage par un silence, puisqu'ils ne pouvaient rien dire de plus profond. Et même si certains en ont parlé, après avoir discerné la capacité de leurs auditeurs, ils n'en ont d'abord parlé que partiellement en vue de l'utilité de ceux qu'ils enseignaient, et ont laissé de cote la majeure partie des points à examiner » (Maxime le Confesseur 2012, 31).

Il ne serait pas trop erroné, à mon avis, de considérer ce sens apophatique du silence comme étant du même rang que *la prière*, s'identifiant même, parfois, à celle-ci. Car qu'est-ce qu'prière intérieure sinon un « silence dialogique » (Garcea 2007, 157-176), selon l'expression que saint Augustin utilise dans les *Enarrationes in psalmos* 59, 13 ? Ce « silence dialogique » n'apparaît pas, par exemple, chez Plotin, pour lequel, au moment de l'union, même la prière (εὐχή) intérieure se tait (Plotin, 2003, 156). La prière est plus proche du silence que le discours parce qu'elle n'a pas besoin d'être proférée *de vive voix*, on peut la faire aisément *dans le cœur*.

« Priez sans cesse! » dit l'Apôtre (I *Thessaloniciens* 5, 17), et l'on n'arrive pas à suivre cette exhortation de Saint Paul que par la prière du cœur, qui n'a pas besoin de paroles dites. Le dialogue le plus efficace entre l'homme et Dieu s'accomplit par la prière, dont le succès ne dépend pas de la verbalisation.

Le silence est la langue la plus simple et la plus universelle de ce dialogue, car il n'existe pas à ce niveau une médiation verbale entre la vérité et la parole (Garcea 2007, 176). Pour Maxime, *la prière* s'avère être l'autre nom de la *théologie*, entendue comme *doxologie*. D'ailleurs, pour les Pères de l'Église grecque en général, prier signifie *s'abandonner à Dieu*, L'évoquer et invoquer Son nom en essayant de faire un avec Lui. La prière et la théologie s'unissent par un lien indissoluble. Il n'y a pas de théologie sans prière; l'acte même de la prière se présente comme acte théologique, et la théologie s'avère être, pour reprendre la belle expression de Nikos Nissiotis, « une pensée priante » (Nissiotis 1960, 294). *Praxis* ne représente rien d'autre qu'un temps pour *le silence* (σιωπή), tandis que *theoria* (θεωρία) est un temps pour *la transfiguration*, du, dans le terme d'Isaac le Syrien, « le silence est le mystère du siècle à venir, tandis que la parole est l'instrument du monde présent » (Isaac le Syrien 1993, 461).

III. Il existe une « diversité des silences » (David Le Breton), chose applicable dans le cas de Maxime. Comme il résulte de ses textes, le Confesseur n'invoque pas le silence seulement quand il parle de l'apocatastase, mais dans d'autres contextes aussi : par exemple, dans les *Capita gnostica*, Maxime parle du novice dans la vie monacale, « celui auquel le silence a été ordonné par la crainte » (Maxime le Confesseur 2004, 425). Le silence dont il est question ici est différent du silence qu'implique un discours sur Dieu, car son sens est pédagogique (voire discipliner celui qui vient de commencer sa vie monastique). Il faut donc considérer le silence comme un *moyen* : « le silence n'est pas un but en soi, c'est sa qualité qui est plus importante; il ne signifie rien s'il n'exprime pas un rapprochement à Dieu. Dans ce sens, la parole équivaut au silence, si les deux sont pénétrés par amour » (Le Breton 1997, 190).

Dans un autre texte on mentionne « les verbes naturels des êtres, annonçant silencieusement en Esprit le Verbe » (Maxime le Confesseur, 1994, 343). Si Maxime s'était tu, en l'absence de demandes d'un frère, sans rien écrire, il ne se serait pas pourtant tu quand il aurait dû défendre la juste foi. Le Rédempteur Lui-même, même s'Il a Ses propres moments de

silence (*Matthieu* 26, 63; *Marc* 14, 61; *Luc* 23, 9), nous dit clairement que nous serons jugés selon nos paroles aussi: « Je vous le dis : au jour du jugement, les hommes rendront compte de toute parole vaine qu'ils auraient proférée. Car par tes paroles tu seras justifié, et par tes paroles tu seras condamné » (*Matthieu* 12, 36-37). En ce qui concerne l'expression de la foi, dans *Disputatio inter Maximum et Theodosium Caesareae Bithyniae*, Maxime est très clair en affirmant que *taire ces paroles* signifie *supprimer ces paroles* […] la parole qui n'est pas prononcée n'existe même plus. Qui plus est, dans *Relatio motionis*, 7, le Confesseur dit encore je ne peux pas attrister Dieu en me taisant sur ce qu'Il a ordonné Lui-même d'être prononcé et exprimé. Quelques siècles plus tard, entre autres, Théodore Stoudite dira explicitement que lorsque la foi est en danger, nous sommes sous le commandement de Dieu de ne pas garder le silence.

Silentio conclusit

L'homme doit trouver une solution de réconcilier de nombreux contraires dans la vie quotidienne, par exemple le discours et le silence, la pluralité et l'unité, le temps et l'éternité. Serait-il possible d'atteindre à l'unité par le silence ? Si nous nous taisons, serait-il possible de sortir du temps, de choir de lui, pour goûter l'éternité, d'après la belle expression de Cioran (1995, 1152) ? Il m'apparaît comme évident qu'il ne faut pas entendre le silence comme *interdit* mais comme partie d'un discours incapable de tout dire. Il y a toujours un reste qu'on n'arrive jamais à exprimer de manière discursive. D'autant plus, dans le cas de Dieu, qui est au-delà des paroles, des pensées, de tout ce qui naît dans notre esprit, et c'est pourquoi il est impropre de se servir du langage lorsqu'on parle de la divinité : « Le langage s'avère souvent nécessaire, même pour dire, comme les mystiques, l'impossibilité de dire » (Le Breton 1997, 185).

Pour tout chrétien, il y a entre l'homme et Dieu une relation, de quelque manière qu'on la définisse (filiale, paternelle, ontologique). Or, si l'on transpose cela dans les termes de *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, « ne peut se *dire*, mais se *montre* » (Wittgenstein 1993, 93). C'est la raison pour

laquelle il vaut mieux se taire sur les choses divines que d'en parler. Cette relation, que chacun d'entre nous établit, et qui se soustrait à toute forme discursive, doit être rendue manifeste et communiquée aux autres. Selon cette perspective, les limites de la discursivité sont assez faciles à saisir, puisqu'on reconnaît la différence ontologique entre le Créateur et la créature. Le silence possède sa valeur dans les textes patristiques, mais si l'on le pratiquait totalement, on ne discuterait plus de la parole divine et on ne pourrait plus l'interpréter. Par ailleurs, il est bien évident que le discours humain ne peut tout dire sur les questions divines, à cause d'une limitation originaire entre la créature et son Créateur.

C'est une position classique de la patristique grecque, qui s'est vu contredire au cours de l'histoire de la philosophie surtout lorsque l'enjeu a été la connaissance de Dieu (par l'homme) ou la connaissance que Dieu avait de soi-même. On pourrait citer de nombreux auteurs pour lesquels la question du discours humain sur Dieu ne se décline que selon le versant cataphatique, mais s'il faudrait choisir un auteur privilégié, je m'arrêterais au *moment Malebranche*, étant donné son extrême importance dans l'histoire du concept de *scientia divina*, comme le montre Jean-Christophe Bardout : « Malebranche est l'un des acteurs principaux d'une mutation déterminante dans le traitement de la science divine » (Bardout 2002, 223). En tant que théologien (augustinien) et philosophe (postcartésien), Malebranche a un rôle privilégié parce qu'il « assume pleinement les transformations qui affectent le concept de science divine au XVIIe siècle » (Bardout 2002, 224), tout en étant lui-même un acteur de ces transformations. Autrement dit, il ne se contente pas de se faire l'écho de ces mutations de la science divine, mais il en joue un rôle déterminant, proposant, d'une manière très audacieuse, la mise hors-jeu de la dimension apophatique de la théologie. Or, il arrive que dans les *Entretiens sur la métaphysique et la religion* (son œuvre de maturité), Malebranche refuse explicitement d'adopter une position apophatique. Ariste, un des personnages, qui qui craint de « former sur les perfections divines des jugements qui le déshonorent » et qui se demande s'il « ne vaut-il pas mieux de les honorer *par le silence* et par l'admiration » (nous

soulignons), est ouvertement contredit par Théodore, qui assume une thèse selon laquelle l'impératif de la connaissance de Dieu oblige à abandonner la position apophatique qui imposerait le silence: « Nous sommes faits pour connaître et pour aimer Dieu : eh quoi ! Vous ne voulez pas que nous y pensions, que nous en parlions, je pourrais donc ajouter, que nous l'admirions ? Qu'admirez-vous dans la Divinité si vous n'en connaissez rien ? » (Malebranche 1965, 170). Pour Malebranche, *aimer* Dieu requiert *la connaissance (positive) de Dieu*, qui ne saurait se manifester par le silence. C'est une approche que des fins exégètes viennent confirmer, reconnaissant que « Malebranche ne reconnaît qu'un silence naissant de la parole et de l'adoration » parce que « le seul silence que Malebranche admette en cet ordre est final et non pas initial, il ne saurait pour nous être un choix premier » (Chrétien 1990, 301). Or, rien n'est plus anti-apophatique que *la primauté de la connaissance sur l'adoration*, puisque la définition malebranchiste de la connaissance (« Connaître, c'est d'avoir une idée claire de la nature de son objet et en découvrir tel ou tel rapport par lumière et par évidence » − Malebranche 1965, 60) ne laisse aucune place au mystère et au silence. Dans ce contexte précis, « l'universelle prétention de la métaphysique à statuer sur la nature du savoir, comme sur tous les modes d'apparition de l'étant » (Bardout 1999, 144) ne permet aucune dérogation, la théologie apophatique et le silence étant mis hors-circuit par une métaphysique qui assume, au défi de toute la tradition patristique, le présupposé non-critique de la connaissance de Dieu par l'idée, ne fut-ce qu'une idée *infinie* (néanmoins toujours *une idée*): « Je veux néanmoins qu'on voie l'infini, *qu'on connaisse Dieu par une idée*. Mais certainement cette idée sera Dieu même » (Malebranche 1966, 166).

Contrairement à ce qu'allait soutenir plus tard Malebranche, pour saint Maxime, l'institution du silence ne fait qu'exprimer la conscience qu'a l'esprit humain de ses propres limites. Tout discours à propos du divin laisse toujours un reste, et dans ce cas on pourrait se demander à juste raison si le silence n'est pas la solution la plus adéquate. Dans la paix que le silence offre, il se peut que nous sentions la présence de Dieu. Le sens que chacun d'entre nous cherche dans les lectures, par

les dialogues, en faisant des commentaires, n'est pas retrouvé, car le sens de la vie et en dehors du monde (Wittgenstein 1993, 109).

Si le silence indique la limite de notre discursivité, et que parfois Maxime encourage ce genre de silence, cela est possible pour deux raisons : d'une part, la conscience des propres limites de rendre par discours certains éléments de la doctrine chrétienne, d'autre part, la faible capacité de l'auditoire, des lecteurs incapables de comprendre le message transmis. Il ne s'agit plus ici d'une limite de l'interprète d'un texte des Écritures ou des Pères, mais d'une limite du récepteur du message. D'où la connexion entre le silence et le probleme de la réceptivité que nous avons déjà mentionnée.

A mon avis, on peut considérer l'acception apophatique du silence, que Maxime assume lui aussi à un moment donné, comme *une thérapie*. « La conclusion d'une pareille thérapie est qu'il faut se taire sur ce qu'on ne peut pas dire. Chose étrange, un tel silence, par son assertion même, ne conduit pas au scepticisme » (Ungureanu 2009, 32). Face au mystère, le silence est, pour Maxime aussi, l'approche la plus juste, rien d'autre qu'un simple « hymne de silence » (Grégoire de Nazianze, *Carmina*, 29: « σιγώμενον ὕμνον »), où « ni la raison ni l'intellection ne peuvent en aucune manière manifester ce silence » (Maxime le Confesseur 2010, 109).

NOTES

[1] Il y des exégètes qui affirment que « Maximus' reason for not speaking is not a desire to honor a doctrine in silence but to pass it over for the present, because he is not equal to the heights of Gregory's teaching » (Sherwood 1955, 210).

[2] Maxime a sans doute lu les écrits d'Évagre, et en particulier *Kephalaia gnostica* (comme l'avait prouvé, par des arguments, M. Viller 1930, 150-184; 239-268; 331-336). A. Lévy retient deux aspects essentiels dans la discussion des érudits à propos de l'influence d'Évagre sur Maxime : 1. Maxime a lu *Kephalaia* – pourtant, il les a lues en syriaque, car il ne cite pas la version originale, mais la variante revue par le rédacteur syriaque (le plus probablement, Philoxène de Mabboug). Cette connaissance du syriaque (par Maxime) confirme la *Vie* de la même origine: jusqu'à la moitié du VII[e] siècle, c'est le syriaque la langue parlée dans les monastères palestiniens, avant le grec; 2. Maxime s'inspire des écrits évagriens – plus exactement, des passages

où ces derniers ont été artificiellement composés selon une interprétation conforme à celle des Pères (et implicitement de Denys), en perdant ainsi ce que leur conférait leur saveur hétérodoxe. Situation qui pousse A. Lévy à renverser la thèse soutenue par I. Hausherr 1936, 351-362 (conformément à laquelle Maxime a exprimé, à travers des termes dionysiaques, des idées évagriennes) et à affirmer que c'est Évagre qui est superposé à Denys, et non l'inverse : à l'aide de mots évagriens, Maxime n'a fait qu'exprimer des idées dionysiaques (Lévy 2006, 488)

[3] L'exhortation au silence est souvent rencontrée dans le milieu monastique, comme il résulte des *Apophtegmes des Pères. Collection systématique* (vol. I), 1993 et (vol. II), 2003. Par exemple: Abba Isaïe dit que « la fatigue, la pauvreté, la vie à l'étranger, le courage et le silence engendrent l'humilité, et l'humilité supprime beaucoup de fautes; mais chez celui qui n'observe pas cela, le renoncement est vain » (I, 107). « Un vieillard dit: si quelqu'un demeure clans sa cellule et y pratique le silence, attentif de toute son âme à la prière et au travail, il peut être sauve en ce siècle » (I, 143). « Abba Isaïe dit: „Aime te taire plus que parler. Car le silence thésaurise tandis que parler disperse"» (I, 195). « Un vieillard dit: „L'absence d'inquiétude, le silence et la méditation secrète engendrent la pureté"» (I, 267). « Un frère demanda à abba Poemen: „Comment faut-il demeurer dans la cellule ?" Le vieillard dit: „Demeurer dans la cellule c'est, pour l'extérieur, le travail manuel, ne manger qu'une fois par jour, le silence et la méditation"» (II, 73). « Un vieillard dit: „…rien n'est-il préférable au silence"» (II, 99). « Un vieillard dit: „Il y en a qui gardent le silence non à cause de Dieu, mais pour s'acquérir de la gloire. Mais si quelqu'un garde le silence à cause de Dieu, c'est vraiment de la vertu, et il en reçoit la grâce de Dieu et du Saint Esprit" » (II, p. 131). « Un vieillard dit: „Pratique le silence, ne te soucie de rien, applique-toi a la méditation, te couchant et te levant dans la crainte de Dieu, et tu n'auras pas à craindre les assauts des impies"» (II, 193). « Abba Poemen dit: „La victoire sur toute peine qui te survient, c'est de garder le silence"» (II, 399). En définitive, les récits sur les vies des moines et la *Philocalie* sont riches en apophtegmes conseillant au silence

[4] « Malgré leur caractère souvent érudit, tous les ouvrages maximiens ne sont pas des actes d'érudition écrits dans le silence d'une bibliothèque pour un public intellectuel et en visant des objectifs académiques. Ils ont tous été écrits dans le contexte vivant de la formation spirituelle dans le cadre de communautés monacales concrètes » (Ică 1998, 429-430).

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Faculties of the Soul and their Hierarchy in Bonaventure's 13th Century Voluntarism

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Abstract

The aim of my article is to observe the way in which the concept of *hierarchy* may be applied and understood from the philosophical writings of Bonaventure of Bagnoregio in a twofold manner as mainly applied to the created world, but also as a reference to the faculties of the human soul dealing with both intellectual and moral knowledge. The assumed perspective shall be treated from the point of psychological voluntarism assumed by the philosopher in asserting a primate of will in dealing with moral actions and human behavior. The terms implied in defining how one may apply the concept of *hierarchy* in relation to the faculties of the soul refer to intellect, reason, conscience, will and synderesis. By means of direct textual analysis I want to establish the correct links between these concepts and what their role in the process of moral knowledge is.

Keywords: conscience, will, synderesis, hierarchy, Bonaventure, voluntarism, medieval philosophy

Philosophy represents, according to Bonaventure, a way of approaching the knowledge of nature according to Aristotelian ideas that mingle with the Augustinian way of understanding the concept of *logos* present in ancient Greek philosophy as the second Person of the Trinity, the divine Reason. The Christian philosopher has to observe the created world according to the light of this divine reason, Christ, understood as the Center of all sciences. In the hierarchy of

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sciences that lead to the divine Logos, each science reveals in a necessary way certain *marks* or *traces* of the Trinity. This is possible due to the fact that each science, and, especially, the one dealing with the interpretation of the Scripture, hides an understanding of the Trinity. Philosophical speculation arises from the faith in a revealed Truth that nurtures the desire of knowledge present in the human being. Philosophy and theology become two ways of reaching God, ways that have different methods, but succeed in completing and developing each other (Gilson 1991, 407).

Bonaventure's idea of knowing the world through contemplation manifests in a threefold manner: first one has to be purified, after illuminated and in communion with God. The reality is thus observed by following an order of the created things understood through the help of analogy with the uncreated ones according to the following hierarchy: material world, human mind, eternal art as a mirror for the Trinity (Bonaventure 1891, 1, 3):

> […] *haec respicit triplicem rerum existentiam, scilicet in materia, in intelligentia et in arte aeterna, secundum quam dictum est; fiat, fecit, et factum est; haec etiam respicit triplicem substantiam in Christo, qui est scala nostra, scilicet corporalem, spiritualem et divinam.*

A closer look to the structure of the treatise *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* offers a clear sight of the way in which Bonaventure understands the hierarchy of the world: the first chapter speaks about the *vestigia*, the marks or traces of God present in the universe at a material level, while in the second chapter sensibility is present as a common feature in the vivid beings. The signs through which God may be observed by man according to his intellectual faculties are described in the third chapter of the treatise completed by chapter four that shows how the natural powers of the soul may be perfected with the help of divine grace. The deeper understanding of the divine being is made by contemplating the divine unity according to the name *being* (*esse*) as life generating principle for the entire creation (present in chapter five) and the contemplation through faith of the Trinity as *summum bonum* achieved in the sixth chapter of the treatise. The last chapter reminds the life of Francis as it has been done in the beginning of the work in

the Prologue in order to highlight the fact that through rapture God may be known even in this ephemeral life and thus achieving *scientia viatorum* that will be perfected in the moment that men as righteous beings will earn the complete knowledge of God, *scientia beatorum*, in the kingdom of Heaven.

Through the itinerary defined by Bonaventure one observes a variety of ways that lead the creation *quantum potest* to knowing God. Walking the first step in the hierarchy of the created world, human reason discovers the existence of a Creator, a discovery inherent to human nature and not a subject of grace, because reason is present in man even after the original sin. Reality is perceived by man in a threefold structure through sensibility, soul and mind, structure that unfolds itself in senses, imagination, reason, intellect, intelligence and synderesis or the faculty that helps one to distinguish right from wrong orienting us always towards what is right, according to the voluntarist perspective assumed by Bonaventure (1891, I, 4, 6):

> *Secundum hunc triplicem progressum mens nostra tres habet aspectus principales. Unus est ad corporalia exteriora, secundum quem vocatur animalitas seu sensualitas: alius intra se et in se, secundum quem dicitur spiritus; tertius supra se, secundum quem dicitur mens.* […] *Iuxta igitur sex gradus ascensionis in Deum, sex sunt gradus potentiarum animae per quos ascendimus ab imis ad summa, ab exterioribus ad intima, a temporalibus conscendimus ad aeterna, scilicet sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia et apex mentis seu synderesis scintilla.*

At the first level of the hierarchy of the created world by observing material reality, one sees that objects are created according to a certain weight, number and measure like marks imprinted by the Creator in the created things. The unity, beauty and order of creation reflect by means of analogy the power, the wisdom and the kindness of the Creator. The one grasping to understand more will access the next level of created reality through faith by approaching its origin, evolution and end as signs of the divine power, providence and justice. From a rational point of view, the multitude of forms belonging to created things determines the human being to approach the understanding of Divinity with the help of analogy in a different manner: things that are changeable or

unchangeable, corruptible or incorruptible represent ways of approaching the power, the wisdom and the kindness of the Creator once again (Bonaventure 1891, I, 11, 12, 13).

The next step of the hierarchy of the created world leads man in realizing that creation reflects in the human being when speaking about the nature of its sensitivity. Reality is perceived by the means of the five senses according to shape, force, efficacy, beauty, delicacy and proportion. At a sensitive level knowledge arises due to an action of an exterior object upon a sense organ. Through apprehension (*apprehensio*) the sensible world is perceived due to the five senses (Bonaventure 1891, II, 4):

> *Intrat igitur quantum ad tria rerum genera in animam humanam per apprehensionem totus iste sensibilis mundus. […] et sic generatio speciei in medio et de medio in organo et conversio potentiae apprehensivae super illam facit apprehensionem omnium eorum quae exterius anima apprehendit.*

Delighting (*oblectatio*) follows apprehension and helps one perceive if the sensed aspect is agreeable or not (Bonaventure 1891, II, 5):

> *Ad hanc apprehensionem, si sit rei convenientis, sequitur oblectatio. Delectatur autem sensus in obiecto per similitudinem abstractam percepto vel ratione speciositatis, sicut in visu, vel ratione suavitatis, sicut in odoratu et auditu, vel ratione salubritatis, sicut in gustu et tactu, appropriate loquendo.*

Judgement (*diiudicatio*) establishes why the perceived aspect delights the perceiver by expressing a reason for which a thing is in a certain way or in another (Bonaventure 1891, II, 6):

> *Post hanc apprehensionem et oblectationem fit diiudicatio, qua non solum diiudicatur, utrum hoc sit album, vel nigrum, quia hoc pertinet ad sensum particularem; non solum, utrum sit salubre, vel nocivum, quia hoc pertinet ad sensum interiorem; verum etiam, quia diiudicatur et ratio redditur, quare hoc delectat; et in hoc actu inquiritur de ratione delectationis, quae in sensu percipitur ab obiecto.*

The soul formulates a judgement (*iudicium*) regarding the action that one suffered and this judgement represents the exact way in which man accesses knowledge at a sensitive level. In this sense, Bonaventure asserts that the soul itself is affected by this action in a spiritual manner (the soul

representing the principle that maintains life in a body), but reacts in an immediate manner by formulating the judgement (*iudicium*) about the action.

Bonaventure creates a synthesis between the Aristotelian theory of sensation (the passivity of human nature receiving sensitive data) and the Neoplatonic theory found in Augustin (the soul has a direct action in perceiving the sensitive world) when developing the theory of sensitive knowledge. Another interesting aspect regarding the medieval theory of human knowledge expressed by Bonaventure is related to practical knowledge. When speaking about practical knowledge as Bonaventure understood it one has to take in consideration the connections present between the faculties of the human soul: conscience, will, synderesis. Similar to the theoretical human knowledge seen from an Augustinian and Aristotelian perspective, the way in which human behavior has been defined in the philosophy of the Middle Ages has been approached in two different ways according to: voluntarism (psychological before 1270 and ethical after 1270) and intellectualism (Stone 2004, 99).

Psychological voluntarism follows the line of the Augustinian hermeneutical tradition in which authors like Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure and John of Rochelle assert that the role of the affective and volitional parts of the human soul is primary in moral behavior and activity (Stone 2004, 100-102). Differing from the psychological version of voluntarism, ethical voluntarism adopted by John Peccham, Peter John Olivi, Walter of Bruges, John Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent confirms the primate of the will in relation to reason, but in their texts one tends to observe that the will has an active and dynamic character, in other terms, a liberty to act against the principles of reason (Stone 2004, 100). The origin of intellectualism is to be found in the texts of Aristotle and in the works of his Arabian commentators in which human action is determined by the rational part of the human soul, free will representing merely a moral choice developed through rational deliberation (Stone 2004, 101).

As a representative of psychological voluntarism, Bonaventure asserts the supremacy of the will in explaining

moral actions and the importance of the intervention of divine grace in certifying the rectitude of human actions. Grace constitutes the fundament of a righteous will and of reason as bearers of the real truth discovered by the means of the activity done by the intellect. Observing the way in which Bonaventure understands the hierarchy of the created world one discovers that the same hierarchic model may be applied in understanding the connections between the faculties of the soul regarding practical knowledge, conscience, will, synderesis. The judgement that has to be made in this case is to analyze the type of hierarchy present here, if one may speak of a primate of will, of conscience or of synderesis in which regards human behavior and what determines moral acts. If, from an ethical point of view, conscience is understood in medieval philosophy as the faculty that differentiates good from evil, but also as the source of remorse for those who commit bad deeds, will is seen as a natural innate power of the soul that is never wrong (along with the other infallible powers of reasoning, memory and thought) in deliberating moral aspects and the exercise of this power, named also will, that fails when manifests itself in a chaotic way, ignoring moral principles (Petrus Lombardus 1891, I, II, II, 3). The term *synderesis* is transliterated from the Ancient Greek word συντήρησις < συντήρειν (tr. to watch over, to look carefully and attentive) and it means attentive sight, watch. Medieval writers took the term from the *Commentary to Ezekiel* made by Jerome who interprets the vision of Ezekiel as an allegory that illustrates the rational part of the soul (human face), the emotional one (the lion) and the appetitive one (the calf) according to Plato. According to Jerome's interpretation, the forth part with the image of the vulture is not mingled with the other tree because it is the faculty that corrects the others when they fail in their moral deliberation. It is the faculty that is never extinguished, but only diminished in those who are choosing freely to act morally wrong. In the hierarchy of the faculties of the soul, from a voluntarist point of view, has primacy over the others, because it is never wrong and it represents the faculty that orients the human soul towards doing good deeds, as an inclination, a tendency of always chasing and choosing the *summum bonum*:

> *Plerique, juxta Platonem, rationale animae, et irascitivum, et concupiscitivum, quod ille λογικόν et θυμικόν et ἐπιθυμητικόν vocat, ad hominem et leonem ac vitulum referunt* [...]. *Quartamque ponunt quae super haec et extra haec tria est, quam Graeci vocant συντήρησιν, quae scintilla conscientiae in Cain quoque pectore, postquam ejectus est de paradiso, non extinguitur, et qua victi voluptatibus vel furore, ipsaque interdum rationis decepti similitudine, nos peccare sentimus* (Hieronymus, 25, 22).

Bonaventure asserts that the term *conscience* could be understood in three ways: de thing that we are conscious about, the possibility of being conscious because natural law is written in our conscience and as a habitus, a disposition that perfects our way of reasoning at a practical level. Conscience as habitus guides ones deliberation and could be seen as innate by approaching the fundamental moral principles and as an acquired aspect achieved through education. Similar to free will that depends on reason and will because it functions through deliberation, conscience and synderesis refer to reason and will and both work in a natural by tending towards what it is good (according to natural law), differing from free will that sometimes tends towards that what is good and sometimes towards that what it is bad.

Synderesis represents the movement of the will that orients it towards good and the spark of conscience that ignites the deliberation regarding moral principles. If synderesis is understood by Bonaventure as a natural infallible tendency towards good, conscience is morally oriented from a theoretical point of view dealing with primary moral principles and specific conclusions that may be not always be drawn correctly through reasoning (Bonaventure 1891, II, 39). Here Bonaventure distinguishes three types of principles that are dictated by conscience: according to, indifferent and contrary to divine law (Bonaventure 1891, II, 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4). The ones that are according to divine law are simple and universal (they act against a principle that has as finality the action of committing a mortal sin); the ones that are indifferent to divine law remain like that as long as conscience maintains its deliberation in this direction of keeping them neutral from moral affiliations (they refer to objects and actions that until a certain point in human deliberation do not belong to the moral sphere until it is decided

differently by a morally judging community), and the principles contrary to divine laws are the ones that place man outside salvation and according to this reason, they do not oblige man in acting in a certain way, but show him how to avoid a morally wrong deliberation (Bougerol 1969, 38-39). This type of judgement may also surprise the belief that a thing is good, although it is definitely wrong from a moral point of view, and the acts submitted to this fallacious belief constitute a sin because they are always oriented against God.

As the intellect that has received by creation a "natural light" that orients it towards knowledge, thus will is oriented in a just manner towards a moral activity. The light of reason is called conscience when referring to the knowledge of God, and the natural inclination of will it is called synderesis when man acts according to that what it is good (Bougerol 1969, 125). If synderesis represents a static faculty in the sense that it cannot be altered or changed by anything exterior to it, conscience is a perpetual evolving faculty that may be trained with the help of moral exercise on how to apply better innate principles. The hierarchy present in the human being at the level of its faculties reflects the hierarchy of the created world at a microcosmic level through the means of analogy. In this sense, man has been named *minor mundus* in medieval times and is "struggling" to preserve it until the contemporary ones and beyond.

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The Friendship between Two Great Thinkers: David Hume and Adam Smith

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Dennis Rasmussen, *The Infidel and the Professor: David Hume, Adam Smith, and the Friendship That Shaped Modern Thought*, Princeton University Press, Princeton & Oxford, 2017, 336 pp.

Keywords: David Hume, Adam Smith, philosophical friendship, Scottish Enlightenment

One of the long-lasting controversies concerning the adequate interpretation of philosophical works is the one about whether or not it should focus only on the argumentative content of the respective work, or it should also take into consideration the way in which the biography of its author could shed some light on the ideas comprised in it. While the dominant view is the one according to which philosophy should be treated as an activity that must be appraised only in relation with its rational intrinsic worth, there are also important attempts to emphasize that a philosopher's line of reasoning cannot be fully understood without a reference to the broader context of its formation and evolution.

A remarkable contribution along these lines is the recent book of Dennis Rasmussen, *The Infidel and the Professor:*

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David Hume, Adam Smith, and the Friendship That Shaped Modern Thought, published at the prestigious Princeton University Press in 2017. The main objective followed in the book, as should be obvious from the title, is the one of „telling the story" of the „friendship which had played a role in the lives of two of the history's most significant thinkers", as Rasmussen announces on the first page of the *Introduction*. And, in his opinion, this aim is even more significant if we take into consideration the fact that it is the first book on this topic, which he believes to be a „remarkable" thing, if we reflect on David Hume's and Adam Smith's „stature and influence".

The main reasons why the topic didn't got the necessary attention are, in his view, the fact that information about their relation and their lives (and especially Adam Smith's life) are scarce, because they were not too eager to publish personal information, and the fact that friendships are much harder to bring to life than quarrels (pp. 3-5). Hence, in order to compensate for the scarcity of information regarding their relation, Rasmussen relied not only on the fifty-six existing letters between Hume and Smith (fifteen from Smith to Hume and forty-one from Hume to Smith), but also on their scientific and philosophical works, on biographies, on contemporaneous sources, on the correspondence of their acquaintances, and even on periodicals and book reviews (pp. 4-5).

In order to justify the significance of the subject matter of his book, Rasmussen refers to Aristotle's classification of friendship in three categories: those motivated by utility, those motivated by pleasure, and, „the highest and the rarest of the three – those motivated by virtue and excellence". In his opinion, Hume's intellectual relation with Smith is „a nearly textbook model of this kind of friendship: a stable, enduring reciprocal bond" which arises from „the shared pursuit of a noble end – in their case, philosophical understanding" (p. 6). Moreover, he adds that this is „a philosophical friendship of the highest level in action" and even „the higher example of a philosophical friendship in the entire Western tradition" (p. 6). And, as Suzanne Smith, one of the reviewers of this book remarked „philosophy takes friendship (*philia*) as its roots" and in the Western tradition there is an „extensive perceived

overlap between fitness for friendship and fitness for philosophy" (Smith 2017).

Rasmussen's argumentation is developed in a chronological way covering a period between 1711, the year of David Hume's birth, and 1790, the year of Adam Smith's death. He carefully presents the political, cultural, educational and religious context of the formation and the evolution of their line of thought in direct connection with the evolution of their friendship and of the wider political and cultural circumstances. Therefore, the twelve chapter of the book (which are followed by an *Appendix* containing Hume's text *My Own Life* and Smith's *Letter to Strahan*) are centred on what Rasmussen regards as the most important moments, encounters, events, or changes in their professional or personal life.

The first chapter of the book, „The Cheerful Sceptic" is dedicated to the first four decades of Hume's life and formation between 1711, the year of his birth, and 1749, the year of his first encounter with Smith and the beginning of their friendship. He presents Hume's childhood, his typical Presbyterian upbringing and his formation beginning with the four years experience at Edinburgh University, the several years of intensive independent study and the completion of his formal education in France at the University of Rheims (one year) and the La Fléche College (for two years). During these three years he has developed his philosophical project, the „science of human nature" based on the experimental method. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to a brief presentation of Hume's *Treatise* and his main philosophical works published before his encounter with Smith.

The second chapter „Encountering Hume" is focused on Smith's formal education at the universities of Glasgow and Oxford. The main experience was his encounter with Hume's philosophy, which had a long lasting influence on his work, and with Hume himself (in 1749). An interesting analysis is the one concerning the difference between their personalities: Hume is portrayed as cheerful and kind, with a sparkling personality, great social and conversational abilities, while Smith is described as a more reserved and absentminded man (pp. 46-49). A similar discrepancy is also manifest in their attitude

towards religion: Hume was unambiguous and out-spoken in his sceptical attitude (which lead to his failed attempt to become a university teacher in Edinburgh, in 1745), while Smith was more circumspect and less disposed to reveal his religious beliefs.

Therefore, their different attitude towards religion and towards their more pious contemporaries is another key topic of the book, one that is reflected by the two portrayals used in the title. Hume was labelled as the „Great Infidel" and Smith as a respected professor of moral philosophy, although, as Rasmussen rightfully underlines, their religious attitude was much more similar than it is assumed in this common image of the two thinkers. One important notice made by Jon Rick in his review on Rasmussen's book, is that „religion is the book's most consistent thematic thread" which is appropriate given the „significant role that religiosity played in shaping Hume and Smith's lives as well as their contemporaneous reception" (Rick 2018).

The next two chapters describe the decade between 1749 the year of their encounter and 1759 the year of the publishing of Smith's first major book, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, a decade marked by the developing of their „budding friendship", but also by Smith's successful attempt to become a university professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow (in 1751) and Hume's failed attempt to fill the Chair of Logic in the same university, due to their different religious attitudes. However, shortly after that, Hume was appointed keeper of the Advocates' Library in Edinburgh. This position gave him access to a great library and the opportunity to write the *History of England* in a well-documented and impartial style that assured him fame and a relative prosperity. But, the same religious reason leaded to another important biographical event of that decade: the unsuccessful effort made in 1755 by the Kirk (the Scottish Presbyterian church) to excommunicate Hume on a charge of heresy.

The fifth chapter offers an extensive analysis of Smith's book *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which was profoundly influenced by Hume's moral philosophy, but also contains some original contributions. In Rasmussen's opinion, there are two

main divergences between Smith and Hume on the subject of moral life. The first has to do with their explanation of the faculty of sympathy: Hume describes it as a passive emotional contagion, while in Smith's view it presupposes a more active projection into the situation of the other. The second divergence has to do with the foundation of justice: for Hume justice is an artificial virtue which is valued based on its utility for public interest, while for Smith it is a natural virtue based on our sympathy with the injured party.

Rasmussen underlines that in Hume's view the moral approval for an action is deriving from a judge's understanding of the usefulness and agreeableness of an agent's action, and not simply from a mechanical view of utility, as Smith is suggesting. Therefore, Smith misrepresents Hume's theory (p. 109). In his review to Rasmussen's book, Erik Matson argues that Smith's misrepresentation of Hume's moral theory is *intentional* and is *greater* than Rasmussen acknowledges (Matson 2017).

The chapters six and seven are dedicated to presenting Hume's very successful stay in France as a private secretary of the ambassador Lord Hertford, which gave him the opportunity to meet all the major figures of French Enlightenment (except Voltaire), and to be celebrated by them and by the French aristocracy. However, Rasmussen also presents Hume's conflict with Rousseau, who is unjustly described as a paranoid and „wild philosopher". The chapter eight depicts the last decade of Hume's life and Smith's isolation years in Kirkaldy, while writing his major work *The Wealth of Nations*.

One of the most consistent chapters of the book is the next one which provides an inquiry in the main ideas of Smith's celebrated work, but also in the way in which Hume's political economy anticipated many of them. Nevertheless, Rasmussen also underlines Smith's original theses concerning the division of labour and his concerns regarding the negative effects of commercial society (pp. 166-173). However, as Erik Matson points out, Rasmussen's statement according to which for Smith the wealth of nations is made possible only by a massive self-deception about the true nature and source of happiness is

an overstatement: acquisition of wealth and happiness are compatible for Smith (Matson 2017).

The last three chapters focus on the last year of Hume's life, the conflict caused by Smith's refusal to be his literary executor and to publish the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, Hume's stoic and peaceful death, the consequences produced by Smith's *Letter to Strahan*, which unleashed the fury of his religious contemporaries, and the last years of Smith's life. Hence, in this last part of the book, Rasmussen revisits in a very expressive way the theme of the philosophical friendship between Hume and Smith. And he describes it by focusing on their last days together, on Hume's serene and dignified way of dying, and especially on Smith's description of it from the *Letter to Strahan* in which he depicts his friend as „approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit" (p. 220).

Therefore we can declare that Rasmussen's book is indeed a successful attempt to tell the story of this philosophical friendship in an inspirational and sensitive way. Nevertheless, there are some objections that could be raised against some of his statements and even against his overall approach. To the remarks that were already mentioned above I will add another two objections. The first is that the presentation of Hume's works is too brief and doesn't account for many of his main sources of inspiration (like Locke, Berkeley, Bacon and others) or for the way in which he distinguishes his view from those of other significant modern philosophers (like Descartes or Malebranche). For example, it is obvious from his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* and the posthumous work *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* that he mentions several times some of the theses of Malebranche and even cites extensively from his work *De la recherche de la vérité*, which proves that Hume read his works and has taken them into consideration in the process of developing his philosophical project.

Another objection has to do with the fact that Rasmussen's description about how the friendship between Hume and Smith helped to shape modern thought is not as

extensive as one would expect. Moreover, he practically does not address some of the most important ideas supported by the two famous authors: Smith's theory about the invisible hand of the market and Hume's is-ought problem (Knee 2017). To this I would also add that Hume's well-known arguments against the idea of causation, against induction and other important epistemological ideas do not receive as much as necessary attention from Rasmussen in his line of reasoning.

Nevertheless, despite these objections, Rasmussen's book is a very insightful investigation on a difficult but meaningful topic: the friendship and the philosophical relation between two great thinkers presented against the background of the cultural, religious and political context they lived in. Hence, it is a successful attempt to reveal the way in which the historical and cultural contexts are intertwined with biography and the development of philosophical ideas. For these reasons, I believe that this is a book which will become, without a doubt, an important basis for future investigations on the relation between Hume and Smith, on the correct interpretation of their works, but also on the wider topic of understanding the nature and characteristics of the Scottish Enlightenment.

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Spinoza et Malebranche: les voies sinueuses de leur réception

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Raffaele Carbone, Chantal Jacquet, Pierre-François Moreau (sous la direction de), *Spinoza-Malebranche: à la croisée des interprétations*, ENS Editions: Paris, 2018, 247 p.

Keywords: Malebranche, Spinoza, reception, interpretation, cartesianism, rationality

Spinoza et Malebranche ne devraient être pas vus comme étant uniquement des *post-cartésiens* (ils l'ont été, sans aucun doute), mais aussi comme des philosophes capables par eux-mêmes de générer une postérité à part entière, où le *terminus a quo* ne soit pas Descartes.

En ce sens, une histoire de la philosophie qui soit écrite en prenant en compte non seulement leur rapport à Descartes et la "triangulation" dont parle Pierre-François Moreau dans la *Postface* (p. 243), mais aussi les « influences » (terme générique mais cependant utile du point de vue méthodologique, puisqu'on peut le lire dans les deux sens, tant actif que passif) de Spinoza et Malebranche, suppose une nouvelle méthodologie, qui passe « de la simple comparaison à la véritable confrontation » (p. 243).

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Ce livre paru aux ENS Editions s'acquitte remarquablement de la tâche ambitieuse de mener une recherche qui aborde « de front, dans un face à face spéculatif » (comme l'affirme Chantal Jacquet dans la *Préface*) les relations entre les philosophies (je pense qu'on aurait même pu dire *les systèmes*) de Spinoza et de Malebranche.

Issu d'un double colloque international tenu en septembre et en octobre 2015 à Paris et à Lyon à l'occasion du tricentenaire de la mort de Malebranche, le livre structuré en deux parties (*Spinoza-Malebranche: de l'ontologie à la politique* et *Spinoza-Malebranche: réceptions croisées*), comporte, à part la *Préface* et la *Postface*, une *Introduction* (signée par Raffaele Carbone) et 11 articles qui partagent la même ambition philosophique, celle de surprendre non seulement des aspects encore insuffisamment analysés chez les deux auteurs, mais aussi la *transformation*, la *circulation* et l'*efficace* des notions qui prouvent avoir vécu un destin contredisant l'idée reçue selon laquelle le rapport entre Spinoza et Malebranche se réduirait aux discussions sur le concept d'étendue (intelligible) et à la correspondance entre Malebranche et Dortus de Mairan.

Si Malebranche ne peut pas être renfermé dans l'alternative limitée dénoncée par Chantal Jacquet (« Malebranche, dernier des spinozistes ou premier des anti-? », p. 13), a *fortiori* le rapport qu'il entretient avec Spinoza ne devrait pas réduit, comme l'a fait l'historiographie des idées au XVII-ème et XIX-ème siècle, à une position philosophique dépourvue de nuances et hâtive à établir des démarcations trop rigides.

Loin de la position réductrice de Hegel (mauvais lecteur de Malebranche, comme le prouve Raffaele Carbone dans l'*Introduction*), pour lequel le spinozisme et le malebranchisme apparaissaient comme les deux formes de l'achèvement du cartésianisme, ou de la thèse étrange

de Schopenhauer, selon lequel Spinoza se serait davantage inspiré de Malebranche que de Descartes, le livre thématise le rapport entre ces deux philosophies évitant l'emploi des concept chers au XIXe siècle (*achèvement* ou *dépassement*). Ceci faisant, le livre comme tel et les auteurs des articles évitent de projeter sur l'histoire de la philosophie un sens téléologiquement prédéterminé et de lire la succession des systèmes comme en rapport unilatéral (du prédécesseur à l'héritier), comme si la *réception* ne pourrait se décliner que sur le mode du *gain* ou de la *perte* d'un concept ou d'une intuition.

On ne saurait le souligner suffisamment: le livre prouve bien que les concepts de Spinoza et de Malebranche ont eu une postérité à laquelle leurs auteurs n'avaient même pas songé, que les raisonnements ont migré en tant que tels ou ont été importés implicitement d'un système à l'autre, que la transformation des idées a été faite au fil des controverses et des (re)lectures dont personne n'aurait pu deviner à l'avance la finalité.

L'histoire des idées philosophiques n'est pas l'histoire des successions des systèmes, ni un répertoriages des positions défendues comme des « îles de sens » isolées, mais l'articulation inattendue entre l'argument nouveau dans la controverse ancienne, la réplique démesurée à la piqure ironique, l'usage d'un concept en dehors de son champs philosophique initial, l'analogie en tant qu'explication, la radicalisation de ce qui était encore acceptable.

Dans le premier article, Pierre-François Moreau revient sur la correspondance entre Malebranche et Dortus de Mairan, prouvant que tout n'a pas été dit sur ce sujet, puisque on y découvre comment le jeune Dortus de Mairan, intéressé par le statut de l'étendue, « s'approprie et développe » (p. 47) la démarche de Spinoza, découvrant que la pensée de Malebranche, en ce qu'elle a de plus fondamental, tient à une idée mal formulé par lui-même,

mais correctement formulée par Spinoza (p. 49). Un pas que Malebranche n'a pas eu le courage de faire, s'arrêtant, grâce à la foi mais contre la raison, « sur le bord du précipice ».

Cristina Santinelli, dans un article très dense dédié à l'attention comme méthode philosophique, part de Descartes et de la « dynamique de la vision oculaire » (p. 52) qui permet de comprendre sa conception de l'*attention*, toutefois assez indéterminée quant à son statut (« ni *res*, ni *facultas*, l'attention…est la disposition psychologique qui lie dans une relation féconde le sujet et l'objet de la connaissance », p. 53), même si sa « valence heuristique inédite » (p. 57) ne peut pas être niée. On appréciera la manière fine dont Cristina Santinelli surprend la transformation conceptuelle de l'attention chez Spinoza, sous le poids du changement du statut ontique de l'idée immanente (pp. 57-63) et mais aussi l'audacieuse remarque (à notre avis, justifiée par les textes) de « platonisme renouvelé et théologisé » (p. 64) qui caractérise la conception malebranchienne de l'attention qui s'efforce de vider l'esprit de toute idée, afin de l'orienter vers Dieu. A un modelé de la vision oculaire (Descartes), s'oppose « la puissance évocatrice et l'inépuisabilité expressive de la métaphore » (p. 69) chez Malebranche. On aurait bien aimé que l'auteur, tout en identifiant la métaphore de l'idée qui « touche » l'âme, observe qu'il s'agit d'un modèle *tactile* qui sous-entend la présence de l'idée à l'esprit, d'autant plus opposé à Descartes que celui-ci s'était interdit l'usage d'une métaphore pour décrire le rapport de l'idée à la *mens*.

Eric Marqueur analyse le rapport entre la conscience et l'imagination chez Spinoza et Malebranche, afin de surprendre si « l'étude conjointe de la conscience et de l'imagination ne permet-elle de mieux comprendre l'existence de la conscience » (p. 74). Chez Spinoza, l'imagination est liée à un *conatus* (p. 79), tandis

que la conscience n'est pas un principe, mais un effet (p. 83). Par contre, chez Malebranche, la conscience (ou le *sentiment intérieur*) n'est pas une « connaissance » dans le sens fort du terme (parce que nous n'avons l'*idée* de notre âme), ce qui permettrait à l'oratorien de critiquer « la primat de la conscience « (p. 90).

Dàniel Schmal est préoccupé par « le rôle épistémologique des idées dans la théorie de la sensation » (p. 92) chez les deux auteurs. Si chez Malebranche il y a « une épistémologie nouvelle où la notion de représentation s'associe à la causalité » (p. 94), en revanche, chez Spinoza il n'y a pas une théorie complète de la représentation (faute d'analyse poussée de la sensation), ce qui fait que Spinoza ne traite jamais la dimension *intentionnelle* des idées, un aspect qui aurait permis de comprendre comment les idées « représentent » les choses. L'auteur risque l'hypothèse audacieuse (p. 98) d'un « cartésianisme » de la position de Spinoza et même d'un similitude entre la positions épistémologiques de Spinoza et d'Arnauld (p. 103, n.25), vu que chez ces deux auteurs la relation intentionnelle de l'idée à la chose semble être une notion ou relation « primitive » (p. 97 et p. 108), *i.e.* inexplicable, tandis que chez Malebranche, l'opposition *sensation-idée* introduit une dichotomie entre la dimension *intentionnelle* et celle *consciente* de la pensée (p. 108) et ouvre ainsi la voie à un concept original de la conscience.

Francesco Toto aborde la question de l'humilité chez Malebranche et Spinoza, revisitant premièrement les *Méditations pour se disposer à l'humilité et à la pénitence* afin de déceler les conséquences anthropologiques du dogme du péché originel et « l'ambiguïté » de l'amour de soi (p. 116, n. 19), ainsi que « l'oscillation » entre plusieurs types de relation entre le *Moi pécheur* et le *Moi humilié* (continuité ou rupture, évolution ou transformation, p. 118) ou « l'ambivalence » (p. 119) des concepts qui portent

des sens différents, en fonction du contexte. Quant à l'œuvre de Spinoza, l'auteur y découvre une « réhabilitation analogue à celle du plaisir « (p. 125) et une critique de l'humilité et de la pénitence qui, tout en étant cohérente avec la métaphysique spinoziste, ne laisse pas d'être la conséquence de l'amour propre (p. 135).

Raffaele Carbone a comme but, dans son article, d'établir un parallèle entre Malebranche et Spinoza quant à la question difficile de l'agencement politique des relations individuelles (p. 138). Partant du principe spinoziste d'*immitatio affectuum*, Carbone met en lumière l'évolution de la pensée politique de Spinoza, du *Traité théologico-politique* au *Traité politique* (en passant par l'*Ethique*) quant à la théorie du contrat social, que Spinoza rejette au nom des « racines passionnelles de la société » (p. 139). Malebranche, de son coté, partage avec Spinoza une certaine affinité lorsqu'il soutient que les hommes sont liés entre-eux par une affinité passionnelle, à savoir les liens tissus par l'imagination et par l'inclination naturelle à chercher l'union avec les semblables. Si les deux auteurs privilégient l'*immitatio affectuum* comme « principe explicatif des relations interindividuelles » (p. 149), l'accent en diffère, parce que chez Malebranche nous retrouvons aussi un appareil conceptuel théologique (finement analysé par Carbone aux pages 151-157) qui, à notre avis, n'est pas loin de rappeler celui déployé par Blaise Pascal (sur le rôle de l'imagination dans la dissimulation de la force et dans l'édification d'un « règlement admirable » qui imite la charité).

Dans la deuxième partie du livre, les auteurs s'intéressent à la « réception » multiforme de Malebranche et de Spinoza, esquissant le paysage d'un foisonnement de structures théoriques qui passent d'un système à l'autre et subissent des « torsions et des réécritures » (p. 245).

Antonella Del Prete utilise une image très bien choisie pour illustrer le rapprochement de Malebranche et

de Spinoza : celle d'un fleuve souterrain qui émerge de temps en temps mais qui innerve constamment les polémiques de l'époques (p. 161) et sert soit à dresser « une généalogie des erreurs » de Descartes à Spinoza (c'est la position des anti-cartésiens), soit à jouer le rôle d'une arme utilisée dans les disputes intra-cartésiennes. Ainsi, Noel Aubert de Versé intègre le premier groupe, auquel s'ajoute Arnauld et Pierre-Valentin Faydit dans leur critique de Malebranche, qui partagent tous la même intention : appliquer à Malebranche une critique initialement conçue contre Spinoza (p. 164). Antonella Del Prete suit un parcours inverse et détecte chez Pierre-Sylvain Régis une critique de Spinoza à l'aide des objections adressées initialement à Malebranche. Le point fort de son analyse consiste dans l'identification d'une position métaphysique chez Régis qui ne se contente pas d'épingler la conséquence de la *vision en Dieu* (à savoir la transformation de Dieu en un Dieu *corporel*) et d'embrasser la doctrine de la création des vérités éternelles (p. 170), mais qui revient à la thèse analogique de Thomas d'Aquin (identifie avec acuité par Antonella Del Prete), que Régis modifie en refusant la théorie de la participation (p. 176), après une « complexe opération d'appropriation et de refus de la philosophie de Spinoza » (p. 177).

Marine Picon utilise une approche génétique de l'œuvre leibnizienne, exploitant l'intuition d'André Robinet (selon laquelle Spinoza a joué un rôle dans la difficile relation entre Malebranche et Leibniz) afin de déceler la manière dont la réception de ces deux post-cartésiens a marqué la constitution de la noétique leibnizienne. Partant des premières lectures du philosophe allemand (la période parisienne de 1675-1676) qui montrent une métaphysique en train de se constituer et infléchie vers le scotisme (p.181) et une doctrine du savoir inspiré par Hobbes (p. 182), Marine Picon identifie une transformation majeure opérée chez Leibniz par rapport à

Malebranche : les idées divines, équivalentes chez Malebranche aux *perfections* divines, deviennent désormais identifiables aux *attributs* divins (p. 185). Quant à la querelle des idées entre Malebranche et Arnauld, Leibniz penche vers la position arnaldienne, tout en adoptant une conception non-intentionnelle de l'idée (p. 189).

Gianni Paganini passe en revue les « variations » (p. 197) subies par le malebranchisme dans les courants clandestins, notamment dans les philosophies de Challe et de Du Marsais. Il surprend la paradoxale transformation du malebranchisme en « ressort du rationalisme anti-chrétien » (p. 198), par la mise au point des instruments conceptuels qui permettent la construction d'une religion naturelle. L'auteur fait preuve d'une remarquable esprit de synthèse, passant en revue plusieurs thèmes malebranchistes qui, bien que soumises à une « dérive », marquent chez ces deux auteurs une certaine continuité avec la pensée de l'oratorien : l'idée de Dieu, la primauté de la sagesse en Dieu, l'univocité des idées et le refus de l'innéisme, le rôle éminent de la raison, le principe de la régularité et de la simplicité des voies. A part les thèmes qui démontrent l'acception (partielle et avec aménagements conceptuels) du malebranchisme, il y a des transformations qui témoignent du rejet pur et simple : le refus de la vison en Dieu, les doutes sur l'occasionalisme, l'abandon de la théodicée, la réhabilitation du plaisir. Pour paraphraser la belle formule de l'auteur, le destin du malebranchisme peut être décrit comme la conjonction entre l'*allègement métaphysique* et l'*épuration religieuse* (p. 204).

Laetitia Simonetta s'intéresse à la réception condillacienne de Malebranche et de Spinoza, qui, bien que négative, ne laisse pas de témoigner d'une reprise du principe de l'occasionalisme (p. 209), Condillac critiquant en même temps (d'un point de vue lockien et avec une certaine mauvaise foi) la distinction entre l'entendement et la volonté (p. 212). La thèse de Laetitia Simonetta est

que Condillac n'est pas si radicalement opposé à la position de Malebranche et de Spinoza sur « l'intrication de l'entendement et de la volonté » (p. 217), mais il réoriente le concept de l'attention, faisant dépendre celle-ci non pas de l'*idée*, mais des *plaisirs* et des *peines* provoqués par les sensations. L'article montre que, selon la perspective condillacienne, l'entendement et la volonté sont inséparables du point de vue de leur genèse, mais distincts du point de vue de leurs opérations.

Sophie Bergont déplace la discussion sur l'occasionalisme malebranchiste dans les « pays des fées », pour reprendre l'expression ironique de Hume, pour qui le système des causes occasionnelles n'entretient aucun rapport à l'expérience courante (p. 217), étant uniquement l'expression de l'ignorance humaine quant aux causes naturelles. Sophie Bergont détecte dans la section 7 de l'*Enquête sur l'entendement humain* une critique généalogique de la formation de l'occasionalisme, qui, aussi surprenant que cela puisse paraître, s'enracinerait « dans la crainte et dans le paganisme (pp. 230 et 234). Le lecteur appréciera l'analyse poussée de Sophie Bergont, qui décèle dans les textes humiens où Malebranche est critiqué l'esquisse d'une histoire « naturelle » de la religion, vue comme la preuve de l'illisibilité de la causalité du point de vue de l'expérience ordinaire (p. 235). Entre la « réception » et « l'usage » (p. 236), le rapport de Hume à l'oratorien s'avère plus complexe qu'il ne parait au premier abord.

On pourrait dire, en fin de compte, que ce livre continue avec succès la direction ouverte par un autre, le précédant de peu, en 2014, (*Les Malebranchismes des Lumières. Études sur les réceptions contrastées de la philosophie de Malebranche, fin XVII^e^ et XVIII^e^ siècles, études réunies par Delphine Antoine-Mahut,* Paris : Honoré Champion) et ouvre de nouvelles pistes de recherche sur l'éclatement du malebranchisme comme

système, ainsi que sur la surprenante réception de Malebranche et de Spinoza chez les contemporains et les successeurs. Une direction prometteuse et fertile pour les chercheurs intéressés tant par le Grand Siècle que par le siècle des Lumières et ses racines philosophiques.

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Book Reviews

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The Unconscious in Contemporary Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis

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Cristi Bodea, *Hiatus. Problema fenomenologică a inconștientului*, Eikon Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2018, 288 pp.

Keywords: unconscious, subjectivity, language, mental illness, symptom, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan, Marc Richir

Cristi Bodea's book entitled *Hiatus. Problema fenomenologică a inconștientului* (*Hiatus. The Phenomenological Problem of the Unconscious*), which stands as the edited version of the author's PhD dissertation, defended at the Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, under the supervision of Professor Virgil Ciomoș, focuses on the relationship between Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytical approach and Marc Richir's phenomenology, pursuing the articulations of the theme of the unconscious in both theories.

In the phenomenological attempt of exhaustively conquering subjectivity as the ultimate source of meaning, the problem of the unconscious stands as a recent milestone, for it unveils an additional layer of subjectivity which seems to complete the scheme envisioned by an entire phenomenological tradition. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, was the one to discover, and, thereafter, to bring into discussion the unconscious as the core structure of subjectivity. Consequently, the inquiries of both contemporary phenomenology and

psychoanalysis differ from the type of knowledge aimed at by continental and analytical philosophy. Both Lacan's revised version of psychoanalytical theory and Richir's *non-standard* or non-symbolic phenomenology dismiss any type of epistemological inquiry for which knowledge and science are the main goals of every intellectual enterprise, by positing a type of knowledge closer to the meaning of the French *savoir*, which can no longer be designated as „justified true belief" and which cannot be grounded in the same way as in the case of scientific knowledge. According to Lacan's psychoanalytic theory, this *savoir* represents the type of (self)knowledge which can be gained by the subject throughout her/his own analysis. As a very personal type of knowledge, this *savoir* cannot be shared with the others within a scientific enterprise, yet it can be used by someone in the position of psychoanalyst. On the other hand, in Marc Richir's view, the goal of the phenomenological endeavor is a sort of artistic experience which could produce in the embodied subject some knowledge about the phenomenality of the world(s) and of herself /himself. In a thorough comparative analysis of the methods proposed by Jacques Lacan and Marc Richir, two of the most relevant representatives of contemporary psychoanalysis and phenomenology, Cristi Bodea reveals the conceptual difference between *savoir* and *connaître*, i.e., between knowing something by a personal experience and knowing something only by theoretical inquiry, thus succeeding to convincingly argue that both the psychoanalyst and the phenomenologist are rather practitioners than theoreticians. Moreover, Cristi Bodea's book gives proof that both of these methods are rather poetic than scientific and that they cover other „objects" of study than the ones envisaged by the mainstream philosophical tradition.

Despite their slight differences, the two methods also resemble, if examined from the perspective of the notion of the unconscious. In order to offer an account of these fine similarities, Cristi Bodea leads the reader towards the issue of the divided subject, i.e., of the subject *of* the unconscious. As the central point of this book, the unconscious is described in relation to the constitution and becoming of the human agent. The individual is seized not merely as a rational being, but

rather as subject *of* the unconscious. What we find interesting and very well highlighted in the book is that both Lacan and Richir have realized that the human being is not at all a *natural* being. In Richir's words, the human being does not ultimately have any nature, yet it is capable of symbolic institutions, meaning that it can appear as human to the others and that it can live within a culture understood in the anthropological sense. A similar idea, that of a human being affected in such a way by language that it loses any sort of *naturalité* and suffers a process of individuation is to be found before, in Lacan's writings. For it is fundamentally *divided* and affected by the unconscious, by the language and by its own symptom, thus being symbolically *instituted*, the Lacanian *instituted* psychoanalytical human subject cannot at all be related either to the transcendental ego of the Husserlian phenomenology or to the Cartesian modern ego. Yet, it finds an echo in Marc Richir's concept of symbolic institution of the individual as *human* subject, which due to this type of symbolic institution can live a life together with its peers. A memorable accomplishment of this comparative analysis of the human's symbolical individuation in both psychoanalytical and phenomenological traditions is to be found in the author's analysis of Lacan's famous *mirror stage* from a phenomenological perspective.

If both in Husserlian phenomenology and in philosophical epistemology, experience means constituting or making sense of something, in the case of the *instituted* subject from Lacanian psychoanalysis and from Richirian phenomenology, experience means rather to witness something. For Richir, this kind of experience of the *instituted* subject implies that outside or beyond the transcendental subjectivity there must be a multitude of senses or meanings in their making (*sens se faisant*). Yet, these meanings are neither intentional, nor constituted by the transcendental ego; they are rather experienced by the subject as something which is apart form it, is autonomous and which has its own *ipse*. Cristi Bodea explains how the Richirian concept of meanings in their making (*sens se faisant*) correspond to the Lacanian notion of signifiers,

which stand as singularities, and which are foreclosed in the case of psychosis.

The discussion of the issue of the instituted sense or meaning opens up Cristi Bodea's book and is developed throughout the second chapter by an analysis of Richir's non-symbolical phenomenology method. Then, by using a comparative approach, the third chapter of the book heralds the relationship between this Richirian phenomenology with psychoanalysis, whereas the fourth chapter raises the problem of the instituted subject in both phenomenological and psychoanalytical theories. If, before the publication of this book, the common point between psychoanalysis and phenomenology was thought to be the notion of the subject or, rather subjectivity, Cristi Bodea's book offers a new perspective upon the main passage between phenomenology and psychoanalysis. By analyzing, along the last two chapters of his book, the symbolical and the phenomenological meanings of the unconscious, the author succeeds to demonstrate that the unconscious encompasses the issue of the subject, of the meaning and of language. An unanticipated resemblance between the architectonics of Richir non-symbolical phenomenology resembles the one of Lacan's psychoanalysis is strongly proven by the Cristi Bodea's demonstration throughout his book. First of all, as Cristi Bodea well emphasizes, the concept of *symptom,* which is critical to Lacanian theory finds a correspondent in the fundamental difference, or in the *hiatus* placed by richirian philosophy between the phenomenological realm and the symbolical one. In Richir' s view, the annulment of this hiatus is able to explain mental pathologies, for this hiatus gives the human subject the necessary freedom for not being trapped in a single one of these realms. Richir's concept of *phenomenon as phenomenon* is equivalent, according to Cristi Bodea, to the Lacanian concept of the real. Moreover, the subject experiences it in the cases of psychosis, yet it does in a negative way. Secondly, human experience expends way beyond the limits of knowledge, as every human subject is affected both by the symbolical and the phenomenological realm and, *moreover,* by both the symbolical unconscious and the phenomenological unconscious. If the symbolical unconscious relates to the psychoanalytical

unconscious and stands at the basis of any symbolical institution, thus making it function, the phenomenological unconscious corresponding to Lacan's real unconscious, represents a savage part of human experience, occurring under different forms in myths, art or, rarely, even in philosophy.

What Cristi Bodea's book brings forth is a new interpretation of mental illness, from a twofold perspective: that of Jacques Lacan's phychoanalytical theory and that of Marc Richir's phenomenology. Thus, mental illness can be conceived, both psychoanalytically and phenomenologically, by using the same categories describing what is considered to be the „normal" experience of the subject. Described as such, mental illness is, ultimately, nothing but an extreme version of the normal experience of the human subject. This new perspective allows a more inclusive, fair and humane perspective upon the way contemporary society deals with mentally ill subjects.

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Luce Irigaray's Project for a New Human Being

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Luce Irigaray, *To Be Born: Genesis of a New Human Being*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 106 pp.

Keywords: Luce Irigaray, Martin Heidegger, phenomenology, inautentic existence, alienation, life, desire, a new educational model

Luce Irigaray's *To Be Born: Genesis of a New Human Being* aligns with the author's previous works and demonstrates the importance of life processes in relation to our human becoming. The world that, in particular, the Western European culture has built over time, departs from some patterns that should remain fundamental to humans. The author's thesis states that we often compare ourselves with God or with animals and forget those structures that give meaning to the life itself. The consequence of this way of representing life is that "the world that we have built deprives us of our real potential" (p. 94). Furthermore, in a sense taken from Heidegger's work, we are captive in an inauthentic existence in which we don't have any beacons to guide us. Life itself is in danger, says Irigaray, and the causes that send us to this threatening kind of being are also inspired by the Heideggerian works. First of all, our "onto-theological tradition - have substituted a celestial genealogy for natural roots" (p. 93).

This implies that our origin has a transcendent principle and not the fact that we were born after a simple relationship between two different human parts. At the same time, this tradition that Irigaray recalls may also be accused of having a

model of education that always takes into account the ways in which things should be, not as they are in reality. This framework limits the meanings of the complex aspect of life. The criticism of this metaphysical model has the consequence that we are now into a new philosophical period: "Criticizing and abandoning the supersensitive values, thanks to which humanity kept its becoming on hold, forces us to discover another setting or frame starting from which we can achieve our destiny" (p. 85).

The post-metaphysical epoch places us, as Heidegger intuited, in an era in which technology dominates us in an overwhelming way. Irigaray's opinion is that we must not let ourselves trapped in the mirage produced by the technical-scientific structure of the world. It aims to plan human life and behaviors, which also leads to various forms of alienation. In a general manner, "our religious, cultural and political ideals are unable either to secure the safety of humanity or to offer it a plan for constructing a future which corresponds to our current necessities" (p. 99).

Irigaray emphasizes in her book the proposal which reflects the construction of a new world based on foundations taken from the relationship of desire and love between us. This project is built like a journey: from the birth of a person to the point of which it comes to give birth to others. The sixteen chapters of the book are short descriptions of how education should be done according to this new approach.

In Prologue, Lucy Irigaray states that the way we come to investigate our origin is one that does not allow us to live in ourselves and also in the world. We have built through our cultural tradition, forms of thought that depart us from our true origin: a birth resulting from the union of two. In Irigaray's words: "We try to attribute to ourselves an origin by assigning an origin, a being, to everything and everyone that we approach, at a material or a spiritual level. But we do not correspond in this way to our human lot, a lot that requires us to be ecstatic in relation to our origin and our environment" (p. ix). All these ideas have to be changed with simple actions that can propose, as a search for our origin, dreams, desires, and also care for others. Leaving behind any ideal of superhuman, we must go

beyond the classical concepts of the man with the help of two actions: by cultivating our breathing and also by assuming our sexuate belonging. In that manner, we can get a real image of what life and the processes of becoming means, beyond the nostalgia of the origins.

In chapter 1, Irigaray states that we wanted our own birth, being those who decided its time. If the most developed idea of our origins is that we have been given life when God breathed on us, Irigaray believes that the will to exist, manifested by our first breath, demonstrates that it is natural and uninfluenced by external interventions. It is a truth that "such a will to live at first acts naturally, independently of the intervention of our consciousness. Unfortunately our education does not teach us how to cultivate it at a conscious level" (p. 2). Also, the way we are educated limits our sexuality. The gender aspect is that which questions the finitude of ours, not in a metaphysical way linked to death, but by a mere limitation due to our nature. Any of us represents only half of what humanity expresses in the world.

Hegel himself admits in *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* or in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, "that he has underestimated the importance of the genus in the dialectical process going from nature to spirit" (p. 4). Consequently, Irigaray considers these two processes to be defining and argues that they should be highlighted more in our educational training which fails to consider the child as a whole. These processes facilitate the transition from nature to culture, from singularity to universality.

In chapter 2, Irigaray points out the risk that the newborn encounters when it comes to the world, a risk grounded in the basic needs: oxygen, food, light. That is why adults consider the newborn as completely dependent on them, forgetting that also there are certain processes of life itself, upon which they have no effect. The child always moves between empirical needs and a series of transcendental aspects. That is why it is necessary "to elaborate and to construct a place which takes into account its natural potentialities and permits it to cultivate them towards a human blooming which corresponds to them" (p. 10). It is important not to miss the fact that for this newborn the body is a place that makes knowledge possible.

Through sensations and experiences, the child begins to define his subjectivity and build his own world. Unfortunately, "a lack of cultivation of our physical properties (...), has gradually led to an exhaustion of our vitality and results today in a quite anarchical re-emergence of our natural belonging, of which we know almost nothing" (p. 11). That's why education needs to interfere and eliminate this issue.

In chapter 3, Irigaray mentions that the aspects of transcendence, such as growth or movement, in the newborn are the vital ones. That does not depend in any way on the cultural acquisition, because these vital aspects are always present. Also, through the growth and development of the locomotor system, the exploration of the world is facilitated. In contravention of these natural elements, cultural aspects automate the child by teaching him always what to do. That's why "the human being becomes a kind of manufactured product, whose accomplishment will be subjected to an idea – an *eidos* – of the human element which results from a culture instead of being a flowering of its natural belonging, notably into a fleshly face" (p. 16).

In chapter 4, Irigaray develops the aspect of the human need to explore the world. This is done first by moving the hands, and then by bringing objects to the mouth to be perceived. This desire to discover the world is facilitated thus by the emergence of the biped position which helps overcoming any limits. However, adult intervention is often harmful because they stop the child from getting things, from going to some places to avoid falling or burning. That's why the natural environment has largely come to be replaced by a built environment "and it is regrettable that the environment in which the child carries on investigating is more and more made up of fabricated objects and not of living beings" (p. 21).

In chapters 5, 6 and 7, Irigaray begins to develop the problem of the loss in the world, affirming that this process of alienation can be solved by returning to itself. The thesis in this chapters is that we cannot live in the world without living in ourselves. The consequence of such a position is not narcissism, because once again in a vision taken from *Being and Time*, Irigaray says that "the world into which we are thrown or abandoned is an impersonal one, in which we get lost in a being-

with which does not consider the authentic or real being of the elements which constitute it" (p. 27). This return to oneself, and especially to life-related issues, is the one that can facilitate the departure of this impersonal empire and lead us to the development of authentic forms of interrelation. Sometimes the state of inauthenticity can be obtained, in the middle of the family: "they gain in comfort and relief from anguish or fear, humans in this way lose some intimacy with themselves and a perception of what might help them to be" (p. 35). All these models make people to "become a kind of fabricated product, the functioning of which is ruled by supersensitive patterns and ideals extraneous to their real being and which are impracticable by them (p. 38). There the following question arises: How can we become ourselves? Irigaray believes that by taking into account the transcendental potential of the child and his desires that send to powerful forms of affective energy. To become oneself entails moving away from everything that culture and the environment give us, by all the means through which people come to be considered identical and defined by a unique nature. It means positive capitalization of differences and the introduction of some forms of respect for those who are different from us.

Chapter 8 and 9 bring attention to the problem of language. Irigaray believes that language has developed a whole parallel universe that allows us to bring to life everything that lives without regard to life itself. It is also forgotten that language is produced through our body, and those forms that allow our bodies to communicate such as the sounds of a child are removed. It seems that language has become autonomous and externally being distant from us: speech has been assimilated to a tool that is useful for us to know the world, to dominate it, to construct it, without us caring enough about its contribution to our own shaping and our becoming (p. 47). Also, the middle voice that model which facilitates relationship and communication with others has no longer exist.

In chapter 10 and also in chapter 11, Irigaray states that all these arguments are sufficient to prove that the educational model built on these foundations is no longer satisfactory. They rely too much on the description of the world in an ideal way that

does not permit becoming and eliminates life, reducing everything to the stage of the object. The emphasis should be on what really exists, on the stages that describe becoming, and not on the products that the human mind has developed. It's really a danger that "the body, the affects, the emotions or feelings are invited to remain outside of the public space of the school" (p. 59), and also the fact that are no areas in education that offer children truly satisfying models of thinking and making projections about themselves.

The proper manner in which these models are to be removed must not reflect a negative criticism, condeming and destroying everything that already exists: "on the contrary, we have to acknowledge what has been, and be capable of giving thanks for what we received. Gratitude releases us from resentment and frees our energy to construct bridges towards the future and to become ourselves, bridges in order that a new humanity can occur" (p. 64). That's why Irigaray proposes a new model that does not rely on existing patterns that would give us the world through the eyes and the brains of the antecedents. It emphasizes the results of our own experiences with the world and everything surrounding us, with the emphasis on living elements.

This own model is developed in chapters 12-16. In Irigaray's words: "The meaning that we must consider and cultivate in our epoch is first that of life itself" and is based on criteria such as desire, amorous desire, love (which puts together physical emotion and spiritual emotion). This model is an alternative to aspects of social issues in the contemporary world. In the author's view, the means that keep the differences between people through the boundaries of our sexualized, culturalized, and racialized incarnation can be eliminated by rebuilding the world based on forms of desire and love among us. Thus, Irigaray is firmly convinced that by developing this model we can improve our lives "and to let the human face blossom from desire and love, especially those inspired by life, ends by changing the face of the world in which we live so that it becomes a place in which living beings can dwell and coexist" (p. 92).

This book has the merit of bringing to our attention a well-structured and well-grounded perspective on some of the essential aspects of what the human is, especially today when we

are going through a period where inhuman issues are becoming more and more numerous. Although Irigaray is confident in her own ideas, also based on her previous studies, the book *To Be Born: Genesis of a New Human Being* doesn't offer any real conclusion. This study remains at the stage of proposing some possible alternatives to phenomena such as dehumanization, alienation, and to the possibility to get lost in a universe of inauthentic life based on prefabricated truths and the tendency to humiliate by maintaining people captive in a consuming universe.

Analyzed from a philosophical point of view, this alternative fails to illustrate how safe can be an approach, which seeks to focus only on life and everything that it permits to take place. The removal of the moral rules from this vision, which pleads for a return to nature, may be a far too expensive price to pay. Nothing guarantees that a human being lacking in morality can go beyond the simple bestial stage. It is possible that the social pressure that exists is intended to lead life further, even if it does not allow to express its full capacity.

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From Heidegger and Hermes the Trickster to A.I. and a God Even Nietzsche Could Love

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John D. Caputo, *Hermeneutics. Facts and Interpretation in the Age of Information*, Penguin Books, 2018, (Kindle Edition), 345 pp.

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Hermeneutics. Facts and Interpretation in the Age of Information, signed by John D. Caputo, is a complex, yet accessible introduction in the field of contemporary hermeneutics. As the title suggests, the book seeks to clarify the role this line of thinking plays nowadays, "in the age of information", when one can no longer ignore or fight against the technological advancements that bring about "a sea change in everything we do" (p. 20) and that sometimes outdistance many individuals, including (if not especially) philosophers. But before tackling this major challenge, the American author dedicates more than two hundred pages to painting a picture of hermeneutics in the 20th century.

It becomes obvious right from the introduction that the book is not intended only for a specialized reader: the text starts with basic observations concerning the distinction between facts and interpretations, followed by a neat display of what hermeneutics aims at, in a precautious, yet spirited series of FAQs. One may dare comment that such expositions of the standpoint of philosophical (radical) hermeneutics are

much needed, since dictionaries still reduce the term to definitions such as "the science of searching for hidden meaning in texts" (Thesaurus); "the branch of knowledge that deals with interpretation, especially of the Bible or literary texts" (Oxford); or even "a method or principle of interpretation", exemplified by "a philosophical hermeneutic" (Merriam-Webster). In contrast, Caputo points out how a proper description of objectivity and a reasonable acceptance of the interpretational character of all understanding contribute to avoiding both dogmatism and relativism, which is translatable into our contingent world as follows: "Hermeneutics provides our best protection against the threat of tyranny, totalitarianism and terror in politics, and of dogmatism and authoritarianism in ethics and religion." (p. 11) This bold assertion seems to sum up the motivation behind this book.

The author is, of course, referring to *radical* hermeneutics, which focuses mainly on *deconstruction*, on dissent, in the sense that it intends "to point out alternative explanations, to bring up anomalies, to question received interpretations, to suspect unquestioned assumptions." (p. 10) Nevertheless, the line between a moderate hermeneutic approach and deconstruction is very thin and flexible: philosophers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer – the epitome of cautious hermeneutics – often practise deconstruction; at the same time, writers such as Jacques Derrida – the champion of deconstruction – do, in fact, have a hermeneutic perspective, no matter how much they might struggle to avoid the word in their texts, convinced that their "exorbitant method" surpasses hermeneutics.

This is not to the disadvantage of either side. On the contrary. In Caputo's words: "Without deconstruction, hermeneutics risks being naïve; without hermeneutics, deconstruction risks running off the rails." (p. 10) Even if "a view from the margins" may prove to be more productive and closer to a democratic outlook, mainstream interpretations play their role.

The American philosopher beautifully portrays the two faces of Hermes, which never show up apart from each other: "Hermes the Straight Man, favoured by the mainstream, the

theologians, the more tradition-bound" and "Hermes the Trickster, favoured by the marginal, the outliers. […] The view from the centre and the eccentric view." (p. 16) Although the trouble-maker is preferred in a radical approach, both voices of the ancient gods' messenger need to be listened to: "I do not want to abolish the pious Hermes. I am not trying to abolish interpretations (it's the absolutizers who abolish) but to multiply them. I affirm throughout the two faces of Hermes, both traditional interpreter and interloper, both messenger and trickster, both courier and corruptor, both god of caution and god of risk-taking. The two interpretations of interpretation are deeply intertwined, the way hermeneutics and deconstruction are intertwined." (p. 16)

Deconstruction is, in fact, derived from classical hermeneutics: "When Derrida coined the word *déconstruction*, a word which would really have legs in contemporary theory, this was a gloss on Heidegger, who was glossing Luther, who was himself glossing St. Paul (1 Cor. 1: 19), who was citing Isaiah, who had the Lord say, 'I will destroy (apollo) the wisdom of the wise.'" (Caputo 2018, 54) Grasping it properly requires an overview of the broader context in which it was born. Caputo, therefore, starts with a discerning presentation of the most relevant works of Martin Heidegger, who pinpointed that "[i]nterpretation is not an isolated act, one thing among many that we do; it is what we are, the pivot, the crux of our being." (p. 31)

Besides being the one with whom "contemporary or postmodern hermeneutics" began, the work of Heidegger also represents a hermeneutic challenge, not only due to his intricate language and complex thinking, but also because of his biography. There are two main aspects regarding the German philosopher that Caputo treats astutely. On the one hand, he reflects upon how the Heideggerian legacy should be perceived in light of his involvement with the German national-socialist movement, which became the subject of more and more heated debate beginning with the 1980s. On the other hand, he provides a critical insight regarding Heidegger's own re-interpretation of his early work – i.e. *Being and Time* – in his

later texts, such as *On the Way to Language* or *Letter on Humanism*.

With regards to the controversies concerning the German philosopher's biography, Caputo does not dismiss the accusations, nor does he deem them as grounds to rejecting the former's thinking. First, given the impact Heidegger had on 20th century both European and American philosophy, looking for a way around his work may prove fruitless, if not impossible. Hermeneutics itself took its ontological turn with Heidegger; avoiding his writings would only lead to an impoverished understanding of this field. Although one needs to keep in mind, while reading Heidegger, the philosopher's belief in "the spiritual kinship of the Germans with the ancient Greeks" and his conviction that "genuine and deep thinking could be conducted only by pondering ancient Greek and speaking modern German, which authorized the German nation to lead the world" (p. 28), "relocating his books from the philosophy section of the library to that of the history of National Socialism" (p. 29), as some suggested, would be a mistake.

Momentarily leaving this matter aside, Caputo goes on with a recap of the main aspects one needs to learn from Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity and the ontology of Dasein. Understanding that interpretation is a world-making and that we dwell in this thus conceived world is the bread and butter of contemporary hermeneutics. Assuming the hermeneutical circle is the most secure way in which one can begin questioning one's own presuppositions, not with the purpose of "*freeing* ourselves" of all assumptions, but in order to *renew* them, to project new understandings by "*revitalizing* our deepest resources." (p. 37) Authentic questioning is not driven by specific objectives, but by "the call of existential conscience", stirred by a pre-understanding of Dasein's outmost possibility – death. It is a call to striving towards authenticity.

After the mid-1930s, the accent in Heidegger's work moves from Dasein to Being. Caputo phrases the complex changes in the German philosopher's thinking as follows: "Dasein's projective understanding of Being is rethought as Dasein's standing-under Being's own advance, and Dasein's authenticity, being-its-own-self, now looks more like being-

owned by Being, and its being-in-the-world is being-in the historical world that Being sends its way." (p. 69) It is from this perspective that his critique of how his own work had been perceived ensues. Caputo argues that the *Letter on Humanism* is not a "philologically faithful account of the 1927 text", but "a hermeneutic reinterpretation or 'retrieval' (*Wiederholung*) of nearly all the major terms in *Being and Time*" (p. 81). These reinterpretations are marked by the "sending of Being" the German philosopher chooses to focus on.

This also has an impact on the way in which he conceives hermeneutics, on which he rather gives up after *the turn*. Even the hermeneutic circle is renamed as a "movement back and forth between language 'itself' speaking to us and humans speaking in response" (p. 80). By requesting his readers not to interpret the "'as' as a function of how human beings project but as the way that Being is given" (p. 81), the late Heidegger chooses Hermes the messenger over Hermes the prankster.

But the "sending of Being" is – for Caputo – "what most other people would call the tides of history". Here is where one needs to be reminded of the author's biographical circumstances and the assumptions related to them: "The call of Being turned out to be a pretty particular interpretation, namely, Martin's own highly tendentious rendering of the history of the West, as if there were just one thing that could be named that simply." (p. 82) This history mainly included the Greeks and the German poets and philosophers, as interpreted by Heidegger within his peculiar version of National Socialism. The need to *demythologize* the concept of the sending of Being suggests that the call of Being – a call for hermeneutic discernment – is itself in need of interpretation. This "It brings out a deeper structure of hermeneutics as the hermeneutics of the call, or […] the *interpretive imperative*." (p. 84, my emphasis)

The hermeneutic challenge posed by Heidegger is perhaps the most controversial among the perspectives introduced in this book, which is why Caputo's approach has been presented here extensively. But exhibiting any insight concerning this line of thinking implies itself practising hermeneutics, which means listening to what the other has to

say (in this case Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida, Vattimo or Rorty), while being aware of the context (including the author's biography) and of the fact that what is spoken is spoken to me. The American philosopher shows this chiefly when discussing Derrida, the main source of his own radical hermeneutics.

Jacques Derrida himself avoids using the word "hermeneutics" because he "rashly" consigned it to a traditional sense, "treating it as a kind of code-breaker, a method of finding the one true meaning of a text." (p. 117) Nevertheless, he was very much aware of the fact that there are two sides to interpretation, both equally important, inasmuch as the one he favoured – the marginal, daring, exorbitant side – was not possible without the other – the faithful, reproductive side. The French philosopher experienced this as a teacher at ENS, where he was supposed to help his students prove an accurate understanding of a text along with originality. His "solution was to press the students to undertake a reading that would be a punishingly meticulous reconstruction of the original […], but so close, so micrological, as to expose the hidden presuppositions in the text, which would in turn expose a conflict." (p. 118) A close reading was meant to reveal that the text is "divided against itself", opening the way for an original interpretation that started from such contradictions.

The two types of interpretation are an answer to the interpretive imperative and "imply a deeper responsibility by which both are subjected to a deeper call." (p. 134) It is an inescapable call, which "lays claim to us, so relentlessly as to constitute the very thing, if there is such a thing, that makes us who we are we, who do not know who we are, we who are defined by this very unknowing and by this very question." (p. 141)

The interpretive imperative is manifest especially in the face of the impossible. Caputo exemplifies this with the help of a lecture about justice, held by Derrida at a Law School in the United States. The deconstructionist surprisingly announces early in his speech that justice is undeconstructible. The affirmation was soon enough clarified: justice does not exist, therefore, it cannot be deconstructed. "Justice is a hermeneutic call for action, not a Categorical Imperative but a softer sigh, a gentler lilt, like the quiet whisper of 'perhaps'." (p. 194) In

opposition to the real force of law – which may very well be deconstructed –, there is only "the spectre of a justice to come". In this sense, "hermeneutics is always and necessarily *hauntological*, and never ontological." (p. 196, my emphasis) It is a practice made possible by the impossible. "What gives interpretation a cutting edge, the thing that triggers hermeneutical intervention, is the undeconstructible, which is the impossible." (p. 198)

A hermeneutic approach is the answer to the interpretive imperative, to the call for action that arises in the face of the impossible, in situations which cannot be calculated, when the outcome cannot be predicted. Interpretation occurs "between the calculable and the incalculable". To interpret "means to negotiate the price (*inter* + *pretium*) between the two, but without the benefit of an algorithm that would guide us." (p. 215) This is the thesis Caputo tests in relation to concrete situations such as the practice of the law or nursing – a field within which many practitioners have already turned their attention to the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer.

The last three chapters of *Hermeneutics. Facts and Interpretation in the Age of Information* explore the issue of post-humanism on the background built in the previous sections. One of the first remarks Caputo makes in this respect is that the "old debate between materialism and idealism is obsolete. We are in fact neither a machine nor a ghost-in-a-machine, neither a pure spirit nor a clunky set of gears but a *tertium quid*, a third thing that no one ever thought of before – bits of information. Complex, delicately tuned biotechnological information – processing systems. Cyborgs" (p. 249). Instead of feeling threatened by the uprise of virtual reality and artificial intelligence, one should become aware that these are continuations of "the most ancient system of virtual reality we have devised", which is language itself (p. 251). A "disembodied version" of human intelligence "interpreted as a complex formal system transferable to other material substrates", comparable to AI, sees the body not even as an external container of a spirit, but as a "replaceable substrate of a formal system". However, without intending to formulate a definition of "humanism", Caputo emphasizes that even

communication is always "embedded and embodied in the material medium", which "saturates the message". It is never disincarnated. A materialist and biological account of human intelligence is, therefore, more plausible. Such a version recognizes "how much of being-human is non-formalizable and non-programmable", and it is here that hermeneutics finds its place.

The conclusion that conceiving human intelligence as embodied implies the "non-formalizable and non-programmable" aspects of being human may seem to be a leap, serving the old human hubris so neatly avoided so far in the book. Nonetheless, inasmuch as formalizing or programming all aspects of human behaviour (including the way history is to unfold) does not appear conceivable, the assertion is useful and insightful, especially with regard to the scope of hermeneutics.

Before concluding the book, Caputo remains faithful to his original interest in "the state of religion in the postmodern world" (p. 275) and suggests a deconstruction of the "modernist divide between religious and secular" (p. 279). In such a context, neither theism, nor atheism, not even agnosticism stand up. The American philosopher finds an approach to religion that is appropriate to current times in the works of Paul Tillich, who lays the background for what he calls "the post-religious". Tillich replaces the idea of God as "a Superbeing" with that of "the 'ground of being', the deepest source and foundation of all beings." (p. 291) The Christian existentialist argues that genuine religion "is a matter of ultimate concern, of being seized by something of ultimate or unconditional worth", thus cutting through "the binary opposition of the religious and the secular" (p. 293). Just like the undeconstructible justice Derrida was talking about, the unconditional does not exist, but which receives symbolic expression in particular circumstances. "[T]he challenge is to feel about for – to interpret – the unconditional that is being symbolically expressed in the concrete conditions under which it presents itself, and not to confuse the two." (p. 296) With such an approach, Caputo believes, one gains "a new vitality, a new spiritedness that preserves the lightness of life, the undecidability of a fluctuating experience." (p. 300) It preserves

"the endless questionability of lives, which means the endless interpretability of our lives." (p. 307) The name of God would be "the name of everything that is *possible*, up to and including the impossible" – a God even Nietzsche would love.

Even for a reader who is not keen on theological matters, this last chapter and the conclusion of the book constitute at least a great example of how radical hermeneutics work. All in all, Caputo manages to illustrate the role of hermeneutics in quite diverse manners: from the exercise of understanding Heidegger, Gadamer or Derrida, to seeing it at work within concrete contexts, such as the judicial system or within medical care; from making sense of how one is to perceive the rapid technological changes that took over our lives, to offering a reasonable account of religion still possible nowadays.

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